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SYSTEMS OF BUDDHISTIC THOUGHT

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UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA
No. 218
Ambedkar
REGISTRAR'S OFFICE.

PUBLISHED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA
1912

CENTRAL ARCHAEOLOGICAL
LIBRARY, NEW DELHI.

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Printed by Atulchandra Bhattacharyya,

AT THE

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY PRESS,

Senate House, Calcutta.

PREFACE.

In the autumn of the year 1906, when I was leaving the shores of Japan, as a Post-Graduate Research Scholar of the Sôtô-shiû Daigak of Tôkiô, with the object of studying Sanskrit and Pâli in the land of Buddha's birth, I came across a fellow-passenger, a kind-hearted American gentleman, who, on learning that I was a Buddhist priest, enquired of me in a half-curious, half-condescending manner, what Buddhism really meant. I fully understood the import of the question, and, though my heart was over-flowing with eagerness to explain to my interlocutor the doctrines of the religion in which I had been brought up, I discovered, to my very great regret, that my defective knowledge of the English language proved an unsurmountable barrier to the accomplishment of my pious purpose. A few words of broken English came to my lips and melted there. But my fellow-passenger was inexorable; he was determined to have an answer. Being at a loss to satisfy his laudable curiosity, I went down to my cabin and brought up Hepburn's English-Japanese Dictionary and a brand-new copy of Dr. Brewer's Dictionary of Phrase and Fable, the parting gift of a benevolent friend and fellow-countryman. The English-Japanese Dictionary was unfortunately of little or no use; but Brewer's work appeared for the time being to relieve me of my helplessness. Without hesitating for a single moment, I turned over the leaves of Brewer's book until I came to the article on Buddhism, and showed it to my trans-Atlantic companion who read it with apparent pleasure, thanked me for the information thus supplied, and departed in good humour. When he had gone out of sight, I retired to my cabin and attempted the then somewhat heroic feat of interpreting to myself, with the help of Hepburn's Dictionary, the account given of Buddhism by the venerable Brewer; and distressing indeed was my surprise when I had made the passage intelligible to myself. Most of you, who are no doubt more familiar with Brewer's Dictionary of Phrase and Fable than I can claim to be, will recollect how even in the revised, corrected and enlarged edition

of that work published in 1900, the article on Buddhism reads. "Buddhism," says Brewer on p. 184 of that book, "is a system of religion established in India in the *third* (!) century. The general outline of the system is that the world is a transient reflex of *deity* (!), that the *soul* is a 'vital spark' (!) of deity, and that after death it will be bound to matter again till the 'wearer' has, by divine contemplation, been so purged and purified that it is fit to be *absorbed into the divine essence* (!)". "Surely," said I to myself after perusing Brewer's statements, "there must be some error somewhere; for the Buddhism which I have practised and studied from my earliest youth believes in neither *deity* nor its '*spark*,' and is something quite different". And the necessity of exposing the erroneous notions prevalent in occidental countries about Buddhism—the enormity of which might be measured by the fact of their having misled even the octogenarian encyclopædic Brewer—urged itself upon me more strongly than ever. At that very time I made a solemn resolve that, should I be spared to acquire a sufficient command over English and Sanskrit, it would be my first care to explain to the inhabitants of the country which gave us our religion, what Buddhism really is and what it is not. Such an opportunity, however, seemed never to be coming, until, to my great surprise, I was informed one day that the large-hearted and erudite Vice-Chancellor* and the learned Syndicate had appointed me Reader on Buddhism to the University of Calcutta. And great indeed is the thankfulness and delight with which I embrace this opportunity which promises an early fulfilment of my long-cherished hope of expounding to the countrymen of Buddha the real essence of the faith which he preached, recovered from the numerous, though fragmentary, accounts enshrined in the Sanskrit canon, which, though lost in the original, is still accessible to scholars in Chinese and Tibetan versions, faithfully executed through centuries of indefatigable labour, by generations of learned and pious scholars who consecrated their lives and energies to the dissemination of Buddha's teachings beyond the confines of Jambûdvîpa.

The gentleman* now at the helm of this University, and to whom I take this opportunity of offering my humble tribute of thanks, is a man of many-

* The Hon. Justice Sir Asutosh Mookerjee, Kt., C.S.I., D.L., D.Sc., *Saraswati*, &c. &c. &c.

sided abilities as is conspicuously shown by his discharging, in various capacities, a number of the highest public duties. I should like to mention here the supreme courtesy and sympathy that I always received from him.

In the eleven months and a year which have passed since I first began lecturing, I have had occasion to become acquainted with many other Indian gentlemen. To them I owe a debt of obligation for the various ways in which they rendered me help and assistance. In view of my insufficient knowledge of English which has ever been a great obstacle in my path, I cannot but express my sincerest gratitude for the benevolent aid which I have received from them, and without which I could not possibly have accomplished this work.

First and foremost I should mention the late Mr. Harinath De, a greater scholar than whom it has seldom been my fortune to come across. He was an honour to his country, and his great linguistic gifts would have proved of invaluable service in what I consider to be the most important task which lies before Indian scholarship, namely, the rediscovery of ancient Buddhistic Works, lost in the original Sanskrit and now to be found only in Chinese and Tibetan versions. To him—alas! now passed away—I must record my deep debt of gratitude for help and counsel in my present task.

I must also express my obligation specially to Mr. M. Ghosh, Professor of English Literature in the Presidency College, and to the Hon. Dr. Suhrawardy, M.A., Ph.D., Bar-at-Law, Mr. Kasiprasad Jayaswal, Bar-at-Law, and Mr. R. Jagannathâcârya for their kind revision of portions of this book. And last, but not the least, I should mention Babu Bidhubhushan Dutta, M.A. of this University, and now working on educational lines in Calcutta. In him I found a fine scholar and a sincere worker to whom I am also indebted for assistance in revision and the looking over of proofs.

In conclusion, I desire to express my thanks to all who have helped me in the preparation of this work and to whom is chiefly due the rapid progress in its publication. I am more sensible of its deficiencies than any one else can be. Yet I do not hesitate to commend it to the public, if for no other reasons, at least for the comprehensive character of the philosophical system expounded therein—a philosophy, which, though arising from the

soil of Indian speculation, has been totally ignored and condemned here for centuries together. It is my devout hope that Indian scholars of Sanskrit and Pāli may not neglect the Chinese and Tibetan versions of the Canons of Buddhism. It is they who have to take up the mission of unveiling the true relation between the religious and philosophical ideas that lie concealed in the numberless, though fragmentary works of ancient India and Tibet, and solve the problem of the bond of union amongst the great religions of the East. I believe or rather am convinced that these religions, though modified greatly in the course of long ages and their passage through varying climes, all have their beginnings in the soil of India: and hence, a future religious union of the East may not be altogether a dream.

I ought perhaps to add a few words as regards the scope and nature of the present little work. My main object has been to present in a short and comprehensive form a complete view of Buddhistic philosophy, both of Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna Schools, in order to stimulate my fellow scholars in the same field to independent research. Obviously, the attempt to confine so vast a subject within narrow limits must lead to unavoidable obscurity. I hope in the near future to issue a series of books, each treating of a separate portion of this great subject in a clearer and more detailed manner.

CALCUTTA :
September, 1912. }

S. YAMAKAMI.

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CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.

Buddhism, as is well-known to you, is divided into two great schools, *viz.*, that of the Greater Vehicle or Mahāyānism and that of the lesser or Hīnayānism. Mahāyānism again, as is not generally known, is subdivided into two groups, *viz.*, the *Partially developed Mahāyānism* and the *Fully developed Mahāyānism*. This sub-division is not arbitrary, but is based on the historical development of what constitutes the essential theory of Buddhism. Thus the Mādhyamikas and the Vijñānavādins fall into the category of *Partially developed Mahāyānism*, while the *Avatamsaka* School, the *Dhyāna* School, the *Mantra* School as well as the great Chinese School of Buddhism known as the *Tien Tai* School are included in *Fully developed Mahāyānism*. The grounds on which this classification is based I shall attempt to set forth later on.

There is a second method of classification, which is based on a practical point of view. According to this method, Buddhist schools are divided into two great groups, *viz.*, (1) those which believe in the possibility of emancipation through one's own intellectual powers, and (2) those which consider salvation to be dependent on the power of another. In other words, the former of these two groups maintains that, for the attainment of Buddhahood, we must rely on our own powers and on our own powers alone; while the latter advocates dependence on a saviour like Tathāgata-Amitābha for the purpose of obtaining rebirth in Paradise. The reasons given for their theory by the latter school are that

Classification of Buddhism.

The two 'Vehicles.'

Sub-divisions of the Greater Vehicle.

A second and a more practical mode of classification based on one's conception of the instrument of salvation.

man's intellectual powers are too limited to enable him to attain Nirvāṇa unaided and unassisted, and that the world is too full of sin and suffering to permit him to reach Buddhahood through his own independent exertions. This is exactly what is taught in the Lotus of the Good Law, an authoritative work of the Mahāyāna, of which the Sanskrit text is being published in St. Petersburg. "There is no rest," says that Sūtra, "in any of the three worlds, *viz.*, the world of desire, the world of form and the world of formlessness, for they are like a house on fire and teem with all manner of confusion, pain and suffering. Life and old age, sickness and death, are ever present in them, and they burn like a fire which nothing can quench. The Tathāgata, having left the conflagration of the three worlds, is dwelling in peace in the tranquillity of his forest-abode, saying to himself: 'All three worlds are my possession, all living beings are my children, the world is full of intense tribulation, but I myself will work out their salvation'."

Picturesque but perhaps more familiar names which are respectively given to these two groups are (1) *The Gate of the Noble Path*,¹ and (2) *The Gate of the Land of Bliss*² which in Sanskrit would be called (1) *Ārya-mārga-dvāra* and (2) *Sukhāvirgīha-dvāra*. The former of these is usually styled "The Difficult Path"³ while the latter is generally termed "The Easy Path."⁴ How these two names sprang up is not very difficult to determine. Suppose there are two men who intend to travel from Bombay to Calcutta, one of whom makes up his mind to journey on foot, while the other decides to travel by rail. Both, unless they perish in the way or change their minds, are bound to reach their destination sometime or other. The traveller on foot will naturally require a herculean effort to accomplish his journey, while his companion the railway passenger will reach Calcutta without hardly any effort on his part. It would be difficult to say which of these two travellers has travelled better, for the labours and hardships of the traveller on foot find their compensation in the enjoyment of the beauty and magnificence of the surrounding sights and sounds of nature, while the rapidity with which the

The Easy Path, and the Difficult Path. Their respective advantages and disadvantages.

¹ Japanese: *Shō-dō-mon*.

² Japanese: *Ziō-dō-mon*.

³ Japanese: *Nan-gō-dō*.

⁴ Japanese: *I-pō-dō*.

railway passenger must hurry to his destination is calculated to destroy all charm of travelling. The simile of the Difficult and Easy paths is as old as Nāgārjuna, who, in his greatest work "The Commentary on the Prajñā-pāramitā-sūtra"¹ says:—"Various are the gates in the Law of Buddha, like unto the difficult paths and easy paths in this world of ours, where hard is the journey of a traveller who walketh on foot and easy the voyage of him who travellet in a boat. But the choice between the difficult and the easy paths must be left to the taste of him who wisheth to travel."

In short, according to its theoretical and practical aspects, Buddhism admits of two different modes of classification.

From the theoretical point of view Buddhism is divisible into Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna. The *Hīnayāna* consists of twenty schools with the addition of the little known *Satyasiddhi* School. *Mahāyāna* is sub-divided into the "Partially developed Mahāyāna" and the "Fully developed Mahāyāna." The "Partially developed Mahāyāna" consists of the Mādhyamika and the Vijnānavādin Schools, while the "Fully developed Mahāyāna" embraces a large number of schools, the best known of which are the Avatamsaka, Mantra, Dhyāna, Sukhāvati-vyūha, the Chinese *Tien-Tai* and the Japanese *Nichiren* Schools.

From the practical point of view, two broad classifications of Buddhism are possible, *viz.*, the "Self-reliant group"² and the "Dependent group."³ The former will embrace all the schools of the Hīnayāna, and most of the Mahāyāna schools such as the Avatamsaka, the Mādhyamika, the Vijnānavādin, the Tien-Tai, the Mantra, the Vinaya and the Dhyāna schools. The "Dependent group" on the other hand will contain all the Paradise-seeking schools of the *Sukhāvati-vyūha*.

A third and perhaps a more important mode of classification is based upon the divisions of the Tripitaka. All the schools of Buddhism mentioned above, with the sole exception of the Dhyāna School, depend principally upon some

Theoretical division of Buddhism—the *Hīnayāna* and the *Mahāyāna*. The schools included in each.

Practical Division of Buddhism into the Self-reliant and the Dependent groups.

Classification based on the Tripitaka—first made by Japanese scholars, but unknown in India.

¹ Nanjiō Cat. No. 1199.

² Japanese: *Ji-riki-kiō*.

³ Japanese: *To-riki-kiō*.

Sūtra or some book of the *Vinaya* or some *Śāstra* constituting the sacred text upon which they base their theories. Thus the Avatamsaka school depends on the "Buddhāvatamsaka-mahāvaiṣṭya-sūtra," the Tien-Tai school on the "Lotus of the Good Law," the Mantra school on the "Mahā-vairocana-abhisambodhi-sūtra," the Sukhāvati school on the "Sukhāvati-vyūha-sūtra."

Others again depend on *Śāstras*. Thus the Sarvāstivādin depend on the "Abhidharma-śāstra"; the Satya-siddhi school on the "Satya-siddhi-śāstra"; the Viṣṇūnavādin school mainly on the "Viṣṇūna-mātrā-śāstra," the Mādhyamika on the "Mādhyamika-śāstra," the "Dvādaśa-nikāya-śāstra" and the "Śata-śāstra."

The Vinaya school again depends on the *Vinaya Pitaka*.

From this point of view all Buddhist schools are classified into four groups: the Sūtra school, the Vinaya school, the Śāstra school and the Dhyāna or the *Buddha-citta* school. This division is unknown in India and was first made in Japan.

But such a classification, whatever its merits may be, ought not to make us lose sight of the significant fact that even the several divisions overlap one another. Śāstra schools sought to support and corroborate the views which they held respecting the highest truth, by adducing in every instance proofs from one or more of the *Sūtras* accepted by them as the direct teaching of Lord Buddha. Moreover, every school indulged in criticisms of an adverse character against all others for the purpose of securing for itself the highest place among all the schools of Buddhism. This spirit of hostile controversy amongst the professed followers of a religion of peace was not unknown in India; but it is in China that it acquired important dimensions. It will be no exaggeration to state that controversialism, and that of a most active character, is perhaps the most salient characteristic of Chinese Buddhism. Unfortunately the records dealing with the history of controversialism in Indian Buddhism are not to be found, save and except in the form of a small treatise preserved in the Chinese Tripitaka. This is the celebrated work of Vasumitra entitled "A Treatise

dealing with the Points of Contention among the different Schools of Buddhism."¹ The Sanskrit original of this very interesting work is unfortunately lost, but three translations of it are extant in Chinese, showing the great importance which was attached to it by Buddhist scholars even in early times.

Now this spirit of criticism of one another's theories which became so rampant amongst Indian Buddhists at a later period, seems to have originated as early as the century which followed Buddha's death. The first great schism dates, according to Vasumitra, from the beginning of the 2nd century which followed Buddha's Nirvāṇa. The leader of the dissenters was a priest named Mahādeva, one of the most remarkable thinkers India has produced, and the school which he founded was called the *Mahā-saṅghika*² or the "School of the Great Congregation" as opposed to the orthodox school of the elders known as the *Sthavira-vāda*.³ These two schools underwent divisions and sub-divisions, until at the beginning of the 5th century after Buddha's death, their number rose to eighteen, which, being added to the two original schools, make up the Twenty Schools mentioned by Vasumitra. It would seem that the majority of them did not attach themselves to any particular *Sūtras* or *Śāstras*, excepting the Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas who alone adhered to religious texts, just as Chinese and Japanese Buddhists do at the present day.

Of all the schools of Buddhism perhaps the most rational and the least fettered by dogmas is the Dhyāna school.⁴ This The Dhyāna School. school does not cling for support to any particular portion of the Tripitakas, but rather takes up whatever is excellent in the various portions of the sacred canon, not without subjecting it to a critical examination. The Dhyāna school moreover believes that the human tongue is too weak to give expression to the highest truth. As a natural consequence of such a belief, its adherents disclaim attachment to

¹ Naitō's Cat. No. 1284, 1285, 1286.

² Japanese: *Dai-shū-bu*.

³ Japanese: *Jiō-Za-bu*.

⁴ Japanese: *Zen-shū*. This school was introduced in China by an Indian priest, Bodhidharma who was the third son of a King of Kancī, in South India. He came to China in A. D. 527.

sacred books as their final authority, but nevertheless they respect the canon, regarding it as an efficient instrument conducing to the attainment of enlightenment. The well-known similitude which they employ in this connection is that of the finger pointing out the moon, the sacred books being compared to the former and the highest truth to the latter. It becomes needless to point the moon out with the finger, once we are in a position to see the moon herself in all her brightness.

Last comes the psychological classification of Buddhism, which corresponds to the psychological division of all mental functions into intellect, emotion and volition. According to this mode of classification, all the so-called Self-reliant schools—with the sole exception of the Dhyāna school,—are to be classed as the intellectual schools, the Dependent school as emotional, and the Dhyāna school must be regarded as the sole representative of a volitional school in Buddhism. But this method of classification is by no means absolute. It is merely relative, for there are to be found traces of emotional and volitional teachings in the so-called intellectual schools and *vice versa*. In Buddhism there is no purely intellectual, or purely emotional or purely volitional school.

To the scholar who is interested mainly in the philosophical aspect of Buddhism, the intellectual schools are by far the most important, and it is to an account of these that the greater portion of my lectures will be devoted. At the same time, no student of Buddhism ought to forget that the chief end of the preachings of Buddha is the attainment of Nirvāṇa or Mōksha, which is the outcome, not of philosophical speculation, but of religious and moral practice. Thus the emotional and the volitional schools of Buddhism are superior from a practical point of view to the intellectual ones and, as such, more potent in religious influence in China and Japan. But why do I limit myself to these two countries? They would be more powerful as religions in any part of the world, seeing that the intellectual schools lack the essential quality indispensable to every religion, *viz.*, the quality of popularity. This is the reason why the Sukhāvati-vyūha School and the Dhyāna School are constantly gaining in

Psychological classification of Buddhism.

The relative importance of the several schools.

power in Japan, while their rival schools are fast declining year after year. Of course, I do not mean to say that there are no intellectual schools which possess an intensely practical character and exercise a powerful sway over the minds of men in Japan. To ignore this fact would be tantamount to wilfully blinding oneself to the great influence wielded by the Mantra school and the Nichiren school, both of which fall under the category of the so-called intellectual schools. But enough of dry classifications. I shall proceed to the essential principles of Buddhism in my next lecture.

THE ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES OF BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY.

सर्वमनित्वं, सर्वमनात्मं, निर्वाणं शान्तम् ॥

"All is impermanence, there is no *Ego*, and Nirvāṇa is the only calm."

Such is the three-fold corner-stone upon which rests the entire fabric of Buddhism, be it *Hīnayānism* or Buddhism of the lesser Vehicle or be it *Mahāyānism*, that of the Greater. The Buddhists of the Greater Vehicle, as they call themselves, claim, in contradistinction to those of the Lesser the credit of establishing a further principle peculiar to themselves, which they formulate in the words *Sarvam tathāṭam*—"All is such as it is." But this principle is not entitled to any claim of novelty, inasmuch as it is merely a phase, or, more properly speaking, a legitimate outcome of the third of the above-named principles, *viz.*, that Nirvāṇa is the only calm. The sacred canon of the Buddhists often alludes to what is called the fourth sign of the Dharma, *viz.*, that "all is suffering". But this too cannot be called a new principle, for it is nothing more than a corollary of the first great principle which formulates the truth of universal impermanence. "All is impermanent": argues the Buddhists, "whatever impermanent is fraught with suffering, *ergo* all that is is full of suffering."

We shall not therefore err, if we were to lay down that the above three principles are the fundamental tenets which distinguish Buddhism from all other religious systems in the history of the world. Nor will it be hazardous to affirm that, should there be found any other system of thought which

accepts all the fundamental principles mentioned above, that system can lay full claim to identity with Buddhism.

Let us now proceed to examine the three principles in detail:—

First comes "*All is impermanence.*"

This is what has been called the *mudrā* i.e., the stamp or seal of the fundamental principles of Buddhism. Like the kindred principle of Heraclitus "*ΠΑΝΤΑ ΠΕΙ*" (i.e., 'All is in a state of flux'), this statement means that all is subject to change, that all is in a state of becoming. The truth of this statement, so far as the phenomenal world is concerned, receives ample corroboration from the researches of modern science. A lucid exposition of this tenet is given by Professor Rhys Davids in one of his recent publications. "According to the Buddhist," says that veteran scholar, "there is no being, there is only a becoming, the state of every individual being unstable, temporary, sure to pass away. Even among things we find in each individual form and material qualities; and living organisms too possess a continually ascending series of mental qualities, the union of which makes up the individual. Everything, be it a person, a thing or a god, is, therefore, merely a putting together of component elements. Further, in each individual without exception the relation of its component parts is eternally changing and never the same for even two consecutive moments. Putting together implies becoming, becoming means becoming different, and becoming different cannot arise without a dissolution, a passing away, which must inevitably at some time or other be complete."¹

But why is it, we may ask, that all things are impermanent? Why is it that they are subject to an invariable law of change and are condemned to a state of becoming? Let us see what answer Buddhism has to give to this question of paramount importance. The Buddhist who knows Buddhism will reply that this law of universal impermanence which has been preached by the founder of his religion, is inseparably connected with the law of cause and effect, for nothing in this phenomenal world can exist without some causes

Its cause:

¹ 'Early Buddhism,' Pt. 56—57.

while the very name *phenomenon* presupposes origination, which again implies destruction, exactly in the same way as destruction invariably implies origination.

Shortly before he departed this life, Buddha himself, as the Great Sūtra of the Decease (*Mahāparinirvāṣūtra*) relates, said to his disciples:—
 “Know that whatever exists arises from causes and conditions and is in every respect impermanent.”¹

Its three-fold aspect
 examined.

The principle of Universal impermanence, admits of
 being considered in a three-fold aspect, namely as,—

- (a) The Impermanence of Life-period;
- (b) Momentary Impermanence;
- (c) The Impermanence of the Self-nature of Conditional Things.

Now what is meant by the “Impermanence of Life-period”? In modern times no scientific man doubts the laws of the indestructibility of matter and of the conservation of energy in the physical world. Buddhism acknowledges the working of both these laws in the noumenal world, for it maintains, as the texts of the Sarvāstivādin tell us, the eternality of the noumenal state of the *dharma*s throughout the three divisions of time, the past, the present and the future. The well-known Mahāyāna sūtra called The “Lotus of the Good Law” says that “Everything is what it is”. In fact, according to the Buddhist, the universe has neither beginning nor end, and it is inconceivable that something should spring out of nothing or that nothing should spring out of something. It is impossible also that there should exist a thing which does not change. In the “Stanzas of the Law” (*Dharmapada*) the following sayings of Buddha are recorded:

“THAT WHICH SEEMS EVERLASTING, WILL PERISH,
 THAT WHICH IS HIGH, WILL BE LAID LOW,
 WHERE MEETING IS, PARTING WILL BE,
 WHERE BIRTH IS, DEATH WILL COME.”

¹ Nanjio's Cat. No. 552.

The above stanza is to be found in the Chinese and the Tibetan versions only, but the following stanza occurs also in the Pāli:

“NA ANTALIKKHE NA SAMUDDAMAJJHE,
 NA PABBATĀNAM VIVARAM PAVISSA,
 NA VIJJATI SO JAGATIPPADESO,
 YATHATTHITAM NA-PPASAHETHA MACCU.”

i.e. “Not in the sky nor in the depths of the ocean, nor having entered the caverns of the mountain, nay, such a place is not to be found in the world where a man might dwell without being overpowered by Death.”

Birth and death indeed are the great antipodes in the career of a living being; and death, ‘the Great Migration’, as the Tibetans call it, is indeed a change that has struck and even confused the minds of the high and low from the dawn of time to the present day. This change, along with birth and old age, constitutes, according to Buddhism, one of the prime miseries of life, and we are over and over again reminded in the Sacred Canon of the sorrowful fact that death is the end of life—*maranāntam ki jīvitam*. In the technical language of Buddhist Philosophy the change involved in death implies the impermanence of life-appearance. In other words, the tenet of the impermanence of life-period denotes among living beings the difference between the birth-state and the death-state, and among inanimate things the difference between the state of being produced and the state of perishing. The great Asanga, who founded the Vijnānavāda or the Idealistic school of Buddhist philosophy, says in his well-known treatise on “The Madhyāntānūgama-śāstra” :—“All things are produced by the combination of causes and conditions and have no independent noumenon of their own. When the combination is dissolved, their destruction ensues. The body of a living being consists of the combination of the four great elements, *viz.*, earth, water, fire and air; and when this combination is resolved into the four component elements, dissolution ensues. This is what is called the impermanence of a composite entity.”¹

¹ Nanjio's Cat. No. 1246. This Śāstra was composed by the great Nāgārjuna and Asanga, the latter explaining the text of the former. The Chinese translation of this work is made by an Indian scholar, Gautama Prajñāraci, in A.D. 543, of the Eastern Wēi dynasty, “A.D. 534—550.”

So much for the impermanence of life-period. This impermanence presupposes impermanence of moments (*kṣaṇa*). A (b) Momentary impermanence. logical transition of thought makes it fully intelligible how any great change in a human being or in any other thing, which takes place within a certain space of time, is nothing else but the aggregate of minute changes which occur therein every moment. Thus, every man, every thing, is ever changing and can never be the same for even two consecutive moments. This is what is known in Buddhist philosophy as "momentary impermanence"—a principle, which, as I shall latter on point out, has been entirely misunderstood and grossly misrepresented by the Vedantin Śaṅkarācārya. It is with the support of this principle that the Buddhist seeks to explain any change, however minute, in the phenomenal world. The great philosophical encyclopædia of the Lesser Vehicle entitled "Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣa-śāstra" or the "Treatise of the Great Exposition of Philosophy"¹—the Sanskrit original of which has been lost, but which survives in Hiouen Tsang's laborious Chinese translation—says, that a day of twenty four hours has six thousand four hundred millions, ninety nine thousand, nine hundred and eighty *kṣaṇas* or moments, and that the five *skandhas* or aggregates of being, are repeatedly produced and destroyed in every *kṣaṇa*. Buddhaghosha, the famous exponent of Ceylonese Buddhism, who flourished at the commencement of the fifth century of the Christian era, says in his "Path of Purity" (*Viṣuddhimagga*) :—"Strictly speaking, the life-duration of a living being is exceedingly brief, being commensurate with the period during which a thought lasts. And just as a chariot-wheel in rolling rolls merely at one point of the tire and in resting rests only at one point, even so the life of a living being endures only for the brief period of one thought and as soon as that thought has ceased, the being too is said to have ceased. Thus the being of a past moment *has* lived, but *does not* live *nor will* it live; the being of a future moment *will* live but *has not* lived *nor does* it live; the being of the present moment *does* live but *has not* lived and *will not* live."²

¹ Nanjio's Cat. No. 1263. This Śāstra is said to have been the work of the five hundred Arhats of Kanishka's council with Vasumitra at their head.

² Warren's "Buddhism in Translation," P. 150.

Is there then a motive power whereby things are changed? Every carriage, we see, has the capacity to move, but it does not move unless set in motion by some outside power. Similarly the water-mill is turned by the power of water and the wind-mill depends on the propulsion of the wind to be able to revolve. The earth too requires the gravitation of the sun in order to turn round its axis. In fact, all things need some sort of motive power to be changed from one state to another. The sword, we know, cannot cut itself and the finger cannot itself point out its own self. What then, we may ask, is the power which makes all things change? Buddha, when he wanted to answer this question, spoke of origination, staying, growth and decay, and destruction—*utpāda, sthiti, jara, nirodha*. These, he said, are the four characteristics of every composite thing and he added that it is owing to their possession of these four characteristics, that all things undergo modification and are subjected to repetition of themselves in endless revolution.

The Sarvāstivādin, or the realistic school of Buddhism, who, by the way, belong to the Lesser Vehicle, regard these four characteristics, *viz.*, origination, staying, growth and decay, and destruction, as the only appearance or existence of a thing throughout the three divisions of time, the past, the present and the future. According to this theory of the four characteristics, technically called *Chatur-lakṣaṇa* in Buddhist philosophy, (i) there exists *origination* by which everything is brought to a state of existence from the future to the present; (ii) there also exists *staying* which tries to make everything stay in its actual or identical state as soon as a thing emerges from the future into the present by the force of origination; (iii) there is thirdly, *growth and decay* whereby everything is dragged into the pale of old age; and (iv) fourthly and lastly, there comes *destruction* which destroys everything by carrying it to the past. Such is the reason which explains why nothing can continue in the same state for even two consecutive moment in this phenomenal world. In short, all things are being incessantly changed by the operation of the four characteristics.

Tradition relates how before a few centuries had elapsed after the death of Buddha, a great discussion arose between his followers as to whether the four characteristics exist simultaneously or successively. One school, *viz.*,

the Sarvāstivādins, strenuously maintained their simultaneity, saying that they exist in the same *kṣaṇa*, while their opponents, the Sautrāntikas, persistently adhered to the opinion that the four characteristics do not exist simultaneously but spread themselves successively over the limits of a life-period. Want of time, I regret, prevents me from entering into the interesting details of this memorable controversy, but those, who are curious to know something about it, will find a summary of it in the second chapter of the Commentary on the Abhidharmakosha-śāstra.¹

I pass on now to the third phase of the doctrine of universal impermanence, *viz.*, the Impermanence of the Self-nature of Conditional Things. Just as the impermanence of life-appearance presupposes momentary impermanence, so does also momentary impermanence presuppose the impermanence of the self-nature of conditional things. This is a simple logical deduction. A careful analysis of the doctrine of the impermanence of phenomenal existences in the temporal scheme brings us at length to the doctrine of *śūnyatā*, inadequately rendered "emptiness." To realise that every living being will die sometime or other, is a very easy easy matter, but it is not so easy to feel that every living being is coming nearer and nearer to death as days and nights elapse or that he is continuing to change as the moments pass. To the vulgar mind it is a matter of extreme difficulty to grasp that the state of a human being or of any other thing is itself impermanent, or, to clothe the idea in the technical language of Buddhist philosophy, that the self-nature of every conditional thing is *śūnyatā*. This indeed is the final, legitimate and rational conclusion to be drawn from the first principal of Buddhism *viz.*, that all is impermanent.² A correct comprehension of this conclusion would facilitate the task of understanding the true meaning of *śūnyatā*—a word which is capable of so many different meanings in Buddhist philosophy, that it has proved a veritable pitfall to many a critic of Buddhism, European or Asiatic. Most occidental writers on Buddhism imagine that *śūnyatā* is synonymous with what they understand by nothingness or annihilation; and the Śūnyatāvādins have been mercilessly branded

¹ Nanjio's Cat. No. 1269. And see "the Abhidharma Mahāvibhāṣa-śāstra," fasc. 38.

² सर्वमनित्यम् (Sarvamanityam.)

by them as out-and-out nihilists. But to the Buddhist *śūnyatā* conveys a far different sense. He understands the word to mean "the perpetual changes occurring at every step in this phenomenal world." The great Nāgārjuna says in the *Mādhyamika Śāstra*¹ (ch. xxiv)—

सर्वं च युज्यते तस्य शून्यता यस्य युज्यते ।

सर्वं न युज्यते तस्य शून्यं यस्य न युज्यते ॥

which means according to the interpretation of Kumārajīva:—"It is on account of *śūnyatā* that everything becomes possible; without it nothing in the world would be possible." In other words, it is on the truth of the impermanence of the nature of all things that the possibility of all things depends. If things were not subject to continual change but were permanent and unchangeable, forthwith the evolution of the human race and the development of living things would come to a dead stop. If human beings had never died or changed but had continued always in the same state, what would the result have been? The progress of the human race would stop for ever. In his epoch-making treatise entitled "Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism," which ought to be in the hands of every student of philosophy, my learned countryman Prof. D. Suzuki, expounds the idea of *Śūnyatā* in the following masterly fashion:—"Śūnyatā simply means conditionality or transitoriness of all phenomenal existence. It is a synonym for *anitya* or *pratitya*. Therefore, 'emptiness,' according to the Buddhists, signifies negatively the absence of particularity, the non-existence of individuals as such, and positively the ever-changing state of the phenomenal world, a constant flux of becoming, an eternal series of causes and effects. It must never be understood in the sense of annihilation or absolute nothingness; for nihilism is as much condemned by Buddhism as *naïve* realism."²

In what sense is the
Law of Impermanence
universal?

In fact the principle of universal impermanence touches not the substantial world at all, but is concerned only with the phenomenal world. And the explanations given of it, which are cited above, incline more towards a negative

¹ Nanjio'scat. No. 1179. The text of this Śāstra is composed by the Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna and is explained by his greatest disciple, Ārya Deva. The Chinese translation of this work was made by Kumārajīva, about A. D. 405, of the Latter Tsin dynasty.

² See P. 173 of "Outline of Mahāyāna Buddhism."

or destructive interpretation than towards a positive or constructive one. This is an important point and one which ought not to be lost sight of by students of the Sacred Canon of the Buddhists. But why, it might be asked, did Buddha confine himself to a negative and destructive definition of the phenomenal world? The answer becomes easy when we come to reflect that Buddha's object was not to found a school of philosophy but to point out to all his fellow creatures the path of enlightenment and the road to salvation. And hard indeed was the condition of Buddha's fellow creatures in his time. The phenomenal world weighed upon them with the oppression of a terrible nightmare, and arduous was their struggle for life in the flames of the scorching world. Therefore, in giving a negative or destructive explanation of the phenomenal world, Buddha's real object seems to have been to lead his fellow creatures from the storms and raging billows of the ocean of phenomena, safe to the shores of the world of noumena, to Nirvāṇa, to everlasting peace. But though such may have been the purpose of Buddha, a negative exposition of the principle of impermanence is not without its own advantages. "What is not so" leads to an understanding of "what is so," and the negative serves as a guide to the positive. Thus, from the principle of impermanence can be evolved the principle of permanence, viz., Nirvāṇa, when once the opposite of Nirvāṇa, namely, the phenomenal world, is refuted and rejected. Moreover, by applying the three principles, which we have described as the corner-stone of Buddhism, to the phenomenal and the noumenal worlds respectively, we shall find (a) that the principle of universal impermanence¹ concerns exclusively the phenomenal world; (b) that the principle of non-ego² touches both the worlds; (c) and, that the principle of Nirvāṇa being the only calm,³ belongs only to the noumenal world.

So much for the principle of Universal Impermanence. In my next lecture I shall treat of the remaining doctrines.

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¹ *Sarvamanitiam.*

² *Sarvamanātmam.*

³ *Nirvāṇam Śāntam.*

ALL THAT IS, IS WITHOUT SELF.

(सर्वमनात्मम् ।)

We pass on now to the second great corner-stone of Buddhism, namely, *Sarvam anātmam* which literally means "All that is, is without *ātman* or self." The understanding of this doctrine has remained, and will probably long remain, a stumbling-block to occidental students and critics of Buddhism, some of whom it has misled into characterising the teachings of Buddha as a soulless form of pessimism, while others (ii) The doctrine of *Anātmam*, it has induced to give Gautama Buddha credit for what they imagine to be an unmistakeable anticipation of their favourite materialistic schemes from which the soul and the supernatural are summarily ejected. Even in metaphysical India, the true meaning of *sarvam anātmam* came to be forgotten with the disappearance of Buddhism. No wonder, therefore, that Śaṅkarācārya, with all his acuteness and erudition, failed to comprehend its real import, and so undertook to malign it in the loudest terms of condemnation.

Most of the authoritative works contained in the Sacred Canon of the Buddhists were, in all probability, inaccessible to him in their original completeness, for there is no reason to doubt that the Sanskrit Tripitaka met, at the hands of the Brahmin persecutors of Buddhism, a treatment not dissimilar to that which the Indian Buddhists themselves received. Too well known to need mention here is the royal mandate of Sasanka, King of Karnasuvarna commanding the utter extermination of Buddhists from the face of India with the unwholesome alternative of the penalty of death to be inflicted on the executioners themselves in case they neglected to carry out the inhuman order of their king and master.

आ सेतोरानुषाराद्रे बौद्धानां वृद्धवालकान्

यो न हन्ति स हन्त्यो भृत्यानिह्यशिष्यन्त्यपः ॥

We must not therefore be hard on the Vedantin Śaṅkara, if he shows its twofold aspect. ignorance of the *nāiratmagaddeyam* of the Buddhists.

In fact, Buddhism acknowledges two sorts of *anātmam* or Non-Ego. The first is the denial of a subjective *ātman* or a personal *Ego*,

and the second that of the objective *ātman* or the *Ego* of the *dharma*s or the phenomenal world. Generally speaking, when *ātman* is criticised and refuted in Buddhist philosophy, what is exactly meant by it, is an eternal substance exempt from the vicissitudes of change and incapable of entering into combination with anything else. This is just what is stated by Dharmapālācārya in the opening chapter of his commentary on the *Vijñānamātra-śāstra*.

This great dialectician,—who, by the way, must not be confounded with his living Singhalese namesake, the energetic founder of the Mahābodhi Society,—was a native of Kanchipura in Southern India. He was the teacher of Śīlabhadra, the learned

Three classes of
ātman-theories.

Professor of the University of Nālandā, at whose feet Hiouen Tsang sat as a pupil. As the original Sanskrit of Dharmapālā's commentary is lost, I shall content myself with translating from Hiouen Tsang's Chinese version of the same. "The term *ātman*," says Dharmapālā, "is said to mean supreme authority and is identical with freedom, eternity and absolute unity. The views held concerning it by the Tīrthakaras fall into three groups. First comes the view which regards *ātman* as an organism in itself made up of the five *skandhas* or constituents of being. Next comes the view which considers *ātman* to be an absolute existence segregated from the five *skandhas*. Third and last comes the view of those who maintain that the *ātman* is neither the same as, nor different from, the five *skandhas*".

In modern phraseology, the three views represented above would perhaps be described as follows :—

- (a) The first is the common view respecting the personal *Ego*, such as is accepted by the vulgar mind which regards it to be a composite of the mind and the body.
- (b) The second is the idea of an *Ego* such as is held by the Naiyāyikas who consider it to be the supreme and eternal governor of man essentially independent of the mind and the body.
- (c) The third is the well-known view of the Hīnayāna School called the Vatsīputriyas, whose belief in the existence of *ātman* forms the subject of the opening discussion of the *Kathāvatthu*.

Now Buddhism refuses to admit the possibility of any individual or independent existence like the *ātman* represented by any of the three

classes of views mentioned above. Its strenuous denial of *ātman*, which constitutes the second *mudrā* or seal of Buddhism, is but a legitimate inference from the first *mudrā* which formulates the law of universal impermanence. Once the doctrine of *sarvam anityam* is definitely accepted as true, one has to concede that no conditional existence can ever imply eternity, absolute unity or supreme authority in any sense. In other words, consistently with the doctrine of universal impermanence, Buddhism has to maintain that no existence, which is impermanent temporarily, can possibly be identical with absolute freedom, for the very simple reason that it is conditioned by another existence. Therefore, such an existence can not be said to have an *ātman* or *Ego*. In fact, a thing which is subject to causes and conditions, cannot, liable as it is to perish sometime or other, be maintained to possess authoritative command over itself, much less over any thing else. Hence it can not be said to have an *ātman* or *Ego*.

But while emphatically maintaining the doctrine of *anātman*, Buddha and his disciples never attempted in their teachings and preachings to deny the provisional existence of what is called the empirical *Ego*. This fact has been brought out very clearly by Nāgārjuna in his commentary on the Prajñāpāramita-sūtra, where he says :—

The empirical *Ego* in Buddhism.

“The Tathāgata sometimes taught that the *ātman* exists and at other times he taught that the *ātman* does not exist. When he preached that the *ātman* exists and is to be the receiver of misery or happiness in the successive life as the reward of its own Karma, his object was to save men from falling into the heresy of Nihilism (*Ucchedavāda*). When he taught that there is no *ātman* in the sense of a creator or perceiver or an absolutely free agent, apart from the conventional name given to the aggregate of the five *skandhas*, his object was to save men from falling into the opposite heresy of Eternalism (*Śāśvatavāda*). Now which of these two views represents the truth? It is doubtless the doctrine of the denial of *ātman*. This doctrine, which is so difficult to understand, was not intended by Buddha for the ears of those whose intellect is dull and in whom the root of goodness has not thriven. And why? Because such men by hearing the doctrine of *anātman* would have been sure to fall into the heresy of Nihilism. The two doctrines

were preached by Buddha for two very different objects. He taught the existence of *ātman* when he wanted to impart to his hearers the conventional doctrine; he taught the doctrine of *anātman* when he wanted to impart to them the transcendental doctrine".¹

Similarly, Dharmapālācārya says in his commentary on the *Vijñāna-mātra-śāstra* :—

"The existence of the *ātman* and of the *Dharmas* (i.e., of the *Ego* and of the phenomenal world) is affirmed in the Sacred Canon only provisionally and hypothetically and never in the sense of their possessing a real and permanent nature".²

Also, in the *Samyutta Nikāya* of the Pāli Canon it is related that when a non-Buddhist teacher enquired of Buddha whether the soul (*puruṣa*) exists or does not exist, Buddha gave no reply to him. The reason given by Buddha for his silence on this occasion is, that an affirmative answer would have been tantamount to a direct contradiction of the truth that "the phenomenal world is without an *Ego*" while a negative one would have added to the bewilderment of the enquirer's understanding by leading him to imagine that the *Ego* had existed once upon a time but did not do so any longer,—a delusion which Buddha considered to be far more dangerous than a belief in the existence of the soul. The same idea is graphically expressed in Vasubandhu's own commentry on his *Abhidharmakosha-śāstra*, a work, the original Sanskrit of which is lost, and which must not be confounded with the existing Sanskrit commentary of that name, which is really a late sub-commentary compiled by writer named Yaśomitra.

"Buddha's preaching of the Good Law" says Vasubandhu, "resembles a tigress's bringing up of her cub. Buddha observes how some of his fellow-creatures receive hurt from the heresy of Eternalism, while others allow their good *Karma* to be eaten up by the heresy of Nihilism. Thus, whoever believes in the existence of *ātman* in its transcendental sense, exposes himself to the tiger's tooth of the heresy of Eternalism, and whoever does not believe in the existence of *ātman* in its conventional sense, runs the risk of destroying the seeds of his own good *Karma*".³

¹ Nanjio's Cat. No. 1169, "fasciculi, XXVI." ² Nanjio's Cat. No. 1197, "fasciculi I."

³ Nanjio's Cat. No. 1267, "fasciculi XXX."

Āryadeva, too, the most prominent of Nāgārjuna's disciples, says in his commentary on the Madhyāmika Śāstra :—

"The Buddhas, in their omniscience, watch the natures of all living beings and preach to them the Good Law in different ways, sometimes affirming the existence of the *ātman* and at other times denying it. Without an adequate development of one's intellectual powers, no one can attain Nirvāṇa nor can one know why evil should be eschewed. It is for people who have not reached this stage that the Buddhas preach the existence of *ātman*".¹

We see, then, how in teaching his fellow-creatures to steer a midway course between the Scylla and Charybdis of Eternalism and Nihilism, Buddha sometimes maintained the existence of the *ātman* and other times denied it. Such an attitude of mind in the founder of a great religion may appear to smack of self-contradiction ; but is it really open to that charge? We shall be in a better position to answer this question, if we try to understand what Buddhism means by *ātman* when it seeks to deny its existence.

The conception of the soul which is abhorrent to Buddhism is that of the *hindūman*, or the individual soul, regarded as a concrete agent enshrined in the body and ever acting, thinking and feeling ; in short, the conception of an independent entity which the vulgar mind endows with the power of existing apart from the body and of directing all its activities. To the Buddhist, the idea of a soul existing in permanent isolation from the body seems nothing better than a delusive mirage, and the belief in the existence of an all-creating *deus ex teo mundum* is regarded by them as a crude relic of a superstitious past, calculated to retard the march of progress and enlightenment. To combat and successfully counteract the baneful influence of so wide-spread a *Mithyādrīṣṭi*, Buddhism formulates the great principle of *sarvaṃ anātman*—i. e., All that is, is without an *Ego*. Those who have read Buddhaghosa's commentary on any of the works included in the Abhidharma Pitaka of the Pāli Canon, will recollect how he frequently goes out of his way merely to find a pretext for refuting the theory of a Universal Creator

Buddhist rejection of the individual soul.

Denial of a Universal Creator.

¹ Nanjio's Cat. No. 1119. Chap. XVIII.

existing outside the universe. In the very opening chapter of the Atthasalini which explains the text of Dhammasaṅgīni "*Yasmim samaye*" which means "*the time in which*", Buddhaghosa, true to his pedantic instincts, gives with numerous apposite examples, a number of significations which the word *samaya* can admit of, such as *samavāya* (collection), *ksapa* (moment), *hetu* (cause) etc., most of which he makes out to be applicable to the context in question. He next proceeds to take the meaning *samavāya* (collection) and explains it as *Paccayasāmaggi* or "a conglomeration of causes." Now why did Buddha, he asks, use the word *samaya* in this context? The answer given is, that he did so purposely in order to emphasise the truth that nothing can arise from a single cause but that everything originates from a conglomeration of causes, refuting thereby the view that the universe owes its origin to a single all-creating deity—*Tasmā eko kadda adma utthāti imam pi attham dīpeti*.

The ingenuity of the indefatigable Ceylonese commentator, however misplaced it might seem, is entitled to its due share of praise, but there is no overlooking the fact that he reads far more into Buddha's words than Buddha himself could ever have meant, granting, of course, (which is more than doubtful) that the Dhammasaṅgīni is a genuine collection of Buddha's words. The only passage in the Pāli Canon containing a direct reference to God occurs in the Tika Nipāta (61) of the Anguttaranikāya, where Buddha condemns as leading to inaction (*'akiriḍāya sanahanti'*) the theories of Chance (*yadricchā*) Fate (*nigati*) or God (*Īśvara*) being the author of man's happiness or misery in this life (*'yam kiñcāyam purisaṃpuggala paṭisaṃvedeti sukkham vā dukkham vā adukkhamasukkam vā sabbam tam (i) pubbekatahetu, (ii) issaranimmanāhetu, (iii) uhetuapaccayoti'*). The passage is well worth reading and will be found on page 173 of the first volume of the Pāli Text Society's edition of the Anguttaranikāya.

To return to *ātman*, Buddhist philosophy has always expressed a most emphatic denial of the existence of an ever-lasting individual soul. Instead of referring to earlier Buddhist writings on the subject, which are too numerous to mention, I shall quote an interesting extract, from a well known work of Dōgen Zenji, one of the

Dōgen Zenji on the Soul.

founders of the Dhyāna School of Japan. It is in the form of question and answer.

*“Question—*Grieve not over the cycle of birth and death, for there is a short cut to escape from them. This short cut is the realisation of the truth that the soul is eternal, that is to say, that although the body is subject to birth and death, the soul is exempt from them and will never die, being an eternal existence enshrined in the body. The body is a transitory form which may be born at one place and die at another, while the soul is ever-lasting and unchangeable throughout the past, the present and the future. A realisation of this truth is the only means of escape from the cycle of birth and death, and he who has realised it will be exempt from both. He will be able to dive into the ocean of truth and thence obtain for himself the gem of perfection and excellence such as belonged to all the Tathāgatas. As long as we are clogged by this body of ours, which owes its production to Karma moulded by ignorance in an anterior birth, we can never reach that stage of perfection which the sages have attained. Whoever does not realise this truth, is doomed to tedious transmigration through birth and death. Therefore it behoves us to learn and understand this truth as early as possible’.—Now is the view expressed in these words in conformity with Buddha’s doctrine or not?”

*“Answer :—*The view you have just stated does not at all agree with the doctrine of Buddha. It is rather the doctrine of non-Buddhist heretics who say that there exists a supernatural soul capable of distinguishing between good and bad, right and wrong, and of feeling pleasure and pain, joy and sorrow, whenever any object comes in contact with it. They add that it is really indestructible, though it may seem to perish at the dissolution of the body,—that it has the power of being reborn in another body as soon as it leaves the body of one who is dead. Such is the opinion of the heretics and whoever thinks it to be identical with the doctrine of Buddha, is more foolish than him who exchanges a lamp of gold for a handful of clay. It is the height of foolishness. Soul in Buddhism is identical with the body and noumena and phenomena are inseparable from each other. We must not misunderstand this fundamental principle of Buddhism which has been handed down from the West (India) to the East (China and

Japan). When Buddhists speak of the permanence of the noumenal world, they regard as permanent everything included in it, and the body itself considered as a noumenal entity can not be treated apart from the so-called soul. So also, when Buddhists speak of Nirvāṇa, they consider everything included in it to be Nirvāṇa. Thus noumena can not be separated from phenomena. It should also be understood clearly that Nirvāṇa and Saṃsāra are one and the same,—यः संसारः तद्विर्वाणम् । In fact, Buddhism never teaches that Nirvāṇa exists apart from Saṃsāra ; and the doctrine that the body and the soul are one is the common property of all Buddhist schools." So says the venerable Dōgen Zenji.

His opinion is supported by Nāgārjuna, who maintains the identity of Nirvāṇa and Saṃsāra in the well-known lines of the Madhyāmika Kārika :—

न संसारस्य निर्वाणात् किञ्चिदस्ति विशेषणम् ।
 न निर्वाणस्य संसारात् किञ्चिदस्ति विशेषणम् ॥
 निर्वाणस्य च या कोटिः कोटिः संसरणस्य च ।
 न तयोरन्तरं किञ्चित् सूक्ष्ममपि विद्यते ॥¹

That is to say :—"Saṃsāra and Nirvāṇa are in no way to be distinguished from each other. Their spheres are the same and not the slightest distinction exists between them."

But while condemning, as rank heresy, the theories of a Universal Creator and of an individual soul, Buddhism not only acknowledges the permanence of the noumenal *ego*, but actually enjoins its adherents to train themselves in such a manner as to be able to attain union with the Great Soul of the Universe, the technical term for which is *Mahātman*. The *locus classicus* for this injunction is a well known passage in Asaṅga's Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṅkāra-śāstra where it is recommended to the aspirant to Buddhahood to look upon the Universe as a mere conglomeration of con-formations (*saṃskāras*), devoid of an *ego* and fraught with suffering, and to take refuge from the bane of individualism in the mightily advantageous doctrine of *Mahātman*.

¹ The "Madhyāmika-śāstra" Chap., 25. Karika 19-20.

संस्कारमात्रं जगदेत्वं बुद्ध्या निरात्मकं दुःखविरुद्धिमात्रम् ।

विहाय यानर्यमयात्मदृष्टिः महात्मदृष्टिं त्रयते महार्याम् ॥¹

The *hindūman* which is here condemned as "fraught with bane" resembles in many respects the *ahankāra*² or egotism of Sāṅkhya philosophy. Egotism, in any form, is injurious to man, for it constitutes an unsurmountable barrier to his practising true morality either in domestic or in social life. And the reason is not far to seek, seeing that virtue, covetous of reward, must needs be an inferior incentive to noble action as compared to virtue that seeks no reward. The former is an outcome of *hindūman*, the latter, that of *andūman* or *mahātman*, according as we look upon it from the negative or the positive point of view. "The stage of *Mahātman*," says the Mahā-vairocana-abhisambodhi-sūtra, "can be attained only by the practice of the highest motive (*anuttarārtha*)." Again, "*Mahātman* is only another name for Buddhahood."³ It is explained as *Paramātman* by Asanga in his commentary on the well-known lines of the Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṅkāra-śāstra :—

शून्यतायां विशुद्धायां नैरात्मशास्त्रार्गलाभतः ।

बुद्धाः शुद्धात्मलाभित्वात् गता आत्ममहात्मताम् ॥

The commentary observes—

अनेनाभिसंधिना बुद्धानामनासवे धातौ परमात्मा व्यवस्थाप्यते ।⁴

¹ Asanga's "Mahāyāna-sūtra-alaṅkāra-śāstra," Chap. 14th, Kārika 37 of the Sanskrit Text. And Chinese version. Chap. 15th v. 24.

² The term here given as the synonym and definition of 'Egoism', is *abhimāna*, translated 'consciousness.' The ordinary sense of the word is *pride*, and the technical import is 'the pride or conceit of individuality ; 'self-sufficiency ; 'the notion that I do, I feel, I think, I am,' as explained by Vacaspati :—यत् स्वत्वाद्योचितं मतं च तदाहमधिकृतः यतः स्वत्वहमत मदयो एवमौ विषयाः नमो नाद्योवाधिकृतः कथिदत्त्वहमस्मिदोऽभिमानः सोऽसाधारणव्यवहारत्वादहंकारः । [i. e. 'I alone preside and have power over all that is perceived and known, and all these objects of sense are for my use. There is no other supreme except I ; I am. This pride, from its exclusive (selfish) application, is egoism.']

³ Nanjio's Cat. No. 534.

⁴ "The Mahāyāna-sūtra-alaṅkāra-śāstra," Chap. 9th, Kārika 23 (Sanskrit Text). And see Chap. 10th v. 19 of Chinese Translation.

A fuller explanation of *Mahātman* is given in a *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*¹ of the Sanskrit Canon, where it is stated that “by *ātman* (i.e., *Mahātman*) is meant the *Tathāgatagarbha*, a term which implies that all living beings are endowed with the essential nature of the *Tathāgata*,

Mahātman is identical with the *Paramātmān* and the *Tathāgatagarbha*.

of which, however, they are not aware as long as it is shrouded by the *kleśas* or passions, just as no man can discover a treasure in a poor woman’s dwelling, although

ages ago there may have been buried in it a basketful of the purest gold.”

The same *Sūtra* points out the identity of *Mahātman* with the indestructible *Tathāgatagarbha* which, though imperceptible to ordinary men, is realisable by one who has attained supreme and perfect enlightenment (*anuttara-samyak-sambodhi*.)

Now what is meant by the term *Tathāgatagarbha*? Literally it signifies “the womb of the *Tathāgata*,” that is to say, the treasure or store in which the essence of Buddhahood remains concealed under the veil of *avidyā* or ignorance, just as gems and metals lie hidden in the bowels of Mother Earth under the covering of filth and impurities. In other words, *Tathāgatagarbha* is another name for the ‘Womb of the Universe’ from which issue forth the myriad multitudes of things mental and material.

This idea of a universal womb is not peculiar to

The idea of the Universal Womb.

Buddhism, for it occurs also in the 14th Discourse of

the *Bhāgavadgīta*, *Kṛishṇa* is represented as saying to

Arjuna :—

मम योनिर्महद् ब्रह्म तस्मिन् गर्भं दधाम्यहम् ।

संभवः सर्वभूतानां ततो भवति भारत ॥

सर्वयोनिषु कौन्तेय मर्त्यः संभवन्ति याः ।

तासां ब्रह्म महद् योनिरहं बीजप्रदः पिता ॥

[i.e., “To me the great *Brahma* is a womb wherein I cast the seed. Thence comes the birth of all beings. In whatsoever womb mortals are born, their main womb is *Brahma* and I am the seed-giving father.”]

Psychologically speaking, the *Tathāgatagarbha* may be defined as “the transcendental soul of man, just coming under the bondage of *karmaic*

¹ Nanjio’s Cat. No. 112.

causation." And in certain sense the *Tathāgatagarbha* corresponds to the *Paramātmān* or the Universal Soul of the Vedantists, from which they suppose the world of phenomena to emanate. The term *paramātmān*, as has already been noticed above, was not unknown to the Buddhists. But between the Buddhist and the Vedantic conceptions of *paramātmān* there is a wide gulf which no exertion of ingenuity can bridge over. The Buddhists themselves took very great care to lay stress on this fact, as will be seen from the following extract from the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* :—

"Then the great Mahāmati Bodhisattva said to the Blessed One 'The *Tathāgatagarbha*, O Lord, has been described by thee as brilliant by nature and absolutely pure from beginning, as possessed of 32 characteristics, as abiding in the body of every living creature, as enveloped by the *skandhas*, *dhātus* and *āyatanas* like a costly gem covered by dross, as sullied by the defilements of erroneous imaginings and swayed by passion, malice and folly. It has also been described by thee as permanent, stable, blissful and everlasting. Is not this thy doctrine of the *Tathāgatagarbha* similar to the soul-theory of the Tīrthakaras (heretics) who maintain that the soul is an agent, everlasting, all pervading, undecaying and exempt from attributes?'

"Thereupon the Blessed One made answer thus to Mahāmati :—'My doctrine of the *Tathāgatagarbha*, O Mahāmati, differs widely from the soul-theory of the Tīrthakaras. Verily the *Tathāgatas* by preaching the doctrine of the *Tathāgatagarbha* as being constituted of the sphere of *śūnyatā*, Nirvāṇa, cessation of birth, and exemption from thoughts and imaginations, impart to the vulgar, for their easy comprehension the doctrine of the *Tathāgatagarbha* which transcends the range of thought and imagination, so that the vulgar may thereby get over the terrors of the doctrine of *anātman*. Now, O Mahāmati, the soul-theory deserves rejection at the hands of the Bodhisattvas of the present as well as of the future time. And just as a potter with his manual skill and by the employment of rod, water, and string, makes pots of various sorts out of a single heap of earth-particles, even so do the *Tathāgatas* preach the *anātman* (non-ego) of the phenomenal world by a variety of skilful and intelligent methods, sometimes teaching the doctrine of the *Tathāgatagarbha*, at others that of *Nairātmyam*, and their

having recourse to a variety of expressions and locutions reminds one of the potter's skill. For this reason it is, O Mahāmātī, that I say that the doctrine of the *Tathāgatagarbha* is entirely different from the soul-theory of the Tīrthakaras. Again the *Tathāgatas* preach the doctrine of the *Tathāgatagarbha*, for the purpose of converting the Tīrthakaras who cling to the soul-theory. Otherwise how would the transcendently perfect enlightenment become intelligible to those whose minds are confined within the narrow limits of the threefold emancipation and who have fallen into the heresy of believing in the existence of an *ātman*, which, in reality, does not exist. Therefore it is that the *Tathāgatas* preach the doctrine of the *Tathāgatagarbha* which is quite different from the soul-theory of the Tīrthakaras. Accordingly, thou, O Mahāmātī, shouldst follow the doctrines of *anātman* and *Tathāgatagarbha* which have been preached by the *Tathāgatas*, so that thou mayst be able to explode the heretical notions of the Tīrthakaras.”¹

The only European critic of Buddhism who has correctly stated the Buddhist point with respect to the soul is, as far as I know, Dr. Max Walleiser; and I gladly avail myself of this opportunity to recommend, for the perusal of such of you as may not have already read it, that erudite scholar's accurate exposition of early Buddhism as given in his excellent monograph entitled “*Die philosophische Grundlage des-älteren Buddhismus.*” It is highly desirable that this masterly treatise should be translated

¹ See Sikkhānanda's Chinese Version of the “*Laṅkāvatāra sūtra.*” (fasc. II). And the Sanskrit passage runs as follows:—

अथ खलु महामतिर् बोधिसत्त्वो महासत्त्वो भगवंतम् एतद् अबोधत् । तद्यागतगर्भः पुनर् भगवता नृणां तपति अनवर्णितः । स च किल तया प्रकृतिप्रभाक्षरविग्रहादि विग्रहं च वर्णते दासि शृङ्गचण्डरः सर्वस्य देहात्मनः, महाधर्मसूत्रं च मलिनवस्तुपरिवेष्टितम् इव सत्त्वधालायतनवस्तुपरिवेष्टितो रागद्वेषमहाभूत-परिकल्पमलमनो निधौ ध्रुवः शिवशाश्वतश्च भगवता वर्णितः । तत् कथम् अयं भगवन् तीर्थंकरास्मादतुल्यम् तद्यागतगर्भवादो न भवति । तीर्थंकरा अपि भगवन् नित्यः कर्ता निर्गुणो विमुरत्यय इति आत्मवादोपदेशं कुर्वन्ति ॥ भगवान् आह, न हि महामते तीर्थंकरास्मादतुल्यो मम तद्यागतगर्भोपदेशः, किं तु महामते तद्यागताः युक्ताभूतकोटिनिर्वाणानुपादानिमित्ताप्रविहिताद्यानां महामते पदार्थानां तद्यागतगर्भोपदेशं कृत्वा तद्यागता अर्हन्तः सत्यं सुबुद्धा वाक्ता नैरात्म्यसंवासपदविवर्जनायै निर्विकल्पनिराभासगोचरं तद्यागतगर्भं सुखोपदेनं दिशयन्ति । न च अथ महामते अनागतप्रत्युत्पन्नैः बोधिसत्त्वैर्महासत्त्वैरात्माभिनिवेशः कर्तव्यः । तद्यथा महामते कुम्भकार एकस्मात् स्वपरमात्मराशेर्विविधानि भांडानि करोति हस्तमित्यदृष्टोदकसुप्रवृद्ध-योगात् । एवमेव महामते तद्यागतास्तदेव धर्मनैरात्म्यं सर्वविकल्पवृत्तचरिनिवृत्तं विविधैः प्रज्ञोपायकीशल्य-योगैर्मोपदेशेन वा नैरात्म्योपदेशेन वा कुम्भकारवन्तैः पदव्यंजनपर्याधेदशयन्ति । एतस्मात् कारणात्

into English for the benefit of students of Buddhism in India, Burma and the Far East. Nor will it be found altogether uninteresting in the island of Ceylon, for in that reputed stronghold of Buddhism there prevail at the present day such misconceptions concerning the fundamental principles of Buddhism as would have brought a blush even to the cheeks of a declared enemy of Buddhism like Śāṅkarācārya. To quote a single instance, in an English Catechism of Buddhism published at Colombo in 1881 and bearing, as the learned Metropolitan of India informs us (*Buddhism*, 2nd Edition p. 282), the imprimatur of the time-honoured H. Sumangala, it is distinctly taught that "*the soul is a word used by the ignorant to express a false idea.*" If this is a serious specimen of the sort of religious instruction imparted to boys and girls in the Buddhist schools of Ceylon—

चेतो न लङ्घामयते मदीयम्

अन्यत्र कुत्रापि तु साभिलाषम् ॥

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NIRVĀṆA IS THE ONLY CALM.

(निर्वाणम् शान्तम् ।)

A correct idea of the principle of universal impermanence and of the absence of an Ego is absolutely indispensable to a right understanding of third *mudrā* or seal of Buddhism, which is formulated in the words '*Nirvāṇam Śāntam*' (i. e., "Nirvāṇa is the only calm"). This doctrine which is but a logical

महामते तीर्थकरात्मवादोपदेशस्तुल्यसंसारतन्मोपदेशो न भवति । एवं हि महामते तथ्यागतन्मोपदेशं चात्मवादविनिवृत्तिना तीर्थकराणां आकर्षणार्थं तथ्यागतन्मोपदेशेन निर्दिशन्ति कथं वत अभुतात्मविकल्पाद्विपत्तितायथा विमोक्षतन्मोपदेशपतितायथापि ताः विप्रसन्नतन्मोपदेशं सम्यक्संशोधिं अभिसंबुद्धेरन् इति । एतदर्थं महामते तथ्यागता अर्हन्तिः सम्यक्संज्ञां तथ्यागतन्मोपदेशं कुर्वन्ति । अत एतन्न भवति तीर्थकरात्मवादस्तुल्यम् । तस्मात्तर्हि महामते तीर्थकरवृत्तिविनिवृत्त्यर्थं तथ्यागतन्मोपदेशोपदेशा च न भवितव्यम् ॥

sequel of the *mudrās* of *anityam* ('Impermanence') and *anātman* ('Non-Ego') is regarded by the Buddhists as the central axis round which revolve the various schools of Buddhist philosophy. And in fact a thorough grasp of the essential principle of Nirvāṇa has not, without cause, been regarded as the *sine qua non* of any pretention to a mastery over Buddhist philosophy.

What, then, really is the essential principle of Buddhist Nirvāṇa? This very question was put nearly two thousand years ago, Nirvāṇa is really
 Indescribable. by the Greek monarch Menander or Milinda to a Buddhist elder named Nāgasena; and we who are removed from the age of Buddha by a far longer period of time than both Milinda and Nāgasena were, how can we ever expect to give a more satisfactory answer to the king's query than was given by that learned priest?

"Venerable Nāgasena", said King Milinda, "the Nirvāṇa of which you are always talking, can you explain to me by metaphor, elucidation, or argument, its form, figure, duration or measure?"

"That I cannot, O King," replied Nāgasena, "for Nirvāṇa has nothing similar to it." "I cannot bring myself to believe," continued Milinda, "that of Nirvāṇa which, after all, is a condition that exists, it should be impossible in any way to make us understand the form or figure, duration or measure. How do you explain this?"

"Tell me O King," said Nāgasena, "is there such a thing as the great ocean? "Yes" replied the king. "Now," continued the sage, "suppose some one were to ask your Majesty, how much water is in the ocean and how many the creatures that dwell therein; what would you answer?" "I would say to him", replied the king, "that such a question should not be asked, and that the point should be left alone, seeing that the physicists have never examined the ocean in that way and no one can measure the water or count the creatures that it contains. Such, Sir, would be my reply." "But why would Majesty", enquired the sage, "make such a reply? The ocean is after all a thing which really exists. You ought rather to tell the man that such and so much is the water of the ocean and such and so

many are the creatures that dwell therein." "That would be impossible," said the king, "for the answer to such a question is beyond human power." "Equally impossible O King," said Nāgasena, "is it to tell the measure, form, figure or duration of Nirvāṇa, although Nirvāṇa is a condition that after all does exist. And even if one endowed with magical powers may succeed in measuring the water and counting the creatures in the ocean, he would never be able to tell the form, figure, duration or measure of Nirvāṇa."¹

Such then being the case, there is no other way for us to realise Nirvāṇa save by experiencing it in our own selves by an earnest cultivation of it according to the methods prescribed in the Sacred Canon. This

Realisation of
Nirvāṇa.

is why Buddhism lays so much stress upon self-introspection in the case of aspirants to Buddhahood.

This explains also why all attempts to explain the real nature of Nirvāṇa have invariably been attended with failure or, at best, with very scant success; while details with respect to the training which has to be undergone by one who longs for its attainment, are given in the Sacred Canon with a fulness which would prove tedious even to the most patient of human beings. It is a significant fact also that Nāgārjuna himself has recourse to negatives when he comes to describe the characteristics of Nirvāṇa :—

अप्रतीतमसम्प्राप्तमनुच्छिन्नमशश्वतम् ।

अनिर्दृष्टमनुत्पन्नमेव निर्वाणमुच्यते ॥²

[i.e., "That is called 'Nirvāṇa' which is not acquired, not reached, not extirpated, not eternal, not suppressed, not produced."]

From pre-Buddhistic times the word Nirvāṇa came to signify, in the Sanskrit language, the *summum bonum* of man. In this sense it is of frequent occurrence in the Mahābhārata, as has been shown by Father Dahlman in his monograph on Nirvāṇa. The original and radical meaning of the word seems to have been a negative one, that is to say, the 'cessation' or 'absence' of something, though in course

¹ "The question of King Milinda," Part II, PP. 186-187. (S. B. E. Vol. xxxvi.)

² "The Madhyâmika Śāstra," Chap. XXV, Kārika 3.

of time it came, like the English word '*innocence*' (अहिंसा) to acquire a positive signification. Sanskrit grammarians derive the word from the root *cā* in the sence of 'blowing,' with the addition of the prefix '*nir*' which denotes absence or privation. By the well-known rule of Pāṇini निर्वाचो वाचिः the past participial suffix '*Ta*' is replaced by '*Na*' when the word is applied to the wind. Thus the root meaning of Nirvāṇa, according to the Sanskrit Grammarians, seems to have been 'cessation of a gust of wind' and, by a slight stretch of meaning, the word came to be applied the extinction of a lamp. Pāli scholars will here recollect the well-known lines illustrating this idea :—
"Dīpaṃs' iva nibbānaṃ vimokkha aha cetasa" (i.e., "The emancipation of my mind was like the blowing out of a lamp"); *"Nibbaṇti dhīrā gathāyaṃ padīpa"* (i.e., "The wise attain Nirvāṇa like this lamp attaining extinction"). But though such is its original and etymological signification, the Buddhists, from comparatively early times, availing themselves of the enormous flexibility of the Sanskrit language in matters of derivation, undertook to interpret the word Nirvāṇa in a variety of ways agreeing with their conception of its different aspects. Thus in that great philosophical encyclopaedia of the Hinayāna, entitled Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣa-śāstra, which is extant only in Hiouen Tsaṅg's Chinese translation, the following derivations of the word Nirvāṇa are given :—

(a) '*Vāna*' means 'the path of transmigration' and '*Nir*' means 'leaving off' or 'being away from.' Therefore 'Nirvāṇa' means 'the leaving off permanently all the paths of transmigration.'

(b) And again : '*Vāna*' means 'stench' and '*Nir*' means 'not', and these two combined (i.e., Nirvāṇa), mean 'a state altogether free from the stench of vexatious Karmas'.

(c) And again : '*Vāna*' means 'a dense forest' and '*Nir*' means 'to get rid permanently of,' so that 'Nirvāṇa' means 'a state which has got rid permanently of the dense forest of the *skandhas*, the three fires (of lust, malice and folly,) and the three attributes of things (*viz* : origination, stay, and destruction)."¹

¹ "The Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣa-Śāstra," fasc. 32.

(d) And again: '*Vāna*' means 'weaving' and '*Nir*' means 'not'; so that '*Nirvāṇa*' means 'a state in which there is the entire absence of the thread of vexatious Karmas and in which the texture of birth and death is not to be woven.'¹

So varied and so deep were the meanings with which the Buddhist mind loved to impregnate the word *Nirvāṇa*. And it is this circumstance which probably accounts for the well-known fact that the Chinese translators of the Sacred Canon of the Buddhists, after having tried to render the word by something like forty unsatisfactory equivalents, indicative of the idea of emancipation, absolute calm, and supreme bliss, were, at last, forced to transplant that word bodily into the Chinese language in the form of *Nie Pan*. But the tendency for fanciful derivations in matters religious, of which we have had a number of examples above, is not confined to the East alone. It used to predominate a few centuries ago even in Christian Europe. Thus, in a sermon preached by Bishop Andrewes before King James I. of English on Christmas-day, 1614 the learned divine, shows a superlative example of etymological temerity in his derivation of the name *Immanuel* which, according to the Gospel of Matthew (I. 23) means 'God with us.' But Bishop Andrewes improves on the Apostle's derivation and goes on to say:—"Without Him in this world" saith the Apostle; and if without Him in this; without Him in the next; and, if without Him there—if it be not *Immanuel*, it will be *Immanu-hell*: and, that no other place will fall, I fear me, to our share. Without Him, this we are. What, with Him? Why, if we have him, and God by him, we need no more; *Immanu-el* and *Immanu-all*."

To return to our main point, I have already said in a previous lecture that the principal of Universal impermanence and of non-Ego are concerned with the phenomenal world, while the principle of '*Nirvāṇa* being the only calm' has to do with the noumenal world. In other words, the realisation of the first two principles leads to the eradication of the manifold causes of *samsāra*, such as illusions, evil passions, etc.; while a correct understanding of the third principle helps in laying the foundation of the fabric of true enlightenment and supreme bliss.

¹ The two aspects of *Nirvāṇa*.

In its negative aspect, Nirvāṇa is the extinction of the threefold fires of lust, malice and folly; that is to say, it conduces to the utter annihilation of all thoughts of selfishness, to the complete removal of suffering, and to absolute liberation from the round of birth and death.

In its positive aspect, Nirvāṇa consists in the practice of the three cardinal virtues of generosity, love and wisdom; that is to say, in the practice of altruism, of purity and peacefulness of heart, and in shaking off all fetters, such as ignorance etc. The positive aspect of Nirvāṇa has been excellently described in the *Questions of Milinda* from which I beg leave to quote the following extract:

Nāgasena's beautiful illustrations.

"Venerable Nāgasena," said Milinda, "I grant that Nirvāṇa is bliss unalloyed, and yet that is impossible to make clear, either by simile or explanation, by reason or by argument, its form or its figure or its duration or its size. But is there no quality of Nirvāṇa which is inherent also in other things that it can be made evident by metaphor?"

"Though there is nothing as to its form which can be so explained, there is something" replied Nāgasena, "as to its quality which can." "O happy word, Nāgasena! Speak then," said the King, "that I may have an explanation of even one point in the characteristics of Nirvāṇa. Appease the fever of my heart by the cool breeze of your words!" "There is," said the sage, "one quality of the **lotus**, O King, inherent in Nirvāṇa, and two qualities of **water**, and three of **medicine** and four of the **ocean**, five of **food**, and ten of **space**, and three of the **wish-conferring gem** and three of **red sandal-wood** and three of the froth of **ghee**, and five of a **mountain-peak**." "As the **lotus**, O King, is unternished by the water, so is Nirvāṇa unternished by any evil dispositions. This is the one quality of the lotus inherent in Nirvāṇa. As **water**, O King, is cool and assuages heat, so also is Nirvāṇa cool and assuages the fever arising from all evil dispositions. This is the first quality of water inherent in Nirvāṇa. And again, O King, as water allays the thirst of men and beasts when they are exhausted and anxious, craving for drink, and tormented by thirst, so does Nirvāṇa allay the thirst of the craving after lusts, the craving after future life, and the craving after utter extinction. This is the second

quality of water inherent in Nirvāṇa.—As **medicine**, O King, is the refuge of beings tormented by poison, so is Nirvāṇa the refuge of beings tormented with the poison of evil dispositions. This is the first quality of medicine inherent in Nirvāṇa. And again, O King, as medicine puts an end to diseases, so does Nirvāṇa put an end to griefs. This is the second quality of medicine inherent in Nirvāṇa. And again, O King, as medicine is ambrosia, so also is Nirvāṇa ambrosia. This is the third quality of medicine inherent in Nirvāṇa.—As the **ocean**, O king, is empty of corpses, so also is Nirvāṇa empty of the dead bodies of all evil dispositions. This, O King, is the first quality of the ocean inherent in Nirvāṇa. And again, O King, as the ocean is mighty and boundless and fills not with all rivers that flow into it, so is Nirvāṇa mighty and boundless and fills not with all beings who enter into it. This is the second quality of the ocean inherent in Nirvāṇa. And again, O King, as the ocean is the abode of mighty creatures, so is Nirvāṇa the abode of great men, Arhats in whom the great evils and all stains have been destroyed, endowed with power, master of themselves. This is the third quality of the ocean inherent in Nirvāṇa. And again, O King, as the ocean is all in blossom, as it were, with the innumerable and various and fine flowers of the ripple of its waves, so is Nirvāṇa all in blossom, as it were, with the innumerable and various and fine flowers of purity, of knowledge and of emancipation. This is the fourth quality of the ocean inherent in Nirvāṇa.—As **food**, O King, is the support of the life of all beings, so is Nirvāṇa, when it has been realised, the support of life, for it puts an end to old age and death. This is the first quality of food inherent in Nirvāṇa. And again, O King, as food increases the strength of all beings, so does Nirvāṇa, when it has been realised, increase the power of Iddhi of all beings. This is the second quality of food inherent in Nirvāṇa. And again, O King, as food is the source of the beauty of all beings, so is Nirvāṇa, when it has been realised, the source to all beings of the beauty of holiness. This is the third quality of food inherent in Nirvāṇa. And again, O King, as food puts a stop to suffering, in all beings, so does Nirvāṇa, when it has been realised, put a stop in all beings to the suffering arising from every evil disposition. This is the fourth quality of food inherent in Nirvāṇa. And again, O King, as food overcomes, in all

beings, the weakness of hunger, so does Nirvâṇa, when it has been realised, overcome, in all beings, the weakness which arises from hunger and every sort of pain. This is the fifth quality of food inherent in Nirvâṇa.—As **space**, O King, neither is born nor grows old, neither dies nor passes away nor has a future life to spring up into, as it is incompressible, cannot be carried off by thieves, rests on nothing, is the sphere in which birds fly, is unobstructed, and is infinite; so, O King, Nirvâṇa is not born, neither does it grow old, it dies not, it passes not away, it has no rebirth, it is unconquerable, thieves carry it not off, it is not attached to anything, it is the sphere in which Arhats move, nothing can obstruct it, and it is infinite. These are the ten qualities of space inherent in Nirvâṇa.—As the **wishing-gem**, O King, satisfies every desire, so also does Nirvâṇa. This is the first quality of the wishing-gem inherent in Nirvâṇa. And again, O King, as the wishing-gem causes delight, so also does Nirvâṇa. This is the second quality of the wishing-gem inherent in Nirvâṇa. And again, O King, as the wishing-gem is full of lustre, so also in Nirvâṇa. This is the third quality of the wishing-gem inherent in Nirvâṇa.—As **red sandal-wood**, O King, is hard to get, so is Nirvâṇa hard to attain to. This is the first quality of red sandal-wood inherent in Nirvâṇa. As it is unequalled in the beauty of its perfume, so is Nirvâṇa. This is the second quality of red sandal-wood inherent in Nirvâṇa. And again, O King, as red sandal-wood is praised by all good people, so is Nirvâṇa praised by all the Noble ones. This is the third quality of red sandal-wood inherent in Nirvâṇa.—As **ghee** is beautiful in colour, O King, so also is Nirvâṇa beautiful in righteousness. This is the first quality of ghee inherent in Nirvâṇa. As ghee has a pleasant perfume, so also has Nirvâṇa the pleasant perfume of righteousness. This is the second quality of ghee inherent in Nirvâṇa. And again, O King, as ghee has a pleasant taste, so also has Nirvâṇa. This is the third quality of ghee inherent in Nirvâṇa.—As a **mountain-peak** is very lofty, so also is Nirvâṇa very exalted. This is the first quality of a mountain-peak inherent in Nirvâṇa. And again, O King, as a mountain-peak is immovable, so also is Nirvâṇa. This is the second quality of a mountain-peak inherent in Nirvâṇa. And again, O King, as a mountain-peak is inaccessible, so also is Nirvâṇa inaccessible to all evil dispositions. This is the

third quality of a mountain-peak inherent in Nirvāṇa. And again, O King, as a mountain-peak is a place where no plants can grow, so also is Nirvāṇa a condition in which no evil dispositions can grow. This is the fourth quality of a mountain-peak inherent in Nirvāṇa. And again, O King, as a mountain-peak is free alike from desire to please and from resentment, so also is Nirvāṇa. This is the fifth quality of a mountain-peak inherent in Nirvāṇa." "Very good, Nāgasena. That is so, and I accept it as you say" replied the king.¹

This somewhat lengthy quotation might appear tedious to some of you, but perhaps it has a justification in the fact that it is probably the best known illustration of the qualities of Nirvāṇa and contradicts the so-

Artificial distinction between the two so-called sorts of Nirvāṇa.

called distinction drawn by some scholars of Buddhism between the Nirvāṇa of the Mahāyāna and that of the Hīnayāna. The former is supposed by them to possess, in contradistinction to the latter, four qualities, *viz.*, permanence, blissfulness, freedom and purity. But surely these qualities are not omitted from the list of the properties of Nirvāṇa as given in the extract quoted above from the *Questions of Milinda*, a Pāli work which belongs to the Lesser Vehicle. Of course, I do not mean to deny that, considering the fact that Buddhism is still a living religion, the Buddhist idea of Nirvāṇa has passed through a long process of evolution, or that it has been subjected to numerous different interpretations, ever since the day when it was preached for the first time, 2,500 years ago, by the princely ascetic of the Sakya race in the Deer-park at Isipatana near Benares. But a treatment of this important subject, which is so valuable to those who wish to study the history of human thought in the East, does not, I regret to say come within the scope of my lectures. Nevertheless, it is impossible to overlook the fact that the priestly adherents of the Lesser Vehicle have been led, by their misconception of the true sense of

Hīnayānistic misconception of Nirvāṇa.

the Nirvāṇa which was preached by Buddha, to devote themselves to a life of fruitless inactivity; whereas quite the contrary is the case with the followers of the Mahāyāna. The Hīnayānists of the present day, claiming, as they do, that

¹ S. B. E., Vol., xxxvi. pp. 188—195.

they belong to primitive Buddhism, seem to imagine that calmness and peace cannot co-exist with activity,—a delusion belied by the very manner of Buddha's own life which is an incontestable proof of the possibility of calmness and peace being consistent with all higher sorts of human activity. Nor can Hīnayānism satisfactorily establish its claim to be regarded as the authoritative representation *par excellence* of original Buddhism. Buddha, as you all know, died without himself leaving any document embodying the whole system of the religion he preached; and if you were to read Vasumitra's treatise of which I spoke in my first lecture, you would know how there sprang up, soon after Buddha's decease, a number of schools each of which explained the Master's views in its own way and claimed the legitimate interpretation for its own self.

Thus the Vatsīputriyas maintained the existence of *ātman* by turning and twisting the sense of several *convenient* passages of the Sacred Canon, like the Sūtra of the Burden Bearer, in which the word *ātma* or *puṅgava* happen to occur.

In like manner, at the present day, when the Buddhists of Ceylon, Burma or Siam seek to support their favourite quietistic interpretation of Nīrvāṇa, they have recourse to canonical passages like the following stanza of the Ratanasūttam.

Khīnam purāṇam, navam n'atthi sambhavam,
 Virattacitta ayatike bhavasmim,
 te khīnabīja avirellichanda
 nibbanti dhīra yathayam padīpo,
 idampi Saṃghe ratanam paṇītam.
 etena saccena suvatthi hotu.¹

[i.e., "The old is destroyed, the new has not arisen, those whose minds are disgusted with a future existence, the wise who have destroyed their seeds (of existence, and) whose desires do not increase, go out like this lamp. This excellent jewel (is found) in the Assembly. By this truth may there be salvation!"]

¹ Ratna Sutta, Verse 14. And see Coomāra Swāmy's translation of Sutta Nipāta. p. 64

But with all their fondness for following, to the very letter, what they have been taught to regard as *Buddharacanam*, the Buddhist monks in Ceylon, Burma and Siam lose sight of the glaring fact that a life of inactivity, miscalled meditation, has been condemned by Buddha in the most emphatic terms. And instead of following the philanthropic example of their great Teacher and raising the moral level of those in the midst of whom they live, the monks practise many an art and craft such as sorcery,

Nirvāṇa as understood in Ceylon. Its demoralising influence.

alchemy, fortune telling, etc. which are expressly prohibited in the *sīlas*. Thus, as Bishop Copleston tells us (*Buddhism*, 2nd. Edition, page 260), and as I myself have seen with my own eyes, the Bhikshus of Ceylon, while rejecting, as forbidden by Buddha, all approved means of honest livelihood, repeat charms of protection at the opening of a new house or on the occasion of a child's first eating rice, perform the part of astrologers and make horoscopes for new-born children, officiate when water is poured for the benefit of the spirit after a corpse has been laid in the grave etc., etc. And in doing such things they become conveniently oblivious of the fact that Buddha himself, according to the testimony of their own Sacred Canon, never approved of them. These doubtful practices may perhaps be said to constitute the dark side of Sinhalese monastic life; but what does its bright side consist in? The pious Sinhalese Buddhists will probably mention, to the credit of the monks of their country, that the Sangha take part in the *Bana-pinkamas* or the meritorious act of reciting the Sacred Books for the benefit of the laity. These *pinkamas* form the great delight and entertainment of the Sinhalese people and are preceded by long and elaborate preparations. The theory is that, in return for gifts and good which they receive from the laity, the monks ought to give to them the opportunity of acquiring the merit of hearing or, at least, seeing the Sacred Books read. Accordingly, on such *pinkama* days, the monks take it by turns to read, with their Sinhalese comments or explanations, the Pāli Sūtras or, what is far more popular, the Jātaka stories. But, as Bishop Copleston rightly observes, the acquaintance of the common people with the classical Sinhalese, in which the commentaries are mostly written, and that of the monks with the Pāli original, is far too

small for any meaning to be conveyed, in the majority of cases, by the reading and interpretation of the Sacred Books. Now, in these days of scientific progress, might not the clergy of Ceylon, I beg leave to ask, be spared the labour of exerting their vocal organs caused by the rapid interchange of each word of the Pāli text with its corresponding Sinhalese equivalent, as has to be done by pairs of them during those *lamashas* which are called 'merit-acts of recitation.' Surely the pious laity may be enjoined, with advantage, by the Sinhalese clergy to employ gramophones on such occasions. And a procedure of this sort would not only not constitute a violation of the rules of the Vinaya, seeing that nowhere has Buddha proscribed the use of a gramophone, but would actually be consistent with the Sinhalese conception of Nirvāṇa as a complete cessation of all activity, not to mention the merit accruing from gifts given to the Sangha.

Ye puggala aṭṭha satam pasaṭṭha
cattari etani yugani honti,
te dakkhineyya Sugataessa savaka,
etesu dinnani mat apphalani.
idam pi Saṃghe ratanam paṇṭam,
etena saecena suvatti hotu!

which means according to the orthodox Sinhalese interpretation as given in Sir M. Kumāraswāmi's version :—"If there be one hundred¹ and eight (!) priests praised (by the saints), they are the four pairs. They are disciples of Buddha, worthy of offerings. Things given to them become fruitful, and this excellent jewel (is found) in the Association (of priests May there be happiness from this truth!"²

I am sure that in return for such gifts the Sinhalese clergy will bless the donors with all their heart, wishing (Beware of applying the word 'praying' to the orthodox adherents of "primitive" Buddhism!) that the gramophones thus presented to the Sangha, may facilitate the attainment of Nirvāṇa to the givers of them—*dayakānam nibbanapaccaya hontu*.

¹ The real meaning is "eight persons praised by the good" as the Commentary explains it. 'Satam' = *Sk.* सताम् here.

² See Sir Kumāraswāmi's English version of Sutta Nipāta, p. 62.

But such though may be the modern monastic conception of Nirvâṇa in the lands of the Lesser Vehicle, that is to say, in Ceylon, Burma and Siam, it must be urged in their favour that they themselves are not responsible for this erroneous view of Nirvâṇa, which is older than the Lankâvatara Sûtra where it is condemned as an unsound and unorthodox opinion. In the third chapter of this Sûtra there

The nihilistic view of Nirvâṇa is an orthodox.

occurs the famous criticism of the twenty heretical views concerning Nirvâṇa, the importance of which was first pointed out by the illustrious Burnouf in his *Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien*. The first of these views, which is that of the Hīnayāna, is described as follows :—

तत्र केचित्तावन्महामते तीर्थकराः—स्कन्धधात्वायतननिरोधाद्विषयवैराग्या-
द्वित्र्यं वैधर्म्यदर्शनाच्चित्तचैतकलापो न प्रवर्तते, अतीतानागतप्रत्युत्पन्नविषयाननु-
स्मरणात् दीपबीजानलवदुपादानोपरमादप्रवृत्तिर्विकल्पस्येति” वर्णयन्ति। अत-
स्तेषां निर्वाणबुद्धिर्भवति, न च महामते विनाशदृष्ट्या निवार्यते ॥¹

i. e., “There are some who maintain that by the extermination of the *Skandhas*, *Dhatus* and the *Āyatanas*, by an aversion to the objects of the senses consequent thereon, and by fixing one’s attention always on the difference of attributes among things, there arises a cessation of thought and of what appertains to thought, and that the cessation of imagination in consequence of a non-remembrance of the past, the future and the present, resembles the extinction of light, the destruction of seed and the quenching of fire for want of aliment. Such is their conception of Nirvâṇa. But Nirvâṇa, O Mahamati, cannot be attained by a view of annihilation.”

The correct view of Nirvâṇa has been given by Nāgārjuna who identifies it with Samsāra, as I have already pointed out in a previous lecture.

What Nirvâṇa really means. In fact the relation which Samsāra bears to Nirvâṇa is the same as that which a wave bears to water. This is exactly what Nāgārjuna means when he says that “That which under

¹ Nanjio's Cat. No. 175, 176 and 177. There is one Sanskrit text of this Sûtra in the Library of the Asiatic Society of Bengal. Sikkhānanda's Chinese version agrees with the Sanskrit text.

the influence of causes and condition is Samsāra, is, when exempt from the influence of causes and conditions, to be taken as Nirvāṇa."

य आजवंजवीभाव उपादाय प्रतीत्य वा ।

सोऽप्रतीत्यानुपादाय निर्वाणमुपदिश्यते ॥¹

In the technical language of Buddhist philosophy, Nirvāṇa has been described as follows in the Lankāvatāra Sūtra:—

अन्ये पुनर्महामते वर्णयन्ति सर्वज्ञसिंहनादनादिनो यथा स्वचित्तदृश्यमात्राव-
बोधात् बाह्यभावाभावेनाभिनिवेशाच्चातुष्कोटिक-रहितयथाभूतावस्थानदर्शनात्
स्वचित्तदृश्यविकल्पस्यान्तद्वयपतनतया ग्राह्यग्राहकानुपलब्धैः सर्वप्रमाणग्रहणा-
प्रवृत्तिदर्शनात्तत्त्वस्य व्यामोहत्वादग्रहणन्तत्त्वस्य तदव्युदासात् सर्वप्रमाणस्व-
प्रत्याकार्यधर्माधिगमाच्चैरात्म्यद्वयावबोधात् क्लेशद्वयावरणद्वयविशुद्धत्वात् भूम्युत्तरो-
त्तरतयागतभूमिमायादिविज्ञसमाधिचित्तमनोविज्ञानव्यावृत्तेर्निर्वाणं कल्पयन्ति ॥

This extremely difficult passage which puzzled even Burnouf who
Technical definition of Nirvāṇa. called it "*un véritable galimatias*," becomes fortunately
intelligible to us through the help of the extant Tibetan
and Chinese versions. It may be paraphrased as follows:—

"Nirvāṇa is attainable by a cessation of cognition when the mind has
been fixed on all the *saṃdhi* from the *Māyasaṃdhi* upwards, which
gradually lead up to the stage of the Tathāgata, after the following ante-
cedent conditions have been fulfilled:—

- (i) realisation of the non-existence of external things by knowing them
to be the creations of one's own fancy,
- (ii) realisation of the position of Suchness as being free from the
fourfold limitations [or (i) existence, (ii) non-existence, (iii)
existence *plus* non-existence and (iv) neither existence nor non-
existence.]
- (iii) rejection of the subject and object of perception by rejecting the
two extremes of imagination [*i.e.*, 'is' and 'is not'] concerning
the creations of one's own mind.

¹ The Madhyamika Sāstra. Chap. xxv. Kārika 9.

- (iv) realisation of the impossibility of accepting any evidence as conclusive.
- (v) non-adherence even to Truth by regarding it as illusory.
- (vi) comprehension of the Noble Dharma as being the embodiment of all evidence.
- (vii) comprehension of the two sorts of Nairātmya, and
- (viii) removal of the two forms of *Kleśas*, (*viz.*, intellectual and habitual) and of the two sorts of veil (*viz.* passion and conventionalism.)"

This description of Nirvāṇa is, I acknowledge, perhaps almost as difficult to understand as Nirvāṇa itself is to realise, but were I to attempt to elucidate it at this stage, I would have to include in the elucidation the main substance of what is going to form the subject of my succeeding lectures, so that my not explaining it now merely means that the passage will become perfectly intelligible to you after you have gone through the few lectures which I have yet to deliver. My remarks, it is needless to say, do not apply to such of you as already know the meaning of the passage.

CHAPTER II.

KARMA-PHENOMENOLOGY.¹

The Two sides of Buddhist Philosophy.

Before I proceed to treat of the main subject of my present lecture, *viz.*, Karma-phenomenology, I must explain to you, by way of introduction, what are known as the two sides of Buddhist Philosophy. Students of

The two central problems of European philosophy.

European philosophy will recollect the two central problems with which it is mainly concerned, *viz.*

1. The determination of the relation between reality and cognition ;
2. The determination of what constitutes the substance of reality.

In Buddhist philosophy, the school which treats of the first of these two problems, is that of the *Vijñānavāddins* and that which treats of the second, is that of the *Madhyamikas*.

The problem of the determination of what constitutes the substance of

The principal opinion about the substance of reality.

reality, resolves itself, as is probably well known to you, into two principal heads of opinion called (a) singularism ; (b) pluralism ; that is to say, whether

the substance of reality is (a) one or (b) more than one. The Singularists attempt to explain the problem of the Universe with the help of a single fundamental principle, while the Pluralists have recourse to more than one. In modern European philosophy the Singularists are represented by Lotze and Hartmann, Fichte and Schelling. In ancient Greek philosophy, Singularism had its adherents in the Eleatics who maintained the unity of being, be it a formal or essential unity as formulated by Parmenides and Xenophanes, or be it a mere unity of matter as laid down by Melissus. Plato also regarded unity to be the essential cause of his "Ideas," which again were, according to him, the essential causes of everything else.

¹ Japanese: *Gōkan-pengi-ron*.

In Buddhist philosophy, the appellation of Singularists would be applicable, on the one hand, to Nāgārjuna and his disciple Āryadeva who accept *śūnyatā* as the sole fundamental principle, and, on the other, to Aśvaghoṣa who considers "Suchness" to be the underlying substance of the universe; while the Pluralists would be represented by the *Sarvāstivādin*¹ who include the *Vaibhāṣikas*² and *Sautrāntikas*.³

The fundamental principle of Reality, as you all know, subdivides itself into two heads, *viz.*, (1) the Metaphysical or Ontological principle which indicates the final essence of reality, and (2) the Phenomenological or Cosmological principle which deals with the variety of changeable phenomena. To the metaphysical principle belong, in European philosophy, Idealism, Materialism, Doctrine of Identity ('*Identitätslehre*'), Agnosticism, Monism and Dualism; and, in Buddhist philosophy, *Sarvāstivāda*, *Bhūtatahatāvāda* and the *Madhyamika* doctrine. To the phenomenological principle belong, in European philosophy, Mechanism, Teleology (including Rational Teleology), and, in Buddhist philosophy, *Bhūtatahatāvāda*, *Vijñānavāda* and in a way also *Sarvāstivāda*.⁴

In fact, with the complexity of its divisions and sub-divisions, Buddhist philosophy may be aptly compared to a gigantic banyan tree which has been steadily growing up for nearly twenty five centuries, in such a manner that its original trunk now defies the search of an investigator who approaches it for the first time. He who desires to find for himself an entrance into the stupendous structure of this philosophy, without adequate guidance, is sure to be bewildered and disheartened by the sight of its labyrinthine complications. Accordingly, I may say without exaggeration that I shall consider myself amply repaid for my labours if my humble

¹ Jap: *Issei-ubu-shiō* or *Uba*.

² Jap: *Fusheten-ronshi*.

³ Jap: *Kiōpa-bu* or *Kiōbu*.

⁴ The theory of Karma of the *Sarvāstivādin* school is to be included in Buddhist Phenomenology.

performance should, in any way, contribute to relieve the perplexity of students of Buddhism by enabling them to get at the main trunk of this intricate system. To succeed in my proposed task, I must endeavour, at the very outset, to point out what have been considered in the Buddhist world to be the fundamental problems treated of in Buddha's teachings, as far as they can be gathered from the *Tripitaka*. The opinions of the most celebrated scholars in China and Japan, whose informations are mainly based on the Chinese translations of the Sacred Canon, concur in the conclusion that the principal doctrines of Buddhism fall within the area of the Ontological and the Phenomenological principles, both of which form, as it were, the warp and woof of the texture of Buddhist philosophy. Any attempts to understand Buddhism by wading through the monstrous bulk of the Sacred Canon of the Buddhists, in complete ignorance or utter forgetfulness of the facts mentioned above, is found to prove, in the end, a labour absolutely lost.

To return to our main point, it is needless for me to dwell upon, any longer, on the finity of phenomena and the infinity of noumena. But how do phenomena, though finite, arise in all their variableness from noumena which are infinite and uniform? Or, to take a more concrete example, considering the waves to be the phenomena, and the water to be the noumenon, how, we may ask, do the multiform waves arise out of uniform water, and what, in reality, is the true nature of water itself? The answer to the former half of this question belongs to the domain of that branch of philosophy which is known as Phenomenology and the answer to the latter half forms part of Ontology. At least, such would be the case in Buddhist philosophy in which Phenomenology is the term applied to that method of study which is concerned with the causes and conditions of the phenomenal world in the temporal scheme, while Ontology is the name given to the method of study which treats of the nature of noumena in the spacial scheme. Though neither of these two can be adequately treated without a reference to the other, nevertheless, in an attempt to trace the theoretical development of Buddhism by separating from one another the numerous trains of

thought, which, at first sight, appear to be inextricably blended together in a hopelessly confused mass, it will be extremely convenient to take up each of them by itself.

The Ontological principle, in early Buddhism, is represented by the three great *mudras* or seals which I have explained at considerable length in my earlier lectures. I have also pointed out there that the Universe is divisible into noumena and phenomena, the latter being finite and the former infinite. The principle of Nirvâṇa being the only calm appertains, as I have already said, to noumena, while, if we subdivide phenomena into temporal and spacial, to the former of these sub-divisions will be applicable the law of universal impermanence and to the latter the principle of non-ego.

In early Buddhism the Phenomenological principle is represented by the doctrine of the Four Noble Truths and that of the Twelve-linked Chain of Causation. Before proceeding further, let us take a brief survey of Buddhist philosophy from the aspects, respectively, of Phenomenology and Ontology. Phenomenology is represented therein by the doctrines of *Karma*, *Ālaya*, *Bhūtatathatā* and *Dharmadhātū*, four of the most abstruse terms in Buddhist philosophy, which may be here tentatively rendered by 'Action,' 'Repository,' 'Suchness,' 'Oneness' of the totality of things or the great Soul. Ontology in Buddhist philosophy is represented by the realistic theory of the Sarvāstivādin, the Satyasiddhi school which adheres to absolute *Śūnyatā* and the Madhyamika school whose idea of *Śūnyatā* is somewhat different. If we go beyond the limits of India, we shall have to include among the Ontological schools the Tien-Tai school of China and Japan.

What I have just now stated is nothing new ; for nearly ten centuries ago, a learned scholar of the Ten-Dai school of Japan, named Genshin, wrote in his Chinese commentary on the Lotus of the Good Law :—"The apparently complicated teachings of Buddha admit of numerous divisions and sub-divisions, which, however, fall into two main heads, when we have got at their essential outlines. These heads are (α) the Ontological system

and (b) the Phenomenological system. The former explains the nature of noumenon without losing sight of phenomenon, while the latter explains phenomenon without losing sight of the noumenon."

But, while applying the term Phenomenology to Buddhist philosophy,

The difference between Buddhist phenomenology and that of European philosophy.

we must not forget that between Buddhist phenomenology and the phenomenology of European philosophy, there is a great difference in the method of treatment. European philosophy treats of the phenomena of the universe objectively, while Buddhism treats of all things subjectively. One of the distinctive features of Buddhism is that its phenomenology regards all that is in the universe as the subjective product of the living mind, since the starting point of Buddhism is the question "Whence came the various phenomena of human life?" and not an investigation into the origin of the universe. In other words, it is the view of human life which forms the central problem in Buddhist phenomenology, and, it is on the conclusions arrived at after an enquiry into human life, that its view of the universe is based. The solution, accordingly, of this great problem is attempted by Buddhism not objectively but subjectively. It follows, therefore, that the doctrine of the Four Noble Truths, the Twelve-linked Chain of Causation, Ālaya and Bhūtatathatā are, as their very names indicate, of the nature of subjective propositions. The Buddhists regard this as the inevitable outcome of the fundamental theory of autonomic morality as taught by the Blessed One. Buddhist phenomenology can, therefore, we may affirm, lay a just claim to the title of Subjectivism.

Compared with its wealth of phenomenology, the subjective aspect of

Reality cannot be explained unless it is objectivized.

Buddhism, large though it is, dwindles into insignificance. In general philosophy, as you all know, for facility of interpretation, reality is objectivized or, to be more technical, noumena are phenomenized. And the reason of this is not far to seek, seeing that whatever is to be explained with human speech must be treated as an objective thing, whereas reality or noumenon, or, if you prefer Kant's phrase, the "Thing-in-itself" (*Das*

Ding an sich'), is, do what you will, unknowable and indescribable after all. Not being an object of cognition, reality can never be reduced to logical explanation by our conventional knowledge. The noumenal world with its intangible panorama is visible only to the gaze of intuition or self-

Intuition or self-experience is the only way to see the real aspects of the noumenal world.

experience acquired through a long process of mental and bodily training. The etymological ingenuity of Indian Buddhists discovered, curiously enough, a proof of this truth in the word *Śāntam* which occurs in the third great seal of Buddhism, *Nirvāṇam Śāntam* (i.e., Nirvāṇa is the only calm.) '*Śāntam*' is the perfect participle passive of the Sanskrit verbal root '*Śāta*' which means, according to the grammarians, 'to desist' generally and in particular 'to desist from speaking.' Availing themselves of this latter meaning of the verbal root, Indian Buddhists made out that the words *Nirvāṇam Śāntam* signify not only that '*Nirvāṇa is the only calm*' but that "*Nirvāṇa (belonging as it does to the noumenal world) is something which cannot be spoken of or described.*" This sort of deep and double interpretation seems to have had a great fascination for religious minds of antiquity and reminds us of the famous anecdote about a mediæval Italian divine who, in his ignorance of the Greek language and out of hatred for the Greek church, refused to believe that the fish-symbol of the early Christians represented the words *I (esus) CH (ristos) TH (eu) I (os) S (oter)* [i.e. (in Greek) "Jesus Christ, Son of God Saviour"], but faithful to his devotion to the Vulgate and his love of the Latin tongue, discovered, to his own satisfaction at least, that the symbol represented the word '*Piscis*' which means 'fish' in Latin and that it was merely a monogram in which the name of God the Son was lovingly put twice between those of God the Father and God the Holy Ghost, that is to say, that the letters *P. C.* were put for *P(ater) C(reator)* [i.e., God the Creator and Father]; *S.* for *S(anctus), S(piritus)*, [i.e., the Holy Ghost,] and that the *I* put twice between *P* and *S* and *C* and *S* respectively, was merely the name of God the Son Jesus (in Latin, *Iesus*). So the Italian priest saw in the fish-symbol all the three persons of the Christian Trinity, while his Greek-knowing predecessors saw only one. But etymology is not the *forte* of

Buddhist commentators. They are perhaps better at practical illustrations. One of them, while treating of the indescribability of noumena, eloquently observes :—"Take, for instance, a bird's-eye view in early morning of the

Its example. Vulture Peak (गुह्येश्वर) and all its surrounding scenery.

You will exclaim 'How beautiful! How sublime!'

But to estimate its real beauty and sublimity, you must yourself ascend the hill and gaze on what you have around you with your own eyes. And even then, though you may have fully felt its beauty and sublimity, you cannot convey an exact impression of it to any one who has not seen it, as you have yourself seen, so that he who wishes to enjoy the beauties of the scenery must ascend the hill and see for himself. Even so is the case with Nirvāṇa or the noumenal world."

The illustration cited above serves also to explain why Buddhist Ontology abounds more in negative explanations than in positive. The positive explanation of Nirvāṇa or the noumenal world is, of course, left to our inner intuition or subjective realisation. I have already pointed out that, in Buddhist philosophy, Phenomenology stands to Ontology exactly in the same relation as warp does to woof in cloth-weaving. And it is also to be noted that when Buddhists speak of the former they never forget the latter and *vice versa*. Accordingly, he who wishes to understand the philosophy of the Sacred Canon of the Buddhists, will do well to observe the following

Some important directions for the student of the Buddhist Canon.

directions from the very outset of his study: (1) Find out the nature of the main subject-matter of the work you wish to study, that is to say, whether it is Ontological or whether it is Phenomenological. (2) Never let the mere title of a work mislead you as regards its subject-matter, which you will discover only after carefully going through the work in question, at least, more than once. (3) Carefully bear in mind that in one and the same work very often Ontology and Phenomenology are blended together, sometimes every skilfully, sometimes not.

With these general hints, I pass on to the main subject of my present lecture which will treat of Karma-phenomenology.

KARMA-PHENOMENOLOGY.

All is impermanent, so that there is no eternal entity passing over to Nirvāṇa across the ocean of *Samsāra*. All is without an *Ego*, so that there is no imperishable soul surviving the shocks of death and dissolution. Boundless is the ocean of *Samsāra* and countless are the waves that ruffle its expanse in the shape of individuals and phenomena. But the wave which precedes is neither quite the same as, nor entirely different from the wave which follows, for the two are inseparably linked together by the Universal Law of Cause and Effect—a law which constitutes the “Adamantine Chain of the Phenomenal World,” yielding, as it does, the only possible *rationale* of its ever-changing features. This is why Buddha gave to the Doctrine of Universal Impermanence the foremost place in his teachings.

Samsāra, then, is existence subject to the control of cause and effect.

Samsāra is the effect
of our karma.

But what is it which sets revolving the “wheel of becoming”—“*tu trochon tēs genesēs*”—as the Apostle James has it (*Epistle* III. 6.)—a characteristically Buddhist expression which is rendered in the Vulgate by “*rota natiuitatis*,” but misunderstood by the English translators of the Authorised Version who interpret it to mean “course of nature.” Buddhism says that it is our *Karma*, the abiding result of our actions, which subjects us to a repetition of births and deaths. Thus, although from the theoretical standpoint Buddhism denies the existence of an imperishable individual soul, it accepts from the ethical standpoint the unbroken continuity of *Karma* or action. In other words, while rejecting from the philosophical point of view the doctrine of the soul’s immortality, Buddhism does not deny the continuity of personality. In this respect, among the great occidental thinkers, Immanuel Kant is the intellectual successor of Gautama Buddha, for, he too in a way denied the eternal existence of the personal soul in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, but accepted it in his *Critique of Practical Reason*. According to Buddhism, our present happiness or misery is not the award of a power existing outside ourselves, but is rather the

fruit of what we ourselves have done in the past, either in this life or in an anterior birth. "*Quisque suos patimur maues*" as the Great Latin poet Virgil, (*Aeneid Bk.vi.*) tersely, and, perhaps not unconsciously, expresses the idea of *Karma*. Nothing, according to Buddhism, is exempt from the operation of *Karma*, which, like Fate in Greek Mythology standing even above Jupiter, exercises a paramount sway over every thing human or divine. The Gods become Gods by the force of *Karma*; the Gods lose their godhead by the force of *Karma*. Whatever happens is the effect of an anterior cause, and what one reaps is nothing but the harvest of what one has previously sown. This is the main principle of Buddhist Ethics

which is rightly characterised as an autonomic system
 of morality in which man has not to stand in any
 relation of dependence to any being save himself.

The fundamental
 principle of Buddhist
 Ethics.

Buddha himself seems to have taught no other sort of dependence, for one of his last injunctions to his disciples was: "Be ye your own light, your own refuge; have no other refuge." This belief in the ethical autonomy of man, rendering him absolutely independent of the inscrutable will of any Being outside himself, cannot but shock Christian and Monotheistic prejudices; but the influence it has exercised over the minds of people in lands where Buddhism does or did flourish, has undeniably been potent for much good. It has strengthened the idea of moral responsibility in the mind of man by bringing home to him the truth that his happiness or misery, instead of being the award of an iron-willed or capricious Deity, or the decree of an inflexible Fate, or the out-come of Blind Chance, is entirely the result of whatever he has formerly done himself. It has encouraged him to virtuous action, dissuaded him from vice, and helped him, more than any other system of Ethics, to realise that "Man is man and master of his fate." Buddha himself recognised the superiority of his autonomic system of ethics over those of his predecessors or rivals, who attributed the supreme power over man's destinies to God, Fate, or Chance. Thus, in a well known section of the Anguttara Nikāya, to which I have already referred in a previous lecture, he is represented as discoursing with his disciples in the following manner:—

"There are, O Bhikshus, three views held by the Heretics, which, when

Exemplified by Buddha's teaching.

followed by the learned, are calculated to land them into moral irresponsibility in spite of the perfection which they may have attained. What are those three views?

Some *sramanas* and Brahmins there are who maintain that, whatever a human being has in this life of pleasure or pain, or of neither, is entirely due to Predestination, others say that it is due to God's will, others again attribute it to blind Chance. Now, O Bhikshus, when I find *sramanas* and Brahmins holding or preaching such views, I ask them whether they really believe in them. When they reply in the affirmative, I say to them, 'So then, you must acknowledge that men become murderers, thieves, adulterers, liars, slanderers, calumniators, light of speech, jealous, malevolent, heretical, on account of Predestination or God's will or Chance. Accordingly, all attempts at moral improvement or discrimination between right and wrong are of no avail; and such being the case, the moral regeneration of the fallen becomes an impossibility'. This sort of reasoning must needs silence those who held any of the three views mentioned above. But the doctrine taught by me, O Bhikshus, is incapable of refutation, flawless, and can successfully withstand the criticisms of *sramanas* and Brahmins. And what is it? It is what I have taught concerning the six *dhātus*, the six *āyatanas*, the eighteen mental impressions and the *Four Noble Truths*." So said Buddha to his disciples.

The doctrine of *Karma* is only a phase of the second of these Four Noble Truths, of which I shall presently have occasion to speak. In countries which are, or were once, Buddhistic, this doctrine is so deeply ingrained into the human mind that every mishap is attributed to *Karma*. Thus where the English say "What cannot be cured must be endured", we in Japan admonish saying "Resign thyself to it regarding it as the result of thy own *Karma*". (*Zigō zitoku to akirame nasare*!)

The Indian Vernaculars abound in proverbs of like import, and, if I mistake not, the word *Karma* has been corrupted in many an Aryan dialect of this vast continent, into the form *Karam* which is used in the sense of

A Japanese proverb and the doctrine of *Karma*.

The doctrine of *Karma* and the Indian Vernaculars.

Fate or Destiny. Thus, a melodious bard of mediaeval Bengal, lamenting the cruelty of fortune in one of his well known lyrics says:—*बखिरे कि मोर करमि बखि* [*i.e.*, My dear, what alas! was written in my Karma (*i.e.*, fate)!]

And even the savage in the wilds of the Central Provinces, when brought face to face with an inevitable calamity, consoles himself with the belief that "it was so written in his *Karma*."

Buddhism, in short, believes that our tomorrows are begotten of our
The meaning of Karma in Buddhist philosophy.
 todays, even as our todays are begotten of our
 yesterdays, and that the continuity of the three
 divisions of time, *viz.*, the present, the past and the
 future, is upheld by the chain of *Karma* eternally begetting and begotten.
 Etymologically, *Karma* means 'action' or 'deed,' but in Buddhist philosophy
 at least, the word covers two very distinct ideas, *viz.*, that of the deed itself
 and that of the effects of the deed in so far as it modifies the fate of the
 doer, continuing even beyond his death and moulding his subsequent exist-
 ences. The operation of the Law of *Karma* will, perhaps, be more easily
 understood by the following illustration taken from biology. The embryos
 of man, of the anthropoid ape and of the bat are, during their earlier stages,
 absolutely indistinguishable from one another, so much so that even the pri-
 mitive brain with its five cerebral vesicles is the same in all. Therefore,
 since there is no difference whatever between the compositional structures of
 the three embryos, the embryo of a bat ought to develop into a man and
vice versa under favourable conditions. But, as it is, this does not happen,
 and why? "Because of the difference of heredity," says Science. The
 numberless influences which affected the different ancestors of the three
 embryos and the countless actions performed by them under those very in-
 fluences are, in some mysterious manner, stored up in the several embryos
 compelling them inevitably to bear their own respective fruits and none
 other. Thus the embryo of a bat cannot develop into a human being, be-
 cause a human being is the outcome of an entirely different set of conditions,
 or, as the Buddhist will put it, because a human being's *Karma* is different.
 But by *Karma* the Buddhists do not mean heredity in the sense of what a
 living being inherits from its ancestors; they confine it to what a living
 being inherits from itself in an anterior birth.

So the Buddhist, while he does not believe that "the iniquity of the fathers will be visited upon the children unto the third and fourth generations", has to realise with respect to himself the inevitability of moral liability, or *Karma*, from which nothing can ever exempt him. In fact, if we look at it from its fields of operation, the doctrine of *Karma* admits of being treated of from three different points of view viz :—

- (i) From the point of view of the moral world.
- (ii) From the point of view of particulars or individuals.
- (iii) From the point of view of the physical world.

KARMA AS A PRINCIPLE IN THE MORAL WORLD.

Viewed as a principle in the moral world, the doctrine of *Karma* becomes the law of the immortality of deeds. A deed done is as imperishable in the Moral World as it is in the physical; and its fruits are bound to be reaped by the doer, when all the necessary conditions for it are ripe. The only thing which follows a man after death, according to Buddhism, is his *Karma*, and accordingly it has been said in the *Samyutta Nikāya* :—

"Nor grain, nor wealth, nor gold, nor silver, nor wife, nor child, nor slave, nor servant, nor dependent, can accompany a dying man, but must remain behind him; while, whatever a man doth through his body, speech, or thought, are to be called his own by him for they follow him when he departeth this life like a shadow that leaveth not. Therefore all men should do noble deeds considering them to be a stored treasure for future weal, and a crop of merit sown in this life will yield, in a future birth, a rich harvest of bliss."¹

Buddhist Ethics, therefore, is absolutely autonomic from the beginning to the end. Man's moral responsibility is regarded as something due to himself and must be discharged by himself. "That which cometh out of thee returneth unto thee" is

¹ Buddhist Ethics is absolutely autonomic.

¹ Nanjio's Cat. No. 544. (iii. 2. 10).

the categorical imperative in Buddhist Ethics. This unique element of superiority in the moral system of Buddhism appears to have shaken the professed impartiality of many an otherwise fair-minded Christian critic. One of these, and by far the most learned of them, who frankly admits to have started with what he calls "immoveable convictions about the main principles of truth and goodness," says in the latest edition of his interesting work on Buddhism :—

"The motive which Buddhist morality recognises, if it can be said to recognise any, is wholly selfish and individual. It is not for the love of truth or goodness, nor for the benefit of others, it is solely for the individual's own advantage that he is incited to cultivate virtue.....And the idea of duty is utterly absent. From first to last, the sacred books are terribly consistent in failing to recognise any sort of obligation.....Much as we read of effort, it is always effort for self, effort to attain independence and quiet; never work for the sake of work, or work for the sake of others, or work for the sake of duty. Such a system is unsocial. If it recognises the propriety of mutual kindness, it recognises—except in certain family relationships—no duty of mutual service or action.....In the contemplation of an endless series of lives, the paramount importance of this present life is overlooked.....To make the most of one's opportunity while one lives; to have done something before one dies, whether for oneself or for others;—no such ambition is set before the Buddhist. He has no aim in a life except to escape from it.....On the whole, the Buddhist view of human hopes and possibilities is pale and cold. I will not contrast it with Christian hope.....for with all its proud claims and assertions of attainment, Buddhism does, in effect, deny the high capacities of man.....The Buddhist theory makes the fatal mistake of supposing that it is grand to have nothing and no one to look up to.....Buddhism degrades man by denying that there is any being above him."¹

Here we have a long list of arraignments against Buddhism and before we proceed further, it will be worth while examining them in detail.

¹ See Bishop Copleston's "Buddhism," PP. 150—152.

Is Buddhist morality, then, selfish and individual? We emphatically answer, "No." It is far less so than Christianity, the founder of which is represented by one of his disciples (Matthew XVI. 26) as saying:

Buddhist morality far less egoistic than Christianity.

"For what is a man profited, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul? Or what shall a man give in exchange for his own soul?"

Such an apprehension for the salvation of one's own soul is condemned by Buddhism in the strongest terms as the "baleful heresy of individuality" (*anarthamagā dīmadṛṣṭi*). The duty of self-preservation is enjoined in Buddhism because it is the only means whereby one can save others. In the *Bodhisattva-pratimokṣha*, a Mahāyāna treatise on the Duties of the Aspirant to Buddhahood, it is distinctly laid down that self-preservation through the avoidance of evil must be effected, even at the cost of one's own life, for the sake of the preservation of other living beings:—

रक्षिष्यामीत्यात्मा रक्षितव्यः, एव' रूपया हितैषिकतया
समन्वागतो बोधिसत्त्वो जीवितहेतोरपि पापं कर्म न करोतीति ॥

As regards self-abnegation, Buddhism enjoins the duty of abandoning, for the good of others, not only material things, but also one's present, past and future merits, *kuṣalamūlāni* or "roots of goodness" as they are technically called. This injunction is contained in the memorable lines:—

आत्माभावस्य भोगानां अध्ववृत्तेः शुभस्य च ।
उत्सर्गः सर्वसत्त्वेभ्यस्तद्रूपा युद्धिवहनम् ॥

Nor is it correct to affirm that, in Buddhism, it is not for the benefit of others but solely for the individual's own advantage that he is incited to cultivate virtue. The motive recognised for meritorious action is not the good of self but the good of others, as can be gathered from the following, among other passages of the Sacred Canon:—

"It is not for the sake of self, nor of heaven, nor for supremacy among the Gods, or enjoyment or prosperity of beauty, or noble birth or fame, nor for fear of hell or birth among the brute creation that virtue is to be practised, but it is for the purpose of the acquirement of the means leading to

Buddhahood, to Nirvāṇa, whereby all sentient beings may be made happy and may be benefitted.”

नात्महेतोः शीलं रक्षति न स्वर्गहेतोः, न शक्रतहेतोः,
न निरयभयभीतः, न तिर्यग्योनिभयभीतः ।
अन्यत्र बुद्धनेत्री प्रतिष्ठापनाय यावत्सर्वसत्त्व-
हितसुखयोगचेमार्थिकः रक्षति ॥

Thus, in the Parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus (Luke XVI.), when the rich sinner in Hell cries to Father Abraham to have mercy on him and to send Lazarus, that he may dip the tip of his finger in water and cool the sufferer's tongue, and Abraham refuses to grant the prayer, the Jewish Patriarch behaves in a manner unworthy even of an ordinary human being if his action is to be judged according to the canons of Buddhist ethics which distinctly says “Take others' sufferings on thy own self, as if they were thine own.”

यदा मम परिपां च भयं दुःखं च न प्रियम् ।
तदात्मनः को विशेषो यत्तं रक्षामि नेतरम् ॥¹

Nor is the idea of duty and obligation, in the very highest sense, absent from Buddhist ethics. In the 10th Chapter of the

The recognition of
duty and obligation
in Buddhism.

Bodhisattva-kṛidāya-bhūmi,² a lost Sanskrit Mahāyāna work which survives in Kumārajīva's Chinese version,

the following injunctions to duty are contained :—

“All living beings pass through the six paths of existence (*i. e.*, birth in hell, among brutes, among *pretas*, among *asuras*, among human beings, among gods), like unto a wheel revolving without beginning and without end. And they become by turns fathers and mothers, males and females, and through generations and generations one is in debt to others. Therefore, it is proper to regard all beings as our fathers and mothers, although the mystery of this truth can be realised only by one who has mastered the Good Law. All men are our fathers; all women are our mothers. Instead of discharging towards them the debt of love contracted by us in our

¹ “*Bodhicaryāvatāra*,” P. 331.

² Nanjio's Cat. No. 1087.

previous births, is it right to harbour, with a heart averse, feelings of enmity towards them? Let our thoughts be riveted on love; let us strive our utmost to do good to one another; stir not enmity up through quarrels and evil words". If this is not a proof of the recognition of duty, what is?

Again Buddhism does not deserve to be branded as "an unsocial system in which effort always means effort for self and never for others or for the sake of duty."

The very obligation to accomplish the Ten Perfections (*Pāramitā*) viz:—

Is the doctrine of the ten perfection unsocial?
 (1) Charity (*Dāna*); (2) Purity of Conduct (*Śīla*);
 (3) Patience (*Kṣānti*); (4) Strenuousness (*Vīrya*);
 (5) Meditation (*Dhyāna*); (6) Intelligence (*Prajñā*);
 (7) Employment of right means (*Upāya*); (8) Resoluteness (*Pratidhāna*);
 (9) Strength (*Bala*); (10) Knowledge (*Jñāna*); without which the attainment of salvation is considered impossible by Buddhism—is an instance of effort for the sake of duty, the motive of which is to practice virtue for the sake of virtue and not for the sake of saving one's own soul or of keeping on good terms with a Supreme Being whose pleasure admits souls into Paradise, whose anger hurls them down to Hell.

The essence of the Christian conception of duty is summed up by the Apostle Paul (*Romans XIII*, 8-10) in the following words:—

"Owe no man anything but to love one another; for he that loveth another hath fulfilled the law. For this, Thou shalt not commit adultery. Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not bear false witness, Thou shalt not covet; and if there be any other commandment it is briefly comprehended in this saying, namely. Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. Love worketh no ill to his neighbour; therefore love is the fulfilling of the law". The Apostle John (I. Epistle 16) goes a step further when he says "Hereby perceive we the love (of Christ), because he laid down his life for us; and we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren".

But neither of these sentiments is the monopoly of Christianity, seeing that they formed part and parcel of Buddhism, centuries before the advent

of Jesus Christ. Thus, in the *Avatamsaka Sūtra*¹ the aspirant to Buddhahood is taught to think in the following manner, after he has practised all the virtues of perfection and done other meritorious acts :—

“All the good deeds practised by me are for the benefit of all sentient beings, for their ultimate purification from sin. By the merit of these good deeds may all sentient beings obtain release from the countless sufferings undergone by them in their various abodes of existence.....All sentient beings are creating evil *Karma* in countless ways, by reason of which they undergo innumerable sufferings. For their sake, I will in the midst of the three evil existences (*brutes, prelas, asuras*), suffering all their sufferings, deliver every one of them. Painful as these sufferings are, I will not retreat, nor be frightened, nor be negligent, nor forsake my fellow beings ; because it is the law that all sentient beings should be universally emancipated. Even as the all-illuminating sun seeketh no reward, nor grudgeth to shed his light on the wicked, I too shall not abandon the salvation of all beings because of the unrighteous, and through the dedication of all the merits acquired by me, I would make every one of my fellow creatures happy and joyous”. Can Christianity boast of a nobler ideal of duty than this ?

Nor is the propriety of mutual kindness in a practical shape an exclusive heritage of Christianity. Christian ethics, as is well known, reaches its highest pinnacle in the famous utterance of Christ (Matthew 5. 44) “Love your enemies,”—a sentiment which Buddhism had long before Christ’s birth given expression to in texts like the following :—

“*Na hi verena verāni sammanti idha kuddānaṃ*

Averena hi sammanti eso dhammo sanantano.”

i. e., “Not by hatred hatred ceasing on this earth men ever saw ;

’Tis by love that hatred ceaseth : this is an eternal law.”

But the motive recognised in the Christian Gospels for repaying evil with good appears rather selfish to the Buddhist mind. St. Paul says (Romans XII. 17-21), “Recompense to no man evil for evil. Provide things honest

¹ Nanjio’s Cat. No. 87.

in the sight of all men. If it be possible, as much as lieth in you, live peaceably with all men. Dearly beloved, avenge not yourselves but rather give place unto wrath: for it is written, *Vengeance is mine; I will repay, saith the Lord.* Therefore if thine enemy hunger, feed him; if he thirst, give him drink: *for in so doing thou shalt heap coals of fire on his head.* Be not overcome of evil, but overcome evil with good."

Doing good to an enemy is then, according to St. Paul's precept, to be undertaken, not for its own sake, but because it might disarm an enemy's rage by bringing him to contrition, or because "Vengeance belongs to the Lord."

But the Buddhistic or rather the pre-Buddhistic Indian adage is actuated by a much nobler motive:—

उपकारिषु यः साधुः साधुत्वे तस्य को गुणः ।

अपकारिषु यः साधुः स साधुः सद्गिरुच्यते ॥¹

[i.e., "What is the merit of him who does good to his benefactors? The wise call him good who does good to his harm-doers".]

Surely here is no want of recognition of mutual service or action.

Christianity, believing as it does that a human being has but one life on earth which will lead, after death, to an eternal existence in Heaven or Hell, according to the goodness or badness of his deeds, naturally encourages man to make the most of his opportunities here. An appeal to the mercifulness of a just and almighty God is the hope of him who has failed to do something on earth for the salvation of his own soul. This form of faith may have its advantages, but it has also great disadvantages. Some it tends to make devout even to weakness, like the famous French lady who prayed to God, saying, "Forgive me my sins, O Lord, if it is Thy will, but, if it is not, let my sins not be forgiven." Others, on the contrary, it makes somewhat bold and reckless, like the poet Henri Heine, who, being asked whether he believed in Divine Grace, said "Dieu me pardonnera car c'est son métier" ("God will forgive me, for that is his profession"). This is especially the case with Islam where one is often and often reminded that

"He who does not sin, cannot hope for mercy;

Mercy was made for sinners; be not sad."

¹ "Pancatantra," story VIII. (Verse 270.)

To the Buddhist mind such conceptions appear puerile and irrational. If the Supreme Being is a Being and the main cause of all that is, he, according to Buddhist ethics, ought to display towards man, his handiwork, *Kshudatī-pāramitā* or, the perfection of forbearance,—an expectation the logicalness of which is illustrated in that real or feigned epitaph of an old sinner:—

“Here lie I Martin Elginbrod,
Have mercy on me, O Lord God,
As I would do were I Lord God
And thou wert Martin Elginbrod.”

But if the fear of Hell or the hope of Heaven be a powerful incentive to good conduct in this life, the prospect of countless births and deaths which can end only by the attainment of Nirvāṇa, is far more so. With its staunch belief in the imperishableness of *Karma* and the law of cause and effect, Buddhism regards every birth to be the moulder of the next, until, through the exhaustion of the individual's *Karma*, Nirvāṇa is reached. Accordingly, far from overlooking the paramount importance of this life, the Buddhist is enjoined to make the best use of it. Accordingly, it is laid down in the Sacred Canon:—

“Let noble deeds each man perform,
A treasure-store for future weal,
Since merit gained in present birth,
Will yield a blessing in the next”.¹

Lastly, the Buddhist view of human possibilities, instead of losing by comparison with Christian hope, actually gains by it, although Christians *must* think otherwise. It is Christianity which degrades man by inculcating doctrines like that of Original Sin, whereas Buddhism ennobles him by making him absolutely responsible for all that he does or suffers. Buddhism considers it discordant with reason that “as by the offence of one, judgement came upon all men to condemnation, even so by the righteousness of one

The Buddhist view of human hope and possibilities.

¹ Warren's "Buddhism in Translation," P. 214.

the free gift should come upon all men unto justification of life". It fails to realise how "by one man's disobedience many were made sinners", and how "by the obedience of one many shall be made righteous." Man, according to Christianity, is born imperfect and is expected to return his soul perfect to his Creator on pain of eternal damnation. The first temptation into which man fell did not attract the protecting attention of the Almighty Being whose creature he was, and for this fall, of which his omniscient maker must have surely had a foreknowledge, all the human race were punished for milleniums. A non-Christian feels tempted with the Persian astronomer-poet, or rather his English paraphrast, to exclaim against this deplorable lack of fair play in a Being whom men have been taught to call "Their Heavenly Father":—

"What ! from his helpless Creature be repaid
Pure gold for what he lent him dross-allay'd—
Sue for a Debt he never did contract,
And cannot answer!—Oh the sorry trade !
O Thou, who Man of baser Earth didst make,
And ev'n with Paradise devise the Snake ;
For all the Sin wherewith the Face of Man
Is blacken'd—Man's forgiveness give—and take."

The last line, scholars need hardly be told, is inspired by a most fortunate misunderstanding of the tame original which merely means "O Lord, let me repent (*lit* : 'give me repentance') and accept my excuse." (*Yâ rabb tu marâ taubâ deh ra 'uzr pizîr.*)

Let us contrast Buddhist expectation with Christian hope. Hope, as understood in Christianity, has thus been described by St. Paul (Romans VII. 26):—

"For we are saved by hope : but hope that is seen is not hope, for what a man seeth, why doth he yet hope for? But if we hope for that we see not, then do we with patience wait for it."

The highest hope of a Christain has been formulated by St. John (1 Ep. 2-3) in the oft-quoted words :—

"Beloved, now are we the sons of God ; and it doth not yet appear what we shall be : but we know that when He shall appear, we shall be like Him ; for we shall see Him as He is."

This half-mystical passage contains the germs of what, later on, developed into "Imitation of Christ." Buddhism, fortunately, offers to man no such faint foreshadowings of a remote hope. It is much more positive in its view of the high destiny of sentient creatures. The doctrine of the *Tathāgatagarbha*, to which I have already alluded in an earlier lecture, teaches, in no hesitating fashion, that every sentient creature has in it the latent germs of Buddhahood, of which it becomes conscious, as the veils of passion gradually disappear through adequate cultivation of the mind and the body.

According to a Mahāyāna Sūtra of the Decease (*Parinirvāṇa Sūtra*), Buddha said to his disciples shortly before his death : "Every living being possesses the essential germs of Buddhahood."¹ These germs have only to be developed by proper training for a sentient creature to become a Buddha.

Christianity, so far as I am aware, makes no offer to man of a destiny higher than this.

The highest ideal of Mahāyāna Buddhism is, not to escape from the ills of life, but universal love. Nirvāṇa in the sense of extinction, as I have already shown, is never regarded as man's final aim. Even attempts for the salvation of one's own self, irrespective of that of others, are deprecated. As a proof of this, let me translate an extract from Āryadeva's *Mahāpuruṣa-sūtra* which illustrates the cardinal principle of Mahāyanistic perfection, viz., that thoughts for the good of others should always precede those for the good of self :

(मा भूत् तन्मम कुशलमूलं यत्र सर्वसत्त्वोपजीव्यं स्यात्) :—

"Those who are afraid of *samsāra* and seek their own advantage and happiness in salvation are inferior to those aspirants to Buddhahood, who rejoice at their rebirth, for it gives them an opportunity to do good to others. Those who feel only for

Āryadeva's saying on universal love.

¹ Nanjio's Cat, No. 113.

themselves may enter Nirvāṇa, but the aspirant to Buddhahood who feels for the sufferings of his fellow-creatures as though they were his own, how can *he* bear the thought of leaving his fellow-creatures behind, while he himself is making for salvation and reposing in the calm of Nirvāṇa? Nirvāṇa, in truth, consists in rejoicing in others being made happy, and Saṃsāra means not feeling happy. Whosoever feels a universal love for his fellow-creatures will rejoice in conferring bliss on them and by so doing attain Nirvāṇa."¹

A further charge laid at the door of Buddhism is the denial of God and of an individual soul. God, in the sense of an extramundane creator of the universe who caused the downfall of the human race in a fit of anger and subsequently, touched by remorse, sent down from heaven his only son through whose crucifixion mankind was saved, is a conception absolutely revolting to the Buddhist mind.

On the other hand, Buddhism loves to acknowledge the presence in this [world of a reality which transcends the bounds of phenomena, which is immanent everywhere, and in which we live and move and have our being. Of this I shall have occasion to speak at some length when I treat of the *Dharmakāya* or the Religious Object of Buddhism. The Buddhist denial of the immortality of an individual soul turns out, after all, to be a truth supported by the researches of modern science. Let me quote to you Ernst Haeckel's summing up of this question in his "Last Words on Evolution".

"The very interesting and important phenomena of impregnation" says that eminent biologist, "have only been known to us in detail for thirty years. It has been conclusively shown, after a number of delicate investigations, that the individual development of the embryo from the stem-cell or fertilised ovum is controlled by the same laws in all cases.....One

¹ Nanjio's Cat. No. 1242. This *śāstra* was translated by a Chinese Buddhist scholar T'ao-thai, of the Northern Lián dynasty. He went to the west of the Himālaya mountain and obtained the text of the Vibhāṣā, and some Sūtras and Śāstras. Having returned eastward to China, he translated the Vibhāṣā with Buddhavarman. And afterwards he alone made the translation of the "Mahāpuruṣa-Śāstra."

important result of these modern discoveries was the prominence given to one fact that the personal soul has a beginning of existence and that we can determine the precise moment in which this takes place; it is when the parent cells, the ovum and the spermatozoon coalesce. Hence what we call the soul of the man or the animal has not pre-existed, but begins its career at the moment of impregnation; it is bound up with the chemical constitution of the plasm, which is the material vehicle of heredity in the nucleus of the maternal ovum and the paternal spermatozoon. *One cannot see how a being that thus has a beginning of existence can afterwards prove to be immortal.*"

Such is the real truth about the soul which Christianity is so anxiously concerned about saving even at the cost of the whole world. In Dānapāla's Chinese version of *Kāshyapa-parivarta* there occurs a beautiful parable, of which I shall cite a metrical translation from the pen of one of my Indian friends:—

“There lived of old a simple man ;
 He was so frightened of the sky
 • Hither and thither oft he ran,
 Lest o’er him it should drop from high.
 But heaven’s high dome, no limit has
 And none can hurt below,
 Through ignorance indeed it was
 The poor man trembled so.
 So is it, as you may discern,
 With teachers by weak judgment led,
 ‘The world is void’ when this they learn,
 Their hearts are full of dread.
 They wrongly think ‘If that be true
 Void too, it follows, is the soul,
 So whatsoever on earth we do,
 Still nothingness must be its goal.’”¹

¹ Nonjo's Cat. No. 805. The metrical translation is made by Prof. M. Ghosh.

In short, the treatment meted out to Buddhist Ethics by Christian critics, in spite of prefatory professions of justice, generosity or candour, reminds us of the Fable of the Lion and the Painting. Buddhist critics too have hardly been more generous towards Christianity, some of whom, like the Pāli teacher of Professor T. W. Rhys Davids, identify it with the fetter (*samyojana*) of ritualism (*śīlavarata-paṇḍumāraka*); others again, borrowing the language of Pāli Abhidhamma, label it '*somanassasahagatam ditthigatasaṃpayuttam sasankhārikam kāmāvacaram akusalam cittam*' (i.e. "Evil consciousness belonging to the realm of sensual pleasure, coupled with gladness, conjoined with heresy, and instigated.")

With the advance of culture and progress, let us hope, sectarian biases will disappear and it will come to be universally admitted that there is but one true religion, namely that of universal love which may assume a variety of forms according to circumstances.

Our hope for true religion in the future.

To quote a stanza from a popular Japanese Buddhist poem,

"Many are the paths that rise
To the hill-top, but when we
Reach the hill-top, then our eyes
Universal moonlight see."

In religious matters, alas! points of view have always been a fertile source of discord. What appears good to the followers of one religion, often disgusts the adherents of another.

And Christian criticisms of Buddhism are mostly, in spirit at least, if not in actual phraseology, but an echo of what the Roman historian said in his criticism of the cult of the Chosen People of God: "They regard as unholy what we regard as holy, while they allow things to be done which are perfectly revolting to us."

Difficulty of its realization.

Thus as Prof. Rhys Davids tells us, the belief in self or soul, which is the foundation-stone of Christianity, is regarded by Buddhists so distinctly as a heresy that two well known words in Buddhist terminology have been

coined on purpose to stigmatise it. The first of these is "*Sakkāya-dṛṣṭi*", or the heresy of individuality, which constitutes one of the three primary delusions; or *Saṃyojana*s, which must be abandoned at the very first stage of the Buddhist path of freedom; while the other term is "*ātma-vāda*", or the doctrine of soul or self, which is regarded as forming part of the chain of the causes which laid to the origin of evil, bringing about the great miseries of birth, decay, death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief and despair.

On the other hand, the doctrine of Nirvāṇa, as conceived by the Hinayanists appears revolting to Christian critics, one of the most learned of whom expresses his opinion about it in the following manner:—

"A similar complaint may justly be made against that which Buddhism does propose as man's final goal and aim extinction or Nirvāṇa. No language could be too strong to express the indignation with which a true sense of human dignity rouses us to protest against this dreary calumny."

And calumny certainly it is; for a view of annihilation or extinction is not the right conception of Nirvāṇa, न च विनाशदृष्ट्या निर्वाणं as Buddha is represented to say in the Lankāvatara Sūtra. But a spirit of controversy does not lead to an unclouded view of truth, and I gladly turn away from the dreary task of odious comparisons to resume the main subject of my lecture. The lengthiness of my criticism has for its justification the existing misconceptions concerning the essential doctrines of Buddhism, which prejudices of birth and early training, and not unfrequently also a desire of proselytism, have given rise to even in these so-called enlightened times.

To return then to the doctrine of Karma, the ecstatic utterance of Buddha when he reached enlightenment under the Bodhi tree near Gaya, and, we may say, the primal words of the Buddhist Holy Writ, is the well known Hymn of Victory, the poetical grandeur of which is surpassed only by its intense spiritual fervour. The Pāli original of these lines is too well known (Dham. 153, 154) to require a reference here. Sir Edwin

Arnold cites them in his "Light of Asia." But, a few years ago, a Sanskrit version of them was discovered in the sands of Turfan in Central

The Sanskrit version
of Buddha's Hymn of
Victory.

Asia, thanks to the industry of that indefatigable explorer, Von Lecoq, whose noble and unselfish work has placed the Buddhist world under a deep debt

of gratitude to him. These verses, written on birch barks in the Kashgar Brahmi character, were deciphered and published by the late lamented Prof. Richard Pischel not long before his tragic death in the General Hospital, Madras, when he was on his way to Calcutta to deliver his lectures on the Prakrit Languages as Reader on that subject to this University. According to Prof. Pischel's decipherment, the Sanskrit version of Buddha's Hymn of Victory reads as follows :—

अनेकं जातिसंसारं संधावित्वा पुनः पुनः

गृहकारकम् एषमानः त्वं दुःखा जाति पुनः पुनः ।

गृहकारको दृष्टोऽसि न पुनर्गेहं करिष्यसि

सर्वे ते पार्श्वका भग्ना गृहकूटं विसंस्कृतम्

विसंस्कारगते चित्ते इहैव क्षयम् अध्यगाः ॥

The variations from the Pāli text are interesting. In the first line, the Pāli has "*Sandhārisam anibbisam*," which, by the way, means "I incessantly ran through" (*anibbisam* is an adverb and not a participle meaning "not finding", as may be seen from the line of Mahāpajapati Gotami "*Tathābhūtam ajānanti samsari aham anibbisam*" which last word, if it was a participle, should have been in the feminine form). The "*team*" in the second line does not occur in the Pāli, and in the last line the cessation is ascribed to the tent-builder himself (note the second person singular *adhyagāh*) and not to desires as the Pāli original has it ("*Tonhak-khayam idha ajjhagā*?").

Of these lines, a friend has favoured me with a metrical version which adheres much more closely to the text than the paraphrases of Sir Edwin Arnold, A. J. Edmunds, Prof. Rhys Davids, Prof. Lanman and even the rendering of Henry Clarke Warren :—

"Many a birth and transmigration wandering o'er in ceaseless round,
Seeking for the house's builder, painful births I ever found.

O house-builder, thou art found out, house thou shalt not build again,

All thy rafters lo ! are broken, and the roof-peak split amain,

Reaching dissolution my heart doth here end of thirst attain."

The house is this human body, this house of clay, and its builder is desire, for it is desire, technically called "trishná" or thirst, which is the cause of birth according to Buddhism. Now what produces desire and how is desire, and consequently the liability to births and deaths, to be avoided ? The

answer is, "By the realisation of the Four Noble Truths (Catvâri âryâsatyâni)". These four noble truths, which are the outcome of Buddha's great renunciation are respectively in the technical language of Buddhist philosophy :—

(i) *Dukkham*—Suffering *i.e.*, "That suffering is universal".

(ii) *Dukkha-samudaya*—Origin of suffering, *i. e.*, "That this suffering has an origin."

(iii) *Dukkha-nirodha*—Cessation of suffering, *i.e.*, "That this suffering admits of cessation."

(iv) *Dukkhanirodha-gâmini-pratipad*—"The path leading to the cessation of suffering", *i.e.*, "That there is a path which leads to the cessation of suffering."

These Four Noble Truths are nothing else but the cardinal articles of

Indian medical science applied to spiritual healing, exactly as they are in the Yoga Philosophy. This fact is pointed out in Vyâsa's Commentary on the 15th Aphorism of the second book of Patanjali's Yogasûtra (परिणामतापसंस्कार [etc.]) where we read as follows :—

यथा चिकित्साशास्त्रं चतुर्थ्यहं रोगो, रोगहेतुर्, आरोग्यम् भैषज्यम् इति,
एवमिदमपि शास्त्रञ्चतुर्थ्यहमेव तद्वथा संसारः, संसारहेतुर्, मोक्षो, मोक्षोपाय
एवेति ।

[“As the Medical Science has four departments, *viz.*, Disease, Cause of Disease, Removal of Disease and Remedy, even so this branch of knowledge has four divisions, *viz.*, Samsāra, Cause of Samsāra, Emancipation and Means conducting to Emancipation.”] That the Buddhists themselves were not ignorant of this fact is clear from their calling Buddha the *Great Healer*. The examples quoted to illustrate this epithet are generally taken from the extant Mahāyāna works such as *Lalitā Vistara* (Ed. Mitra p. 448 *Vaidyardjak* etc.) and *Buddhacarita* (XIII. 61. *Mahābhishak*); but the Pāli Canon also contains similar passages. For instance in the Songs of the Elders, (*Theragāthā*) we find Buddha called the “Healer of the Entire Universe” (*Sabbalokatikicchako*) by Adhimutto Thero and “The Great Healer” (*Mahābhishakko*) by the retired actor Tālaputo. It is a significant fact also that Vāgbhata, the famous Indian writer on Medical Science, salutes Buddha as the Primaval Doctor in the opening stanza of his *Ashtāṅgahridaya* :—

यःपूर्ववैद्याय नमोऽस्तु तस्मै ।

So much for the origin of the Four Noble Truths. According to Vasubandhu, they admit of a twofold division, whether we look upon them, on the one hand, from the point of view of cause and effect, or, on the other, we consider them with reference to their bearing upon *Samsāra* or *Nirvāṇa*. Thus the First and the Second Noble Truths, *viz.*, the *Dukkha-satya* (the Truth concerning Suffering) and the *Samudaya-satya* (the Truth concerning the Origin of Suffering) represent respectively the effect and the cause of *Samsāra*. The third and the fourth Truths *viz.*, the *Nirodha-satya* (the Truth concerning the Cessation of Suffering) and the *Mārga-satya* (the Truth concerning the Path leading to the Cessation of Suffering) represent respectively the effect and the cause of *Nirvāṇa*. The first two Truths are characterised as *Sāsrava* or “fraught with defilement,” and the last two as *Aśrava* or “free from defilement.” In short, the Four Noble Truths answer the following questions respectively :—

- (1) What is the cause of transmigration ?

- (2) What is the effect of transmigration ?
- (3) What is the cause of Nirvāṇa ?
- (4) What is the effect of Nirvāṇa ?

The answers are respectively :—

(1) Passions (*Kleśas*), (2) Suffering, (3) Cultivation of the Right Path, (4) Cessation of Passion.

In this connection, it is important to note that Vasubandhu takes the word "*Samudaya*" in both of its senses, *viz.*, (a) origin (*i.e.*, of Suffering) and (b) collection (*i.e.*, of the *Kleśas*, Karma and various evils). Note that, in the enumeration of the Four Noble Truths, effects are put before the causes. This fact, as I have already pointed out, is due to the nature of the origin itself of the doctrine of the Four Noble Truths which, I need hardly repeat, are merely the cardinal principles of Indian Medical Science applied to spiritual healing. Vasubandhu himself recognises this fact when he says in Chapter VII of his commentary on the *Abhidharma-kosha-Śāstra*: "Having discovered the malady, seek for its cause; having resolved upon cure, seek for good medicine." We shall see presently that the second Noble Truth, which is concerning the Origin of Suffering, is identical with *Avidyā* (Ignorance), *Samskāra* (Conformation), *Trishna* (Desire), *Upādāna* (Clinging), *Bhava* (Existence),—terms which will be explained in their proper places.

The Third Noble Truth, which is concerning the Cessation of Suffering, indicates the ideal state of freedom, perfection, independence and permanence, *viz.*, the state of *Nirvāṇa*, when the adamantine fetters of *Karma* are struck off for ever by a sentient creature which then becomes like a lotus that can not be touched or tainted by the foul water in the midst of which it grows. One who reaches this stage can no more be tormented by the evils of Birth, Death, Old-Age and Sickness. But how can this state of bliss be attained? This enquiry brings us to the Fourth Noble Truth which is concerning the Path that leads to the Cessation of Suffering or the Eight-fold Noble Path, of which I shall have occasion to speak later on.

As regards the Buddhist theory of the omnipresence of Suffering in the phenomenal world, it must be borne in mind, that, according to Buddhism, suffering is not limited merely to the human world but spreads over all the six abodes of existence or "*gati*" as they are technically called, viz., hell (*niraya*), the goblin world (*preta-loka*), life among brute beasts (*tirak-yoni*), the human world (*manushya-loka*), the world of demons (*asura-loka*) and the world of gods (*deva-loka*). These six existences are classified into three realms¹ (*dhātu*) viz., the Realm of Desire (*Kāmadhātu*)² the Realm of Form (*Rūpadhātu*),³ and the Realm of Formlessness (*Arūpadhātu*).⁴ The Realm of Desire (*Kāmadhātu*) embraces the first five *gatis* and six out of the 28 subdivisions of the *deva-loka* or the world of gods. The Realm of Form (*Rūpadhātu*) consists of 18 out of the 28 subdivisions which make up the world of gods; the Realm of Formlessness (*Arūpadhātu*) consists of the four remaining subdivisions of the world of gods. Before proceeding to a detailed examination of the three realms, I must give you a brief account of the Buddhist conception of *Sumeru*.⁵

Sumeru, the "mountain of wonderful height" or "excellent brilliance" is said to rise out of the ocean to a height of 84 thousand *yojanas*, while its total attitude is computed to be 168,000 *yojanas*. This mountain is supposed to be made up of gold, silver, malachite and crystal and to be surrounded by seven concentric circles of rocks which are known as the "Seven Golden Mountains." These seven circles of rocks are separated from one another by seven "Fragrant Seas," and the seventh mountain is surrounded by a great Salt Ocean. Outside this ocean, is a circling mountain named "*Cakra*."⁶ All these together are known as the Nine Mountains and the Eight Seas. On the four sides of Mt. *Sumeru* and the Seven Golden Mountains, Buddhist cosmology places four continents viz., *Pārcravaleha*⁷ to the East, *Jambūdvīpa*⁸ to the South, *Avartagodaniy*,⁹ to the

The Buddhist conception of *Sumeru*.

¹ Jap: *San-gai*.

² Jap: *Yak-kai*.

³ Jap: *Shiki-kai*.

⁴ Jap: *Mu-shiki-kai*.

⁵ Jap: *Shu-mi-sen*.

⁶ Jap: *Tecchi-sen*.

⁷ Jap: *Hobbedai-shiā*.

⁸ Jap: *Yenbudai-shiā*.

⁹ Jap: *Guguni-shiā*.

West and *Uttarakuru*¹ to the North. All human beings have their habitation in one or other of these four continents. Higher than the world of men, are located the six heavens of the Realm of Desire (*Kāmadhātu*), the 18 heavens of the Realm of Form (*Rūpadhātu*) and the 4 heavens of the Realm of Formlessness (*Arūpadhātu*). But the lengthy names and the tedious gradations of these gods need not detain us here. The most enlightened Buddhists have never accepted them as objective existences apart from mankind. They have regarded them merely as the indications of the various stages of mental and moral development acquired by human beings through the practice of *dhyāna* or ecstatic meditation. Accordingly, it has been said in that encyclopaedia of Hīnayāna philosophy, the *Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-sāstra*: "The word '*Deva*' means 'shining,' that is, resplendent with the light of knowledge, for the light of the knowledge possessed by the gods is more brilliant than that possessed by human beings. In fact every religious system in India in the days of Buddha laid particular stress upon meditation and pointed out to its adherents as their final goal the attainment of a life in a celestial region. But the gods did not enjoy the same order of precedence in every system. Thus the Great Brahma, though accepted as the highest being and styled as "Great Father of All" in Hinduism, has been degraded by Buddhism to the lowest region in the Realm of Form. Again, the "Abode of Neither-Consciousness-nor-Unconsciousness" (*Nairāṇjñā-udānjanāyatana*)² and the "Abode of No-what-ness" (*Akiñcandāyatana*)³ which are considered to be the ideal state in the Sāṃkhya system, are considered to be merely the loftiest region of the Realm of Formlessness where the gods are still exposed to some sort of suffering. The highest aim of Buddhism is to be delivered from Birth and Death, and this goal man cannot attain as long as he continues to wander in any of these three Realms (*dhātus*) or in any of the six *gatis*. This is what is stated in the Lotus of the Good Law in a passage to which I have already referred, where Buddha is represented as saying to Śāriputra: "I, O Śāriputra, am the Great Seer, the protector and father of all beings; and creatures, who childlike are captivated by the pleasures of the three realms, are my sons. These three Realms of Desire, Form and Formlessness

¹ Jap: *Uttar-otzu-shiā*.² Jap: *Hieō-hi-hi-shō-jō-ten*.³ Jap: *Mushō-u-ten*.

are as dreadful as a house set on fire, overwhelmed with manifold evils, inflamed on every side by hundred different sorts of Birth, Old Age and Disease.' The three worlds, accordingly, are full of suffering which Buddhism divides into four heads, *viz.*, (a) the suffering of birth, (b) the suffering of old age, (c) the suffering of sickness, and (d) the suffering of death.

So much for the operation of the Law of *Karma* in the moral world. I proceed now to consider the operation of *Karma* in the world of particulars.

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KARMA AS THE ACTIVE PRINCIPLE IN THE WORLD OF PARTICULARS.

I have already stated, a little while ago, that in his Hymn of Victory Buddha recognized desire or *trishṇa* to be the builder of this human body. Tracing, then, desire back to its original source, he discovered what came to be subsequently known as the Twelve-linked Chain of Causation in Buddhist philosophy. The links of this mighty chain, of which I shall have to give a detailed account presently, are as follows :—

The original source of the builder of human body.

- (1) From ignorance¹ proceed the 'conformations.'
- (2) From 'conformations,'² consciousness.
- (3) From consciousness,³ name-and-form.
- (4) From name-and-form,⁴ the six organs of sense.
- (5) From the six organs of sense,⁵ contact.
- (6) From contact,⁶ sensation.
- (7) From sensation,⁷ desire.

¹ Jap : *Ma-myō*.

² Jap : *Gyō*.

³ Jap : *Shiki*.

⁴ Jap : *Myō-shiki*.

⁵ Jap : *Rok-myō*.

⁶ Jap : *Soku*.

⁷ Jap : *Ju*.

- (8) From desire,¹ grasping.
- (9) From grasping,² existence.
- (10) From existence,³ birth.
- (11) From birth,⁴ old age.
- (12) From old age proceed death,⁵ lamentation, grief and despair.

These are also known as the Twelve *Nidānas*. In Buddhist Philosophy, conformations or *samskāras* (carefully distinguish this term from the *samskārasandha*) are synonymous with *Karma*, both words going back to the Sanskrit root *kṛi* which means 'to do' or 'to effect.' In its most abstract sense, the word *karma*, as used by Buddhists, has the same meaning as *avidyā* or ignorance, while, in its concrete sense, *karma* means the principle of activity in the world of particulars or the "World of Name-and-Form" as it is technically called in Buddhist philosophy. In other words, it is the law of *karma* which alone yields a satisfactory explanation of the phenomenon of *Samsāra*. Since Ignorance is the prime cause of all our sufferings, to be free from it, or, in other words, to attain enlightenment, ought to be the highest goal of man. Now what is the nature of Ignorance?

The nature of ignorance. It is the mistaking of the true for the false and of the false for the true,—a delusion which can be dispelled only by enlightenment, which may, in its turn, be described as the taking of the true for the true, and of the false for the false. The vulgar mind labours from this sort of '*viparyāsa*', or contrariety, as it is technically called, because it loves to confound permanence with impermanence, freedom with subjection, purity with impurity, and pleasure with pain. This species of delusion, as Buddha realised only too well, is productive of infinite pain and suffering; and in tracing it back to its fountainhead, he discovered that all our existing sufferings are but the fruit of our actions or *karma* in the past, while *karma* itself, the prime cause of all our sufferings, is a direct outcome of *avidyā* or ignorance. 'Avidyā,' therefore, must be completely eradicated, before we can hope to destroy evil

¹ Jap. : *Āi*.² Jap. : *Shu*.³ Jap. : *U*.⁴ Jap. : *Shō*.⁵ Jap. : *Rō* and *Shi*.

karma and the misery consequent thereon. And as long as evil *karma* continues, we must continue to suffer pain or misery which is its fruit. Thus, living beings are ever whirled round and round in the wheel of birth and death, which is a state of suffering begotten of their evil *karma* which again is begotten of *avidya* or ignorance. Now how shall we be able to

The only answer to the question what is the path that will lead to the highest bliss.

get permanently rid of this pain of repeated existence? And what is the path that will lead to deliverance from *samsāra*? How shall we extirpate

the *kleśas*? What condition must we fulfil for the attainment of *moksha* or emancipation? To all such questions Buddhism gives but one answer—"It is by the practice of a life of righteousness and by walking in the Path of Truth". As soon as the darkness of ignorance and delusion is dispelled, the light of truth blazes forth in all its brightness, just as Buddha's routing the hosts of *Māra* resulted in his attainment of perfect spiritual enlightenment. This attainment of enlightenment was, in its positive aspect, the attainment of Buddhahood; while, in its negative aspect, it was the extirpation of the *kleśas* and the dispersion of the clouds of ignorance. When Buddha left home, family, and kingdom, he did so for the purpose of finding an answer to the questions which had

The first and second question of Prince Siddhārtha about human life.

been troubling him night and day ever since he had become conscious of the miseries of existence. The first question was: "What is it which brings about

birth, old age, sickness, and death?", and the second: "How can we effect our release from them?" Renunciation of the world, constant companionship and discussion with the reputed sages of his time, six years' endurance of the terrible hardships of an ascetic's life—all these did not help him to find out the proper answer to the questions that has been troubling his mind, so that he had at last to turn his thoughts away from them, to look into himself and he then discovered the true solution of the problems.

The answer found by him to the above question.

To the first question, *viz.*, the cause of birth, old age, sickness, and death, Buddha found an answer in the ever-revolving cycle of *kleśa*, *karma*, *dukkha*

which being about endless transmigration. The cause of it he explained sometimes in the form of the Four Noble Truths and sometimes

in the form of the Twelve-linked Chain of Causation. How this discovery was effected is thus described in a picturesque manner in a Sûtra of the Sanskrit Canon known as the *Sûtra on the Cause and Effect of the Present and the Past*¹ :—

“In the third night of his meditation, the would-be Buddha examined the natures of all living beings and asked himself ‘What is the cause of old age and death?’ He then replied to himself saying: ‘I know that old age and death are brought about by birth which is not produced by a god or by itself or by chance, but is the effect of causes and conditions, that is to say, it is the outcome of *karma* in the Realm of Desire, of Form, and of Formlessness. Again, whence arise the *karman*s of these three Realms? They arise from the Fourfold Attachments. Whence arise those Attachments? Forsooth from Desire. Whence arises Desire? From Sensation. And whence arises Sensation? From Contact. Whence arises Contact? From the Six Organs of Sense. Whence arise the Six Organs of Sense? From Name and Form. Whence arise Name and Form? From Consciousness. Whence arises Consciousness? From the *samskāras* or Conformations. When arise Conformations? From Ignorance.” So Buddha discovered that Ignorance is the ultimate cause of *samsāra*, and its extirpation is the foundation-stone of enlightenment. Let us now proceed to a detailed examination of the Twelve-linked Chain of Causation, or as they are called

“ THE TWELVE NIDĀNAS. ”

(1) First comes *Avidyā* or Ignorance, frequently rendered by ‘delusion’ or ‘nescience.’ It is identical with the *kleśas* or Ignorance or *Avidyā*. passions, and may be defined as a mental function which gives rise to all the *kleśas*.

(2) The next link is *Samskāra*. Etymologically it means “making up together” (*‘sam’*, ‘with’; *‘kri’*, ‘to make’) and has Conformation or *Samskāra*. accordingly often been rendered in English by apparently unmeaning words, coined for the purpose, such as *confections*, and

conformations. In Buddhist philosophy, it is capable of meaning *impressions, ideas, notions, conceptions, effect of work, merit of action, etc. etc.*, but, considered as a member of the Twelve-linked Chain of Causation, it must be explained as *karma*, good or bad, done in the past and produced by *Avidya*. Mrs. Rhys Davids translates it as "actions of the mind." The first two links, it must be noted, are the cause of life in the present, induced by *karma* in the past.

(3) The third link is *Vijñāna* or Consciousness. It generally means knowledge or understanding, but in the case of the Twelve Nidānas, it is to be interpreted as a primitive mental operation taking place at the very time when a living being enters the maternal womb. This state is induced by *Samskāra* and *Avidya*. At this stage the mind's operation in a human being is stronger than that of the body.

(4) *Nāmarūpa* is the fourth link. Literally translated it means Name-and-Form. 'Name' implies what is mental, 'Form' denotes what is material, so that, roughly speaking, the words may be translated, as Mrs. Rhys Davids has done, by 'Mind and Body.' More exactly speaking, Name denotes, in the case of the Twelve Nidānas, an inferior stage of mental operation which belongs to a being still in the maternal womb in an incomplete stage of corporeal formation. Buddhist philosophers consider Name-and-Form to mean a mental and bodily state of an embryo which has passed about four weeks in the maternal womb after its conception. The five stages through which a baby passes, according to Buddhism, in the maternal womb are called in Sanskrit ; (i) *kalala*, (ii) *arūpa* (iii) *peśī* (iv) *ghana* (v) *prākāśhā*. A baby in the stage of Name-and-Form is said to have passed through the first four of the stages named above and also through a part of the fifth.

(5) The fifth link is known as *Shadāyatana* or the Six Organs of Sense. At this stage, a baby in the maternal womb is regarded to have completed the stage of *prākāśhā*, or, in other words, its eyes, its ears, its nose, its tongue, its body and its mind—the mind,

as in all Indian philosophy, being regarded by Buddhism to be one of the sense organs—are fully formed.

(6) The sixth link is *Sparsā* or Contact. This is the stage of a child in the second or the third year after its birth, during which its consciousness is very dim, and it does not notice the subjective world. It is that stage which the English poet means when he says :

“The child new-born to earth and sky,
When first its tender palm is pressed
Against the circle of his breast
Has never said that “This is I.”

(7) The seventh link is *Vedanā* or Sensation. Sensations are divisible into pleasant, unpleasant and indifferent. These sensations are possessed by children, says Buddhism, when they reach their fourth year. Till its tenth year, the child's mental and bodily functions gradually develop without its coming to feel desires of the flesh.

(8) *Tṛishṇā* or Thirst is often translated by Desire or Craving. It represents, according to Buddhism, the stage of boyhood or girlhood from the age of eleven to that of fifteen, when they begin to covet consciously, without striving to obtain them, things for the body, and to feel desires of the flesh without coveting their fulfilment.

(9) The ninth link is *Upāddāna* or attachment, often translated by ‘grasping.’ It represents the stage of youth in man and woman when not only are various desires produced in their minds, but they seek also for their fulfilment in spite of dangers and difficulties—a stage when longing for objects of the senses become ordinarily strong in the mind.

Note that the seven links from *Vijñāna* to *Upāddāna* refer to the effects of present existence.

(10) The tenth link is *Bhāva* which is translated by 'existence' or 'becoming'. It presents a stage which collects good or Existence or Bhāva, bad *karma* capable of inducing future existence. It is produced by attachment and corresponds to the *Samskāras* which, as I have already stated, give rise to present existence.

(11) *Jāti* is the eleventh link. It is translated by 'birth', and refers to the very first stage of birth in a future existence which Birth or Jāti, is induced by desire, attachment and existence (*Trishṇa*, *Upādāna*, *Bhāva*) in the present life. It corresponds to *Vijñāna* which represents a similar stage in the present life.

(12) *Jarā-maraṇam* (Old age and Death) constitute the last of the twelve links of causation. It represents the whole of Old age and death or Jarā-maraṇam, the future existence induced by *Jāti* as mentioned above. It holds in the future existence the same position as Name and Form, the Six Organs of Sense, Contact, and Sensation do in the present life.

To sum up, out of the twelve linked Chain of Causation, Ignorance, and Samskāra represent the *kleśas* and *karmā* which belong to an anterior existence and which bear fruit in the present existence. *Vijñāna*, *Nāmarūpa*, *Shuddhāyatana*, *Spurśa* and *Vedanā* are the effects, in the present existence, of Samskāras in the anterior existence. *Trishṇa*, *Upādāna* and *Bhāva* represent *Karma* in the present existence capable of producing effects in the subsequent existence. Birth, Old age and Death are to be born in the subsequent existence, as effects produced by causes, (*i. e.* *kleśas* and *karmas*) in the present existence.

This is known in Buddhist philosophy as the "Threefold Cause and Effect in the Three Divisions of Time" (*viz*: the present, the past and the future.) This subdivision is admitted by the Buddhists of the Greater as well as of the Lesser Vehicle. Thus in Mahāmātī's commentary on Nāgārjuna's 'Suhṛillekha' or 'Friendly Epistle'—which exists only in Tibetan and Chinese versions,—we are told that "the whole series of the Twelve Nidānas is divided into three parts; Ignorance and Conformations refer to past birth;

Consciousness upto Existence refer to present birth; Birth, Old age and Death refer to future birth". Nāgārjuna says in stanza 112 of the Friendly Epistle: "This chain of causes is made clear to us by the word of Buddha. Deep is its meaning. Whoever perfectly understands it, perfectly understands the teaching of Buddha". Such is the importance of Twelve-linked Chain of Cause and Effect in the eyes of the Buddhists. The Pāli compendium of philosophy called the Abhidhammattha-

The classification of the twelve nidānas in the Pāli Abhidhamma.

Sangaha, makes the same classification in Ch. viii. Sec. 3—.

"Tattha tayo addhā dvādasangāni.....veditabbāni. Katham?

Avijjā, saṃkhārā atito addhā, jāti-jārā-maranam anāgata addhā, majjhe a/ha paccuppanno addhā titayo addhā."

[i. e. "In this law there are three periods.....to be taken into account. How so? 'Ignorance' and 'Saṃskāra' appertain to the Past; 'Birth,' 'Old age' and 'Death,' to the Future; and the eight intervening links to the present."

The following diagram will best serve to illustrate what has been stated above:—

A. Cause and Effect in the Past and the Present.

- | | |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------|
| 1. <i>Avidyā</i> (Ignorance) | } Past Cause. |
| 2. <i>Saṃskāra</i> (Conformations) | |
| 3. <i>Viññāna</i> (Consciousness) | } Present Effect. |
| 4. <i>Nāmarūpa</i> (Name and Form) | |
| 5. <i>Ṣaḍāyatana</i> (Sixfold Organ) | |
| 6. <i>Sparśa</i> (Contact) | |
| 7. <i>Vedanā</i> (Sensation) | |

B. Cause and Effect in the Present and the Future.

- | | |
|--|------------------|
| 8. <i>Trishna</i> (Desire) | } Present cause. |
| 9. <i>Upādāna</i> (Clinging) | |
| 10. <i>Bhava</i> (Existence) | |
| 11. <i>Jāti</i> (Birth) | } Future Effect. |
| 12. <i>Jarāmaramam</i> (Old age and Death) | |

This period-division of the "Twelve-linked Chain of Causation" is, so far as I know, not explicitly stated in any of the works contained in the Pāli

Pitaka, although the Ceylonese commentator Buddhaghosha develops it in the earlier part of his commentary on the "Great Suttanta on the Law of Causation." I ought not to omit to mention here that another name of this chain is *Pratitya-samutpāda*—(Pāli *Paticeca-samuppādo*) or 'Dependent Origination.' I proceed now to speak so of

The Relation of the four noble truths to the twelve Nidānas.

It is related in the Great Sūtra of the Dcease that when Buddha, accompanied by Ānanda, was sojourning at a village called Kotigrāma shortly before his death, he said to those of his followers who were there:—

"Catunnam ariya-saccānam yathābhūtam adassanā
Samsitam dīgham addhānam tēsu tās' eva jātisu.
Tāp'etāni ditthāni, bhava-netti samūhatā
Ucchinnam mūlam dukkhassa, n'atthi dāni punabbhavo.'

[i. e. "Not to realise properly the Four Noble Truths brings about a long wandering in various births. When these Truths are realized that which brings about existence is removed, suffering is uprooted and there is no liability to future birth."]

Such then being the effect of the realisation of the Four Noble Truths, it is evident that the *Twelve Nidānas*, detailing, as they do, suffering and the causes of suffering, fall within the area of the first and the second Noble Truths. Dividing the Twelve Nidānas into two groups, viz. of (a) Past Cause and Present Effect, and (b) Present Cause and Future Effect, we find that *Avidyā* and *Samskāra* (the former being identical with *Kleśa* and the latter with *Karma*) represent the second Noble Truth, viz., the *Samudayasatya* or, the Noble Truth concerning the Cause of Suffering, in the present life. These two links constitute the two causes which exist in the Past and which give birth to five effects in the Present, each and all of which represent the First Noble Truth, viz., the Truth concerning Suffering, in the present life. The five effects are (1) *Vijñāna* or Consciousness (2) *Nāmarūpa* or Name and Form (3) the *Shuddhāṅga* or the Six-fold Organs of Sense, (4) *Sparsa* or Contact, and (5)

Vedanā or Sensation. Each of these five is fraught with pain. The seven links from *Avidyā* to *Vedanā*, it is needless to repeat, represent the Two Causes in the Past and the Five Effects produced by them in the Present. The remaining five links (from *Trishṇā* downwards) represent the Three Causes in the Present and their Two Effects in the Future. The three causes are (1) *Trishṇā* (Desire) (2) *Upādāna* (Attachment) and (3) *Bhava* (Existence). *Trishṇā* and *Upādāna* are *Kleśas*, while *Bhava* is *Karma* and the three together represent the *Samudayaśatya*, or the Noble Truth concerning the Cause of Suffering, in the future. These three causes existing in the present produce two effects in the future, both of which are fraught with suffering and represent therefore the *Dukkhaśatya*, or the Noble Truth concerning Suffering, in the future life. These two effects constitute the last two links of the Chain of Causation, viz., *Jāti* (Birth) and *Jarāmaraṇa* (Old Age and Death) which is really an abbreviation of the full name of the Twelfth Nidāna which in its uncurtailed form is *Jarāmaraṇa-śoka-paridevāna-dukkha-daurmanasyopāyāsāh* or "Old age and death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, despair." I pass on now to

KARMA AS AN ACTIVE PRINCIPLE IN THE PHYSICAL WORLD.

The Doctrine of Karma which, in the domain of Ethics, teaches the immortality of deeds and the inevitability of moral responsibility in the case of an individual, family or nation, becomes, in the Physical World, the principle of conservation of energy and of evolution and heredity.

When Buddhists speak of Karma they mean, it is true, not what an individual inherits from his ancestors but what he inherits from himself in some previous state of existence. Nevertheless, when we consider the doctrine

The law of karma and the principle of heredity and evolution.

of Karma from the point of view of *Anātman* or *Mohātman*, of which I have already spoken in one of my earlier lectures, that law becomes

almost identical with the modern scientific principles of heredity and evolution. In other words, the combined doctrines of *Karma* and *Mahâtman* establish that an individual has been born here through innumerable generations in the past and that he shall be born through innumerable generations in the future, so that he has had innumerable ancestors and shall have innumerable descendants. Such would be the idea which the Mahâtman doctrine will produce, if considered from the temporal point of view. On the other hand, if considered from the spacial standpoint, the Mahâtman doctrine will make an individual realise that, if he bears in mind the fact of his having parents, grandparents, children, brothers and sisters, uncles and aunts, and others that are near and dear to him, and if he should stretch all his ties of relationship and affection to the farthest end, all men will turn out to be his kinsmen, his brothers; nay, the very same as his own self. He will accordingly realise that the effects of his own actions in the uninterrupted chain of *karma* are liable to determine not only his own future but also, to some extent, the future of others, even as a small stone thrown into the mighty ocean creates an almost interminable series of ripples, whether perceptible or not, which do not cease till they have reached the furthest shore. Such is the Buddhist conception of the universal influence of Karma.

Again, as I have already stated, Buddhist Phenomenology subjectivizes the objective. Whatever happens around us is regarded by Buddhism merely as the manifestation of our own thoughts. In fact, intricate machines, gigantic instruments, nightless cities, terrible warships, cloud-like aeroplanes—are not all such things merely a display of the strength of the human will? And what is will after all, if it is not another name for character, which again, according to Buddhism, is but an aggregation of *Karmas*? To the Buddhist mind it appears impossible to give an adequate explanation for the manifestation of such giant-willed personalities as Confucius, Socrates ("the Jesus Christ of Greece" as Shelley calls him), Christ, and Mahomet, unless the Law of Karma be accepted as an eternal and Universal Truth. Personalities like these are not the pro-

ducts of a single age or a single life, for we know well who and what their fathers were. We know too that these fathers never spoke a single word to their sons concerning the latter's mission in life. Their biographies, at least, are silent on this point. Thousands of kings like Suddhodana have reigned in this world. Millions of carpenters like Joseph, the husband of Mary, have been on this earth, millions are still living and millions certainly will come. If then the manifestation of a Buddha or of a Jesus is merely a case of what is called "individualistic hereditary transmission" and not an example of the universal influence of karma, how would it be possible to account satisfactorily for the vast gulf which separates the ruler of a petty clan like that of the Śākya from his son Siddhārtha whom millions and millions of human beings still adore as the Benefactor and Teacher of Humanity? How would you also explain rationally the marvellous phenomenon of a poor carpenter in an obscure corner of Palestine becoming the progenitor of a personality like Jesus of Nazareth whom nearly half the civilised world still worships as a god or reveres as a prophet? Christians, of course, and over-devout Buddhists will attribute such phenomena to supernatural causes. The man of science will probably reply that these mighty characters were but the favoured products of the prevailing *Zeitgeist* of the India or the Judæa of the period in question. But what is *Zeitgeist* after all? Is it not the continuous stream of human karma flowing through countless ages, with fresh accretion of strength at every stage, till it eventually bursts upon human society in the form of a Confucius, a Buddha, a Socrates, a Jesus or a Mahomet,—seers whose names are ever enshrined in the memory of a grateful posterity which loves to celebrate them as martyrs or heroes?

"Who waged contention 'gainst their time's decay
And of the past are all that cannot pass away."¹

And even when the faiths which they preached, lose their hold upon the descendants of those who first embraced them, these mighty seers still

¹ Shelley : *Adonais* St. 48.

continue to be remembered with a sort of affectionate regret, not unmingled with a faint echo of reverence, such as we find in Jayadeva's melodious lines on Buddha, composed at an age when the Great Teacher was all but shorn of his glory in the land of his birth, having been degraded there to the position of a late incarnation of Vishnu:—

निन्दसि यन्नविधेरहह युतिजातं सदयहृदय दर्शि तपशुघातम् ।

किंयव धृतबुद्धशरीर जय जगदीश हरे ॥

[“Merciful-hearted ! when thou comest as Buddh—

Albeit 'twas written in the Scriptures so—

Thou had'st our altars be no more imbrued

With blood of victims ; Keshav ! bending low.”]

To return then to Karma, this doctrine unquestionably furnishes to the Buddhist mind a key to every manifestation of phenomenal greatness in humanity. Accordingly, when one of the latest German biographers of Napoleon Bonaparte, in his apparent helplessness to account for the almost superhuman military greatness of his hero, finds himself constrained to sum up his estimate of the Emperor's character in the memorable words of Hueffer: “We can do nothing more than to express our thankfulness to God for having gifted a member of our human race with traits of such incomparable superiority over his fellow-creatures, the Buddhist reader feels all the more convinced that it is the Doctrine of Karma alone which can give a satisfactory explanation of all that appears mysterious or superhuman in human destiny and human career. Has not the Blessed one himself said: “All beings have karma as their portion; they are heirs of their karma; their karma is their kinsman; their karma is their refuge; their karma allots them to lowliness and greatness.”

The Doctrine of Karma brings us to

THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE KLEŚAS.

Kleśa, in its general sense, means fatigue or pain in Sanskrit, but in

Buddhist philosophy it bears another sense, namely,
The sense of kleśa in Buddhist philosophy. that of delusion. Buddhist philosophy recognises

two sorts of kleśas, namely:—

(1) Intellectual kleśas and (2) Emotional kleśas.

The former are due to errors of judgment or want of discrimination; the latter are produced by the habits of our emotional nature and are more difficult to eradicate than the former. Thus, for example, it was an intellectual delusion on the part of our remote ancestors to take this round earth for a flat expanse. We, their wiser sons, have, thanks to the progress of science, come to learn that the earth is round and not flat. But although we know intellectually that the idea of the flatness of the earth which our ancestors had was erroneous, yet we, somehow or other, still feel that the earth is not round but flat. This sort of delusion, on our part, is an instance of what the Buddhists call an emotional delusion. The stock example of such a delusion is that of a man walking about at the dead of night in a lonely graveyard and feeling somewhat uneasy in mind in spite of his realising intellectually that ghosts do not exist and that therefore one ought not to be frightened of them.

Intellectual delusions are easy to remove. They arise through ignorance of reason and disappear as soon as the reason is known. But it is by no means easy to remove emotional delusions, a typical example of which I remember to have heard of, during the late Russo-Japanese war, in the case of a Russian prisoner who frankly admitted his inability to act the nocturnal spy on the ground of that though he did not and could not really *believe* in ghosts, he was nevertheless frightened of them in dark nights and lonely places. The only remedy for such delusions, according to Buddhism, is an adequate training of the mind and the body. This is the reason why emotional delusions are called in Buddhism, 'Bhāvanaheya-kleśa', *i. e.* 'delusions eradicable through proper meditation or training', whereas intellectual delusions are termed 'Darśanaheya-kleśa' *i. e.* 'delusions removable through realisation of the truth.' But although intellectual delusions are more easily eradicable than emotional delusions, yet they are more violent than the latter. The more violent delusions, namely those of the intellect, are known in Mahāyāna philosophy as "Speedy Messengers," while the emotional delusions are called "Tardy

Speedy messenger
and Tardy messenger.

Messengers." Each of these groups consists of five members. The "Speedy Messengers" or intellectual delusions are as follows:—

1. Kāya-drishṭi *i. e.*, belief that the five skāndhas constitute the Ego.
2. Anugraha-drishṭi *i. e.*, leaning towards Eternalism or Nihilism.
3. Mithyādrishṭi *i. e.*, erroneous views in general.
4. Drishṭiparamārśa *i. e.*, attachment to all the three delusion mentioned above.
5. Śīlavrataparamārśa *i. e.*, attachment to extreme mortifications or to superstitious rites.

The five "Tardy Messengers" or emotional delusions, are as follows:—

- | | | | |
|--------------|-----|-----|----------|
| 1. Lobha | ... | ... | Greed. |
| 2. Dvesha | ... | ... | Malice. |
| 3. Moha | ... | ... | Folly. |
| 4. Māna | ... | ... | Conceit. |
| 5. Vicikitsā | ... | ... | Doubt. |

In this connection it must be noted that the Pāli Abhidhamma (see Section 1239 of the Dhammasaṅgani) gives a different enumeration of the kleśas, or as they are called in Pāli, 'Kileśa,' a term translated by Pāli scholars as 'torments' or 'bases of corruption.'

Enumeration of kleśas in the Pāli Abhidhamma:

The Pāli enumeration is as follows:—

- | | | | |
|----------------|-----|-----|---|
| 1. Lobho | ... | ... | Greed or lust. |
| 2. Doso | ... | ... | Hate. |
| 3. Moho | ... | ... | Dullness. |
| 4. Māna | ... | ... | Conceit. |
| 5. Diṭṭhi | ... | ... | Error, or speculative opinion. |
| 6. Vicikicchā | ... | ... | Perplexity. |
| 7. Thīnam | ... | ... | Stolidity. |
| 8. Uddhaccam | ... | ... | Distraction, or excitement. |
| 9. Ahirikam | ... | ... | Impudence, or unconscientiousness. |
| 10. Anottappam | ... | ... | Fearlessness of consequence, or disregard of blame. |

The Pāli Abhidhamma knows no classification of the *kleśas*, and the term itself in its Pāli form *Kileśa* is explained as that whereby the mind is defiled (*hīlissati*), scorched (*upatappati*) or afflicted (*bādhiyati*) or that whereby creatures are brought to the state of defilement (*'malina-bhāvam'*) or debasement (*'nihīna-bhāvam'*). It is needless to state that the *kleśas* are not identical with the *Samyojanas*, or fetters, of which I shall presently have occasion to speak. The five emotional and the five intellectual delusions constitute the fundamental or chief *kleśas*. But there are many minor delusions of habit called in Buddhist philosophy, *upakleśas* or "flavours of habit perfumed by the *kleśas*."

The classification of the *kleśas* brings us to the three stages which lead to Buddhahood. They are as follows:—

(i) The stage of Śrāvaka¹ which is attained by one who has extirpated all the fundamental *kleśas* mentioned above.

Śrāvaka.

(ii) The stage of Pratyekabuddha² which is attained by one who has extirpated not only all the fundamental *kleśas* but also a part of *upakleśas* or "the flavours of habit perfumed by the *kleśas*".

Pratyeka-buddha.

(iii) The stage of Bodhisattva or "would be Buddha" which is attained by one who has eradicated all the principal *kleśas* as well as all the "flavours of habit perfumed by the

Bodhisattva.

kleśas". Mahāyānism considers the stage of a Bodhisattva in this connection to be identical with what is known as Arhatship in Hīnayāna.

An Arhat dogmatically is one who is walking in the fourth or highest

stage of the path which leads to Nirvāṇa. This path

The path to Nirvāṇa, and its four divisions.

is divided into four stages, each of which again is subdivided into a higher and a lower degree, viz., the Mārga, or path, and its

Phala, or result. The first stage is that of the Neophyte or 'Srotāpanna'³

who has entered into the stream (*'srota'*) of saintship.

(i) *Srotāpanna.*

He has got rid of intellectual delusions and the first three bounds of human passion (*'samyojana'*) namely *satkāyadṛṣṭi* or the heresy

¹ Jap: *Shōmon*.

² Jap: *Yen-paku*.

³ Jap: *Shūdōan* or *Yōu*.

of individuality, *vicikitsā* or scepticism and *śīlavrataparamāṛśa* or observance of ascetic or superstitious rites. The doors of the gates of punishment ('*apāya*') are shut for him. Buddhism recognises several classes of *arotā-paṇṇas*, the lowest of which is called *Saptakridbhavaparama* 'or one who will be re-born seven times at the most' and the highest of which is styled *Kulamukla*, or one who will be reborn only twice or thrice. The second stage is that of the *Sakridagāmin*¹ or one who will be reborn but once in the world of men. He is also called "Ekabījīn." He has eradicated every intellectual *kleśa* and also a part of the emotional delusions in the Realm of Desire. He has not only freed himself from the first three fetters mentioned above but has in addition eradicated *Rāga* (passion), *Dvesha* (hate) and *Moha* (folly). The third stage is that of the *Anāgāmin*² or one who will not be re-born in the world of living men or the Realm of Desire. Such a one is expected to have extirpated all *kleśas* intellectual and emotional. He has freed himself from all the *Samoyjanas*. He may be born in the world of the gods once more, after which he will forthwith enter the stage of *Arhat*.³ An *Arhat* is, it is needless to say, no longer subject to rebirth. He is the *Ārya*, or the Noble one, *par excellence*, although all others who are progressing towards emancipation are entitled to that name. In later times the Mahāyanists came to apply the term *Śrāvaka* to denote their opponents, the Hīnayanists.

Whoever wishes to attain to the highest stage of saintship which will render him immune from rebirth in any of the three Realms, viz., the Realm of Desire, the Realm of Form and the Realm of Formlessness, must make the most of his present life on earth, for without being born, at least, as a human being there is no possibility for him to enter into the path of salvation. And the chance of being reborn as a human being in a subsequent existence is indeed extremely remote. Therefore a man must make the most of the 'golden gift of life'; otherwise he is undone. Accordingly, it has been said by Śāntideva in one of the opening stanzas of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*:

Very hard to be born
as a human being.

¹ Jap: *Shidagon* or *Ichivō*.

² Jap: *Anagon* or *Fugen*.

³ Jap: *Arakan*.

क्षणसंपदियं सुदुर्लभा प्रतिलब्धा पुरुषार्थसाधनी ।

यदि नात्र विचिन्त्यते हितं पुनरप्येष समागमः कुतः ॥

“Very hard indeed it is to obtain the blessing of the (right) moment (for birth as a human being) which, when obtained, is conducive to the attainment of the summum bonum. If, in this life, no thought is bestowed upon future welfare, whence again can such a combination (of favourable circumstances) arise?”

The importance of *kṣaṇa*, or the right moment, is laid stress on times without number in the Sacred Books of the Buddhists. Do not slip the right moment. The well known passage of the Dhammapada (v. 315) needs only a passing reference here. Readers of the Pāli Canon will recollect a couplet in the Therīgāthā, attributed to a nun called Tissā which runs as follows :—

“Tisse yunjassu dhammehi khano tam mā upaccagā
khanātitā hi socanti nirayamhi samappitā.”

[“O Tissa! apply thyself to virtues and do thou not let slip the right moment, for those who let the right moment slip, are doomed to sorrow, being consigned to hell.”]

Now what is this right moment? In the technical language of Buddhist philosophy it is called “the Ninth moment” or the moment which excludes the eight evil moments detailed in the following *versus memorialis* :—

नरकप्रेततिर्यञ्चो ऽन्नेच्छा दीर्घायुषोऽभराः ।

मिथ्यादृग्बुद्धकान्तारौ मूकताष्टाविद्वाक्षणाः ॥

or as the Pāli religious compendium entitled “Saddhammopāyana” puts it :—

“Tayo apāyā aruppasannam paccantiman pi ca
pañcendriyānam vekallam micchaditthi ca dārunā
Apātubhāvo Buddhassa saddhammamataḍāyino
a//hakkhanā asamayā iti ete pakāsītā.”

The *locus classicus* for this is the 29th section of the 8th Nipāta of the Anguttara Nikāya where Buddha points out to his disciples the eight moments or opportunities which are unfavourable for the practice of a pure life ('akkhaṇā asamayā brahmacariyavāsāya'). These are respectively, (1) birth in hell; (2) birth among brute beasts; (3) birth among the *pretas*, (4) birth among the long-lived gods of the Realm of Formlessness from which they are bound to transmigrate elsewhere and where there is no chance for them to hear the Good Law :—

"Aruppasaññāloke pi sovanopāyavajjito Saddhammasavanāhīno katham punnam karissati"; (5) birth in the country of remote barbarians where there is no one to speak of Buddha's laws; (6) adherence to wrong views and false beliefs (*micchāditthika viparītavassano*) (7) birth with impaired mental faculties and, consequently, without the power of discriminating between right and wrong, (8) birth at a time when the Good Law does not preached anywhere.

Such are the 'eight akshanas' or wrong moments. The ninth moment is the right moment when all the above mentioned possibilities are excluded, and one is born with unimpaired faculties as a human being, at a period and in a place, which affords every facility for hearing and acting according to the Good Law.

The extreme difficulty of obtaining birth as a human being is illustrated by the well known Simile of the One-eyed Tortoise :
Simile for the difficulty of obtaining human birth. "Mahārnava - yuga-ccidra - kūrma-grīvārpanopamā". This simile which frequently occurs in Buddhist works of both the Vehicles, such as the Lotus of the Good Law (Ch. xxv), Nāgārjuna's Friendly Epistle (Stanza 59 of the Tibetan version), Bodhicaryāvatāra (iv 20), Therīgāthā (Gāthas of Sumedha, v 500) Atthasālinī (P. T. S. p. 60, sec. 191) and Saddhammopayana (v.4 + J. P. T. S. for 1887) was long misunderstood by European scholars, including Burnouf and Kern, the latter of whom regarded it as an allusion to the mythological tortoise which supports the earth in Hindū cosmogony. It was for the first time properly explained by my friend, the late Mr. Harinath De who, in a valuable contribution to Prof. Rhys Davids' Pāli Text Society's Journal

for 1900—1907, traced it back to the Bālepanđitasuttam of the Majjhima Nikāya where Buddha uses the similitude :—"Imagine to yourself, O Bhikkhus, that a man should throw into the ocean a yoke with one hole in it; that this yoke should be tossed by the east wind to the West, by the west wind to the East, by the north wind to the South and by the south wind to the North. Imagine also that there should be in the ocean a one-eyed tortoise which raises its head once only at the end of a century. Now what do you say, O Bhikkhus, would that one-eyed tortoise put its neck into the hole of the yoke or not?"

"If it should at all, O Lord", replied the Bhikkus, "it would do so by the rarest chance only and that at the end of a very long period of time."

"Far sooner indeed, O Bhikkhus," said Buddha, "would that one-eyed tortoise put its neck into that only hole of the yoke than would an ignorant man who has once fallen into one of the evil *gatis* (i. e., birth among brute beasts, goblins or in hell) would be able to regain birth among human beings."

Such is the difficulty of attaining human birth. "Even those who die off from the world of gods", says Nāgārjuna, "if they have not any residuum of good Karma left, they too must irrevocably be born, according to their merit, among brute beasts, goblins or in a region of hell."

Therefore a man should make the most of his human existence, for, as Nāgārjuna says "whoever born as a human being commits sin, is more foolish than one who useth for vomiting purposes vessels made of gold and set with gem."

What then, according to Buddhism, is the one thing needful for deliverance? It is character. And character, as Novalis puts it, is nothing but a perfectly educated will. Therefore, it is the paramount duty of man to control his will or, as it is called in Buddhist Sanskrit, his *cittam*, a word translated ordinarily by 'mind' or 'heart.' The restlessness of mind is, in Buddhist works, compared to that of a wild monkey or of an excited elephant

A paramount importance for moksha or deliverance.

which has to be tied up with the rope of mindfulness (वृत्तिरुद्धु). Thus Nāgārjuna says to King Sadvāhana in his Friendly Epistle, "It is not necessary to tell you in many words that you need not fear, seeing that there is a useful counsel to this effect: 'Subdue your mind for the Blessed One has declared that the mind is the root of all our conditions'."

मनःपूर्वङ्गमा धर्माः

as one of the fragments of the Sanskrit Dharmapada unearthed at Turfan has it.

Must then a man embrace Buddhism in order to attain deliverance? Buddhism replies: "No." It is enough that a man should know what is right and what is wrong, and when a man knows really and truly what is right and realises also the penalty to be paid for not doing it at the proper time, he assuredly will not swerve from the path of rectitude. Man, whatever his faith may be, will always reap the fruits of his Karma, or, as the great Athenian poet has said, "He who does must bear the consequences of his deed—this is an old-world law" (Aeschylus Choephori. l. 310).

The Good Law, says Buddha in the Anguttara Nikāya, knows no limitation of time or place, and holds good "whether Buddhas arise, or whether they do not arise." And as true it is that every cause must be followed by its effect, so true it is that whatever good or evil a man does here follows him when he departs this life:—

यत्कृतं हि मनुजैः शुभाशुभम्

तत् प्रयान्तमनुयाति पृष्ठतः ॥

In this respect Buddhism is perhaps much more catholic than Christianity theoretical or practical. The prospect held out by Christianity to the virtuous heathen after death is certainly not very hopeful. I do not know what a Christian Missionary would reply to you, were you to ask him what destiny or abode awaited Vasishṭha or Kanva or Yudhisṭhira or Bhīṣma or any such good and great men who flourished in India ages before the advent of Jesus Christ on this earth. But the case of such men and of many others who flourished in this country after the crucifixion of Christ but whose lot it was not to read or hear of him,—I mean men like Śāṅkara, Rāmanuja,

Chaitanya or Nānak—was first taken up by the great Italian poet, Dante Alighieri who in the nineteenth canto of the *Paradiso* describes how in the Heaven of Justice there arose in his mind a hope that he may find at last the solution of the problem which had so long tortured him, viz., the reason of the exclusion of the virtuous heathen from heaven, a decision so contrary in seeming to God's justice, and how he then addressed the just kings who composed the Divine Eagle, in the following words :—

“A man is born upon the bank of the Indus and there is none there to speak or read or write of Christ ; and all his desires and actions are good so far as human reason sees. He is sinless in life and in speech. He dies unbaptised and without faith. Where is the justice in his being damned ? Where is his fault if he does not believe ?”

For this harmless and unimpertinent query Dante first receives an uncelestial objurgation but is subsequently told :—

“To this realm of heaven never rose one who believed not in ‘Christ,’ neither before nor after he was crucified. But see many cry ‘Christ, Christ,’ who on the day of judgment shall be far less near to him than such as know not Christ.”

Buddhism does not limit its blessings to any particular division of time or place, for it believes in Buddhas that preceded Gautama Buddha, the son* of King-Suddhodana, as well as in Buddhas to come, seeing that every living being has in it the latent germs of Buddhahood. Buddhism deprecates all ambition for the attainment of an existence in heaven, for “as the pleasure to be enjoyed in heaven is great, the pain of dying there is proportionately greater,” and it regards as the highest among all blisses the bliss of the cessation of desire. Buddhism in its universal applicability is summed up in the well known verse of the Dhammapada :—

“Sabbapāpass’ akaranam kuslass’ nṣasampadā
saccitaparyodāpanam etam Buddhāna sāsanaṃ.”

“Not to commit sin, to practice virtue, to purify one's heart—these three precepts represent the essence of the teachings of the Buddhas of all ages.”

He who carries out in his life these three precepts of purity will attain to that stage of supreme perfection which Buddhism calls Tathāgatahood, Christianity "godliness" and which Aristotle, breaking through his habitual reserve, enthusiastically extols as the development of the principle of immortality within us (Eth. N. 10. 7.8 "*ep'h'oxon eudechetai athanattzomen*").

अश्चिप्रतिमामिमां गृहीत्वा जिनरत्नप्रतिमां करोत्यनर्घाम् ।

रसजातमतीव वेधनीयं सुदृढं गृह्यत बोधिचित्तसंज्ञम् ॥

सुपरीक्षितमप्रमेयधीभिर् बहुमूल्यं जगदेकसार्यवाहैः ।

गतिपत्तनविप्रवासशीलाः सुदृढं गृह्यत बोधिचित्तरत्नम् ॥

"What a marvel ! This human frame, the very emblem of impurity, becomes, through the alchemy of Enlightenment, the priceless image of Buddhahood. Firmly lay hold, therefore, of this sovereign elixir. O ye who wander about from birth to birth, like traffickers from market to market, seize this priceless pearl of enlightenment, the excellence of which has been realised by Sages who alone are the leaders of this caravan of existence."

CHAPTER III.

THE SARVĀSTIVĀVĀDINS.¹

Most of you will recollect the great excitement which was created in the year 1909, all over the journalistic world, by lengthy telegraphic messages detailing the importance of the archaeological discoveries made by Dr. Spooner in the North Western Frontier of India. To the energetic excavator himself it must have been a source of no ordinary satisfaction to feel that he had at last succeeded in putting his hand on what appeared, beyond doubt, to be the remains of the great Stûpa of Kanishka, which, according to Hiouen Tsang, was originally 450 feet in height and had a superstructure of gilt copper discs together with a large five-staged base.

The great Chinese traveller relates in his account of the construction of the Stûpa that "it was built by Kanishka in fulfilment of Buddha's prophecy to Ānanda to the effect that 400 years after the Tathâgata's Niavâṇa a sovereign named Kanishka would reign over all Jambudvîpa and would raise a Stûpa in which would be collected many of Buddha's flesh and bone-relics." On the authority of Hiouen Tsang, to whose credit it must be said that he never wilfully makes an incorrect statement, the officers of the Archaeological Department concluded that the relics enclosed in the precious casket discovered in Kanishka's Stûpa must be the "long missing" bones of Buddha himself. This identification came at a most opportune moment, for the contents of the casket excavated in the Piprawa Tope with its ambiguous inscription, had already commenced to arouse suspicion in the learned world as to its claims to sanctity, although scholars were not wanting even in Europe who sincerely believed that the bones in question were in reality a portion of the body-relic of Gautama Buddha.

To this category belonged the late Professor Pischel in whose yet unpublished lectures on the Prakṛita Languages, if I remember aright, the

¹ Jap: *Shobh-jitan-u-ran*, or *Ianai-u-bu-shûn*.

Piprawa Tope is actually called the Tomb of Buddha. But oriental scholars in general, and we Buddhists in particular, are deeply grateful to Dr. Fleet's learning and ingenuity which has at last proved, beyond the shadow of a doubt, that the only possible meaning, which can be extracted from the correct order of the words of the inscription, is that the bones belong to the Sakyas, the clansmen of Gautama Buddha. With the progress of Archaeological discovery, Buddha's bones will probably become as numerous in the centuries to come as fragments of the True Cross on which Jesus Christ was crucified were in the middle ages. And even if the bones discovered in Kanishka's Stûpa turn out to be those of a less eminent personage than Buddha, the zeal and the industry of the learned explorers deserves no detract-
 tion from the praises which have already been bestowed on it, for did not the great German explorer Dr. Schliemann himself arrive at a similar conclusion when, after one of his interesting excavations, he telegraphed to the King of Greece that he had at last lighted upon the corpse of the mighty Agamemnon?

Hienou Tsang, as Thomas Watters, his latest translator, points out, records chiefly what he had learnt from hearsay or oral tradition prevalent in the localities which he visited. Even the prediction about the building of Kanishka's Tope to which he refers in his travels is said in the Sacred Canon to have been made by Buddha not to Ânanda, as Hienou Tsang seems to think, but to the Bodhisattva Vajrapâni in a hamlet named Kharjura where Buddha pointed to a small boy making a mud Tope at a little distance and told Vajrapâni that on the identical spot, four centuries later a King named Kanishka would erect a stûpa which would be known to posterity as Kanishka's Stûpa. It is also worth noting as I once mentioned to that amiable scholar and archæologist, the late Dr. Ernst Theodor Bloch, that in a Chinese work preserved in the Imperial Library at Tokyo, which treats of Buddhist places of pilgrimage in India and out of India and is the composition of a Chinese pilgrim who visited Kanishka's Stûpa in question at least two centuries earlier than Hienou Tsang, there occurs absolutely no mention of Buddha's relics having been deposited there either by Kanishka or by any of his successors. Dr. Theodor Bloch too had his doubts about the genuineness of these supposed relics of Buddha and

Is Hienou Tsang's statement absolutely correct?

expressed a desire to me to have the extract I had referred to transcribed and translated; but alas! it was not given to me to satisfy the curiosity of that ardent and unselfish scholar so early lost to us.

Dr. Theodor Bloch agreed with me in thinking that the teachings of Buddha are infinitely more important to humanity than Buddha's body-relics, so that the question of the genuineness of the bones found in Kanishka's Tope matters but little to us. On the other hand, the Kharoshthi inscription which the casket bears is much more to our purpose. The exact words I do not recollect, but the inscription contains a respectful mention of the Teachers of the Sarvāstivādin (‘*ācāryānaṃ sarvāstivādinānaṃ parigrahe*’). Now who were these teachers of the Sarvāstivādin, and why should they of all persons have found preference in an inscription of this nature? These two questions will have to be answered, before we enter upon a detailed examination of the philosophical tenets of the Sarvāstivādin.

As is well known to most of you, in Buddha's life-time his disciples were saved from the curse of a schism, thanks to the magnetic personality of their teacher. But tradition relates that when 116 years had elapsed after the death of the Great Teacher, there arose amongst his followers a violent controversy regarding the theory and practice of the Vinaya, or rules for the order, which divided them, at last, into two bitterly antagonistic camps. The conservative party came to be designated as the *Sthavira* or ‘the Elders’ while their opponents, who constituted the liberal or, more properly speaking, the progressive section, styled themselves *Mahāsāṅghika* or Members of the Great Congregation. The details of this memorable controversy have not come down to us in all their fullness, but this much we know for certain that one of the fundamental points of difference related to the question of the attainment of Buddhahood by a sentient creature. The Sthavira maintained that Buddhahood was a quality that had to be acquired and accordingly laid great stress on the observance of the rules of the Vinaya and the practice of the injunctions to morality, which in their opinion was the sole means whereby Buddhahood could be attained. The

The conservative party and the progressive section among Buddhists.

Mahāsaṅghikas, on the other hand, declared, on the strength of certain passages of the Sacred Canon, that Buddhahood was a quality inborn in every human being, and that by adequate development it was capable of raising its possessor to the rank of a Tathāgatha. The views of the Sthaviras found adherents in Northern India, and their centre was Kashmere.

This Sthaviravāda or the Orthodox View of the Elders is said to be the lineal ancestor of Ceylonese Buddhism which loves to style itself Theravāda (*Skr.* 'Sthavira' = *Pali* 'Thera').

But the alleged ancestry is unfortunately based on such evidence as appears to my limited intellect to border well-nigh on fiction and mythology. The Mahāsaṅghikas—whose leaders curiously enough are identified with the Vātsīputrīyas by the half-fabulous chronicles of Ceylon, although Vasumitra expressly includes the latter among the Sthaviravādins—flourished chiefly in Eastern and Western India. Its main centre was the Kingdom of Magadha which welcomed with open arms these precursors of the Mahāyāna (for the Mahāsaṅghikas really were such), just as in the days of king Bimbisāra it had hailed with enthusiasm the teachings of the royal ascetic of the Sakya race. By the commencement of the

third century after Buddha's death, the Mahāsaṅghikas were split up into nine different schools, viz. the

The schisms of the Mahāsaṅghika.

(1) Mūlamahāsaṅghikas,¹ (2) Ekavyavahārikas,² (3) Lokottaravādins,³ (4) Kaurukullakā,⁴ (5) Bahus'rutiya,⁵ (6) Prajñāptivādins,⁶ (7) Caityaśailas,⁷ (8) Avaraśailas,⁸ (9) Uttaraśailas.⁹

An account of the views held by these short-lived schools falls beyond the scope of my lectures, as my subject is 'Systems of Buddhistic thought', but those of you who are curious to know their tenets will find sufficient materials to satisfy your curiosity, in the three Chinese versions of Vasumitra's "Treatise on the Points of Contention between the Different Schools of Buddhism."

The Sthaviravādins too had also by this time split up into two schools,

¹ Jap: *Konpon-daishu-bu.*

² Jap: *Issetsu-bu.*

³ Jap: *Setan-shusse-bu.*

⁴ Jap: *Kei-in-bu.*

⁵ Jap: *Tomon-bu.*

⁶ Jap: *Setan-ke-bu.*

⁷ Jap: *Sei-to-san-bu.*

⁸ Jap: *Sei-san-jū-bu.*

⁹ Jap: *Hoku-san-jū-bu.*

The schisms of the Sthaviravāda, viz. (i) *Haimavautā*,¹ and (ii) *Sarvāstivāddins*; and in the course of the fourth century after Buddha's death, nine more schools sprang up out of the original Sthaviravādins. The names of these are :

(1) Vātsīputriyas ;² (2) Dharmottaras ;³ (3) Bhadrāyānikas ;⁴ (4) Sammitiyas ;⁵ (5) Śaṅṅagarikas ;⁶ (6) Mahīśāsakas ;⁷ (7) Dharmaguptakas ;⁸ (8) Kāśyapiyas ;⁹ (9) Sautrāntikas.

These eleven schools of the Sthaviravāda together with the nine schools, which sprang from the Mahāsaṅghika, make up the twenty schools of the Hinayāna which are mentioned in Vasumitra's treatise. How these subdivisions arose from the two main divisions is not exactly known to us. A few stray informations can be gathered from Vasumitra. For instance the Bahuśrutīyas owed their estrangement from the original Mahāsaṅghika school to the fact, that unlike the latter, they denied the transcendental character of all the teachings of Buddha, excepting the doctrines of (a) universal impermanence, (b) universal suffering, (c) universal 'śūnyatā' or void, (d) universal *anātman* or non-ego, and (e) 'Nirvāṇa being the only calm.' Again, the Mahāsaṅghika school discarded the Prajñāptivāddins who thereupon formed a separate school by themselves, because, while the former maintained that the actual state of dharma exists in the present only and not in the past and the future, the latter went a step further and boldly affirmed that even in the present the actual state of dharma has no real existence except in the case of the five *skandhas* or 'constituents of being.'

Likewise among the Sthaviravādins, the Sautrāntikas formed themselves into an independent school, because of their adherence of the Sūtra Piṭaka, or the Section consisting of the discourses of Buddha, to the rejection of the two other Piṭakas viz., the Vinaya or the Rules for the Order, and the Abhidharma or Philosophy. Their opponents, the most influential

¹ Jap: *Sessan-jū-bu*.

² Jap: *Ken-chū-bu*.

³ Jap: *Kōchi-bu*.

⁴ Jap: *Doku-shi-bu*.

⁵ Jap: *Shō-ryō-bu*.

⁶ Jap: *Hō-zō-bu*.

⁷ Jap: *Hō-jū-bu*.

⁸ Jap: *Mitsurin-mu-bu*.

⁹ Jap: *On-kō-bu*.

schools of the Sthaviravāda whom they designated under the common title of Vaibhāṣikas or 'Adherents of the Vibhāṣā (or Commentary on the Abhidharma)' attached themselves exclusively to the Abhidharmapiṭaka and, generally speaking, refused to accept the authority of the Sūtrapiṭaka and the Vinayapiṭaka. In later times, the so-called Vaibhāṣikas came to be identified with the Sarvāstivādin; and the two names became mutually interchangeable although, properly speaking, the Sarvāstivādin originally formed a section of the Vaibhāṣikas. A few of the schools of the Sthaviravāda owed their origin to the peculiarities of the customs and habits of the places where they flourished, a fact which can be gathered from their very names such as *Haimavanta*, *Caityaśaila*, *Avaraśaila* and *Uttaraśaila*.

In Hindū and Jaina accounts of Buddhist philosophy, we find mention of only four schools, viz. (1) the Madhyamikas, or nihilists, (2) the Yogācāras, or subjective idealists, (3) the Sautrāntikas, or representationists and (4) Vaibhāṣikas, or presentationists. The chief tenets of each of these schools are supposed to be summed up in the well-known stanza :—

अथ ज्ञानसमन्वितो मतिमता वैभाषिकेणोच्यते
प्रत्यक्षो न हि बाह्यवस्तुविस्तरः सौत्रान्तिकैराश्रितः ।
योगाचारमतानुगैरभिमता साकारबुद्धि परा
मन्यन्ते वत मध्यमाः कृतधियः स्वस्यां परां संविदम् ॥

These four probably represented the principal classes of Buddhists who flourished in India at a time when militant Vedantism was hurling its missiles against the moribund faith of Sugata. The works of the Buddhists so far as I am aware, know of no such fourfold classification, so that, if I depart from it, I shall at least have the satisfaction of erring in good company, if at all it be an error to analyse Buddhism from the Buddhist point of view. The explanations given of the origin of the names of the four classes of Buddhist philosophers in Hindū works, such as the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* and the *Brahmavidyabharana*, are fanciful and incorrect, ignoring as they do the historical sequence of the development of thought. The passages cited by them in support of their view as to the four classes

of opinions being merely an expression of the points of view from which one and the same thing is considered, are in reality irrelevant, for when referred back to their context the passages do not at all admit of the interpretation which is forced upon them by Hindû critics of Buddhism. Take for instance, the well known stanza of Nāgārjuna cited by Mādhavācārya :

देशना लोकनायानां सत्वाशयवशानुगाः
 भिद्यन्ते बहुधा लोके उपायैर्बहुभिः किल ॥
 गम्भीरोत्तानभेदेन कचिच्चोभयलक्षणाः ।
 भिन्नाहि देशनाऽभिन्ना शून्यताऽहयलक्षणा ॥¹

[“The teachings of the Buddhas take their character from the understandings of beings (who hear them). Verily they owe their diversity in this world to the fact of (the Buddhas having employed) a diversity of methods (in their teachings). Sometimes they are deep, sometimes they are superficial, at other times they are both superficial and deep. Yes, their teachings are diverse, but the doctrine of Śūnyatā, the characteristic of which is non-duality, is not diverse”]

I need hardly point out that the Prof. Gough mistranslates the last line as “diverse is the doctrine of a universal void which is a negation of duality.” The Tibetan version of the lines (Tanjur, Rgyud xxxiii fol. 45 b) proves Prof. Gough’s error.

But when we come to the real meaning of these lines we find that they refer not to the four different schools of Buddhism, as Mādhavācārya makes out, but to the two sorts of doctrines taught by Buddha viz., the conventional (*samvṛtī*) and the transcendental (*paramārtha*) of which we have already spoken in an earlier lecture. The *locus classicus* for this idea is the 5th chapter of the Lotus of the Good Law where Buddha is represented as saying :

धर्मराजा अहं लोके उत्पन्नो भवमर्दनः ।
 धर्मं भाषामि सत्त्वानामधिसुक्तिं विजानिय ॥
 धीरबुद्धी महावीरा चिरं रक्षन्ति भाषितम् ।
 रहस्यं चापि धारयन्ति न च भाषन्ति प्राणिनाम् ॥

¹ “Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha,” P. 19.

दुर्वीथं चापि तज्ज्ञानं सहसा युत्वा बालिशाः ।
 काङ्क्षां कुर्युः सुदुर्मेधास्ततो भ्रष्टा भ्रमेयु ते ॥
 यथाविषयु भाषामि यस्य यादृशकं बलम् ।
 अन्यमन्येहि अर्थेहि दृष्टिं कुर्वामि उल्लुकाम् ॥

[“Lord of Righteousness am I, born in this world to eradicate existence. I preach the Law to living beings, having known what salvation is. Mighty men of firm understanding always observe my preachings. They even keep it a mystery and reveal it not to living beings. That knowledge is hard to understand, and the ignorant, should they come to hear it before being prepared for it, would foolishly arouse desires in themselves and deviating, from the right part would wander about (in *samsāra*). I preach in accordance with the nature of the subject and the capacity of the hearer, and by diversity of meaning I cause right views to arise in the minds of different people.”]

The allusion in such passages is obviously to the conventional and the transcendental doctrines taught by Buddha. The historical order of the rise of these several schools, as I have said before, disproves Mādhavācārya’s account of their origin. Thus the Vaibhāṣhikas arose in the third century after Buddha’s death; the Sautrāntikas came in the fourth; the Madhyamika school, as Āryadeva states, came into existence five hundred years after the Nirvāṇa of Buddha,¹ and Asanga, the founder of the Yogācāras or the Vijñānavādins is, at least, as late as the third century of the Christian era. Although Hindū critics of Buddhism are, in a sense, right in including the Vaibhāṣhikas and the Sautrāntikas in the category of the Sarvāstivavādins on the ground that both schools believe in the reality of the eighteen dhātus, yet it must be borne in mind that the Sautrāntikas never called themselves Sarvāstivavādins because the authoritative works of the latter school were not the same as others. The difference between the philosophical tenets of the Vaibhāṣhikas and the Sautrāntikas are numerous, but, as the limited time at my disposal prevents

¹ See Āryadeva’s commentary on the opening stanza of the “Madhyamika-Śāstra,” (Kumārāyā’s Chinese version.)

me from entering into them, I shall content myself with the observation that while the Vaibhāshikas acknowledged the direct perception of exterior objects, the Sautrāntikas held that exterior objects merely exist as images and are indirectly apprehended. In the 18th section of the second book of his commentary on the Vedānta Sūtras, Śāṅkarācārya, after rejecting the semi-destructive atomic theory of the Vaiseshikas inveigles against Buddhism in the following manner:—

“We have said that the system of the Vaiseshikas cannot be accepted, because it is irrational, contrary to the Vedas and not approved by the learned. It is semi-nihilistic. We now proceed to show that the wholly nihilistic doctrine (viz., that of the Buddhists) is still more worthy of rejection seeing that nihilism is a very pernicious thing. This doctrine has a variety of forms owing either to diversity of views or to diversity of adherents. There are three schools of Buddhists, viz. (1) that of the Sarvāstivādin, (2) that of Vijñānavādin, and (3) that of the Śūnyatavādin. We proceed to refute first the Sarvāstivādin who maintain the reality of everything³ external as well as internal, that is to say, of the elements as well as of the elementary, of mind as well as of the mental.” Śāṅkara then proceeds to detail the views of the Sarvāstivādin and, as I shall presently show, commits a number of blunders. What Śāṅkara’s sources of information concerning the Sarvāstivādin were, it is difficult to determine at the present day. Nevertheless it is certain that he could not have consulted their authoritative philosophical works in their original form.

The first authoritative work of the Sarvāstivādin is the *Abhidharma-jñāna-prasthāna-kāstra* which was composed by the venerable Katyāyaniputra three centuries after Buddha’s death. The original Sanskrit text of this work, which is said to have consisted of 15072 slokas is lost, but two Chinese translations of it are extant, the earlier of which was completed about A. D. 382 and the later is the performance of Hiouen Tsang. In the

³ The first authoritative work of the Sarvāstivādin school.

next century King Kanishka is said to have commanded 500 Sthaviras or Elders to collect together all the works which constituted the authoritative canon of the Sarvāstivādin. This important collection was made under the superintendence of an Elder or Sthavira named Pārśva who is said to have been the teacher of the poet-philosopher Aśvaghoṣa. But by far the greatest philosophical compilation of that age, or, for the matter of that, of any period of Buddhism, is that monumental encyclopædia of Hīnayāna philosophy called the *Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra*, which is as luminous as well as a voluminous commentary on Katyāyaniputra's *Abhidharma-jñāna-prasthāna-śāstra*. The Sanskrit original of this work is lost, but Hienon Tsang's Chinese translation of it exists, consisting of 200 fasciculi which contain 438449 Chinese characters. In the introduction of this great work, which is in the form of dialogues, the original authorship of Abhidharma is attributed to Buddha himself who is there said to have expounded it in order to satisfy the curiosity of his disciple Śāriputra or of an assembly of 500 Arhats or of the Gods themselves or of a number of laymen who had put on the garb of Bhikṣus, according as one or the other of these traditions is credited. The propagator of this Śāstra was Katyāyaniputra and hence, says the introduction, its authorship is ordinarily ascribed to that Sthavira. We are also told that "the self-nature (*svabhāva*) of Abhidharma is wisdom undefiled (*auśrava-prajña*)."¹ Another interesting fact also is given there, viz., the derivation of the word *Abhidharma*. Hitherto the only derivation known of that word was that given in the *Abhidharma-kośa* which is the same as that given by Buddhaghosha in the opening chapter of the *Atthasalini* where it is said that the word *Abhidharma* means "Dharma *par excellence*" ("*Kew'atthena Abhidharmo ? Dhammāttirekadhammavisesatthena. Atirekavisesatthadipako hi ettha abhinaddo*"). But this explanation is not quite satisfactory and convincing. The *Mahā-vibhāṣā-śāstra* settles our doubts by telling us that *Abhidharma* is called by that name "because it examines all dharmas", the prefix *Abhi* being used in the sense of *about* or *concerning*. Of the esteem in which Kanishka held the commentaries which he caused to be compiled an idea may be formed from the tradition prevalent in Hienon Tsang's days about the Great

Council which Kanishka held for the purpose of reviving the Buddhist scriptures.

"Kanishka, King of Gaudhāra," says Hsien Tsang, "was a great and powerful monarch ruling over many nations. He devoted his leisure hours to the study of the Buddhist scriptures receiving instruction daily in his palace from some Buddhist monks. As the monks taught him different and contradictory interpretations of the doctrines owing to their conflicting sectarian views, the king became greatly perplexed. Thereupon, the venerable Pārśva told the king that during the many centuries that had elapsed since Buddha's death, various conflicting theories had arisen amongst teachers and disciples all of whom differed from one another and adhered to their particular views. Hearing this Kanishka was greatly moved and said to Pārśva, 'I desire to restore Buddhism to its eminence and to have the Sacred Canon (Tripitaka)' explained according to the respective opinions of the different schools. Pārśva heartily approved of the idea and the King held a Council. This Council composed one *lakh* of stanzas explaining the Sūtra, another *lakh* explaining the Vinaya, and a third *lakh* of stanzas of *Abhidharma-vibhāṅgśāstras* explaining the Abhidharma. For this exposition of the Sacred Canon all learning from the remotest antiquity was thoroughly examined, the general purport and terseness of the text were elucidated, and this learning was spread far and wide for the guidance of disciples. When the commentaries were finished, Kanishka had them engraved on copper plates which he enclosed in boxes of stone and deposited in a stūpa made for the purpose. He then ordered Yakshas (Query-Afghans?) to guard the plates so that heretics might not take them out of the country while those who wished to study them could do so in the country."

The religious zeal of Kanishka finds an exact parallel in our own days in the case of the father of ex-king Thibaw, King Mindon of Burma whose piety induced him to have the whole of the Pāli Tripitaka engraved on marble slabs fixed to the ground over which he erected several hundreds of temples in order to protect them from the ravages of man and nature,

What a wonderful find would it be, if excavators and explorers, in their

Our hope for the future discoveries in the Archaeological Department of India.

endeavour to search for the bones of Gautama Buddha, should, in the years to come, light upon the stone boxes which contain the copper plates deposited by Kanishka! An equally important discovery awaits him who should be able to locate the Black-bee Mountain or Bhramara-giri in Southern Kosala where King Sadvâha (this is the right name and not *Satavahana*, for the Chinese translate it always by "*Leading right*") built a wonderful five-storied vihâra for Nâgârjuna quarried out in the mountain itself, in the topmost hall of which a copy of the Sacred Canon was deposited. When excavations will bring to light a priceless treasure of this description, India will be able to explain to herself, without seeking the help of foreign scholarship, the complicated philosophy of Buddhism. But, until such a day comes, the assistance afforded by the Chinese translator of the Sacred Canon cannot be overrated, since their work is far more valuable than the versions of the Kanjur and the Tanjur, seeing that, while the Tibetan translators spent their energies on the letter of the text, the Chinese translators sought to interpret its spirit in language generally plain and straightforward. So let us now turn our attention to what we can gather from the Chinese Tripiṭaka about the philosophy of the Sarvâstivâdins.

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THE TENETS OF THE SARVĀSTIVĀDINS.

The name 'Sarvāstivādins', means " 'All-is' sayers" (i. e. "those who maintain the existence of all things"). It is usually translated by the term "Realists." But 'Realism', when applied to a branch of Buddhist philosophy, has to be understood in a sense somewhat different to that which it ordinarily bears in European philosophy where it is opposed to Idealism and Nominalism. Realism, in Buddhist philosophy, does not mean the theory which maintains that the objects immediately perceived by our senses have a real existence. It means rather the doctrine which lays down that "the substance of all things has a permanent existence throughout the three divisions of time, the present, the past and the future." By 'substance', in this connection, is meant what the Greeks called *Υῦοkeimenon* (Latin 'substantia'), or the abiding "substrata" of things.

Hitherto we have been studying transitory phenomena, but now we shall have to deal with the underlying substance of all things and with the methods of their analysis. For this purpose we shall have recourse to Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa* which, is perhaps the most systematic exposition of the philosophy of the Hīnayāna and, what is perhaps not less important, which unlike the *Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra*, is more a work for study than for reference. It contains a very full account of the tenets of the Sarvāstivādins. A thorough mastery of this important work is the only door of entrance to the philosophy of the Hīnayāna and, consequently also, to that of the Mahāyāna. Lest the contents of this great work of Vasubandhu be supposed to be identical with those of any exposition of the Pāli Abhidhamma, like Anurudha's *Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha* or the *Abhidhammāvatāra* with their voluminous commentaries by the Theras of Burma and Ceylon, I shall give you a short account of the *Abhidharmakośa-śāstra*. You will then see how little it has in common, beyond the name, with the quasi-philosophical Pāli treatises like those mentioned above.

Vasubandhu's work is divided into nine chapters, for the first eight of

The content of the
Abhidharmakośa-sāstra.

which there are *kārikas* or aphoristic verses, which are commented upon at considerable length in prose.

The Ninth Chapter has no *kārikas*, being entirely in prose. The Sanskrit vyākhyā by Yaśomitra contains only the first eight chapters. It does not give the *kārikas*. The Tibetan version contained in the Tangyur (Vols. 64, 65) contains the 'kārikas' as well as all the nine chapters of Vasubandhu's work. In the Chinese Tripiṭaka there are two complete translations of it, an earlier one by the Indian priest Paramārtha, and a later and, on the whole, better one, by the travellers, Hiouen Tsang.

The subjects treated of in its nine chapters are as follows :—

Chapter I.—contains a treatment of the *dhātus* showing the nature of the substance of all things. It consists of forty-four *kārikas*.

Chapter II.—contains a treatment of the *Indriyas* and of the function of things ('*dharma*s'). It consists of seventy-four *kārikas*.

(N. B.—These two chapters contain a general treatment of the 'sāśrava' and the 'anāśrava', that is to say, the 'Defiled' and the 'Undefiled', the former being Samsāra and the latter Nirvāṇa).

Chapter III.—contains a treatment of the world ('*loka*') considered as the outcome of 'sāśrava' (or the Defiled *i. e.* Samsāra). It contains ninety-nine *kārikas*.

Chapter IV.—contains a treatment of *karma*, considered as the causes of the Sāśrava or Samsāra. It contains one hundred and thirty-one *kārikas*.

Chapter V.—contains a treatment of the *anuśayas* or 'latent evils' considered as a condition (*pratyaya*) of the Sāśrava or Samsāra. It contains sixty-nine *kārikas*.

(N. B.—These three chapters explain in detail the causes and effects of Samsāra.)

Chapter VI.—contains a treatment of Arhatship considered as an effect of 'anāśrava' or Nirvāṇa. It contains eighty-three *kārikas*.

Chapter VII.—contains a treatment of knowledge (*prajñā*), considered as the cause (*hetu*) of *andśrava* or Nirvāṇa. It contains sixty-one *kārikas*.

Chapter VIII.—contains a treatment of Dhyāna or meditation considered as a condition ('pratyaya') of *andśrava* or Nirvāṇa. It contains thirty-nine *kārikas*.

(N. B.—These three chapters above explain the causes and effects of Nirvāṇa.)

Chapter IX.—contains a refutation of *Ātman*-theories of the Sankhya, Vaisheshika and the Vātsīputrīya schools. It is in prose.

An account of the contents of the Sanskrit work entitled *Abhidharma-kośa-vyākhyā* by Yaśomitra is to be found in Burnouf's *Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien* and, to some extent, in Rājendralala Mitra's *Nepalese Buddhist Sanskrit Literature*. The Bengal Asiatic Society's copy of it has been for years with Dr. Leumann in Germany. Copies of it are still available in Nepal, and a transcript of it was lately obtained from that country by Dr. Ross at a very moderate expense. The importance of Yaśomitra's *Vyākhyā* for us consists in the fact that it gives us the Sanskrit technical terms of the Abhidharma. It can also help us in the restoration of the original Sanskrit *kārikas* the *disjecta membra* of which are scattered about in it.

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CLASSIFICATION OF THINGS.

The Sarvāstivādin adopt two methods in their classification of things, viz., (a) the subjective; (b) the objective.

Subjective Classification.—

According to the subjective method, all things are divided into three departments, viz.—

(a) the five *skandhas* or 'constituents of being';

- (b) the twelve *āyatana*s or 'locations';
- (c) the eighteen *dhātu*s or 'bases'.

Objective Classification.—

According to the objective method all things are classified into :—

- (a) things incomposite ('asamskrīta-dharma');¹
- (b) things composite ('samskrīta-dharma').²

Asamskrīta-dharma.—

'*Asamskrīta-dharma*' or 'things incomposite' are those which are not produced by other things. They are self-existent and exempt from change. Being free from production, they are not liable to destruction; and being indestructible, they are permanent or eternal. They are three in number, viz.—

- (a) '*Pratisankhya-nirodha*',³
- (b) '*Apratisankhya-nirodha*',⁴
- (c) '*Ākāśa*'.⁵

These terms, I shall explain later on. Suffice it to say here that '*pratisankhya-nirodha*' is another name for Nirvāṇa, and '*ākāśa*' means 'space'. That things eternal are incomposite is a truth recognised also by Aristotle in bk. xiii of his *Metaphysics*.

Samskrīta-dharma.—

Samskrīta-dharmas or "Things Composite" are divided into four, viz.—

- (1) *Rūpa* (रूप) or 'Matter';⁶
- (2) *Citta* (चित्त) or 'Mind';⁷
- (3) *Caitta* (चेित्त) or 'Mental';⁸
- (4) *Uttaviprayukta* (विविक्तवियुक्त) or the 'Non-mental'.⁹

These four classes of *composite things* together with the *incomposites* constitute the five-fold objective divisions of things, a knowledge of which

¹ Jap: *Mui*-(hō).

² Jap: *Hi-chaku-metsu*.

³ Jap: *Shin*-(bō).

⁴ Jap: *U-i*-(hō).

⁵ Jap: *Ko-kū*.

⁶ Jap: *Shinjiu*-(hō).

⁷ Jap: *Chaku-metsu*.

⁸ Jap: *Shiki*-(hō).

⁹ Jap: *Fushō-bō*-(bō).

and of the subjective classification together with that of the two forms of truth viz. the transcendental and the conventional, leads, according to the Sarvāstitvavādins or, more correctly speaking, the Vaibhāshikas (of whom the former were really a branch), to the attainment of Nirvāṇa, exactly in the same way as the condition laid down by the *Naiyāyikas* for the attainment of the *summum bonum* is the knowledge of the truths concerning 'demonstration', 'the demonstrable,' and a host of other things detailed in the opening aphorism of Gautama's Nyāya-sūtras. The aim of the subjective classification of things is said to be the removal of delusion and the attainment of right knowledge whereby the true nature of all things may become intelligible.

Students of the Pāli Canon will recollect the constant reference which occurs there to this efficacy which is supposed to be inherent in a knowledge of the *skandhas*, *dhātus* and *āyatanas*. For instance, in the Therīgāthā the line

"*Sā me dhammam adesesi khaṇḍhadyatanudbhāṭṭvā*"

occurs twice, once in the gāthās of an unknown Theri and again in those of Sona who calls herself the 'Immovable daughter of the Teacher', '*Dhīḍa natthu e'anejj' amhi*', which is the correct reading and not the fanciful text of Dharmapala, the commentator, nor the emendation of the late Prof. Pischel which is rendered by Mrs. Rhys Davids:

"*I too was stayed, victor on basis sure, Immovable.*"

NATURE AND ENUMERATION OF THINGS COMPOSITE.

The objective classification further attempts to furnish an explanation of the characteristics of the world of mind and the world of matter. The

The signification of the word, *Dharma*. world of matter is technically called '*Rūpa*' in Buddhist philosophy. Before we treat of *Rūpa*, it will

be necessary to explain to you what is exactly meant by '*Samskṛita-dharma*' or 'composite things'. Of the Samskrit word *Dharma*, as used in Buddhist philosophy, we might say the same thing which has been said of its Latin equivalent '*res*' viz. that it is a blank cheque which has to be filled in accordance with the exigencies of the context,

'Dharma' means, in Buddhist Sanskrit, *law, rule, faith, religion, world, phenomena, thing, state*, etc. In the phrase 'Samskr̥ta-dharma', or 'Asamskr̥ta dharma,' the English word '*thing*' would best represent it. Dr. Karl Eugen Neumann also translates it by the corresponding German word 'Ding', even in passages where this rendering does not suit the context. Thus for example when he renders the opening line of the Dhammapada by "Manopubbangamā dhammā, manosettḥā, manomayā"

*"Vom Herzen gehn die Dinge aus,
Sind herzgeboren, herzgefügt"*

and cites in support of his interpretation the well known passage of the Anguttara Nikāya :—"Ye keci dhammā akusalā ye keci dhammā kusalā sabbe te manopubbangamā," he reminds one of the Hindū convert to Christianity who based his refusal to eat ham on a passage he had read in a Hebrew text of the Book of Genesis which said, "*Curse be upon Ham*". Dr. Neumann's knowledge of the Pāli canon and the Hindū convert's acquaintance with the Hebrew Bible (for in the passage referred to 'Ham' is a variant for 'Canaan', and Hebrew is the mother of all languages as the convert thought) practically come to the same result. The quotation from the Anguttara Nikāya is irrelevant, for the word '*dhamma*' is used there in a quite different sense to that which it bears in the opening line of the Dhammapada. The correct interpretation of the line is, "Our states of existence (*i.e.* the *gati* and the condition of life in which we are born) are the consequences of our character (*i.e.* our good life or bad life) in a previous state of existence". '*Manā*' here is synonymous with '*cittam*' and the explanation I have given is borne out by a passage from Nāgārjuna's *Saḥrillekha* or '*Friendly Epistle*' which I have already quoted in a previous lecture (*Stanza 117 of the Tibetan version*):—"Subdue your mind for the Blessed one has declared that *the mind is the root of our conditions* ('*dharma*'). The commentator of the Friendly Epistle, Mahāmātī, says in his explanation, "If your mind is pure, you will be very happy, but if it is not so, you will be quite unhappy."

This explanation is borne out by a passage in the *Lamen of the Ex-Actor Tālapata* in the *Theragāthā* where it is said that our condition in the present

life, be it on earth or in the other *galis*, depends entirely on our '*cittam*' or mind :

"*tvañ űeva no citta karosī brāhmano,
tvam khattiya rajadisi karosī,
vessā ca suddā ca bhavāma ekadā,
devattanam vāpi tav'eva vāhasā,
tav' eva hetu asurā bhavāmase,
tvammūlakam nerayikā bhavāmase,
atho tiracchāngatāpi ekadā,
petattanam vāpi tav' eva vāhasā.*"

Prof. Rhys Davids has pronounced Dr. Neumann's translation of the Pāli Dhammapada to be the best European version in existence; but in reality, it contains many errors which can be detected by a comparison of his version with those of the Chinese translators of the Dhammapada, in the case of the stanzas which are common to the Pāli recension and the Chinese translations. The same remark may be made as regards Dr. Neumann's versions of the poetical works of the Pāli Canon. For instance he makes himself quite merry over what he considers to be an error in the versions of Max Müller and Fausböll, when they take the word '*dīpam*' in verse 236 of the Dhammapada, in the sense of 'island.' He thinks it must mean 'light' on the strength of a similar phrase in the Great Sūtra of the Decease, where Buddha tells his disciples to be their own light "*attadīpa bhavetha*." In utter ignorance of the fact that even in a Chinese translation of the Dhammapada the word is taken in the sense of an island (Skr. *dvīpa*), Dr. Neumann remarks with characteristic self-complacence :—

"Encheiresin des Pali, übst du auch sie,
Spotttest deiner selbst und weisst nicht wie."

The passage in question is :—

"So karohi dīpam attano,
Khippam vāyāma, paudito bhava."

That the word '*dīpam*' must mean island here, is further corroborated by an exactly parallel passage in the *Dhammapada* (Stanza 25) :—

"*Uttānen' appamādena saññāmena damena ca
dīpam kayrātha medhāvi yam ogho nābhikīrati.*"

—where the floods referred to are the flood of sensual desire (*kāma*), desire for existence (*bhava*), wrong view (*ditthi*) and ignorance (*avijjā*).

But, as Dr. Johnson once remarked, in his "Lives of the Poets," about Milton's finding fault with the Latin of his rival Salmasius without remembering that he himself had committed equally gross blunders, Nemesis is always on the watch in such cases. So we ought not to be surprised to find Dr. Neumann make nonsense of the following, among other passages of the *Theragāthā*. Here the word '*disā*' means 'enemies,' as the context shows and the commentator tells us, and not 'quarters of the sky' as Dr. Neumann will have it :—

"*cakkhum sarīram upahanti roṇṇam
nihiyati vanuabalam mati ca
ānandino tassa disā bhavanti,
hitesino nāssa sukhi bhavanti.*"

The passage simply means that when a man dies his enemies become glad and his friends become sorry. But Dr. Neumann disclaiming common sense renders—"The free breezes are our dearest friends and he who wishes to console us and mitigate our pain is sad and cheerless."—

"Die freien Lüfte sind uns liebste Freunde,
Wer trösten, lindern will, ist trübe, lästig."

Apologising for this digression, which has its justification in the fact that the state of Buddhist learning in the Western World has not yet reached the degree of perfection which it sometimes loves to claim, I pass on to explain the word '*Samskṛita*.'

The word "*Samskṛita*" in Buddhism bears only its etymological meaning, namely that of "put together" (= *Lat.* *confectus*).
The sense of *Sams-* *kṛita-dharma*. '*Samskṛita-dharmas*' or 'composite things' are, according

to the Abhidharma-kośa, those which are produced by an aggregate of causes and conditions, as for example *rūpa*:—

हेतुप्रत्ययजनितरूपादयः संस्कृताः

Vasubandhu lays special stress here on the plurality of causes, because, according to Buddhist philosophy, no effect can ever be produced by a *single* cause. There must be, at least, two causes to produce an effect:—

नत्वेकप्रत्ययजनितं सर्वथात्प्रत्ययत्वेऽपि भवश्यम् द्वौ प्रत्ययौस्तः ।

In the Abhidharma-kośa, 'Samskrita-dharmas' are detailed in a *karika* the Sanskrit original of which was:—

ते पुनः संस्कृतधर्माः पञ्चस्कन्धरूपादयः ।

लोकाध्वाच कथावस्तु सविमोक्षाः सवसुकाः ॥

Hienou Tsang interprets this to mean :

"Again, composite things are the Five Skandhas, viz: *Rūpa* etc., the Path of the World, things which have a name, which have the capacity to attain deliverance and which have a cause."

Vasubandhu further goes on to explain :

"By the Five Skandhas are meant the Skandhas beginning from '*Rūpa*' and ending with '*Vijñāna*'. All Composite Things are included in these Five Skandhas. They are produced by a plurality of causes, for nothing can be produced by a single cause. Composite Things are called the Common Path of the World,—a path which has been gone through (by sentient creatures) in former times, is being gone through at the present time, and will be gone through in future time. Again, 'Things Composite' are called '*Kathāvastu*' or 'the Object of Words.' '*Kathā*' means 'word' the basis of which is its particular sound and meaning. Thus all Composite Things are included under '*Kathāvastu*.' Again, 'Composite Things' are called '*Savimukta*.' '*Vimukti*' means 'Deliverance' for ever from *Samsāra*.' It is another name for *Nirvāṇa*. The name '*Savimukta*' is given to them because all composite things possess the capacity for

ultimate deliverance. Lastly, it is called 'Savastuka' or 'having a cause.' 'Vastu' here means 'cause.'"¹


The doctrine of no-effect being produced by a single cause, excludes from the pale of Buddhism, monotheism and the theory of the creation of the world out of nothing. In an earlier lecture, I have pointed out that the Ceylonese commentator, Buddhaghosha, bases his denial of the existence of an extra-mundane universe-creating deity on this very doctrine. 'Composite things' or 'Samskr̥ita-dharmas' are divided into 72, if we analyse them in detail, viz., eleven 'Rūpa dharmas'; one 'Cittadharma', forty-six 'Caitta-dharmas', and fourteen 'Cittaviprayukta-samskāra-dharmas' or 'Unmental Composite Things.' These seventy-two composite 'dharmas', together with the three incomposite 'dharmas' (viz. 'ākāśa', 'pratisankhya nirodha' and 'apratīsankhya-nirodha', make up the complete tale of the Seventy-five Dharmas.

¹ "The Abhidharma-kośa-śāstra, Chap. I.

RELATION BETWEEN THE SUBJECTIVE AND THE OBJECTIVE CLASSIFICATION OF THE DHARMAS.

In the accompanying diagram, given for convenience of reference, the relation between the subjective and the objective classification of all the Dharmas, is clearly brought out.

The five divisions of the 75 dharmas. The five skandhas. The twelve āyatanas. The eighteen dhātus.



EXPLANATION OF THE SEVENTY FIVE DHARMAS.

The shortness of time which is at my disposal, prevents me from entering upon a detailed exposition of the seventyfive Dharmas which represent the objective classification of the world of mind and matter according to the Sarvāstivādin.

The stepping-stone from the Hinayāna to the Mahāyāna philosophy.

Some day when Vasubhandhu's Abhidharma-kośa-śāstra is restored or translated accurately by competent scholars, from its Chinese and Tibetan versions, Indian and European students of philosophy will find no difficulty in familiarising themselves with the Abhidharma of the Sarvāstivādin, which forms the stepping-stone from the Hinayāna to the Mahāyāna philosophy. In this connection, a word of warning to the unsuspecting student will not be out of place. Beware of confounding the Sanskrit Abhidharma-kośa with Abhidharma treatises of mediæval Pāli writers. The two have very little in common beyond the name. A glance at the contents of the Abhidhammatthasangaha¹ which has recently been translated into English and annotated by an industrious Burmese scholar, and revised by the learned Mrs. Rhys Davids, will clearly show that the much-vaunted Abhidhamma of Pāli literature is the production of a doubtful ancestry, and represents a system of unauthentic philosophy which grew up in absolute isolation in the middle ages in Southern India (Kanchipura), Ceylon and Burma. To return to the seventyfive Dharmas, I shall first take what are known as

*Rūpa-Dharmas.*²

Rūpa (*lit. form*) when used as a technical term in Buddhist philosophy, signifies that which has resistiveness or capacity to obstruct the sense organs, as the Abhidharma-kośa defines it. Rūpa-dharmas are eleven in number, namely, the five sense organs, the five sense objects and Avijñapti,³ that is to say, unmanifested *Rūpa*, a difficult philosophical term of which, I shall give an explanation later on.

¹ Compendium of philosophy. (Published for the 'Pāli Text Society' by Henry Prowde, Oxford University Press.)

² Japanese: *Shiki-hō*.

³ Japanese: *Mukyō-shiki*.

Among these eleven kinds of Rūpa-dharmas, the material things are regarded as collective organisms consisting of the four fold substratum of *Rūpa* (colour as well as form), *Gandha* (smell), *Rasa* (taste), and *Sparsa* (contact). The unit possessing this four fold substratum is known as *Paramānu*¹ or the ultimate atom which defies analysis.

Paramānu or ultimate atom. "Analysis of *Rūpa*", says *Vasubandhu*, "ultimately brings us to *Paramānu* which accordingly is the smallest particle of *Rūpa*". A much fuller account is given in the *Abhidharma Mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra* which says:—"Paramānu is the minutest form of *Rūpa*. It cannot be pierced through or picked up or thrown away. It cannot be placed anywhere or trampled or seized or attracted. It is neither long nor short, nor square nor round, neither curved nor straight, neither high nor low. It is indivisible, unanalysable, invisible, inaudible, untastable and intangible".²

Thus, according to the Sarvāstivādins, matter is indestructible. By itself a *Paramānu* exists only in the future and in the past, that is to say, before it enters into combination with other *Paramānūs*, and after it has disintegrated itself from the *Paramānūs* with which it has entered into combination. In the present time, however, it does not exist by itself, but in combination with other *Paramānūs*. By itself, a *Paramānu* is imperceptible. It becomes perceptible only when it combines with other *Paramānūs*. The perceptible atomic unit, according to the Sarvāstivādins, is not a *Paramānu*, but an *Anu* which is a combination of seven *Paramānūs* which are placed in the following manner: in the centre there is one *Paramānu* round which cluster six *Paramānūs*, one from each side, namely, east, west, north, south, above, and below.

The material things of the universe are said to be made up of atoms in the following order:—

The order of the atoms constituting the universe.

¹ Japanese: *Goku-bi*.

² Nanjio's Cat. No. 1263; fasc. 136.

7 <i>Paramāṇus</i>	= 1 <i>Ann</i>		
7 <i>Anus</i>	= 1 Gold dust ¹	=	49 <i>Paramāṇus</i> .
7 Gold dusts	= 1 Water dust ²	=	343 <i>Paramāṇus</i> .
7 Water dusts	= 1 Rabbit hairdust ³	=	2401 <i>Paramāṇus</i> .
7 Rabbit hair dusts	= 1 Sheep hair dust ⁴	=	16,807 <i>Paramāṇus</i> .
7 Sheep hair dusts	= 1 Cow hair dust ⁵	=	117,649 <i>Paramāṇus</i> .
7 Cow hair dusts	= 1 Windowhole dust ⁶	=	823,543 <i>Paramāṇus</i> .
7 Window hole dusts	= 1 Louse ⁷	=	5764,801 <i>Paramāṇus</i> .
7 Lice	= 1 bug ⁸	=	40353,607 <i>Paramāṇus</i> .
7 Bugs	= 1 Barley grain ⁹	=	282,175,249 <i>Paramāṇus</i> .
7 Barley grains	= 1 Finger tip ¹⁰	=	1975226743 <i>Paramāṇus</i> .

In the above manner all the largest material things in the universe, such as mountains and seas are made up of the corresponding number of *Paramāṇus*.

The atoms are *living things* and possess all the four qualities of the four great elements, viz: earth, air, fire, and water. In this matter I beg leave to point out what I consider to be an error on the part of Śāṅkarācārya.

Śāṅkara's Error.

In his account of the Sarvāstivādin Śāṅkarācārya observes:—

“चतुष्टये च पृथिव्यादिपरमाणव ;
स्वरस्त्रेहोष्णेरणस्त्रभावास्ते पृथिव्यादि
भावेन संहन्यन्त इति मन्यते ।”¹¹

Before discussing the passage, let me point out to you that there is every reason to believe that the whole sentence, from Each atom possesses the four qualities. ‘*catuṣṭaye*’ to ‘*samhanyante*’, reads like a quotation from a Buddhist work. Its meaning is perfectly clear. It signifies that the atoms of earth and the other elements are possessed, all of them, of the qualities of roughness, viscousness, heat and moveableness, and that it is their

¹ लोहरजः । ² अबुजः । ³ शशरजः । ⁴ अबिरजः । ⁵ गोरजः । ⁶ वातायनच्छिद्ररजः ।

⁷ लिषा । ⁸ युक् । ⁹ वयः । ¹⁰ अङ्गुलिपर्व ।

¹¹ Brahma-sūtra-Śāṅkara-Bhāṣyam, II. 2. 4. Sūtra 18.

combination which produces earth etc. This is the legitimate interpretation of the passage for, according to the Buddhists, the atoms are the same in all the elements, and each atom possesses the four qualities, viz : those of earth, air, fire and water. Now as it appears from the commentators of Śāṅkara, who, in all probability, represent the traditional interpretation handed down by him, Śāṅkara misunderstood the meaning of the Sanskrit compound 'वृद्धिश्चादिपरमाणवः स्वरूपेहोपरिणामभावात् वृद्धिश्चादि भावेन' in the context. He thought that the four qualities mentioned there belonged respectively to the four elements. Accordingly the Ratnaprabhā, the Bhāmati and Ānandagiri make out that, according to the Buddhists, the atoms of Earth are hard, those of water are viscous, those of fire are hot, those of air are mobile. Dr. Thibaut's version follows the interpretation of the commentators, while Prof. Deussen's German version retains the ambiguity of the original Sanskrit.¹

That the compound in question does not bear the meaning given to it by Śāṅkarācārya and his commentators, is clear from the following extract from the *Abhidharma-vibhāṣāśāstra* which exists in the Chinese version of Hiouen Tsang:²

Question. "How do you know that the qualities of all the four *Mahābhūtas* (viz : earth, air, fire and water) are inherent in the *paramāṇus*?"

Answer "We know this, because, the possession by the atoms of the distinctive characteristics and special functions of the four elements can be inferred in the case of all material things from the following fact, viz :—

"The characteristics of the earth can be perceived by the sense-organs in solids. But the characteristic of water also is discernible in solids, because if it did not exist in it, gold, silver or copper and tin could not be reduced to a melting form."

"Again if the characteristic of water did not inhere in the atoms, they could not have coherence. And if the characteristic of fire did not inhere

¹ See Deussen's "Die Sūtras des Vedānta," pp. 345-6.

² The *Abhidharma-mahā-vibhāṣa-śāstra*, fasciculi 131.

in them, fire could not be produced by striking a flint with a piece of iron. Preservation being the characteristic quality of fire (that is, heat), according to Buddhism, if the atoms had not the characteristic quality of fire inherent in them, material things would be incapable of preservation. Lastly, if movement, the characteristic quality of wind, were absent in the atom, things would not move, or grow, or perform any other function implying movement."

So, it is clear that Śāṅkarācārya made a mistake about the meaning of the passage. I now pass on to the Four *Mahābhūta*.

If all material things are but collections of atoms, how is it that, the characteristics of the atoms being the same, they differ according to their nature, some of them being solid, others being liquid and the other again being gaseous? In order to answer this question, Buddhist philosophy has recourse to the theory of the four great elements or *Mahābhūta* viz: earth (पृथिवी) or solidness, water (आप) or moisture, fire (तेज) or heat, and air (वायु) or motion. Buddhism maintains that the mutual resistance of material things is due to the quality of earth, or the solidness inherent in them; the mutual attraction of things is due to moisture, or the quality of water; their capacity for ripening and being free from decay is due to their possession of heat or the nature of fire, and lastly, their power of growing is due to their being endowed with the quality of the air, viz: movability. According to Vasubandhu the four great elements are to be observed from three aspects, viz: (a) as things, (b) from their natures, (c) from their functions.¹

Thing	Nature	Function.
Earth (पृथिवी)	Solidity (सख्यम्)	Holding together (धृति)
Water (आप)	Moisture (संविशति)	Cohesion (गन्ध)
Fire (तेज)	Heat (उष्ण)	Ripening (पक्व)
Air (वायु)	Motion (चलन)	Growing (वृद्ध)

¹ See the "Abhidharma-kośa-sāstra," Chap. I.

The kārīka in which these facts are mentioned ran originally as follows :—

“महाभूतानि पृथिव्यादि तानि धातु चतुष्टयम् ।
धृत्वापि कर्म संसिद्धं स्वेयोष्णादि गुणन्वितम् ॥”

The name ‘*Mahābhūtam*’ is further explained by Vasubandhu as follows :—The word ‘*bhūtam*’ means basis and ‘*maha*’

The meaning of the word, *Mahābhūtam*. means great, i.e. universal to all material substances.

The power of these elements is not only very great but it constitutes the ground work of every *anu*. Or in other words, the *anus* are constituted by these four great elements. We have already pointed out that the qualities of the four great elements are commonly possessed by all material things ; but why is it, we repeat, that the atoms being the same, some things are solid, others are liquid, while others again are gaseous. The answer to this question, from the Buddhist point of view,

would be as follows :—In this material world there are two sorts of energy, active and potential. Accord-

The two sorts of energy. ingly, although all material things have the quality of the four elements, it happens that certain elements in one case display active energy, while the others possess but a potential energy which does not act. Thus, for instance, in the case of a blazing flame, heat or the nature of fire predominates as the active energy over the nature of the three other elements which lie dormant with their latent or potential energies. Similarly the nature of water preponderates over those of the other elements in the case of a flowing stream ; the nature of earth predominates over those of the other elements in the case of a metal ; and so forth. This is what constitutes the difference between solids, liquids and gaseous things in the universe.

ŚĀṆKARĀCĀRYA’S CRITICISM OF THE SARVĀSTIVĀDINS.

In this connection it will not be out of place to consider how far Śāṅkarācārya was right in his strictures on the Sarvāstivādin as given

¹ I have composed this kārīka after the Chinese version of Hsuen Tsang, the technical words occurring therein having been borrowed from Yaśomitra’s commentary on the “*Abhidharma-kośa-śāstra*.”

in his commentary on the Vedānta Sūtra (II, ii—xviii); the original passage is well known to you, and it would be needless to attempt a translation of it seeing that Dr. Thibaut has already admirably rendered the passage in the light of the explanations given of it by the different commentators of Śāṅkara. I shall, however, attempt to deduce the criticism to a set of questions and answers according to the well-known catechistical method of Buddhist philosophers.

What are the two sets of aggregates maintained by the Sarvāstitvavādins, and what are their respective causes ?

They are: i. The aggregate of Bhūtas (elements) and Bhautikas (elementals). ii. The aggregate of five skandhas. The cause of (i) is atoms, and of (ii) the skandhas.

Note here that the Sarvāstitvavādins do not recognise any sets of aggregates like those mentioned here by Śāṅkara. It is, most probably, his own invention based on a misapprehension of the subjective (antaram) and objective (bāhyam) classifications of the world of mind and matter of which I have already spoken. Again the atoms are not the causes of the 'bhūtas' or elements as Śāṅkara maintains; but the 'bhūtas', as we have already shown, are the causes of the atoms.

The atom is not the cause of elements.

The 'Bhautikas,' again, are the same as atoms and not the effect of atoms as Śāṅkarācārya maintains. The aggregate of the five skandhas (Pancaskandhi-rūpa) is not a Buddhist technical term. In Buddhist philosophy the aggregate of the five skandhas is any sentient being inclusive of its body and mind. Probably, Śāṅkara imagines that, according to the Buddhists, the mind is the aggregate of the five skandhas; nay, this becomes a certainty, if we look carefully at the context. This is an error, for the manas or citta is one of the five skandhas, viz:—the vijñāna skandha. Accordingly, Śāṅkara is wrong in identifying the mental ('adhyātman') with the aggregate of the five skandhas. After making these mistakes in his thesis, he proceeds to criticise the doctrine of the Sarvāstitvavādins [in the following manner:—

Question. "What is the defect in this doctrine?"

"The defect is that you cannot satisfactorily explain what made the elements of these aggregates combine together. In

Answer.

The so called defect of the Sarvāstitva-vādins.

the first place, how can the atoms themselves combine into material things, since the atoms are '*acetana*' or devoid of intelligence. In the case of the aggregate

of five skandhas, you cannot say that it is *cittam* which causes the skandhas to combine, because, according to your Buddhist theory, the combination of the skandhas must precede the coming into existence of *cittam*, i.e. the mind arises after the body is formed from its constituents. So you must acknowledge an external cause or author who causes the combination, such as a permanent intelligent being who is sentient and supreme as we Vedantins do."

The difficulty raised by Śāṅkara is rather irrelevant. The Sarvāstitva-

The atoms can enter into combination without intelligence.

vādins maintain that the atoms though devoid of intelligence enter into combination with one another owing to causes and conditions, the former of which,

technically called *hetu*, are of six sorts and the latter known as *pratyaya*, are of four sorts. As I have already pointed out, nothing, according to Buddhism, can be produced by a single cause.¹ There must be, as Vasubandhu points out in the *Abhidharma-kośa*, at least, two causes to produce an effect. Thus a paramāṇu becomes an anu by combining with six other paramāṇus through the influence of at least two causes (*hetu*). This is the real truth; but Śāṅkara ignores the fundamental principles of Buddhism and goes on to make further mistakes. *Cittam*, according to Buddhism, is identical with one of the five Skandhas, viz: the *Vijñāna skandha*; and no Buddhist, who knows Buddhism, would maintain that *Cittam* would bring about the combination of the five skandhas. It would be monstrous, on the part of one, who knows anything about Buddhism, to affirm that "the combination of the skandhas must precede the coming into existence of *Cittam*;" because *Cittam* is one of the five skandhas, viz: the *Vijñāna skandha*. But Śāṅkara ignores this elementary fact and yet ventures to criticise Buddhism. Thus he starts with an absolute miscon-

¹ See the "*Abhidharma-kośa-sāstra*," Chap. I. fasc., 1.

ception of the nature of the skandhas, though he glibly enumerates the five skandhas a few lines before. Such being his errors, we see that the Buddhist can support his philosophy, or more properly speaking, his atomic theory without accepting a sentient supreme and permanent Brahma like that of the Vedantins. The rest of the criticism is a mere fighting with shadows, based upon improbable objections which are answered by equally improbable and erroneous statements.

At this point Śāṅkara anticipates an objection from the Buddhists, which we will call *1st objection* :—

Combination of atoms
and causes and con-
ditions.

“May it not be that the elements, which make up the aggregates, themselves undertake for their own sake the activity of combining together?”

Such an objection, as we have already seen, could not be raised by the Buddhists who are taught by their philosophy that the combination of atoms is due to causes and conditions. But let us go on and see how Śāṅkara answers the objection.

Answer to 1st objection.

“If you speak of the elements combining into the aggregates by themselves and for their own sake, then there would be no cessation of their activity and consequently there would be no moksha or liberation.”

The Buddhists might ask here, “Moksha of what”? Is it that of the soul? If so, you forget that we do not believe in a soul. Moksha means, according to the Buddhists, nothing but a condition of perfect freedom from passion. That heart reached the final goal of all which, upon the ground of a perception of the true nature of things, through the knowledge of *andhman*, has so completely loosed itself from everything that it no longer has any passion. Therefore, the Buddhists never allow their mental activities to absolutely cease to work, but always try to use these activities to turning the immorality to morality, hate to love, etc. etc. If moksha means absolute cessation of all mental activities, then it will be annihilation.

After answering, in the fashion mentioned above, the first supposed objection of the Buddhists, Śāṅkara imagines that there might be the

possibility of a second objection from the Buddhists. This second objection which is couched, or rather hinted at, in obscure language, betrays a startling ignorance of the differences between the tenets of the several schools of Buddhism as we shall see later on. The terse and obscure sentence of Śāṅkara runs as follows:—

“आशयस्याप्यन्यत्वनन्यत्वाभ्यामनिरूप्यत्वात् ।”

The commentators of Śāṅkara explain *śaya*, as either (1) *santāna* or the continuity of the five skandhas, as says Ratna-prabha, or as (2) *Ālaya-vijñāna*, as Bhāmati gives. Of both of these difficult terms I shall have occasion to speak when I come to the Vijñānavādins. Dr. Thibaut, in his luminous version, follows the interpretation of the Bhāmati. Śāṅkara's anticipated objection amounts to this:—

2nd Buddhist objection.

“But this combination of the elements into the aggregates may be caused by the series of *ālaya-vijñāna*”.

Before dealing with Śāṅkara's answer to this hypothetical objection, I must point out to you that *ālaya-vijñāna* is unknown to the Sarvāstivādin. It is a theory which exclusively belongs to the Vijñāna-vādins, who, it must be pointed out, never attached such an efficacy as Śāṅkara assumes to it. Śāṅkara's answer is as follows:—

•
Ālaya-vijñāna is not known to the Sarvāstivādin.

Answer to 2nd objection.

Now is this *ālaya-vijñāna* identical with or different from the five skandhas? If you say that it is identical with the five skandhas, we have already refuted you by proving that the elements cannot combine into aggregates by themselves and for their own sake. If, on the other hand, you maintain that it is different from the five skandhas, then you must say whether it is permanent or impermanent. If you say it permanent, your *Ālaya-vijñāna* becomes identical with the Vedantic Brahma who is the permanent cause of everything. And by accepting this you accept Eternalism, which runs counter to the preachings of Buddha. If you say

it is impermanent or momentary, then you cannot maintain it to be the cause of the combination of the elements into any of the two aggregates mental and material, since a momentary thing cannot have such an efficacy. Accordingly, you fail to give a satisfactory explanation of your theory of aggregation upon which you base your explanation of mundane existence; and therefore your explanation necessarily falls to pieces because you cannot, by any means, establish its basis, namely, the combination of elements into aggregates."

This is how Śāṅkara tries to refute the Sarvāstivādin and invites them to accept his Vedānta. Śāṅkara's actual reasoning is based on untenable hypotheses; the reasonings are just, but the premises are false.

In the case of Śāṅkara, there was present not only a defective knowledge of Buddhism, as I have already shown, but also the delusion concerning the infallibility of the Vedānta which he was incapable of resisting. *Ālaya-vijñāna* is not quite different from the five skandhas, and it bears some affinity to the Vedāntic Brahma, but it does not lead the believer to the heresy of Eternalism. I shall endeavour to show it when I treat of the Vijñānavādin school of Buddhist Philosophy.

But let me go on with Śāṅkara's imaginary objections and equally imaginary refutations. After thinking that he has demolished the two supposed Buddhist objections given above, Śāṅkara anticipates a third objection from the "Vaiśiṣṭikas" which clearly proves his ignorance of the real signification of the "twelve linked Chain of Causation," a doctrine which every elementary student of Buddhist is expected to know :—

Third Supposed Objection of the Buddhists.

"You want us Buddhists to assign a cause to the aggregation of the elements which form the Mental and the Material. We say it is the Chain of Dependent Origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) or the Twelve Nidānas, beginning with *Avidyā* or Ignorance which produces the aggregation."

Before proceeding further, I need hardly repeat that the aggregation produced by "causes and conditions," and that the Twelve-linked Chain of

Śāṅkara's criticism
on the Twelve-linked
Chain of Causation.

Causation explains the cause and effect of transmigration throughout the three divisions of time, *viz.*: the past, the present and the future. But let us see how Śāṅkara fights with the phantoms of his own creation. In answer to the supposed Buddhist objection he says :—

“Now *avidya* or ignorance is a mental function of a sentient being. It is the first link in the Twelve-linked Chain of Causation, which, consequently, must be regarded to take for granted the aggregates of the mind and the body, without, however, showing how they came together. The series of the twelve *niddānas* does not, therefore, give an efficient cause of the aggregates.”

It is sure that the twelve *niddānas* give us the efficient cause of the aggregates referred to, as we have already pointed out ;
The real meaning of *avidya*. Śāṅkara, however, mistakes the real meaning of *Avidya*, which, if regarded as a link in the *Chain of Dependant Origination* (*pratītyasamutpāda*) or ‘Causation’ is not the ignorance of any particular individual, but is rather identical with ‘*moha*’ or ‘delusion’; and represents the noumenal state of immaterial *dharma*s. Again the “*avidya*” which, through “*samskāra*” etc., produces “*nāmarūpa*” in the case of a particular individual is not his “*avidya*” in the present existence but the “*avidya*” of his past existence bearing fruit in the present life, as I have explained to you in my lectures on “*Karma-phenomenology*”.

This is not all. Śāṅkara brings forward a second refutation of the supposed Buddhist objection.

“There is”, says he “a further difficulty. Your atoms, O Buddhists,
Śāṅkara's criticism on the doctrine of atoms. are momentary and have no abode in the shape of souls; nor do they contain in them any latent abiding principle, to guide them, corresponding to the *Adṛishṭa* of the Vaiśeṣikas. How can you then maintain *Avidya* to be the cause of the mind, since without mind *avidya* itself cannot exist? Where then does your *Avidya* come from?”

Śāṅkara here ignores one of the fundamental principles of the school he is attacking, *viz.*: that the atoms are permanent and cannot exist save in combination in the present. Moreover, according to the Sarvāsti-

tvāḍins, "Mind" (cittam) which is identical with one of the five skandhas, viz : *vijñāna* is permanent in its noumenal state, being one of the seventy-five *dharma*s which are all permanent in the noumenal state. Śāṅkara, as we have shown a little above, misunderstands the real import of *avidya*. 'Avidya' representing as it does the noumenal state of immaterial *dharma* is permanent and beginningless.

Śāṅkara here faintly anticipates this objection and says:—

"Samsāra is beginningless, you Buddhists maintain. You also say that the aggregates succeed one another in an unbroken chain and therefore also Nescience etc., because these abide in the aggregates".

The last part of the supposed Buddhist objection is a distorted representation of the Buddhist theory of the transmission of the *skandhas*. "Avidya" is included in "caittam" which is represented by the two of five *skandhas*, viz : *vedanā* and *saṃjñā*. Now Śāṅkara here tries to throw the Buddhist opponent, his imaginary adversary, within the horns of a Dilemma.

"If what you say is right", he exclaims, "then you must admit one of the two alternatives, viz : (1) either that the aggregates produce aggregates of the same kind, or (2) that they produce aggregates of a different kind. If the first alternative is true, a man can never be reborn as a god, a brute, or a being in hell, in the course of transmigration ; in the latter he might, in an instant, turn into an elephant, god or a man ; either of which consequences would be contrary to your system."

Śāṅkara here is straining at a gnat. He overlooks the Buddhist theory that when one set of *skandhas* are succeeded by another, the succeeding set is always somewhat different to the preceding owing to the difference in the *manner* of combining. Moreover, there is nothing in a man's turning a god or a brute or even another human being, as soon as the combination of the skandhas which constitute his being is resolved by some cause or other, when this resolution is immediate or long after his birth. Lastly Śāṅkara missing his favourite "*ātma*" goes on to remark :—

"Again, for whose sake is the aggregation of elements formed? Your
 Who desires *moksha* or deliverance? not admitting a permanent enjoying soul implies that the enjoyment of the formation of the aggregates is

self-desired and self-subservient. As you assume no being desirous of salvation, *moksha* or emancipation, according to you, it must be regarded as self-subservient. If you assume one who is desirous of *moksha* and of the formation of aggregates, that being must exist permanently from the period of the formation of the aggregates down to its release from the aggregates. But you cannot admit this, as you are believers in universal impermanence. Therefore in order to establish the formation of the aggregates you must accept a permanent enjoying soul".

To the question "who desires salvation?" the Sarvāstivādians' reply is that it is the "mind, desirous of freeing itself from the bondage of *Karma*".

Buddhism does not see the need of accepting a permanent soul because it believes that the *skandhas* are always changing and that the mental state is also changing with them.

So much for Śāṅkara's lucubrations on the cause of the formation of the two sets of aggregates which Buddhism recognises according to him. He then proceeds to attack the doctrine of Universal Momentariness, without, of course, taking sufficient pains to understand what it really means.

"Not only", says Śāṅkara, "does your Twelve-linked Chain of Causation fail to account for the formation of the aggregates, but it cannot establish itself, that is to say, you Buddhists, believing as you do in universal momentariness, cannot, consistently with that doctrine, regard any link of it as the efficient cause of the immediately succeeding link".

Śāṅkara's impeachment of the doctrine of Universal momentariness.

Śāṅkara then goes on to elucidate his own statement:—

"You Buddhists say that everything has a momentary existence. Therefore, according to you, when the *second* moment arrives, the thing which was existing in the *first* moment ceases to exist and an entirely new thing springs up. Accordingly you cannot maintain that the preceding thing is the cause of the succeeding thing or that the latter is the effect of the former. The preceding thing, according to your theory of momentariness, has ceased

to be when the succeeding moment arrives; that is to say, the former becomes non-existent when the thing of the succeeding moment comes into being, and therefore can not be regarded as producing the latter, since non-existence can not be the cause of existence”.

Śāṅkara here shows his complete ignorance of the Buddhist Doctrine of Universal Impermanence. The substratum of everything is eternal and permanent. What changes every moment is merely the phase of a thing, so that it is erroneous to affirm that, according to Buddhism, the thing of the first moment ceases to exist when the second moment arrives.

In conscious or unconscious ignorance of this fundamental tenet of Buddhism, Śāṅkara anticipates what he thinks a possible Buddhist objection:—

“May it not be that the former momentary existence on reaching its full development becomes the cause of the latter momentary existence.”

No Buddhist would have ever dreamt of raising such an essentially un-Buddhist objection. Let us see how Śāṅkara contradicts it.

“This is not right” he says. “To say that a fully developed existence has greater power or energy than a not fully developed existence, is only a round about way of saying that the full development of the thing in question passes into the second moment; and this runs counter to your doctrine of Universal Impermanence”.

Śāṅkara anticipates another objection—an obviously fallacious one—

as coming from the Buddhist side.

Śāṅkara's criticism
of the Buddhist law
of cause and effect.

“May it not be (the Buddhist may object) that antecedence implies causality”.

He proceeds to refute this in the following manner:—

“No, that cannot be,” says he. “In every effect there is inherent the nature of the cause. But you Buddhists have no right to say that the nature of the cause is inherent in the effect; because that would be tantamount to maintaining that the cause is permanent—which is against your theory of universal impermanence”.

Śāṅkara overlooks the plain fact that causality is not a permanent but merely a relative quality. Thus A may be the cause of B, B the cause of C and C the cause of D, without the causality in the three cases being identical, just as William may be the father of Edward, Edward that of Charles, and Charles that of James, without the fatherhood in the three cases being identical. In any case, no Buddhist would ever have raised such an objection as Śāṅkara anticipates; and if he could raise it, no answer would have been less adequate than that given by him.

We proceed to a third imaginary objection which Śāṅkara puts into the mouth of his Buddhist adversary:—

“But relation of cause and effect” (the Buddhist might say) “may continue to exist without, however, the cause giving its colouring to the effect”.

Śāṅkara's illusory conception of the relationship of cause and effect.

No Buddhist would say this. No Buddhist would dream of denying that causes always produce their effects.

Śāṅkara is here putting a very weak and entirely imaginary argument in the mouth of his Buddhist opponent. He now proceeds to demolish this argument with needless elaboration:—

“This cannot be admissible, because in that case all sorts of confusions would arise, such as between mere efficient cause (such as the potter's staff) and material cause (such as clay in the production of an earthen pot). Now when you speak of the origination and the cessation of a thing, you must mean one of the three following alternatives:—

(i) That the thing in question retains its form during the two stages, or (ii) that the terms, origination and cessation, refer to the different stages of one and the same thing,

or (iii) that the thing becomes entirely different by cessation.”

Let us now examine the alternatives one by one:—

“(i) The first is impossible, because it makes no difference between origination and cessation;

- (ii) In the second, origination and cessation would denote the initial and final stages of that of which the intermediate stage is the thing itself, and such being the case, the thing would be connected with the three stages or moments *viz*:— the initial, the intermediate, and the final, according to which your doctrine of universal momentariness has to be given up.
- (iii) In the third case, origination and cessation will be quite different from the thing itself; in fact quite as different as a buffalo would be from a horse. This is admissible, because the thing being absolutely disconnected with origination and cessation, would be without beginning and without end, that is to say, everlasting."

The first and third alternatives are not to the point. The second agrees with the tenets of the Sarvāstivādin who believe that the substratum of everything is permanent, though its phases are constantly changing. Thus the "aqueous substratum," if I may be permitted to use the expression, inheres permanently through the phases of water, ice and steam. But we are forgetting that all this elaborate refutation is directed by Śāṅkara against an imaginary Buddhist objection which no Buddhist would ever have thought of raising, *viz*: that cause and effect may continue without the former giving its colouring to the effect.

Śāṅkara proceeds to refute yet another series of objections which he imagines to be raised. He loses sight of the Sarvāstivādin's theory and starts an objection such as only a Bhuddist, who had misunderstood Vijñānavāda, could bring forward:—

Śāṅkara loses sight of the Sarvāstivādin's theory.

"What if the origination and cessation of a thing mean its perception and non-perception?"

To this imaginary Buddhist objection Śāṅkara thus replies:—

"That is not the case," says he. "Perception and non-perception have reference to the percipient mind, and have absolutely nothing to do with the thing to be perceived, so that, in this case, you are driven to admit the non-momentariness or the permanence of things".

But the Sarvāstivādin do admit the *permanence of the respective substratum of things* while maintaining the *momentary character* of their *various phases*. The very name of this school points out this fact which Śāṅkara ignores.

Śāṅkara does not stop here. He goes on to say :

"So we have demonstrated that, according to your own doctrine of universal momentariness, the prior momentary existence becomes merged into non-existence, and therefore cannot be the cause of a posterior momentary existence."

Here Śāṅkara misunderstands the point at issue, which is the Buddhist doctrine of Momentariness.

And he goes on to anticipate what he thinks to be the objections likely to arise.

The Buddhist, according to Śāṅkara, may object to this saying :—

"Well, in that case, an effect may rise without a cause".

Here Śāṅkara forgets that, according to Buddhism, nothing can exist without causes, which, indeed, he partially points out below.

How does Śāṅkara refute this? Merely by saying :—

(i) "This assertion is against the Buddhist theory that the *citta* and the *caitta-dharmas* arise from a conjunction of causes.

(ii) Moreover if a thing could arise without a cause, anything might be produced out of anything—which does not stand to reason.

So you are wrong in maintaining that an effect may arise without a cause".

The last objection which Śāṅkara anticipates on the part of the Buddhists is :—

"But may not the antecedent momentary existence last until the succeeding one has been produced?"

This objection is essentially un-Buddhist being based, as it is, on a misconception of the real significance of the doctrine of universal momentariness, which only applies to the *phenomenal phases* of a thing and not to its *substratum* which, according to the Sarvāstivādin, is *permanent* and

unchangeable. Śāṅkara answers this objection, if it can be called one, in the following manner :—

“If you admit this, you must admit the simultaneousness of cause and effect, and if you admit this simultaneousness, you contradict your Buddhist theory of momentariness.”

The refutation is as uncalled for as the objection which it seeks to demolish. In this connection it will not be out of place to say something on the Vedantic and the Buddhist conceptions of the relation between cause and effect. The Vedantins do not accept any other cause save material cause. According to them, effects have no independent existence. They are, in essence, identical with the cause (*i.e.* the material cause) for without the latter they do not exist, so that they must be considered to be identical with them. In other words, two different things cannot have invariable concomitance, while cause and effect have it and therefore cause and effect are identical. The stock example of the cause residing in the effect is that of clay being found in an earthen pot. Of course we must not forget that the only cause accepted by the Vedantins is the material cause. It is needless to remind the scholar of the two readings (भावे) and (भावात्) on the Brahmasūtra, भावे चोपपन्नम्, (“we get the effect when there is the cause”) or भावाच्चोपपन्नम्: (“we see the cause in the effect.”). Again Śāṅkara proceeds to point out that the effect too must be in the cause like oil in a sesamum seed, otherwise we should not be able to get the former from the latter just as we cannot get oil from sand.

Śāṅkara apparently overlooks the fact that the cause is often wider than the effect just as in that well known instance in the Bhagavadgīta, तत्त्वमसि नमो भगवते वासुदेवाय (*i.e.* “I am not in the world but the world is in me”) which means that God (the cause) is something more than the world (“the effect”). According to the Vedantins, then, *taddditya* or identity is the relation between ‘cause’ and ‘effect’; while according to the Naiyāyikas *samavāya* or permanent inherence is the relation between them. The Vedantins do not accept *samavāya*. “Moreover”, says Śāṅkara, “to be

produced implies an action which again implies an agent." If, at the time of production, there is no effect, then what is it which is produced? In other words, according to Śāṅkara, the subject must exist before the predicate. But this view is not sound, as both may be simultaneous. Śāṅkara goes on to say that Causality is a relation and that a relation presupposes more than one thing, so that the effect must be regarded to exist with the causality.

Śāṅkara, at this point, anticipates an objection. "If the effect already exists, why then the effort to produce it?" to which he replies as follows:—

"The effort in question is merely for the purpose of bringing the effect into a desired form and not for that of bringing it into existence."

In fact nothing new can be brought into existence, but only changes of form can be effected and a change of form is not an indication of something new. For example a tortoise contracted is not really different from itself with its head and legs extended. Similarly cause is like a contracted tortoise and the effect is merely its expansion. Those who do not accept existence of the effect before its production, may be asked, why if the effect does not already exist, effort is made to make it appear? The Śāṅkhyas admit that both cause and effect are real—that the effect is but the transformation of the cause. But the Vedāntins maintain that the cause is the only reality and the effects are mere appearances. The difference between the two views appears to me to be immaterial from the practical point of view, for both accept the existence of the effect in some form in the cause (*i.e.* material cause).

Here we must note the Sarvāstivādin's view of causality; for it has been maintained in India, times out of number, by anti-Buddhists that the Buddhists do not accept causality.

In Āryadeva's Commentary on the Madhyamika Śāstra (Chp : xx, Kārika 9.) which has come down to us in Kumārajīva's Chinese version, a portion of which the late Mr. Harinath De and myself have translated and published in the *Herald*, the Sarvāstivādin's view of Causality is stated in the following objection:—

"The cause never perishes but only changes its name, when it becomes an effect, having changed its state. For example, clay becomes jar having changed its state; and in this case the name clay is lost and the name jar arises."¹

I do not think Śāṅkara knew or admitted that his own view of Causality was anticipated by or borrowed from that of the Sarvāstitvavādin. It is worth while noting that the Sarvāstitvavādin allowed the simultaneousness between cause and effect only in one instance, viz: when two things were mutually the cause and effect of each other, that is to say, in their technical language, in the case of mental things only "*samprayuktahetu*," and in the case of both mental and material things "*sahabhūhetu*," The effect in both cases is called "*puruṣakāraphalam*."

This is detailed in full in the Second Chapter of the Abhidharmakośa. In other cases the cause and effect are not regarded as simultaneous by the Sarvāstitvavādin.

It is interesting to note that the metaphysical Madhyamikas disbelieved causality as they disbelieved many other things. Their view is given by Āryadeva in his answer to the Sarvāstitvavādin's objection cited above:—

"Jars and tiles and water-pots come out of clay. If clay is merely a provisional existence, it cannot become jar etc. after changing its state. We may apply the expression "mere change of name" to the case of milk and curd. There it would not be right to affirm that the cause becomes effect by undergoing a change merely by the loss of its name".

But let us return to Śāṅkara's criticisms of the Sarvāstitvavādin. Taking his stand on his misconception of the doctrine of "Universal Impermanence"—which he interprets to mean that the thing of the preceding moment is *absolutely* different from that of the succeeding, whereas, in reality, the Sarvāstitvavādin understands by it that the *phase of a thing or person changes* every moment

Refutation of Śāṅkara's criticism on the Sarvāstitvavādin.

1 The Sanskrit version is as below:—

निरुद्धं चैतदकलं हेतुः हेतुः संक्रमणं भवेत् ।
पुनरावस्थं हेतुश्च पुनरनन्तं प्रसज्यते ॥

but that *its substratum is eternal and permanent*. Śāṅkara goes on to say that, according to the Buddhist doctrine, there cannot be one agent connected with the two moments of perception and subsequent remembrance—an assertion which would render memory an impossibility—which is contrary to experience and truth. Thus I see a thing today and recognise it two years after, which is a fact of common experience; the “I” of today cannot be different from the “I” of two Years hence, although the Buddhist doctrine of Universal Impermanence will say the contrary.

“And” says Śāṅkara, “if the Buddhist further recognises that all his subsequent successive cognitions, up to his latest breath, belong to one and the same subject, and, besides has to attribute all his past cognitions from the moment of his birth to the same self, how can he shamelessly adhere to his doctrine which attributes but a momentary existence to everything?”

But the Buddhist does not ascribe momentariness to the *things themselves* but to their *phases only*.

Śāṅkara anticipated some Buddhist objections and answers them thus:—

• 1st Buddhist Objection

“The recognition of the subject as one and the same takes place on account of the similarity of the different self-cognitions, which are however momentary”.

Refutation

“The cognition of similarity is based on two things. So to assert that recognition is founded on similarity and to deny at the same time the existence of one permanent subject able to connect mentally two similar things, is talking deceitful nonsense. Accordingly you must admit that there is one mind which grasps the similarity of two successive momentary existences; and such an admission would contradict your tenet of universal impermanence.”

Here Śāṅkara betrays his ignorance of the Sarvāstivādin’s view of the permanence of “mind” (*cittam*) as we shall see presently.

2nd Buddhist Objection:—

"May not the cognition 'this is similar to that' be a different new cognition independent of the apperception of the earlier and later momentary existences".

This objection is quite imaginary. Buddhist philosophy always recognises "similarity" to be something relative.

Śāṅkara goes on to refute this objection unnecessarily:—

"The terms 'this' and 'that' point to the existence of different things which the mind grasps in a judgment of similarity. If the mental act having similarity for its object were an act altogether new, and not concerned with the two separate entities that are similar, the expression 'this is similar to that' would have no meaning at all, since in that case we would have used 'similarity' in an absolute and not in a relative sense."

Śāṅkara's argument here is self-evident and never denied by the Buddhist.

Now what is the Sarvāstivādin's view of the "*apalabdha*" or the perceiver?

That great Vasubandhu's view is that it is 'vijñāna' or 'consciousness' the substratum of which, 'mind' or '*citta*', is permanent. Vasumitra, however, maintained that the "perceiver" was the aggregate of the five *Indriyas* which, being material, had a permanent substratum.

The term "perceiver" explained.

Moreover, according to the Sarvāstivādins, "Memory" (*Smṛiti*) is one of the forty-six *caitta-dharmas* and therefore permanent. It belongs to the Mahābhūmika section which includes *vedanā* (sensation), *samjñā* (conception), *cetanā* (thought), *spṛśā* (touch), *chanda* (desire), *matī* (intelligence), *smṛiti* (memory), *manaskira* (attention), *adhimokṣa* (determination), and *samādhi* (meditation).

Before proceeding to examine the remaining criticisms of Śāṅkarācārya, it would be preferable for us to attempt to form an idea of the

other doctrines of the Sarvāstivādin. Accordingly I pass on to their conception of sense-object.

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THE SENSE-OBJECTS.

Sense-objects, according to the Sarvāstivādin, are of five kinds, namely :—

- (1) 'Rūpa' or colour and form.
- (2) 'Śabda' or sound.
- (3) 'Gandha' or smell.
- (4) 'Rasa' or taste.
- (5) 'Sparśa' or touch.

*"Rūpa-Vishaya"*¹

Or "the department of colour-and-form" is a material thing to be perceived by sight (*Cakshurindriya*). From one point of view, it is divisible into two classes, namely, (1) colours ('varna') and (2) form or figure ('samsthāna'); from another point of view it is of twenty kinds. Accordingly it is said in the Abhidharma-kośa :—"Rūpam dvividham va vimsatidha". According to the latter subdivision colour ('varna') admits of 12 divisions, and figure (samsthāna) admits of 8 sub-divisions. As regards colour Vasubandhu observes :—

"Colour is of four kinds, namely, (1) Blue (*nīla*), (2) yellow (*pīta*), (3) Red (*lohita*) and (4) white (*araddha*). The remaining eight colours are made up of a combination of these four principal colours. Samsthāna (form or figure) is of eight kinds, namely, (1) long, (2) short, (3) round, (4) square, (5) high, (6) low, (7) straight and (8) crooked. We next proceed to

¹ Japanese : *Shiki-kiō*.

“*Śabda-Vishaya*”¹

Or, “the department of sound” which means a material thing that can be perceived by the sense of hearing (*Śrotrendriya*).
 The object of hearing.

It is divided into eight kinds. Sound or ‘*śabda*’ is divided into two principal heads, namely, (1) ‘*upādātamahābhūta*’ or the sound of the ‘great element which possesses the power of perception’ and (2) ‘*anupādātamahābhūta*’ or the ‘great element which does not possess the power of perception’. An example of the former would be the lecture of a professor and the latter the fall of a torrent. Again each of these is sub-divided into two heads, namely, (a) ‘*sattva-saṅkhyāta*’ or ‘articulate’ and (b) ‘*asattva-saṅkhyāta*’ or ‘inarticulate’. An example of an articulate sound produced by a body that has no perception would be, say, a song reproduced by the gramophone.

The example given by the Sarvāstivāśādis is what is known, in the Indian literature, as ‘a voice from the cloud’ or *ākāśa-vanī*. Each of these sub-divisions, again is sub-divided into ‘*sukha*’ or pleasant and ‘*duḥka*’ or unpleasant. Next comes,

“*Gandha-Vishaya*”²

Or, “The department of smell” which means a material thing which is to be perceived by the sense of smelling (*Ghrāhendriya*).
 The object of smelling. Vasubandhu says:—“Smell is of four kinds. First *sugandha* or ‘good smell’, second *durgandha* or ‘bad smell’, either of which is again subdivided into two (a) *Samagandha*³ or small which become nourishment for the body, and (b) *visamagandha*⁴ its contrary. Next we pass on to

“*Rasa-Vishaya*”⁵

Or a material thing serviceable, by the *jihvendriya* or the sense of taste. It is of six kinds, namely, (1) sweet, (*madhura*),
 The object of taste. (2) sour (*aṃṭa*), (3) salt (*īvaraṇa*), (4) acrid (*kaṭuka*), (5) bitter (*tikta*) and (6) astringent (*kashaya*). Then comes

¹ Japanese: *Shō-kiō*.

² Jap: *Kō-kiō*.

³ Jap: *Tō-kiō*.

⁴ Jap: *Futō-kiō*.

⁵ Jap: *Sok-kiō*.

“*Sparśa-Vishaya*”¹.

This phrase signifies objects of the sense of touch (*kāyendriyam*). They are of eleven kinds (1) *ap* or watery; (2) *teja* or fiery; (3) *vāyu* or windy; (4) *prithvī* or earthy. The object of touch. These four are technically called *bhūta-sparśa-vishaya* or the ‘touch of the elements’. The remaining seven are called *bhautika-sparśa-vishaya* or the ‘touch of the elementary’ and are as follows :—

(1) *Ślakṣṇatvam* or ‘smoothness’; (2) *Karkṣatvam* or ‘roughness’; (3) *Laghutvam* or ‘lightness’; (4) *Gurutvam* or ‘heaviness’, (5) *Śītam* or ‘cold’; (6) *Jighatsā* or ‘hunger’; (7) *Pipāsā* or ‘thirst.’ It appears, at first sight, strange that cold, hunger and thirst should be reckoned amongst objects of touch, but it must be remembered that these are the names given to the feelings of sentient creatures, which are the effects produced by the three kinds of touch. In other words, the feeling of cold is produced by a touch which excites the corporeal frame when the energy of water and wind becomes active and predominates over that of the other elements, namely, earth and fire, in the body of a living being. Thus touch itself is the cause, while the feeling of cold is its effect. Similarly the feeling of hunger is produced by a touch which excites the physical frame, at a time when the energy of wind becomes active in our body and predominates over the other energies. Likewise the feeling of thirst is caused by a touch which excites the physical frame when the energy of the element of fire becomes active and predominates over the other energies.

Such was the idea of the Sarvāstivādin and in all probability it was not an original invention on their part, but a heritage of all Indian Schools of Philosophy from the earliest period.

We now proceed to treat of

“THE SENSE-ORGANS.”

These are of five kinds corresponding to the five classes of sense-objects.

The five kinds of sense-organs.

They are technically called in Sanskrit *Panchendriya* or the “five Indriyas”. According to the Buddhist usage

¹ Jap : *Mi-kib*.

Indriya means "supreme" (*parama*); "Lord" (*īśvara*) and ruler (*adhipati*); after grasping external objects the Indriyas are capable of arousing thought (*cittotpāda*) or of exciting 'vijñāna' or consciousness. Accordingly the term *Indriya* is to be explained as the act of arousing consciousness and as the grasping of the sense-objects or '*Viśaya*'. In other words, each of the five *Indriyas* is an agent without which none of the five *vijñānas* would become capable of perceiving an external object.

The derivation of *Indriya* adopted by the Sarvāstitvavādins is as follows :—

कः पुनरिन्द्रियार्थ इति । इदि परमैश्वर्ये इति पश्यते । तस्य धातो-
रिन्दन्तीन्द्रियाणीति रूपं द्रव्यम् । कथं कृत्वा इन्दन्तीति इन्द्राणीरप्रत्यय
औणादिकः । इन्द्राखेवेन्द्रियाणीति स्वार्थं धस्तुडितः । अथवा इन्दन्ती-
तीन्द्रियम् ॥¹

"What then is the meaning of the word '*Indriya*'? The word is derived from the root '*Idi*' (1st conj. par.) indicating 'absolute supremacy'. Taking this root, we get the form '*indanti*'. '*Indanti*' gives the form '*indrāṇi*'. (Vide P. Sūtra. *Indrdair-apratyaya anṇāḍika*;) meaning those which exercise supremacy. The next stage *indray-eva indriyāṇi* or *indanti iti indriyam*." (Vide P. Sūtra, *Svarttheḥkas tadāhita*;) Vasubandhu

The essence of the
five sense-organs is
purely material.

says :—"Vijñāna is of five kinds, namely, those connected with (1) eye, (2) ear, (3) nose, (4) tongue and (5) body. Dependent on these five Vijñānas are what are known as the five kinds of pure materials (*Prasāda rūpāṇi*). These 'pure materials' are called the eye-sense-organ (*Cakshvindriya*) ear-sense-organ (*śrotrendriya*) etc." These show clearly that, according to the Sarvāstitvavādins, the essence of the five indriyas or sense-organs is entirely material. As I have pointed out, according to the Sarvāstitvavādins, it is *indriya* which perceives an object;—a fact, the knowledge of

¹ Yaśomitra's *Abhidharma-kośa Śāstra vyākya*, Chap. II.

which would have saved Śāṅkara from the errors he has fallen into in his attempts to refute Buddhist philosophy. He displays almost at every turn his ignorance of the fundamental principle of Sarvāstivāda, namely, that the substratum of all things including the sense-organs is permanent and unchangeable.

Each indriya has two sub-divisions namely, principal indriya¹ and auxiliary indriya.² In modern scientific terminology the former corresponds to the nerve and the latter to the organ for that nerve ; thus in the case of the eyes, optic nerve would be the principal indriya while the eyeball would be its auxiliary. According to the Sarvāstivādins, the substratum of the principal indriya consists of a combination of *paramāṇus* which are extremely pure and minute, while the substratum of the latter is the flesh made of grosser materials. The principal indriya is invisible and intangible owing to its extreme minuteness. Accordingly the Abhidharma-Kośa says :—

“The indriyas of kāya (body) etc., cannot be called divisible because they cannot, by any means, be broken into two or more parts. They cannot be divided because in that case their function would cease, the limbs of the body being parted asunder. The Kāyendriya etc., are further indivisible on account of their extreme purity and excellence resembling the light of gems.”³

The five supreme indriyas differ from one another with respect to the manner and form of their respective atomic combinations. Thus the illustration employed to explain the formation of the organ of vision is that of flour being poured into a vessel filled with water. Just as in such a case the particles of flour would scatter themselves over the surface of the water, even so do the minute atoms (*paramāṇu*) which compose what is known as the organ of vision spread themselves over the pupils of the eye.

The form and manner of atomic combinations of the five sense-organs.

¹ Japanese : *Shūgi-kon*.

² Japanese : *Bujin-kon*.

³ The Abhidharmakośa-Śāstra, Chap. I.

The minute atoms which go to make up the 'organ of hearing' are represented as being subjected to an unintermittent act of screwing up resembling the spontaneous rolling up of the bark of a cherry tree as soon as it is detached from the trunk.

The minute atoms constituting the 'organ of smell' are represented as being situated inside the nostrils in either of which they are said to be placed side by side symmetrically.

The minute atoms of 'taste' are described as being situated in the form of a half moon on the surface of the tongue itself.

Lastly the minute atoms which build up the 'organ of touch' are represented as spreading over the entire corporeal frame, their number being supposed to be exactly equal to that of the atoms of which the body consists.

The special capacity of the Respective Indriyas.

Each of the five *indriyas* has a special capacity of its own and is able to give rise to the particular *viññāna* which corresponds to it. What the special capacity of each *indriya* is will be seen from what follows:—

1. The *indriyas* of vision and hearing can grasp their object remotely as well as close at hand. The keenest *indriya* is that of the eye, possessing as it has not only the power of grasping the colour at a distance but also that of arousing *Cakkhuvijñāna* as soon as it grasps its object. The *indriya* of the hearing has also the power of perceiving its object at a distance but it is not so keen as that eye-organ.

2. The *indriyas* of smell (*Ghrāṇa*), taste (*Jihva*) and touch (*Kāya*) have not the power to apprehend remote objects but only to grasp proximate ones. That is to say, they are unable to give rise to the *viññāna* corresponding to them unless they come in immediate contact with their respective objects. The degree of contiguity to their respective objects required by each of them, is said to vary for the purpose of giving rise to their respective *viññānas*.

The special capacity
of the *cakṣu* and
śrotrendriya.

The special capacity
of *Ghrāṇa*, *Jihva* and
Kāyendriya.

Thus, assuming, for the purpose of our illustration, that an atom is divisible into four parts, it should be understood that if the organ of Smell can perceive to the distance of the three-fourth of the atom, the organ of Taste will be able to perceive only one-half of it and the organ of Touch still less *viz.* only one-fourth of it. Moreover these three indriyas can apprehend only that quantity of their respective objects the atoms of which are equal to their atoms. If the atoms exceed in quantity, then the particular indriya concerned apprehends half the quantity of its sense-object at the first moment and the other half at the next moment, the interval between the two moments, being so small and the action of apprehending being so quick that it looks as if the two "takings" were simultaneous.

It must be noted that the receptivity of the sense-organs of vision and hearing is not limited by the quantity of the object perceived, thus the eye can just as well apprehend a huge mountain as it apprehends the tip of a hair and the ear can hear equally well the buzzing of a fly and the roaring of thunder.

The enumeration of the sense-organs and their nature and capacity brings me to one of the most difficult sections of Buddhist psychology, namely,

'Avijñāpti-Rūpa'.

Vasubandhu in the first chapter of his commentary on the Abhidharma Kośa, briefly describes *Avijñāpti Karma* as follows:—

Explanation of Avij.
ñāpti-rūpa.

"*Avijñāpti Karma* is a product of *rūpa-karma* just as *vijñāpti Karma* is. It derives its name from the fact that it does not manifest itself to others and cannot be known by others".¹

This does not make us any the wiser. Let us see what the term really means. The word *rūpa* in this connection is synonymous with *Karma*, *Vijñāpti* means "making known", and *Avijñāpti* is its contrary. Accord-


1. The Abhidharmakośa-sāstra, Chap. I. (fasc. I). The Sanskrit passage runs as follows :—यस्मात् कपक्रिया स्वभावापि सती विज्ञप्तिवशम् न विज्ञापयति तस्मादविज्ञप्तिरिच्छते ।

dingly the term *Avijñapti Karma* etymologically means "action not made known". It signifies a *karmic* energy which is not perceived by the five senses or made known to another. The vehicles for expressing and communicating our thoughts and ideas are our limbs and voice or as the Sankrit language has it "body and words". The Sarvāstitvavādin lay stress on the fact that as soon as we perform an act or express an idea good, or bad, which, in their technical language, is called under the comprehensive name of *Vijñapti-rūpa* or "action made known", (*rūpa* being synonymous with *Karma* here) a latent energy is impressed on our person, which is designated as *Avijñapti-rūpa* or "action not made known" because it does not manifest itself to others but remain hidden in the person of the doer.

It is quite unconscious or, more accurately speaking, subconscious. According to the Sarvāstitvavādin, the *Avijñapti-rūpa*, being a latent energy, is bound sooner or later to blossom forth into *Karmic* effect, and is the only bridge which connects the cause and the effect of *Karma*, good or bad done by body or speech. It is one of the seventy-five external *dharma*s being included in *rūpa-dharma*. But does it not look like a contradiction to include it in that category seeing that the definition of *rūpa*, according to the Sarvāstitvavādin, is "*pratighāt rūpa*," that is to say, *rūpa* has for its characteristic resistiveness? The apparent contradiction disappears when we come to consider that *Avijñapti-Karma* is a resultant of *Vijñapti-Karma* which is produced by body or speech both of which come under the category of *rūpa-dharma*; thus the effect *Avijñapti* pertakes of the nature of its cause *Vijñapti* which comes under *rūpa-dharma* and is, therefore, classed among the latter.

Thus according to the Sarvāstitvavādin, *Karma* is divided into two great heads—(1) thought or *Cetana-Karma* which is synonymous with *Manaskāra* and (2) motion or *Caitsaṅgikakarma* which is subdivided into (a) bodily act (*Kāyika Karma*) and (b) vocal act (*Vācika Karma*). Now each of these subdivisions of motion is divided into two sections, namely, *Vijñapti-Karma* and *Avijñapti-Karma* of the body and

speech respectively. The divisions and subdivisions are given in the following diagram :—



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CITTAM OR "MIND"

The author and the commentators of the *Abhidharma-Kośa* take pains to point out that "Mind" (*Cittam*) is the king of the mental realm (*Caitta-dharmas*). "The *Cittam* or "Mind", continue the commentators, "governs all things mental and recognises their respective characteristics, as soon as it perceives them, exactly in the same manner as a king governs his ministers and subjects and generally administers his state affairs." This explanation, however, luminous it may appear to the old-world student of Buddhism, fails to leave any

¹ Jap : Gō.

² Jap : *Shin-go*.

³ Jap : *Shin-muhyō-gō*.

⁴ Jap : *Shi-gō* or *I-gō*.

⁵ Jap : *Go-gō*.

⁶ Jap : *Go-hyō-gō*.

⁷ Jap : *Shi-i-gō*.

⁸ Jap : *Shin-hyō-gō*.

⁹ *Go-muhyō-gō*.

lasting impression on modern minds like ours, so that I gladly pass on to Vasubandhu's definition of it by means of terms almost equipollent, to use John Stuart Mill's well-known phrase.

"The mind", says Vasubandhu, "is called '*Cittam*' because it observes ('*cetate*') ; '*Manas*' because it considers ('*manute*') ; Vasubandhu's defini- and '*Vijñāna*', because it discriminates ('*vijñānate*')."¹
tion of the mind.

So the words '*cittam*,' '*manas*' and '*vijñāna*' are, in a certain sense, synonymous, in the Buddhist psychology.

We proceed now to the subdivisions of the mind (*Cittam*, *manas* or *vijñāna*) made by the Sarvāstivādin, which are technically called 'the six kinds of *vijñānas*'.

The six kinds of vijñānas.

The substance of mind in the Philosophy of the Sarvāstivādin is divided into six, viz :

- (1) the *cakṣur-vijñāna*² ('eye-discrimination')
- (2) the *śrotra-vijñāna*³ ('ear-discrimination')
- (3) the *ghrāṇa-vijñāna*⁴ ('smell-discrimination')
- (4) the *jihvā-vijñāna*⁵ ('taste-discrimination')
- (5) the *kāya-vijñāna*⁶ ('touch-discrimination')
- (6) the *mano-vijñāna*⁷ ('thought-discrimination')

These respectively depend upon their respective sense-organs (*indriya*), such as the '*cakṣu-indriya*' (eye-sense-organ),
The respective seat of the six kinds of *vijñāna*. *śrotra-indriya*' (ear-sense-organ), etc. The '*cakṣur-vijñāna*', discriminates color and form (*varṇa* and *saṃsthāna*) ; the '*śrotra-vijñāna*', 'sound' (*śabda*), the '*ghrāṇa-vijñāna*', 'smell' (*gandha*) ; the '*jihvā-vijñāna*' 'taste' (*rasa*) ; the '*kāya-vijñāna*', 'touch' (*sparsa*) ; lastly the '*mano-vijñāna*' discriminates the '*dharma*' or the '*thingness*' of a thing, if I may be permitted to coin the uncouth abstract noun, since the English language has no word to represent exactly the idea of '*dharma*' in this

¹ The *Abhidharmakośa*-Śāstra, Chap. II. (fasc. IV.)

² Jap: *Gen-shiki*.

³ Jap: *Ni-shiki*.

⁴ Jap: *Bi-shiki*.

⁵ Jap: *Zer-shiki*.

⁶ Jap: *Shin-shiki*.

⁷ Jap: *I-shiki*.

sense, the nearest approach to an equivalent being the combination of 'substance' and 'quality' in the Aristotelian sense. The *Abhidharma-Kośa* further states that "each of the *viññānas* discriminates its particular object and perceives the general characteristic of the latter, that the six *viññānas* combine to form, what is known as the '*viññāna-skandha*', that there are further six '*viññāna-kāya*' ('substance of discrimination') each corresponding to each of the six '*viññānas*' such as, '*cakṣur-viññāna-kāya*' '*śrotra-viññāna-kāya*' etc., up to '*māno-viññāna-kāya*'.¹

The sixth *viññāna* ('*mano-viññāna*'), being the 'King of the Mental World' discriminates also color, form, sound, smell, taste and touch, in addition to its own functions, as is shown in the subjoined diagram:—

Manovijñāna	{	Colour and form (<i>rūpa</i>)	<i>cakṣur-vijñāna</i> .
		Sound (<i>śabda</i>)	<i>śrotra-vijñāna</i> .
		Smell (<i>gandha</i>)	<i>ghrāṇa-vijñāna</i> .
		Taste (<i>rasa</i>)	<i>jihvā-vijñāna</i> .
		Touch (<i>sparsa</i>)	<i>kāya-vijñāna</i> .
		'Thingness (almost substance and quality)'	{	(dharma)	...

The forty six '*caitta-dharmas*'; the fourteen '*cittaviprayukta-samskāra*' and the three *asamskṛita-dharmas* will be presently explained.

It is worth while to draw attention to the fact that there took place an interesting discussion among the Hinayanists in very early times as to whether the substance of the six *Viññānas* is one or manifold. It is fully treated of in the thirty-second Chapter of the *Abhidharma Mahāvibhāṣā Śāstra* and an abridgement of the discussion is also given in the first and second Chapter of the *Abhidharma Kośa*, but I regret that the limited time at my disposal prevents me from entering into the salient points of the controversy.

I pass on to the threefold classification of discrimination, according to the *Sarvāstivādin*s.

¹ The *Abhidharmakośa-Śāstra*, Chap. I. (fasc. I.)

Three kinds of Discrimination.

The discriminative function of mind (*'vijñāna'*) is classified into three viz:—(i) *'svabhāva-nirdeśa'*¹ ('natural discrimination'); (ii) *'prayoga-nirdeśa'*² ('actual discrimination') and (iii) *'anusmṛiti-nirdeśa'*³ ('reminiscent discrimination'). The first means an intuitive function operating at the present time; the second indicates not only an intuitive function but also an inferential one operating throughout the three divisions of time, the present etc., and the third signifies a retrospective or a reminiscent function. In other words, the first deals only with the present while the second is concerned with the present, the past and the future in a very comprehensive manner, and the third has to do exclusively with the past. Among the six kinds of *Vijñānas*, the first five (*cakṣu*, *śrotṛa*, *ghṛāṇa*, *jihvā*, and *kāya*) possess only the intuitive function (*svabhāva-nirdeśa*) while the sixth (*'mano-vijñāna'*) possesses all the three functions. This is the reason why the first five *vijñāna's* are called '*anirdeśa*' ('lacking discrimination') while the '*mano-vijñāna*' is called '*anirdeśa*' (possessing discrimination'). The *Abhidharma Kōśa* says:—

"There are, in brief, three kinds of discrimination, viz: 'intuitive' (*'svabhāva-nirdeśa'*), 'inferential' (*'prayoga-nirdeśa'*) and reminiscent (*'anusmṛiti-nirdeśa'*). The intuitive discrimination only is possessed by the first five *vijñāna-kāyas*, and not the other two, for which reason they are called '*anirdeśa*' or ('lacking discrimination'). Thus, for instance, we call a horse 'foot-less' when it has only one foot'.⁴

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¹ Jap: *Jishō-junbetō*.² Jap: *Ketoku-junbetō*.³ Jap: *Zainen-junbetō*.⁴ The *Abhidharmakośa*-śāstra. Chap. I (fasc. II.)

CAITTA-DHARMAS ('MENTAL PROPERTIES').

'Caitta-dharmas' signify 'mental properties' which follow the action of the 'cittam' ('mind') like courtiers who follow their king. The function of the '*Caitta-dharmas*' is to seize the special characteristics of an object, while the '*cittam*' perceives its general characteristics. Thus '*cittam*' is concerned with generalities while the '*caitta-dharmas*' deal with particularities. For example, when we see a human form at a distance, it is '*cittam*' which enables us to find out whether it is that of a man or a woman; whereas the '*caitta-dharmas*' help us to make out whether the person is one-eyed or two-eyed, tall or short, fair or dark, etc. Accordingly perhaps the best equivalent for '*cittam*' in the language of modern European psychology would be 'conception.'

The Sarvāstivādins recognise forty-six kinds of *caitta-dharmas*, the Vijñānavādins, who classify them also differently, give a list of fifty-one.

The Sarvāstivādins divide the "*caitta-dharmas*" into six classes, viz :—

- (a) Mahābhūmikā-dharma.¹ (10)
- (b) Kuśala-mahābhūmikā-dharma.² (10)
- (c) Kleśa-mahābhūmikā-dharma.³ (6)
- (d) Akuśala-mahābhūmikā-dharma.⁴ (2)
- (e) Upakleśa-bhūmikā-dharma.⁵ (10)
- (f) Aniyatabhūmikā-dharma.⁶ (8)

Let us enumerate these one by one.

I. *Mahābhūmikā-Dharmas.*

These are mental operations which, as their name indicates ('*mahā*' signifying 'general' or 'common' in this connection), are common universally to all man's mental functions in the 'moral and immoral realms'. These functions further classified into (a) good, (b) bad, and (c)

The special function of the *Mahābhūmikā-dharma*.

¹ Jap : *Daichi-hō*.

² Jap : *Daibonōchi-hō*.

³ Jap : *Shōbonōchi-hō*.

⁴ Jap : *Daizenchi-hō*.

⁵ Jap : *Daifusenchi-hō*.

⁶ Jap : *Fujishō-hō*.

neutral. In other words, whenever any mental function arises, there arise with it simultaneously a number of *dharmas*, and these are called 'mahābhūmikādharmas' or "mental operation common to the three 'grounds' (good, bad, neutral), into which all mental functions are divisible." They are ten in number, viz :—

- | | |
|----------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 1. <i>Veḷandā</i> ¹ | ... Sensation. |
| 2. <i>Sanjñā</i> ² | ... Conception. |
| 3. <i>Cetanā</i> ³ | ... Motive. |
| 4. <i>Sparśa</i> ⁴ | ... Contact. |
| 5. <i>Chanda</i> ⁵ | ... Conation. |
| 6. <i>Matī</i> ⁶ | ... Intellect. |
| 7. <i>Smṛiti</i> ⁷ | ... Memory. |
| 8. <i>Manaskāra</i> ⁸ | ... Attention. |
| 9. <i>Adhimokṣa</i> ⁹ | ... Determination or 'fixing.' |
| 10. <i>Samādhi</i> ¹⁰ | ... Concentration. |

The next heading is—

II. *Kuśala-Mahābhūmikā-Dharma.*

The special operation
of the *Kuśala-Mahā-
bhūmikā-dharma.*

These are, as the name indicates, "mental operations common to all good thoughts" and are ten in number :—

- | | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 1. <i>Śraddhā</i> ¹ | ... Faith. |
| 2. <i>Vīrya</i> ² | ... Diligence. |
| 3. <i>Upekṣā</i> ³ | ... Indifference. |
| 4. <i>Hī</i> ⁴ | ... Shame for one's self. |
| 5. <i>Apatrapā</i> ⁵ | ... Shame for another. |
| 6. <i>Alobha</i> ⁶ | ... Freedom from covetousness. |
| 7. <i>Adveśa</i> ⁷ | ... Freedom from hatred. |
| 8. <i>Ahiṃsā</i> ⁸ | ... Harmlessness. |
| 9. <i>Prasrabdhī</i> ⁹ | ... Peacefulness of mind. |
| 10. <i>Apramāda</i> ¹⁰ | ... Carefulness. |

¹ Jap : <i>Ju.</i>	² Jap : <i>Sō.</i>	³ Jap : <i>Shi.</i>	⁴ Jap : <i>Soku.</i>
⁵ Jap : <i>Yoku.</i>	⁶ Jap : <i>Ye.</i>	⁷ Jap : <i>Nen.</i>	⁸ Jap : <i>Soku-i.</i>
⁹ Jap : <i>Shō-ye.</i>	¹⁰ Jap : <i>Saumodi.</i>	¹¹ Jap : <i>Shin.</i>	¹² Jap : <i>Gon.</i>
¹³ Jap : <i>Sho.</i>	¹⁴ Jap : <i>Zan.</i>	¹⁵ Jap : <i>Gi.</i>	¹⁶ Jap : <i>Muten.</i>
¹⁷ Jap : <i>Mushin.</i>	¹⁸ Jap : <i>Fu-goi.</i>	¹⁹ Jap : <i>Kei-an.</i>	²⁰ Jap : <i>Fu-hō-iten.</i>

The third heading is :—

III. *Kleśa-Mahābhūmikā-Dharma.*

These are 'the mental operations' which arise with the *Kleśas*, that is

The characteristic of
the *Kleśa-mahā-bhū-
mikā-dharma*.

to say, when any kind of passion begins to act. They
are six in number :—

- | | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 1. <i>Moha</i> ¹ | ... Ignorance. |
| 2. <i>Pramāda</i> ² | ... Inattention or carelessness. |
| 3. <i>Kausidya</i> ³ | ... Indolence. |
| 4. <i>Āsrāddha</i> ⁴ | ... Absence of faith. |
| 5. <i>Styāna</i> ⁵ | ... Idleness. |
| 6. <i>Auddhatya</i> ⁶ | ... Rashness and thoughtlessness. |

Next come—

IV. *Akuśala-Mahābhūmikā-Dharma.*

These are mental operations arising with the activities of mind that are

The characteristic of
the *Akuśala-mahā-bhū-
mika-dharma*.

evil (*akuśala*). They are two in number :—

- | | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| 1. <i>Ahrīkatā</i> ⁷ | ... Shamelessness (for oneself). |
| 2. <i>Anapatrapā</i> ⁸ | ... Shamelessness (for another). |

The next heading is—

V. *Upakleśa-Bhūmikā-Dharma.*

These '*caitta-dharmas*' are *not* common to all *Kleśas* when they arise, but

The special function
of the *Upakleśa-bhū-
mika-dharma*.

spring up only in company with the sixth 'defiled'
vijñāna viz: *mano-vijñāna*. The prefix '*upa*' indicates

this limitation. They are ten in number :—

- | | |
|----------------------------------|----------------|
| 1. <i>Krodha</i> ⁹ | ... Wrath. |
| 2. <i>Mṛakṣa</i> ¹⁰ | ... Hypocrisy. |
| 3. <i>Mātsarya</i> ¹¹ | ... Envy. |

¹ Jap: *Mu-miō*.

² Jap: *Hō-itan*.

³ Jap: *Ge-tai*.

⁴ Jap: *Fu-shin*.

⁵ Jap: *Kon-chin*.

⁶ Jap: *Tak-kio*.

⁷ Jap: *Mu-zan*.

⁸ Jap: *Mu-gi*.

⁹ Jap: *Fen*.

¹⁰ Jap: *Foku*.

¹¹ Jap: *Ken*.

4. <i>Īrshyā</i> ¹	... Jealousy.
5. <i>Paritāpa</i> ²	... Anguish.
6. <i>Vihimsā</i> ³	... Injury.
7. <i>Upanāha</i> ⁴	... Enmity.
8. <i>Māyā</i> ⁵	... Flattery.
9. <i>Śālyā</i> ⁶	... Trickery.
10. <i>Mada</i> ⁷	... Arrogance.

Last come the—

VI. *Aniyata-Bhūmika-Dharma*.

These literally mean “mental operations which do not fall within a definite or particular division (*bhūmī*)”. Under this heading, therefore, are included those “*caitta-dharmas*” which cannot be brought under one of the five headings given above. They are eight in number :—

1. <i>Kaukritya</i> ⁸	... Repentance
2. <i>Middha</i> ⁹	... Torpor.
3. <i>Vitarka</i> ¹⁰	... Discussion.
4. <i>Vīra</i> ¹¹	... Judgement.
5. <i>Rāga</i> ¹²	... Affection.
6. <i>Pratigha</i> ¹³	... Anger.
7. <i>Māna</i> ¹⁴	... Pride.
8. <i>Vicikitsā</i> ¹⁵	... Doubt.

We have already stated that the objective classification of the universe divides it into 75 dharmas, the substratum of which is permanent, according to the Sarvāstivādin. Now these dharmas fall into two main heads “*samskrita*” (“compounded”) and “*asamskrita*” (“uncompounded”). The latter which will be fully treated presently are three in number viz: (i) *Ākāśa*; (ii) *Pratisankhyānirodha*; and (iii) *Apratisankhyānirodha*. The 72 “*Samskrita-dharmas*” fall into four main groups :—

(i) *Rūpas*—which are eleven in number, viz: ‘*avijñapti-rūpa*’ which we have already described, the five ‘*indriyas*’ or faculties (viz:

¹ Jap: *Shitan*.

² Jap: *Ten*.

³ Jap: *Sai-min*.

⁴ Jap: *Shin*.

⁵ Jap: *Nō*.

⁶ Jap: *Kid*.

⁷ Jap: *Zen*.

⁸ Jap: *Mon*.

⁹ Jap: *Goi*.

¹⁰ Jap: *Kid*.

¹¹ Jap: *Shi*.

¹² Jap: *Gi*.

¹³ Jap: *Ken*.

¹⁴ Jap: *Kiai*.

¹⁵ Jap: *Ton*.

sight, hearing, smell, tongue, touch), and the objects of them (*indriya-vishaya*) viz : form, sound, odour, taste, contact.

(ii) *Cittam* (mind), which constitutes a '*dharma*' by itself.

(iii) *Caitta-dharmas* which, as we have just now seen, are *forty-six* in number. They are also called "*Citta-samprayukta-samskāra*", which literally means "composite energy conjoined with the mind", as opposed to,

(iv) '*Citta-viprayukta-samskāra*' which are fourteen in number and thus complete the tale of seventy-five.

Now let us see what are the *citta-viprayukta-samskāra dharmas*.

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CITTA-VIPRAYUKTA-SAMSKĀRA.

The full name is "*Rāpa-citta-viprayukta-samskāra-dharma*" which means "composite energies apart from the matter and mind". These energies are not always actual but potential and it must be noted that they cannot become active unless they are joined to a mental or material basis, though they are quite independent of both mind and matter. They are, of course, different from the *asamskrīta-dharmas*, as the very name "*samskāra*" ("composition") indicates. The number of these *dharmas* is fourteen :—

- | | | | |
|--|-----|-----|--|
| 1. <i>Prāpti</i> ¹ | ... | ... | Attainment. |
| 2. <i>Aprāpti</i> ² | ... | ... | Non-attainment. |
| 3. <i>Sabbhūta</i> ³ | ... | ... | Common characteristics. |
| 4. <i>Asamjñikā</i> ⁴ | ... | ... | Absence of perception. |
| 5. <i>Asamjñi-samāpatti</i> ⁵ | ... | ... | Stage of meditation producing cessation of perception. |

¹ Jap: *Toku*.

² Jap: *Hi-toku*.

³ Jap: *Dō-bun*.

⁴ Jap: *Mu-ō-kicu*.

⁵ Jap: *Mu-ō-jō*.

- | | | | |
|-----|---------------------------------------|-----|---|
| 6. | <i>Nirodha-sandpatti</i> ¹ | ... | Stage of meditation producing cessation of mental activity. |
| 7. | <i>Jīṛita</i> ² | ... | Life. |
| 8. | <i>Jāti</i> ³ | ... | Origination. |
| 9. | <i>Sthiti</i> ⁴ | ... | Continuance. |
| 10. | <i>Jarā</i> ⁵ | ... | Decay. |
| 11. | <i>Anīyatā</i> ⁶ | ... | Impermanence. |
| 12. | <i>Nḍmakāya</i> ⁷ | ... | Words. |
| 13. | <i>Padakāya</i> ⁸ | ... | Sentence. |
| 14. | <i>Vganjanakāya</i> ⁹ | ... | Letters (whether they compose a word or not). |

The point to be borne in mind in this connection is that it is not the fourteen 'dharma's' mentioned above that constitute *Rūpa-citta-viprayukta-samskāra*¹ but it is the energy which produces them which is to be called by that name, such as the energy which produces letters of the alphabet, groups them into words and puts words together into a sentence, etc.

Such are the Samskr̥ita-dharmas, according to the Sarvāstitvavādins. The Vijñānavādins have an enumeration and a classification of their own. They enumerated as many as one hundred *dharmas*, out of which there are fifty-one *caittadharma's*, but, unlike the Sarvāstitvavādins, they regard them all as impermanent excepting *vijñāna*.

We shall treat of the views of this school after we have completed our account of the Sarvāstitvavādins, the Satyasiddhi school and the Madhyamikavādins.

I shall pass on now to

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¹ Jap: *Metan-jin-jjā*.

² Jap: *Jīā*.

³ Jap: *Miō-shin*.

⁴ Jap: *Miō-kon*.

⁵ Jap: *I*.

⁶ Jap: *Ku-shin*.

⁷ Jap: *Shō*.

⁸ Jap: *Metan*.

⁹ Jap: *Bun-shin*.

“ASAMSKṚITA-DHARMA.”¹

Asamskṛitadharma means “that which is not made up or composed of elements”, so that it is unproduced and hence indestructible and immutable. *Asamskṛitadharma*, according to the Sarvāstivādins, is of three kinds, viz: (1) *Ākāśa*,² (2) *Apratisamkhyā-nirodha*³ and (3) *Pratisamkhyā-nirodha*.⁴ I said “according to Sarvāstivādins” because, as I shall later on point out, the Vijñānavādins have their own classification of the *asamskṛitadharma*s.

Ākāśa.

The essential nature of *Ākāśa* is freedom from obstruction (*Āvaraṇa*) or limitlessness—qualities which establish that it is a permanent and omnipresent substance. Now only does it not obstruct another thing but it is also not obstructed by another thing. Innumerable things may be simultaneously produced or destroyed in *Ākāśa* without thereby bringing about any increase or decrease in *Ākāśa*. Vasubandhu says:—

“Freedom from obstruction is the sole characteristic of *Ākāśa* and it is owing to this characteristic that the activity of material things is rendered possible”.⁵

In such passages *Ākāśa* means ‘space’ and it is always regarded as a substance by the Sarvāstivādins.

Śāṅkarācārya’s Criticism of Ākāśa.

In his commentary on the Vedānta Sūtras II, 2, 22-24 Śāṅkarācārya criticises the three *Asamskṛitadharma*s as

- (1) *Avastu*.
- (2) *Abhāvamātram*.
- (3) *Nirupākhya*.

The first epithet means ‘immaterial’ or ‘unsubstantial’. ‘*Vastu*,’ in Buddhist philosophy, is a term for ‘matter’, ‘substance’ or object.

¹ Jap: *Mac-i-kā*.² Jap: *Hichak-metan*.³ The *Abhidharma-kośa-Śāstrā*, Chap 1. (fasc. I.)⁴ Jap: *Ko-kū*.⁵ Jap: *Chak-metan*.

The second epithet means 'capable of being defined by negatives', if, at all, it is a term used in any Buddhist work to characterise the Asamskrīta-dharmas. In all probability, it is a characterisation Śāṅkara's own and means, as he intends it to mean, a negation. The third epithet does not mean 'unreal' or as Dr. Thibaut translates it, 'devoid of all positive characteristics'. It should, if sense is expected from it, rather mean, as the Ratnaprabhā gives it, '*Niravarūpaṃ*' or 'devoid of form'. It is, as we shall show later on, in all probability, a mutilated form of a Buddhist term which Śāṅkara misspelt and did not properly understand. Let us now analyse Śāṅkara's criticism of the views of the Sarvāstivādin concerning *Ākāśa* or space, as distinguished from the ordinary use of that word in the sense of 'sky' and as such synonymous with '*gaganam*', '*kham*'. Śāṅkara's arguments are as follows :—

(i) "You cannot call *Ākāśa*, *Nirupādhya*, because it is a *Vastu*, a fact which is corroborated by

(a) Scriptural passages like: "From *Ātman* arose *Ākāśa*" (*Taittirīya-Upanishad*, II, I).

(b) The fact that the existence of *space* may be inferred from the quality of sound just as the qualities of smell etc., indicate the reality of their abodes such as the earth etc.

(ii) To say that *Ākāśa* is nothing but the general absence of *Āvarana* would hardly meet your case. Suppose one bird is flying. It would thereby create an *Āvarana* or covering or occupation of space with the result that if a second bird wants to fly at the same time, there would be no room for it to do so."

Buddhist objection.

"But the second bird may fly where there is no *Āvarana* or a covering body".

Answer.

"Your objection means that *Ākāśa*, then, is a real *Vastu* or entity, since it is that by which the absence of covering bodies is distinguished. In other words, it is space in the ordinary sense, and not, in your Buddhist

sense, mere "non-existence of covering bodies". If you ask yourself what enables you to declare that there is absence of covering in one place and not in another, the answer will be 'space', which, therefore, must be "Something real."

(iii) "With regard to his views respecting space, the Buddhist contradicts himself. For instance, in a Buddhist sūtra, Buddha is represented as saying "Air has for its basis *Ākāśa*" in answer to the question "What is the basis of air"? This saying of Buddha clearly admits that *Ākāśa* is a positive entity and not a mere negation as the Sarvāstivādin maintain".

(iv) "Moreover, the Buddhist statement concerning the three *Asamskṛitadharma*s is self-contradictory. They say they are *Nirupādhya*, (i. e. non-definable) and in spite of their being so, they characterise them as eternal. Now when a thing is not a *Fastu* or a reality, you cannot predicate its being eternal or non-eternal, because predication of attributes entirely depends on a thing being real. A thing of which the predication of an attribute is possible, must be concluded to be a *Fastu* or reality instead of being *Nirupādhya* or 'an undefinable negation.'"

We shall now proceed to point out

Śāṅkara's mistake. Let us examine Śāṅkara's arguments one by one.

(i) *Nirupādhya*, if it is a Buddhist characterisation of *Asamskṛita-dharma*, does not mean 'undefinable' as Śāṅkara seems to think. It means rather (if it is, at all, a Buddhist term), devoid of form or 'nisvarūpam,' as the Ratnaprabhā explains it. Moreover, Buddhism or rather the Sarvāstivādin regard *Ākāśa* as a positive entity, all pervading and eternal, just as the Naiyāyikas did. It is a *Fastu* if the word be taken to mean an entity, it is not a *Fastu* if the word be taken in its Buddhist sense, viz: that of material thing. *Ākāśa* is immaterial according to the Buddhists. It is certain that Śāṅkara's *Nirupādhya* is a mistake for the Buddhist technical term *Nirūpādhya* (lit: 'to be called non-rūpa') or immaterial thing.

(ii) 'Āvarana', in its Buddhist philosophical sense, means obstruction and absence of Āvarana means freedom from obstruction. Śāṅkara borrows

the Buddhist term but gives it a wrong sense *viz*: that of 'occupation of space' in order to prove his point that Ākāśa is a positive entity, being under the erroneous impression that the Buddhists did not consider Ākāśa to be a negative entity. Accordingly, this part of his argument is labour lost, being based on an erroneous supposition and assuming an unreal objection, such as no Buddhist would ever have made.

(iii) In the passage of a sūtra which Śāṅkarācārya cites, the word *Ākāśa* is used in the common sense of 'sky' and not in the philosophical sense of 'space.'

(iv) The imagined self-contradiction of the Buddhists is based on Śāṅkara's erroneous reading *nirupākkhya* instead of *Nirūpākkhya* as pointed out above.

Let us pass on to the other two *Asamākṛitadharmas*.

Apratisamkhyā-Nirodha.

Vasubandhu briefly defines *Apratisamkhyānirodha* as follows:—

'*Apratisamkhyā-nirodha*' means the non-perception (*nirodha*) of dharmas

The definition of *Apratisamkhyā-nirodha*. caused by the absence of '*Pratyayas*' or conditions and not produced by knowledge." Let us now try to

understand what it means. The Abhidharma Mahāvibhāṣa Śāstra gives us the following illustration:—"Suppose your attention is fixed on one particular colour so deeply that not only can you not see any other colour, but also you cannot hear any sound, smell any odour, taste, or touch anything. Now, why cannot any other colour, any sound, odour etc., come within the range of your perception? Simply because the conditions (*pratyayas*) thereof are absent. And the non-perception of other colours, all sounds, all odours, all objects of taste or touch which were present at that time and would, under other conditions, have come within the range of our consciousness but actually did not come and passed away without entering it—such an unrealised possibility of the perception of the dharmas, (*viz*: of the colours, sounds, etc.,) referred to above, passing from the future stage of "will be perceived" into the past stage of "were not perceived" without touching the present stage of being perceived by him whose attention is

entirely engrossed in the contemplation of one colour, to the exclusion of every other thing, is an example of Apratisamkhyā-nirodha or "cessation without consciousness." Thus, Apratisamkhyā-nirodha is always connected with the future as a possibility of perception though not realised and with the past as non-realisation of perception without ever coming in contact with the present as actual realisation of perception. It is a form of Nirodha to which we might adequately apply the title of "inheritor of Unfulfilled Renown" with respect to the attainment of perception.

To the best of my knowledge, the only European authority who has, (in spite of his inaccuracy), at all come near the correct definition of *Apratisamkhyā-nirodha* is the late Prof. Theodor Goldstuecker, who, in his incomplete Sanskrit Dictionary says *sub voce* :

"(In Buddhist doctrine) unobserved nullity, cessations (of existence) the process of which cannot be perceived; one of the three categories of non-existence or cessation of existence (see P. 211)."

Prof. Deussen's rendering "Unbewusste Vernichtung" is incorrect. Dr. Thibaut's translation "cessation not dependent on a sublative act of the mind" does not agree with the Buddhist notion.

Before examining Śāṅkara's account and criticism of *Apratisamkhyā-nirodha*, it will be better to treat of *Pratisamkhyā-nirodha*.

Pratisamkhyā-Nirodha.

This term means *nirodha* or cessation of *Kleśas* or passions, which can be attained by transcendental knowledge (*pratisamkhyā*).
 The definition of *Pratisamkhyā-nirodha*. This is the *summum bonum* of the Sarvāstivādin who consider it to be synonymous with *Nirvāṇa*, although the Vijñānavādins consider it merely to be a stage leading to *Nirvāṇa*. Vasubandhu says: "The true characteristic of *pratisamkhyā-nirodha* is deliverance (*visamyoga*) from bondage". He goes on to add, "The essential characteristic of it is everlastingness. Its description is beyond the power of the tongue of man. It can only be realised by the self-experience of a perfect man. Generally speaking, it may be, for all practical purposes, designated as the highest good, eternally existing which may be called also *visamyoga* or deliverance". In

describing *Pratisamkhyā-nirodha* as conceived by the *Sarvāstitvavādins*, we can say what Mahomet said of his Paradise (*Al-jannat*) that "it is what the eye has not seen, nor the ear heard, nor what has ever flashed across the mind of man". One of the Buddhist elders called *Sughoshācārya* (quoted in the *Abhidharma-Mahāvibhāṣa-śāstra*) says :—

"*Pratisamkhyā-nirodha* is the *dharma* par excellence among all *dharma*s, the supreme goal among goals, the highest of all things, the noblest of all reasons, the greatest of all achievements. And therefore is the title *anuttaram* or supreme. But what is the abode of this supreme *dharma*, *Nirvāṇa* or *pratisamkhyā-nirodha*? Is it within or outside the Universe?"

The answer to this question is given in the *Abhidharma-Mahāvibhāṣa-śāstra*: "*Pratisamkhyā-nirodha* is neither quite the same as the *Skandhas* nor quite different from them, but its nature is different from the defiled *skandhas* (*sāsrava-dharma*s)."

This statement is tantamount to saying that *Nirvāṇa* does not exist apart from the *Skandhas*, nor is it quite identical with the Universe. It also leads to the inference that *Nirvāṇa* is something eternal. The great conflict between the *Sarvāstitvavādins* and the *Satyasiddhi* school hinged on this point. But, of this, I shall speak later on. Let me first examine the accuracy of Śāṅkara's criticisms of the *Sarvāstitvavādins*.

Śāṅkara's objection to both these Nirodhas.

"Both these forms of *Nirodha* are impossible according to the Buddhist doctrine itself which maintains that the series of momentary existence can never admit of any interruption. Now these *Nirodhas* must have reference to one of the following:—

(i) Either to the series of momentary existence, or (ii) to single member of that series.

In the case of (i) the entire cessation of the series of momentary existences becomes an impossibility from the Buddhist point of view, constituting, as it does, a chain of causes and effects. The last link of this chain must either produce an effect or not produce an effect. If it produces an effect, the series of momentary existence must be continued. If it does not produce

an effect, then the difficulties are still greater. In the first place, according to Buddhism, nothing can exist without possessing a causal efficiency, so that, if the last link of the chain of momentary existences, just referred to, does not produce an effect, you Buddhist must admit that it does not exist. Moreover, if the last link of the chain of cause and effect does not exist, the whole series, *ipso facto*, would become non-existent. Again, it would be impossible to maintain that an existence, though momentary, should be utterly annihilated in such an unaccountable and disconnected manner, for it is contrary to practical experience. However various be the stages through which a thing may pass, still it continues to be recognised through all of them, clearly or dimly and so has a connected existence. Thus, clay is recognisable in jars, potsherds and even in the powder produced by grinding the potsherd."

Śāṅkara's mistake.

Here, we have another startling instance of Śāṅkara's laboriously correct deductions from premises absolutely false. He must have been utterly ignorant of the real signification of either of these *Nirodhas*, or else, he would not have said that *Apratisamkhyā-Nirodha* is the contrary of *Pratisamkhyā-Nirodha* and that the latter means an annihilation of existences, preceded or accompanied by intelligence, as we have seen already that two *Nirodhas* refer to two entirely different sets of dharmas. *Pratisamkhyā-Nirodha* is the cessation of the *Kleśas* by means of knowledge, while *Apratisamkhyā-Nirodha* means the non-consciousness of Dharmas or things which would have forced our way into our consciousness but for the engrossment of our attention by something else. *Apratisamkhyā-Nirodha*, accordingly, is a thing of daily occurrence in every body's life. On the other hand, *Pratisamkhyā-Nirodha* among the Sarvāstivādin, is only another name for *Nirvāṇa*, its real meaning being the extirpation of the *Kleśas* by means of knowledge. But how is this extirpation effected? Not by annihilation, for, as Śāṅkara points out, a thing may pass through various stages, but it cannot be annihilated. Moreover, the Sarvāstivādin themselves maintain that substrata are indestructible. The answer is that the extirpation of the *Kleśas* is effected by their transmutation into *Bodhi* or en-

lightenment, for, according to Buddhism, Kleśa and Bodhi are but the faces of one and the same thing like carbon and diamond. We have already referred to the well-known dictum ब्रह्मे शः सर्वोधि, ब्रह्मं सारं तद्विबिंशन्, but Śāṅkara is not content with this. He hurls forth a further objection.

Further objection by Śāṅkara.

"The cessation of ignorance must be included within Apratisamkhyā-Nirodha and Pratisamkhyā-Nirodha. Its eradication must be effected by one of the two: (1) either by perfect enlightenment and its adjuncts, or (2) by itself. In the case of (1), it contradicts the Buddhist doctrine that everything destroys itself without needing a cause. In the case of (2), what is the necessity of the noble eight-fold path which leads to *Nirvāṇa* by eradicating ignorance."

Śāṅkara's misconception.

The eradication of ignorance means only its transformation into perfect enlightenment and not its annihilation, for nothing, according to the Sarvāstivādin, can be annihilated, and ignorance and perfect enlightenment are merely the phases of one and the same thing. *The eradication of ignorance comes within Pratisamkhyā-Nirodha or Nirvāṇa, and not under Apratisamkhyā-Nirodha which is a quite different thing, as we have already shown. Moreover, the doctrine of *Nir-hetuka-vināśa* (causeless destruction) is absolutely unknown in Buddhism which maintains that nothing can happen without causes and conditions. Śāṅkara is here guilty of a grave misrepresentation. The same might be said of the doctrine of self-destructiveness. The necessity of the eight-fold Path consists in the fact that it is the path to be followed, at least according to the Buddhists, for the attainment of Nirvāṇa or the extirpation of ignorance.

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THE EIGHT-FOLD NOBLE PATH.

Now, what is this oft-mentioned Eight-fold Path? It is identical with the fourth Noble Truth which is concerning the Path that leads to the Cessation of Suffering. Instead of giving my own explanation of it, I think, I shall do well to close this unavoidably lengthy chapter by a translation of an extract from a sermon on it attributed to Buddha, which is to be found in the Pāli Majjhimanikāya as well as in the Chinese Version of the Madhyamāgama-sūtra by Gautama Sanghadeva (A. D. 397-398):—

“Now, what is the noble truth concerning the Path that leads to the cessation of suffering? This is the Noble eight-fold Path, namely—

- (i) Right views; (ii) Right Aspirations; (iii) Right Speech;
- (iv) Right conduct; (v) Right livelihood; (vi) Right Effort;
- (vii) Right Mindfulness; (viii) Right Rapture.

(i) Now, what are Right Views (Pāli: *sammāditthi*—Skr: *‘samyag-dṛishti’*)? Knowledge concerning suffering, concerning the origin of suffering, concerning the cessation of suffering, concerning the path leading to the cessation of suffering:—These are what are called Right Views.

(ii) Now, what are Right Aspirations (Pāli: *‘sammāsankappa’*—Skr: *‘samyaksankalpa’*)?

To renounce worldliness, to renounce ill-feeling, to renounce harm-doing—these are called Right Aspirations.

(iii) Now, what is called Right Speech (Pāli: *‘sammāvācā’*—Skr: *‘samyagvāc’*)?

Abstention from lying, from slander, from unkind words, from frivolous talk—this is called Right Speech.

(iv) Now, what is Right Conduct (Pāli: *‘sammākamanta’*—Skr: *‘samyakkarmānta’*)?

Abstention from destroying life, from taking away what is not given, from wrongful gratification of the senses—this is called Right Conduct.

- (v) Now, what is Right Livelihood (Pāli : '*sammā-djīva*'—Skr : '*samyagdjīvak*')?

Now, a well born layman renounces bad livelihood and adopts a good one. This is what is called Right Livelihood.

- (vi) Now, what is Right Effort (Pāli : '*sammā-vādyāma*'—Skr : '*samyagvādyāmah*')?

Now, a Bhikshu makes a strong and manly endeavour by preparing his mind thereto :—

- (a) for putting a stop to the rise of evil and sinful states (of mind) which have not arisen.
- (b) for renouncing the evil and sinful states of mind which have already arisen.
- (c) for giving rise to good states of mind which have not arisen.
- (d) for the continuance, realisation, repetition, extension, meditation and fulfilment of good states of mind that have already arisen.

This is what is called Right Effort.

- (vii) Now, what is Right Mindfulness (Pāli : '*sammā-sati*'—Skr : '*samyaksmyiti*')?

Now, a Bhikshu lives zealously, consciously, mindfully, subduing covetousness and despondency in this world and regarding (1) the body as body; (2) the sensations as sensations; (3) the mind as mind, (4) the (mental) states as (mental) states. This is what is called Right Mindfulness.

- (viii) Now, what is Right Rapture (Pāli : '*sammā-samādhi*'—Skr : '*samyaksamādhi*')?

It is the attainment of the four stages of intent meditation (Pāli '*Jhānam*'—Skr. '*Dhyānam*') one after the other; to wit :—

- (a) the 1st Intent Meditation which arises on one's separating oneself from passions and evil states (of mind), which is conjoint

with application initial (Pāli : '*vitakka*'—Skr. '*vitarka*') and sustained, ('*vicāra*') which arises from seclusion and is coupled with pleasure and joy.

(b) the *2nd Intent Meditation* which arises on the cessation of application initial and sustained, is conducive to inward peace, is characterised by concentration of mind, dissociated from application initial and sustained, originating from Rapture, coupled with pleasure and joy.

(c) the *3rd Intent Meditation* which involves indifference to pleasure, is associated with mindfulness and knowledge and connected with the bodily feeling of joy.

and (d) the *4th Intent Meditation* which involves the purification of mindfulness coupled with indifference, freedom from sorrow and joy consequent on the renunciation of either and the previous cessation of joy and sorrow.

This is what is called "Right Rapture."

Such is the Eight-fold Noble Path which leads to the cessation of suffering. Here, we have Buddhist Ethics in a nut-shell. Whether the march of centuries has succeeded in making improvements on it, it is not for me to judge, but there it stands in its unembellished form, a signpost which has guided the footsteps of generations which have preceded us and which is destined to guide the footsteps of generations which are yet to follow even though its name and that of its original preacher come to be forgotten in the midst of ages to come.

CHAPTER IV.

THE SATYASIDDHI SCHOOL.¹

*The theory of the Sarva-sūnyatā-vāda.*²

As promised in my preceding lecture, I proceed now to examine the view of the *Sarva-sūnyatā-vādin* (" 'All-is-void' maintainers") who are the

The *Sarva-sūnyatā-vādin* School and its antagonist.

direct antagonists of the *Sarvāstivādin*. The former take up a negative standpoint with regard to everything, strenuously denying the absolute existence of anything in the transcendental sense, ascribing to it a provisional existence in the conventional sense; while the latter, as their name indicates, emphatically lay down that everything exists in the noumenal state, though it does not in the phenomenal. The founder of the *Sarva-sūnyatā-vādin*

The founder of this school is forgotten in India.

school was a native of central India, named Harivarman, who formulated his views in a work of his, entitled "*Satyasiddhi śāstra*"³ or "Treatise on the Demonstration of the Truth". It is remarkable that, not to speak of the author and of his work, the very name of the school has been forgotten in India, so that it will not be out of place to say something about Harivarman and his *śāstra* before proceeding to examine his philosophy.

The Satyasiddhi Śāstra, the Sanskrit original of which is irrecoverably

The *Satyasiddhi Śāstra* in China.

lost, has come down to us in the great Kumārajīva's masterly Chinese version. There was also a Tibetan translation of the work. It consists of just 202 Chapters. The work became so popular with the Buddhists of China that, under the Liāo dynasty,⁴ a philosophical school actually came to be established in that country which took its name after the *Satyasiddhi Śāstra*.

¹ Jap: *Jiō-jitsu-shidō*.

² Jap: *Shō-hō-kui-kū-ron*.

³ Nanjio's Cat. No. 1274.

⁴ That is to say, the Liāo dynasty of the Sīho family which flourished between 502 and 557 A. D.

Struggle between
Hīnayānists and Mahā-
yānists, and the mes-
sage of Harivarman.

The great critical work of the free-thinker, Harivarman, appeared at a time when the so-called Hīnayanists and Mahāyanists were hotly discussing the claims of their respective schools to be regarded as the representatives of genuine Buddhism. How strong the desire for propagandism was in Harivarman and how great the courage of his convictions, can be gathered from the opening words of his "Treatise on the Demonstration of the Truth":—

"Now, I am going to unfold the meaning of the Sacred Canon in its real truth, because, every Bhikshu of every school and Buddha himself will be hearing my exposition".

But, in spite of his efforts to shake off the trammels of early associa-
tions and education, Harivarman could not always
rise above the teachings of the Hīnayāna. Although,
according to his own professions, a declared antago-

Distinction between
the Śūnyavāda of the
Hīnayāna and of the
Mahāyāna.

nist of the *Sarvāstivādin*s, he took his stand upon the Hīnayāna in order to maintain his doctrine of absolute nihilism (*Sarvakūṣyātārvāda*). This is the reason why Harivarman's doctrine is generally called the *Śūnyātārvāda* of the Hīnayāna,¹ as distinguished from the *Śūnyātārvāda* of the Mahāyāna² or the Madhyamika doctrine.

In fact, Harivarman's doctrine is to be regarded as the highest point of philosophical perfection attained by Hīnayanism and, in a sense, it constitutes the stage of transition between Hīnayanism and Mahāyanism.

I have already pointed out to you that Buddhism never accepts the transcendental existence of the empirical *ego*; that it regards it merely as a conventional existence brought about by the combination of the five *skandhas*. We have also seen that the *Sarvāstivādin*s maintained the eternal existence of the noumenal state of each of the five *skandhas*.

Now, Harivarman violently attacked this view of the *Sarvāstivādin*s concerning the nature of the *skandhas*.

¹ Japanese: *Shūjō-no-kū-mon*.

² Japanese: *Daijō-no-kū-mon*.

"The substratum of each of the five *skandhas* appears eternal when considered as factors making up the *ātma* which is but the combination of the five *skandhas*. But, in reality, the substratum of each *skandha* must be regarded as *śūnya*, because, it admits of the possibility of further analysis, so that the so-called *ātma* as well as the substratum of the *skandhas* (*i. e.* the noumenal state of the *dharma*s) must be void or *śūnyatā*."

The philosophical significance of this statement is of great importance to the student of the History of Buddhism, furnishing, as it does, a clue to the transition of Hīnayānism into Mahāyānism.

The *Sarvāstivāda*s maintained only the personal "non-ego", as did also the other schools of the Hīnayāna. But the "nairātmyadvaya" or "the two sorts of non-ego" *viz.* : of persons and of things which forms a characteristic doctrine of Mahāyānism was accepted among the Hīnayānists also by the school of Harivarman, as is indicated by the extract cited above. This is why the Satyasiddhi School has sometimes been included among the Schools of the Mahāyāna¹. But it would be interesting to find out to what school Harivarman really belonged.

The statements made by the Chinese historians of Buddhism are conflicting. Some² say, he belonged to the Bahurutiya; others,³ that he was a member of the Soutrāntika school, others⁴ again maintain that he was an adherent of the Dharmagupta School. There are some⁵ who go so far as to affirm that he interpreted the tenets of the Hīnayāna with the help of the Mahāyāna. In the midst of this conflict of opinions it would be difficult to come to any definite conclusion. What appears to be almost certain (and this we are able to gather from reliable sources) is that Harivarman began his career as an eminent scholar of the Sāṅkhya Philosophy

¹ Ācārya Hō-on of Kōtakufi, Ācārya Chi-xō of Kaizenji and Ācārya Sōmin of Shōgonji. (See the "Outline of eight schools of Buddhism" by Gyōnen of Japan.)

² See the Commentary on the Bodhisattva Vasumitra's the "Śāstra on the Wheel of the Principles of Different Schools."

³ See the "San-ron-gen-gi," the "Go-kiō-shō," and the "Hokke-gen-san."

⁴ See the "Dai-xiō-gi-shō" and the "San-ron-gen-gi."

⁵ See the "San-ron-gen-gi."

and that he subsequently became an adherent of the *Sarvāstivādin*s and joined the Buddhist order.

In the preface which he prefixed to Kumārajīva's
Sanyin's statement
about Harivarman. Chinese version of the *Satyasiddhi śāstra*, Sanyin¹,
 a Chinese priest, says :—

"The *Satyasiddhi śāstra* was composed by Harivarman about 890 years after Buddha's death. He was the chief disciple of Kumāralabdha (*lit*: "Received from the Youth"), a leader of the Hīnayānist in Kashmir."

Kumāralabdha appears to have been the head of the *Sarvāstivādin* school in his days, as the following extract from a
Kitsan's statement
about Harivarman. commentary on the "Three Śāstras" of the *Madhyamika*² by Kitsan, the greatest teacher among Chinese Buddhists, seems to indicate :—

"The *Satyasiddhi śāstra* was composed by Harivarman about 900 years after Buddha's death. He was a disciple of Kumāralabdha who belonged to the *Sarvāstivādin*s."

In fixing the age of Harivarman, if we adhere to the European computation of the date of Buddha's Nirvāṇa,³ we shall
Our discussion of his
date. be bound to fall into an error, for it will bring us down to the 5th Century of the Christian era. Now Kumārajīva who translated Harivarman's work into Chinese, died, according to historical records, during the 'Hunsh' period which extended from A. D. 399 to 415.⁴

This was indeed a glorious period of intellectual blossoming forth in India ; for it saw a Kālidāsa⁵ in the north of India at the Court of

¹ He was the chief disciple of Kumārajīva. When the translation of this śāstra was completed, Kumārajīva ordered Sanyin to deliver a lecture on it ; and all his disciples, three thousand in number, studied and expounded it.

² i. e. The "Madhyamika-śāstra," the "Dvādaśānikāya-śāstra" and the "Śata-śāstra." (Nagala's Cat. No. 1179, 1186 and 1188.)

³ There are many different opinions (more than forty) regarding the actual date of the Buddha's death.

⁴ The exact date of Kumārajīva's death is uncertain, though the "San-Cwhan" (fasc. 2 fol. 116) gives a very minute date as the twentieth day of the eighth month in the eleventh year of the 'Hun-sh' period (A. D. 409).

⁵ See Prof. Rāmavatāra Śarīna's learned and interesting article on Kālidāsa : A study which appeared in the "Hindustani Review". (Vol. XXIII, No. 132 and Vol. XXIV, No. 133.)

Chandragupta II Vikramaditya and a Buddhaghosa in Ceylon. It was also the time when Dignāga flourished in the "middle country" and Kumārajīva carried the torch of Indian Learning far into the heart of China.

Accordingly, Harivarman must be at least a century earlier than Kumārajīva and I think we may safely say that he was not later than A. D. 250. He was very impartial in his views and composed his *śāstras* on the essence of the different doctrines of Buddhist schools with

He went hardly beyond the idea of conservatism of the *Sthaviravāda*.

a view to awaken his contemporaries from their nightmare of bigotry and partiality. He was, however, too deeply imbued with the conservatism of *Sarvāstivāda* (which is a branch of the School of Elders, *Sthaviravāda*), to adopt the progressive views of the *Mahāsaṅghikas*. His work is full of the idea of conservatism as regards the *Buddha-Kāya*-view, (adhering, as he did, to the historical *Buddha*, and not going as far as Ideal *Buddha*), in spite of his strong opposition to the *Nirvāṇa*-view of the *Sarvāstivādins*. It would be interesting to know something of his views on human life, and *Nirvāṇa*, which are

"THE ESSENTIAL PARTS IN THE DOCTRINE OF THIS SCHOOL."

Harivarman based his explanations of the phenomena and noumena of

The two principles :
Samvṛitika and *Paramārtika*.

the universe on two principles, the conventional¹ and the transcendental.² His view of human life or the world coincides with that of the *Sarvāstivādins*, although he was diametrically opposed to them on the question of *Nirvāṇa*. In other words, he regarded the universe from two standpoints *viz. samvṛitika* and *paramārtika*. While he emphatically insisted on the non-existence or "emptiness of all things" when regarding the universe from the *paramārtika*

¹ Sanskrit : *Samvṛita-Satya*, Jap : *Zokutai*.

² Sanskrit : *Paramārta-Satya*, Jap : *Shintai*.

or transcendental standpoint, he regarded it as existent from the conventional or *saṃvṛitika* view. He says :—

“There are two kinds of gates, *viz*: the conventional and the transcendental. In the conventional gate, the existence of the individual is admitted, as is preached in the following *Sātra*—‘A *puḍgala* (man) enjoys good fruit, as a result of his own good *karma*, and receives bad fruit, as an effect of his own bad *karma*; mind and *viñāṇa* (consciousness) always exist; the one who has cultivated his own mind for a long time (made his mind the master of his body, self-control) will be born in heaven; each one will receive the fruit of his deeds—’ Such is the doctrine of the conventional gate. In the transcendental gate, however, the emptiness of everything is maintained, as is preached in the following *Sātra* :—‘There is nothing of me or mine in the five *skandhas*; the mind is changing for ever and ever like wind or flame. Although there is action and its fruit, we can never, at any instant, grasp the mind in one and the same state, for it is continually changing through the law of causes and effects, which, side by side with such mutability, makes the series of five *skandhas* continue.’¹

From the standpoint of *paramārtika*, a man or a thing, in the essential nature, is *śūnyata*, although each surely exists when we look at it from the standpoint of *Samvṛitika*. Such is the fundamental theory of *Harivarman*. He thus progressed one step beyond the theory of the *Sarvāstivādin*s; for the ‘realism’ of the latter, which maintains the existence of the noumenal state of the *dharma*s, is included, as is apparent from the above exposition, in the latter part of the doctrine of *Harivarman* who even recognised the existence of the empirical *ego* from the standpoint of the *Samvṛitika* view. He says :—

“It is heretical to maintain the *Andhman* in the gate of conventionalism”.

“The right view is to insist upon the existence of *Ātman*, as far as concerns the conventional truth, and of *Andhman*, as regards the transcendental truth”.²

¹ Nanjio's Cat. No. 1274, Chap. XIV.

² The “Satyasiddhi Sāstra, Chap. XXXIV.

Harivarman, as we have said above, based his view of human life and of the universe, on his conventional doctrine; and it is for this reason that he agrees, in this respect, with the views of *Kātyāyaniputra*, the founder of *Sarvāstivādin* school, and the chief author of *Abhidharma-mahā-vibhāṣā-śāstra*. He also accepted, in every detail, the theory of the five *skandhas*,¹ the twelve *āyatanas*,² the eighteen *dhātus*,³ the twelve linked chains of causation, the three worlds (*Kāma*,⁴ *Rūpa*,⁵ and *Arūpa dhātu*⁶), the four classes of birth (*aṇḍajā*,⁷ *samsvedajā*,⁸ *jaraḍyajā*,⁹ and *upapādakā*¹⁰) and the four cycles (*antarakalpa*,¹¹ *mahākalpa*,¹² *sarvakalpa*¹³ and *śūnyakalpa*¹⁴), as explained by *Kātyāyaniputra* himself. In short, *Harivarman's* view of human life and the universe may be learned from some of my former lectures *viz*: those on *Karma-phenomenology* and *Realism*.

The two schools differ, however, in the extent of their doctrine of "Non-ego" or "Anātman". The *sarvāstivādins* taught 'anātman of a person,'¹⁵ the doctrine of *non-ego*, but not 'that of things.'¹⁶ As explained in one of my former lectures, they maintained the doctrine of the eternal existence of the noumenal state of *dharma* throughout the three divisions of time.¹⁷ In other words, they insisted that the substance, as such, of things can neither be produced nor destroyed; while *Harivarman*, like his contemporary *Mahāyanists*, maintained the two kinds of anātman *viz*. non-ego of persons and things. That is to say, while the *Sarvāstivādins* believed that the combination of the five *skandhas* comprising the so-called ātman is merely temporary and, on no account, permanent, but that, at the same time, each of them, *viz*: *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, *samākāra* and *vijñāna* exist eternally, *Harivarman* insisted that the five *skandhas* themselves, even when taken separately, are of provisional existence, and being the products of causes and conditions, must be empty in their essence.

¹ Jap: *Go-un*.² Jap: *Jihni-shō*.³ Jap: *Jihhachi-kai*.⁴ Jap: *Yok-kai*.⁵ Jap: *Shiki-kai*.⁶ Jap: *Mushiki-kai*.⁷ Jap: *Ran-shō*.⁸ Jap: *Shus-shō*.⁹ Jap: *Tai-shō*.¹⁰ Jap: *Ke-shō*.¹¹ Jap: *Jō*.¹² Jap: *Jiū*.¹³ Jap: *Ye*.¹⁴ Jap: *Kū*.¹⁵ Jap: *Nin-muga*.¹⁶ Jap: *Hō-muga*.¹⁷ Jap: *Sanze-jitan-u, Hottai-gō-u*.

In order to explain the absolute non-existence of the noumenal state of the *dharman*, he looked at the question from three sides.

The three Principles applied to "objective division" of all things.

- (a) The provisional and nominal existence,¹
- (b) the existence of the Dharman in the substantial state,² and
- (c) the absolute emptiness of the Dharman in the real state.³

We may designate these as "objective divisions" of all things in the universe.

Under the first point, he includes the phenomenal existence of all things with the empirical ego, and under (b) the noumenal or material reality of the existences as they appear to our senses. These two principles have been accepted by the *Sarvāstivādin*, but Harivarman regarded them only as conventional, and not transcendental truths. The next development in the consideration of the substantial state of the Dharman was the idea of "emptiness of substance" itself. For instance, each of the five *skandhas* which constitute a man, seem like the real existence; but, at least, the four elements, earth, water, fire, and wind, which constitute *rūpa dharma* among the five *skandhas*, are merely of provisional and nominal existence, as they are combined only through the medium of colour, smell, taste and contact, and must consequently be in the noumenal state of *dharman*. And in the case of mind, while the mind (*cittam*) is only an existence in the noumenal state, the mental properties (*caitta dharman*) exist in the provisional and nominal world. Not only this: when we analyse the *paramāṇu* (atom) and mind,—Harivarman declared that even they were capable of analysis—we cannot but reach the conception of emptiness and this is the absolute void, the transcendental truth of Harivarman.

According to his *śāstra*, our mind, as far as its existence is concerned,

The three principles applied to "subjective division." is capable of subdivision into three parts *viz* :—

- (a) Mind in the provisional and nominal state,⁴
- (b) Mind in the noumenal or actual state,⁵ and
- (c) Mind in the absolute or real emptiness.⁶

¹ Jap: *Ke-u*.

² Jap: *Jiten-u*.


³ Jap: *Shin-kō*.

⁴ Jap: *Ke-shin*.

⁵ Jap: *Jiten-shin*.

⁶ Jap: *Kō-shin*.

These three may be called "subjective divisions." The combination of the five *skandhas* is considered an eternal *ātman* by most vulgar minds, and the provisional and nominal existence is mistaken for actual existence. This erroneous conception of the state of the mind is included under the first part (a). To remove this erroneous conception or cognition, we must practise, what is termed, "the meditation on the *andtman* of a person."¹ Although, by this process, we come to realise the non-existence of the empirical ego, we still cling to the idea of the eternal existence of *ātman* of things. This stage in our conception is called 'mind in the noumenal or actual existence.' In other words, this is the mental stage in which we cling to the idea of the permanency of the noumena, just as the *Sarvāstivādin*s did. The next step will be to remove this idea of the eternal *ātman* of things; to effect this removal, we must now practise the meditation of the *anātman* of things."² The mental stage in which we come to realise the truth of the two kinds of *anātman*, is called the 'mind in the noumenal state' (*Upadhisesha Nirvāṇa*³). And further we must endeavour to banish even the last lingering idea of absolute non-existence, which may otherwise engender the view of another extremism. The mental stage at which we arrive when we realise the removal of this—*śūnya cittaṃ* or the 'mind in the state of absolute emptiness'—is called '*Anupadhisesha nirvāṇa*.'⁴ The following diagram may help to elucidate the above statements:—



¹ Jap : *Nin-kū-gwan.*

² Jap : *U-yo-ne-han.*

³ Jap : *Hokkū-gwan.*

⁴ Jap : *Mu-yo-ne-han.*

I shall pass on now to

"THE VIEW OF BUDDHA-KĀYA¹ IN THIS SCHOOL."

We have not any documents other than the *Satyasiddhi śāstra* from which we can derive information as to the doctrines of this school; and even in these papers, we do not find any detailed exposition as to how *Buddha-Kāya* should be regarded. The first five chapters, however, deal with the question, "Why should the *Buddha* be saluted as one of the three Treasures or Tri-Ratna². It does not carry us a step beyond the view of *Kātyāyaniputra*, and is essentially that entertained by the *Sarvāstivādin*. Harivarman pointed out the five attributes of the *dharma-kāya*,³ the ten powers,⁴ the four convictions (*vaiśāradyas*)⁵ and the three kinds of meditation,⁶ which were the characteristics of the *Buddha* and of the *Buddha* alone. Let us now deal with them one by one.

• A. The five attributes of the *Dharma-kāya*.

पञ्च धर्मकायाः ।

(1) *Śīla-dharma-kāya*⁷—This implies the capacity for observing the *śīla* (orders, rules, commandments, prohibitions) i.e. the attainment of everything that is good and beautiful, and the extirpation of everything that is evil and ugly.

(2) *Samādhi-dharma-kāya*⁸—Implies the mental power obtained through meditation, the state consequent on a well-balanced (level, even, tranquil) activity of the mind, ever peaceful, never ruffled by external conditions.

¹ Jap : *Busshin-kwan*,

² Jap : *Gobun-hosshin*,

³ Jap : *Shi-mu-sho-i*,

⁴ Jap : *Kai-hosshin*.

⁵ Jap : *Sam-bō*,

⁶ Jap : *Jiū-riki*,

⁷ Jap : *San-nen-jū*,

⁸ Jap : *Jiō-hosshin*.

(3) *Prajñā-dharma-kāya*¹—Implies the attribute of knowledge, free from the trammels of ignorance, with the light of knowledge and truth always before his gaze.

(4) *Vimukta-dharma-kāya*²—Implies the virtue resulting from the extirpation of the *kleśas* (passions); as soon as one realises perfectly the first three merits, (*śīla*, *saṃādhi*, and *prajñā*), he will be free from the bondage of the *kleśas*, and will realise the fourth virtue as well.

(5) *Vimukti-jñāna-darśana-dharma-kāya*³—Implies the virtue of self-understanding. Any one who has attained the first four *dharma*s can know, not only his own *mokṣa*, but also that of others.

These five attributes of the *dharma-kāya* are not the attributes of the Buddha alone; they can also be attained by the *Śrāvakas*.⁴ So that, Harivarman further added the ten powers, the four convictions, and the three kinds of meditation which together are the special attributes of the Buddha, and which the *Śrāvakas* do not and cannot possess.

The pañcha-dharma-kāya is not the attribute of the Buddha alone.

B. The ten intellectual powers of Buddha.

तद्यायतन दश बलानि ।

(1) *Sthāndāsthāna-jñāna-balam*⁵—the intellectual power which can distinguish between right and wrong.

(2) *Karmavipākā-jñāna-balam*⁶—The intellectual power which lays bare the result of one's action either in this or in another birth.

(3) *Dhyāna-vimokṣa-saṃādhi-saṃpatti-jñāna-balam*⁷—The power of knowing the different states of meditation, liberation and tranquilisation.

(4) *Indriya-parāpara-jñāna-balam*⁸—The power which enlightens as regards the lower and higher mental powers.

(5) *Nānādhimukti-jñāna-balam*⁹—The intellectual power which lays bare the different kinds of *adhimokṣas* (understanding).

¹ Jap : Ye-hoeshin.

² Jap : Gedatsu-chi-ken-hoeshin.

³ Jap : Sho-hisho-chiriki.

⁴ Jap : Jōryo-gedatsu-tōji-tōshi-chiriki.

⁵ Jap : Gedatsu-hoeshin.

⁶ Jap : Shōmon.

⁷ Jap : Gō-ijuk-chiriki.

⁸ Jap : Kon-jō-ge-chiriki.

⁹ Jap : Shūju-shō-ge-chiriki.

(6) *Nānādhātu-jñāna-balam*¹—The power through which the different dispositions of sentient beings can be understood.

(7) *Sarvatragāminī-pratipatti-jñāna-balam*²—The power by which the result of all deeds or actions (Samskāra) can be known.

(8) *Pūrva-nivāsānuṣṛīti-jñāna-balam*³—The power of remembering former abodes (existences).

(9) *Cyutyutpatti-jñāna-balam*⁴—The power by which the knowledge of the death of living beings in this life, and their birth in the next can be derived.

(10) *Āsavaśhaya-jñāna-balam*⁵—The power of attaining the *Nirvāṇa* (*pratisamkhyā-nirodha*⁶) by the complete subjection of one's desires.

C. The four convictions of the Buddha.

चत्वारि देश्येयानि ।

(1) *Abhisambodhi-vaiśāradhyam*⁷—That he has attained the highest enlightenment (Sammyaksambodhi). And he is perfectly conscious of it, whatever others may say to the contrary.

(2) *Āsavaśhaya-jñāna-vaiśāradhyam*⁸—That he has rooted out all his passions (kleśas), destroyed all his evil desires. And he has no fear on this point, but carefully admonishes others to do the same.

(3) *Antarāyika-dharmānugathādvaiśāradhyam*⁹—That the defiled Dharmas (the evil thoughts &c.), are the obstacles on the way to Nirvāṇa. And he is certain that he has rightly described the hindrances that lie in the way to a life of righteousness, and he earnestly instructs others to eradicate their irregularities.

(4) *Nairēdṛika-mārgādvatarāya-vaiśāradhyam*¹⁰—That, by the practice of morality, one is able to get rid of every pain. And he is confident that he

¹ Jap : *Shuju-kai-chiriki*.

² Jap : *Shiku-jū-zui-nen-chiriki*.

³ Jap : *Rōjin-chiriki*.

⁴ Jap : *Shō-tō-gak-mui*.

⁵ Jap : *Setu-shō-ho-mui*.

⁶ Jap : *Hen-shūgyō-chiriki*.

⁷ Jap : *Shi-shō-chiriki*.

⁸ Jap : *Chaku-metan*.

⁹ Jap : *Rō-yei-jin-mui*.

¹⁰ Jap : *Setu-shutau-dō-mui*.

has truthfully taught the way to salvation, and instructs disbelievers accordingly.

D. The three kinds of meditation.

दीर्घि क्षुब्धपस्थानानि

(1) The Buddha never becomes exuberant when circumstances are favourable, for his mind is well-balanced and in a state of tranquilisation.

(2) The Buddha is never dejected when circumstances are adverse, for his mind is tranquil.

(3) The Buddha never becomes glad or sorry (is not influenced by any feeling) when he is praised or abused. For his mind is in the transcendental condition apart from conventional affairs.

The seventeen Dharmas indicated above, added to the attribute of boundless mercy, form *ashtādaśdweepikā-buddha-dharma* or the eighteen unique characteristics or independent conditions¹ of the Buddha in the *Abhidharma-mahā-ribhāṣa-śāstra* and the *Abhidharma-kōsa-vyākya-śāstra*. Harivarman accepts them as such in his *Satyasiddhi śāstra*, in order to indicate that Śākyamuni or the sage of the Śākya race, is superior to all sages. He has thus not advanced beyond the *Sarvāstivādin* as regards *Buddha-Kāya*, although he very emphatically criticised the *Nirvāṇa* view of *Kātyāyaniputra* and his followers.

Generally speaking, the theory of the *Harivarman's* school is, as a whole, higher and deeper than that of the *Sarvāstivādin*, who did not recognise the *anātman* of things. But, like them, he could not discover activity in what they took for rest. Nay, some of them mistook rest for absolute quietism, forgetting that true rest does not constitute absolute quietism but implies an evenly balanced activity or tranquilisation. *Harivarman*, further, cannot escape the censure that he adopted extreme views as regards acosmism, and could not discover the active aspect of the *Nirvāṇa*. He taught *what is not, and not what is*. For instance, he maintained that we

Harivarman's doctrine is profounder than and superior to that of the Sarvāstivādin.

¹ Jap: *Jik-hachi-fu-gū-hō*.

cannot but reach the conception of emptiness (void) when we analyse a thing or the mind into its elements, and he further taught that even *paramānu* could be analysed. Thus far as regards the negative aspect of the question. Of course, in his case too, emptiness does not mean nothingness, and he refrained from explaining the active side of emptiness. His chief object was to wipe out the last spot from our mind; for, he said that, as long as there is even the slightest spot in the mirror of our mind, it can never be said to have attained to 'absolute clearness'. According to his extreme ideas on the subject of void, any idea as to the existence of something must be considered as a spot. Imbued, as he was, with his idea of eradicating the last spot, he did not think it worth while to explain the function of such a spotless mirror (absolute emptiness).

Taking another metaphor to illustrate his extremely negative views, as
 Our conclusion. long as there is a breeze over the surface of the ocean of our mind, it cannot be said to be in a state of absolute calmness. Hari-varman's doctrines tend to put a stop to the disturbance caused by the Wind of Ignorance; but he forgot the boundless activity in the world of Enlightenment. He taught rest in activity, but not activity in rest. This is the weakest point in his doctrines, and lays him open to his being considered a *Hindyanist*.

CHAPTER V.

THE MADHYAMIKA SCHOOL.¹

The theory of the middle course.

is well-known that the founder of the *Madhyamika* School is the great *Nāgārjuna*, the most brilliant philosopher of India. He was a Southern-India Brahmin by caste, and flourished about the second century A. D.

The founder of this school.

Most of the Japanese and Chinese scholars of Buddhism deal with the *Yogācāra* school before the *Madhyamika* school, as a more convenient and more systematic exposition of Buddhist philosophy. I do not find, however, any reasons, in my present lectures, to depart from the chronological order. I shall therefore treat of the *Madhyamika* before I take up the *Yogācāra* school.

To the scholar of Buddhism, no part of the subject is more difficult and more interesting than to fix the date of the founder of Mahāyānism. In general, *Nāgārjuna* is said to be the founder of it; but if *Mahāyāna-Sradhotpāda Śāstra* is a work of *Bodhisattva, Aśvagoshā* who is well known as the author of *Buddhacarita*, we must acknowledge the latter to be the greatest pioneer of Mahāyāna Buddhism, being the predecessor of *Nāgārjuna* and *Asaṃga*. The opinions about his date, among Buddhist scholars, are conflicting; this will be perhaps an undecided question for the future. At any rate, we cannot be far wrong in deciding the probable date of *Nāgārjuna* and *Deva* from the data furnished by *Fu-fātsān-yin-yuen-kwhān*,² the life of *Nāgārjuna*,³ the life of *Kānadeva*⁴ and *Hiuen Tsiang's Ta-tan-si-yu-ki* etc.

¹ Jap: *Chū-gwon* (or *Kwon*) *shūh*.

² Sanjio's Cat. No. 1461.

³ Sanjio's Cat. No. 1340.

⁴ Sanjio's Cat. No. 1462.

According to the opinion accepted by the Buddhist scholars in general, Āsvagoṣha is the twelfth patriarch while Nāgārjuna, who is said to have been born in Southern India, 700 years after Buddha's death (i. e. between the later half of the 2nd century A. D. and the first half of the 3rd century A. D.), is the fourteenth patriarch. Deva, a native of Southern India or Ceylon, who is the greatest of the disciples of Nāgārjuna is the fifteenth patriarch. Let us discuss about his native place before we discuss his probable date. The author of "Fu-fā-tsān-yin-yuen-kwhan" and the "Life of Kānadeva" says :

"Bodhisattva Kānadeva, a son of a Brahman in Southern India was the greatest disciple of Nāgārjuna. He was an extensive learned scholar, and matchlessly eloquent. In his time, there was a large golden image of Mahesvara, whose statue was about 22 to 36 feet high. People believed that if they made vows to this image, they could obtain any desire of their heart because of the miraculous powers it was supposed to possess. One day Deva also went to worship, and requested permission to enter the shrine. Thereupon the master of the shrine replied, "It cannot be seen by human eyes, for the image of Mahesvara possesses such a supernatural and miraculous power that whoever catches a glimpse of it, falls into a swoon which lasts for one hundred days. So, you had better worship and offer your vows from this gate." Thereupon Deva said: "A divinity ought to possess supernatural and miraculous power, and it is for this reason that I want to see him. If he were otherwise, why should I long to see him?" So he entered into the shrine himself. When he looked at the golden image, it seemed as if the image had got angry for something and was moving its eyes. But Deva fearlessly said: "If this be God, it must exercise the influence of divine power upon human beings and must overpower all beings with its divine knowledge and virtue. Here indeed is a trickery devised for the purpose of deluding with the gorgeousness of gold and glitter of glass!" With these words, he mounted on this image by a ladder and plucked out its left eye. Some of the by-standers at once began to doubt the supernatural powers of this image, while others were furious at the sacrilege. So Deva addressed

Where is the native place of Ārya Deva?

them thus: "Deity is boundless. I have full faith in His spirit. But material has no connection with Him. I, therefore, plucked out this eye which consists of glass, after mounting on that golden mountain-like image. I am not a proud man and should be the last person to offer insult to the Deity." The narrative may appear tedious; but no one would deny the great interest which attaches to the conduct of the great man as the destroyer of idol-worship which was the root of the numerous superstitions in India at his time. Be it as it may, the authors of these two works mentioned above, describe Deva as a native of Southern India. Dr. B. Nanjiô says that Deva was a native of South India, not of Ceylon. But Hienue Tsang differs. Says that illustrious pilgrim: "At that time Deva Bodhisattva coming from the country of Chi-see-tsen (the island catching a lion) or Ceylon, sought to hold a discussion with him (Nâgârjuna). Addressing the gate-keeper, he said "Be good enough to announce me." Accordingly the gate-keeper entered and told Nâgârjuna. He, recognising his reputation, filled up a *pâtra* with water and commanded his disciple to hold the water before the Deva. Deva, seeing the water, was silent, and dropped a needle into it. The disciple held the *pâtra*, and with some anxiety and doubt returned to Nâgârjuna. "What did he say," he asked. The disciple replied, "He was silent and said nothing; he only dropped a needle into the water."

Nâgârjuna said, "He is a wise man! To know the springs of action, this is the privilege of a God; to penetrate subtle principles is the privilege of an inferior saint. Such full wisdom as this entitles him to be allowed to enter forthwith." He (the disciple) replied, "What a saying is this? Is this then the sublime eloquence of silence?"

"This water", Nâgârjuna went on to say, "is shaped according to the character of things (in it); it fills up every interest in point of clearness and comprehensiveness; he, on beholding the water, compared it to the wisdom which I have acquired by study. Dropping into it a needle, he pierced it, as it were, to the bottom. Show this extraordinary man here at once, [and let him be presented." (Si-yu-ki. Book X p. 210 in Beal's translation).

This evidence may not appear conclusive to prove that Deva was a native of Ceylon because Hiuen Tsang mentioned only that Deva Bodhisattva coming from Ceylon sought to hold a discussion with Nāgārjuna. But Hiuen Tsang gives the following quotation from the words of Deva, himself: "Deva Bodhisattva answered: My father, mother and relations dwell in the island of Ceylon. I fear lest they may be suffering from hunger and thirst. I desire to appease them from the distant spot."

This ought to be sufficient to show that he was a native of Ceylon. We pass on to the date of Bodhisattva Deva. Although there is not the least doubt that Deva was a disciple of Nāgārjuna, still, I can adduce another proof from Si-yu-ki to corroborate the information we have about his life. "Nāgārjuna had a great disciple, Deva, a man illustrious for wise and spiritual energy. This man, arousing himself to action, said "At Vaiśālī, the followers of learning (Buddhist learners) have been defeated in argument by the heretics and now for twelve years, days and months together, they have not sounded the *ghanta*. I am bold enough to rise in order to overturn the mountain of heresy and to light the torch of true religion."

Nāgārjuna replied "the heretics of Vaiśālī are singularly learned; you are no match for them. I will go myself."

Deva said "In order to trample down some rotten stems, why should we overthrow a mountain? I am bold enough to think that, by the instructions I have received, I can silence all the heretics. But, let my master assume the side of the heretics: and I will refute him according to the point of the thesis; and according as the question is decided, let my purpose go or not be settled."

Then, Nāgārjuna took the side of the heretics, and Deva set himself to overthrow his arguments. After seven days, Nāgārjuna lost his ground and said with a sigh, "False positions are easily lost; erroneous doctrines are defended with difficulty. You can go yourself; you will overthrow those men."

That Deva was a great disciple of Nāgārjuna, is established from the records of Hiuen Tsang. And as I said above, Nāgārjuna lived about 700 years after the death of Buddha, according to the opinion prevalent among

Chinese Buddhist scholars in general (i. e. from the latter half of the 2nd century A. D. to the first half of the 3rd century A. D.). Deva, therefore, must be one of his younger contemporaries. If we could find the date of Gnataka Rāja (Sadvahana family?) for whom Nāgārjuna composed Gāthās on the importance of the law, we would be able to fix Nāgārjuna's date with greater precision; but, unfortunately, we have not any record about this rāja. Let us now examine the date about Deva as given in the history of Ceylon. The author of Mahāvamsa says:

"On the demise of Srinaga, his son Vohara Tissa, who was thoroughly conversant with the principles of justice and equity, ruled for twenty-two years. He abolished the (vohara) practice of inflicting torture which prevailed up to that period in this land and thus acquired the appellation of Voharaka Tissa rāja.

Having listened to the discourses of Thera Deva, resident at Kambugama, he repaired five edifices. Delighted also with the Mahātissa then resident at the Anura Vihara, he kept up daily alms for him at Mucilapattana." (Mahāvamsa p. 144 Chap. 36).

The author of Dipavamsa says: "(Abhaya King), having heard the Gilana discourse (of Buddha) which was preached by Thera Deva, he gave medicines for the sick and (constructed) five most excellent residences (for the Sangha?)." Again says: "(The king called Asangatissa or Samghatissa), having heard the Andhakavinda Suttanta which was preached by Thera Deva, the victorious king, ordered rice and milk continuedly to be distributed at the four gates (of the town)."

According to the table of approximate date of the kings of ancient Ceylon, these three kings' reigns are as follow:

<i>Name of Kings.</i>			<i>Reign.</i>	<i>Date A. D.</i>
Vohara Tissa	22 years	215
Abhaya Tissa	8 "	237
Siri Naga II	2 "	245
Vijaya II or Vijayindu	1 year	247
Sangha Tissa I	4 years	248
Siri Sanghabodhi I or Dham	}		2 "	252
[Siri Sangabo.				

I cannot give any proof that Thera Deva in Ceylon is the same man as Bodhisattva Deva in Southern India. *But, if Thera Deva, who was so eminent that he preached to the Sinhalese king, lived in Ceylon till he died, he might have been spoken of more times by Sinhalese historians. May I not suppose that this happened because he came and died in India?* At any rate, we have no more exact data and proof about his approximate date than to assume that Thera Deva in Ceylon was the same as the person known as Bodhisattva Deva in India. If our assumption is correct, he was a learned man who lived in Ceylon at the beginning of the 3rd century (the reign of King Vohara Tissa A. D. 215 or Abhaya Tissa A. D. 237 or Sangha Tissa A. D. 248), and after that he came and died in India. And it agrees with the date of Nāgārjuna, who lived from the latter half of the 2nd century A. D. to the 3rd century A. D., as accepted by the Mahāyanists in general.

To close this essay, I shall add some interesting story and facts about him, Some interesting story and fact about Arya Deva. having translated some parts from the life of Bodhisattva Kānadeva translated into Chinese by Kumārajīva and the Book VI in Fu-fa-tsang-yin-yuen-kwhan translated into Chinese by Ki-kia-ya.

The morning after he plucked out Mahesvara's left eye, he visited the shrine of Mahesvara, taking, as an offering, some sweetmeats. This was mentioned by the writers of the above two books as a conversation between Deva and Mahesvara, which was as follows:—

Mahesvara showing a body with his left eye plucked out, sat down in a quiet corner. And looking at the sweetmeats, said to Deva: "Very well gentleman, you obtained my mind while the multitude were satisfied with my form. You offered me your heart while the people offered me only material things. You respect me heartily while the people fear and accuse me. These sweet meats which you offer me, are the most beautiful and delicious, but I want to receive one thing as the best alms. Will you give me?" Deva replied "Deity knows my mind. I shall obey his will." Mahesvara said: "What I want is the left eye. Art thou able to give me thy left eye?" Deva replied: "Certainly sir." He bored it out and offered it of his own will. Mahesvara said: "Well

done. This is the true and the best of alms. I shall give you whatever you ask for."

This is the reason why Deva is nicknamed Kānadeva. (kāna = one-eyed). Some say, however, he is called Kānadeva because he plucked out Mahesvar's eye. At any rate, his nick-name is "Kānadeva" in the above Chinese translations.

In his days, many Rājas of South India were the followers of the non-Buddhistic sect. He, therefore, intended to convert them. Some time after, he saw a Rāja collecting sentinels to guard his palace. As soon as he became aware of the fact, he offered himself as one of the candidates for the post and was adopted by the Rāja. He did his duty to the best of his power and he, after a little while, became a leader of the Rāja's favourite and faithful troops. Then he asked the Rāja permission to discuss with heretics in the Rāja's presence on the following subjects.

1. Buddha is the greatest of all sages.
2. Buddhism is the best of all religions.
3. The Buddhist Samgha is the best of all religious communities.

The Rāja allowed him to collect all heretical teachers. Heretics came in crowds from all quarters to discuss or to witness the discussion. But no one could refute his argument, so that, all of them became his disciples, shaving their hair, according to the condition laid down for the defeated party. Unfortunately, this victory was the cause of his death. A young heretical disciple became enraged at his teacher's defeat and said to himself: "Though you have conquered with your mouth, I shall be victor by my sword." And he waited for a fit opportunity to carry out his murderous intention.

One day, Deva was teaching, as usual, the doctrine of Śūnyatā (all things are empty), and was refuting heretical views before his disciples in a lonely forest. And when he was taking a walk at the resting time, having arisen from the Dhyana seat, while his disciples were wandering about or meditating under the trees here and there, suddenly the enemy emerged from his covert and stabbed at Deva's belly with the sword shouting out, "You have conquered my teacher with your knowledge and I now conquer you with my sword."

Deva, in spite of his bowels bursting from his belly and his life hanging by a thread, warned the foolish murderer in a quiet manner, saying, "O murderer, here are my three clothes and a bowl on my seat. Take them and effect your escape to the mountain road as soon as you can. Do not take the usual road, because, if some of my disciples who have not yet attained enlightenment see you, they will catch you and send you below and the judge will sentence you to death. You have not yet got the right idea of human life; therefore, you will feel sorry about your form when you are sent to be executed. But the name and form are the root of the greatest trouble. I feel great pity at seeing many people attached to their body to which they ought not to be attached; and they do not feel sorry at that at which they ought to be sorry for the erroneous views. And I feel also deep regret at seeing you sowing the seed of sinful Karma, having been deluded and burned by a poisonous fire of a mad mind." Then, the murderer, having heard Deva's words, wept and cried and asked him to teach him the doctrine. Deva says :

"Well, reflect, everything is unrestrictedness. There is no object which is to be taught nor the man who teaches, according to the universal truth. There is no subject or object; everything is empty. He who does not understand this reason, is deluded by his mad mind. Hence, follow such thoughts—here am I, there is another; here is pain; there is pleasure. All pain and pleasure depend on attachment. There is no pain without dependence. There is also no pleasure without pain."

After a little while, a disciple came and shouted out loudly on seeing the teacher's sad condition; whereupon the other disciples came running from different quarters. They who had not attained enlightenment, crying out, "Where is the brutal man? Who is the murderer of our teacher?" Some fell down on the ground, some fainted, some became mad, and some ran to hunt up their enemy. Seeing this, Deva taught them the following doctrine and died:—"Every thing is unrestrictedness. Mark you the true meaning of all Dharmas. Where is oppression or cruelty? Who is to be stabbed or cut down? If you read the essence of all Dharmas, there is no object which is to be killed, or subject which kills. Then, who is a friend

and who is an enemy? Who is the murderer? Who is the victim? You are crying on account of your delusion through erroneous views. You ought to reflect upon this carefully. You should never do such a foolish act: drive out madness by madness and sorrow by sadness."

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THE FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINE OF THIS SCHOOL.

The fundamental doctrine of the *Madhyamika* school has been imperfectly understood and grossly misrepresented by the so-called scholars of Buddhism in Europe, and latter-day India.

The fundamental doctrine of this school misunderstood.

Most of them give the appellation of 'Nihilism' to this school, simply because *Nāgārjuna* applied the term '*Śūnyatā*' or emptiness to express his conception of human life and truth. *Śūnyatā*, however, as I have pointed out in my first lecture,¹ does not imply 'nothingness'; it simply expresses "the everchanging state of the phenomenal world," or "absolute unrestrictedness of the noumenal side of the universe." To borrow a very favourite simile, the reality of the universe is like a faultless mirror which reflects everything as it really is. "Han

A favourite simile for the reality of the universe and the nature of enlightened mind.

lai han hsien; Hu lai hu hsien"² is one of the most popular phrases among the Chinese Buddhists. It implies "that [a spotless mirror] renders a true reflection of civilized people as well as of barbarians". As a mirror does not adhere to the objects which it reflects, so an enlightened mind does not attach any feeling to what it perceives. Beauty is valued as beauty, and ugliness is considered ugly, but no feelings of lust or hate are attached to these sentiments, for the mind, in this state, is entirely free from passions or *kleśas*, that is, in a state of *atyantaśūnyatā* or absolute unrestrictedness.

¹ vide P. 14.

² Jap: *Kan Kitaro-ha Kan genji, Ko Kitaro-ha Ko genjo*.

We shall now study, in detail, the conception of Śāṅyātā from the following standpoints :—

- (1) *Asaukṛita-śāṅyātā*¹ or as the principle to be applied in the noumenal world.
- (2) *Saukṛita-śāṅyātā*² or as the principle to be applied in the phenomenal world.

1. On considering the noumenal state of the universe from the stand-
 Śāṅyātā as a prin- point of Ontology, *Nāgārjuna* and his followers in
 ciple in the noumenal world. India, China, and Japan, could not but reach the
 conception of *Atyanta-śāṅyātā*³ or absolute unrestrictedness as the conclusion
 of their investigations. For that which can be restricted cannot be accepted
 as the basis for the transformation, evolution or mutability of all things in
 the universe i. e. as the basis of all phenomena. Hence *Nāgārjuna* says :—

सर्वे च युज्यन्ते तस्य शून्यता यस्य युज्यन्ते ।

सर्वे न युज्यन्ते तस्य शून्यता यस्य न युज्यन्ते ॥⁴

which is interpreted by the great *Kumārājīva* as follows :— “It is, on account of unrestrictedness or *śāṅyātā*, that everything becomes possible, without it, nothing in the world is possible”. *Āryadeva* comments on the above *Kārika* as follows :— “It is due to absolute unrestrictedness that the activity, in regular order (following the law of regularity, and of cause and effect) of all mundane and supermundane things (dharma), is possible. If it (noumenon) is otherwise, then such activity would become impossible”.

2. The term *Śāṅyātā* as the principle in *Saukṛita-dharma* or the
 Śāṅyātā as a prin- phenomenal world implies the absence of particularity,
 ciple in the phenome- or the non-existence of individuals in its negative
 nal world. aspect. Hence *Nāgārjuna* says :—

या प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादा शून्यतां तां प्रचक्षते ।

सा प्रज्ञप्तिरुपादाय प्रतिपक्षैव मध्यमा ॥⁵

¹ *Jap : Mu-i Kā.*

² *Jap : U-i Kā.*

³ *Jap : Hi-kkio Kā.*

⁴ *Nāgārjuna's "Madhyamika Śāstra, Chap. XXIV, Kārika 14.*

⁵ *Nāgārjuna's "Madhyamika Śāstra, Chap. XXIV, Kārika 18.*

"That which has been produced through causes and conditions, we say to be 'ever-changing'; it is a conventional name, and may also be called 'the middle path'."¹

अप्रतीत्य समुत्पन्नो धर्मः कश्चिन्न विद्यते ।

यस्मात्तस्मादशून्योऽहिधर्मः कश्चिन्न विद्यते ॥²

"There is no *dharma* which is not produced by causes and conditions. Therefore no *dharma* exists which can be called not ever-changing or *ashūnya*."

Āryadeva explains as follows:—"I say that whatever is produced by cause and condition is *śūnyatā* or ever-changing, because, whatever is the outcome of the union of various causes and conditions, is limited by the law of causation. Hence those that are devoid of any particularity or *svabhāva* are *śūnyatā*." Regarding it from the positive aspect, such a state represents the ever-changing state of the phenomenal things or *sanskṛita-dharma*, a constant flux of becoming; or a continuous series of causes and effects. Hence Nāgārjuna says:—

स्वभावाद्यदि भावानां सद्भावमनुपश्यसि ।

अहेतुप्रत्ययान् भावांस्त्वमेवं सति पश्यसि ॥³

"If thou thinkest that things exist on account of their self-essence or *svabhāva*, (but not on account of *śūnyatā*), then, thou Nothing possesses a *svabhāva*.
seest that they come out of causelessness." And *Āryadeva* comments as follows:—"Thou sayest all things possess their self-essence or *svabhāva*. If it were so, thou then perceivest that they come out without cause and condition. Because if any phenomenon possesses its own self-essence, it can neither be produced nor destroyed; such a thing is independent of cause and condition." If all things were the outcome of causes and conditions, they cannot possess self-essence. Hence

¹ Edkins imperfectly translated this Kārika from Kumārajīva's Chinese version as follows:—"The methods and doctrines springing from various causes, I say to be all 'emptiness'. They may also be called 'invented' names. Further, they may be said to contain the meaning of the 'medial' path." (Edkins' Chinese Buddhism, P. 184.)

² The *Madhyamika śāstra*, Chap. XXIV., Kārika 19.

³ The *Madhyamika śāstra*, Chap. XXIV., Kārika 16.

if we maintain that all things possess their own self-essence, we adopt the theory of causelessness. Again Nāgārjuna has said :—

कार्यं च कारणं चैव कर्तारं करणं क्रियाम् ।
उत्पादं च निरोधं च फलं च प्रतिबाधसे ॥¹

“(Then) you annihilate cause, effect, agent, means, action, birth and death of every object.”

In view of these facts, it is clearly intelligible that no phenomenon has its own self-essence or individuality, but is based on an endless series of causes and effects. In other words, all things are only an absence of their own eternal peculiarities, and are in a constant state of mutation.

The conception of *Śūnyatā* in the *Madhyamika* philosophy goes beyond the development from the *Sanskṛita* and *Asanskṛita* points of view ; for, these are but relative terms, as the great Nāgārjuna has pointed out in his *Dvādaśa-nikāya-sāstra*, an authoritative work on this school.

“The two *dharma*s of *Sanskṛita* and *Asanskṛita* are of relative existence. The existence of the latter depends on that of the former, and on account of their relative existence, all things are *śūnyatā*”.² Transcendental truth cannot be expressed by any of these terms, it is technically called *ālambya śūnyatā*. Hence Nāgārjuna says :—

निवृत्तमभिधातव्यं निवृत्ते चित्तगोचरे ।
अनुत्पन्नानिरुद्धा हि निर्वाणमिव धर्मता ॥³

“The real state of *dharma* is like *Nirvāṇa*, indescribable, incomprehensible, without birth or death. It is beyond the reach of thought or language, for it is absolute.” We may only grasp the absolute reality or transcendental truth if we earnestly cultivate our mind and body. If we shall be able to realise this state, our conceptions of I and thou, this or that &c., will vanish. Nāgārjuna says :—

¹ The *Madhyamika sūtra*, Chap. XXIV, Kārika 17.

² Nanjio's Cat. No. 1186, Chap. IV, Kārika 2.

³ The *Madhyamika sūtra* Chap. XVIII, Kārika 7.

आत्मेत्यपि प्रज्ञपितमनात्मेत्यपि देशितः ।

बुद्धैर्नात्मा न चानात्मा कश्चिदित्यपि देशितम् ॥¹

"It was taught by Buddha that there is ego, as well as non-ego; but there is neither *ātman* nor *anātman* in the real state of *dharmas*." Things composite or incomposite, mine or yours, *sūnyatā* or *aśūnyatā*, good or bad &c., belong to the sphere of conventional truth; such relative ideas cannot be allowed in the transcendental sphere. We, therefore, ought not to rest even in the conception of absolute unrestrictedness or *atyanta-sūnyatā*, as such a conception is one of the extreme views.

शून्यता सर्वदृष्टीनां प्रोक्तानिःसरणं जिनैः ।

येषां तु शून्यतादृष्टिस्तानसाध्यान् वभाषिरे ॥²

"For the sake of removing every kind of erroneous views, the Buddhas teach '*sūnyatā*.'" Those, however, who cling obstinately to this conception cannot be converted from their error."

Āryadeva comments on the above *kāvika* as follows:—"If one obstinately adheres to this view, *Sūnyatā*, his case is hopeless. For instance, one who is ill can recover if he takes medicine, but if the medicine itself becomes another illness, we can hardly consider him curable." The doctrine of *sūnyatā* has been formulated to rid us of certain misconceptions; when its work is accomplished, it becomes incumbent on us to rid ourselves of the conception of *Sūnyatā* as well, which, of itself, is an error, in the light of higher reasoning.

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¹ Do. *Kāvika* 6.

² The *Madhyamika Sāstra*, Chap. 13, *Kāvika* 8.

THE TWO TRUTHS OF THE FOUR FOLDS.

In order to make people grasp the true meaning of *sūnyatā*, the following four folds with two truths in each have been formulated :—

- 1st fold. $\begin{cases} (a) \text{ Existence is the conventional truth.} \\ (b) \text{ Śūnyatā is the transcendental truth.} \end{cases}$
- 2nd fold. $\begin{cases} (a) \text{ The 1st fold of the 2 truths is the conventional truth.} \\ (b) \text{ Neither existence nor sūnyatā is the transcendental truth.} \end{cases}$
- 3rd fold. $\begin{cases} (a) \text{ The 2nd fold of the 2 truths is the conventional truth.} \\ (b) \text{ Neither non-existence nor non-sūnyatā is the transcendental truth.} \end{cases}$
- 4th fold. $\begin{cases} (a) \text{ The 3rd fold of the two truths is conventional truth.} \\ (b) \text{ Neither not non-existence nor not non-sūnyatā is the transcendental truth.} \end{cases}$

These negative explanations, though certainly bewildering, are considered

The negative explanation was fashionable in India.

necessary to lead us to the ideal state of absolute freedom or Nirvāṇa. For, as long as we adhere to any idea of existence, or even of non-existence, we may not realise the transcendental truth and attain absolute freedom. The negative explanation of the transcendental truth, the Mahātman, Brahman &c., was a very fashionable method among the Indian philosophers. We read in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* :—"Next follows the teaching (of Brahman) with No, No ! for there is nothing else higher than this." (if one says) : "‘It is not so’ ; That self (Ātman) is to be described by No, No, (III. 9. 26) ; and it (Ātman in that state) can only be described by No, No, (IV. 2. 4) ; It, the self, is to be described by No, No," (IV. 4. 22). Or more properly speaking, *silence* would be the best answer to the question ‘What is the transcendental truth’. In this connection, let us quote a story well known as the “thunderous silence” of Vimalakīti from the great Kumārajīva’s masterly Chinese version of the “Vimalakīrti Sūtra.”

Bodhisattva Vimalakīrti once asked a host of Bodhisattvas led by

Vimalakīrti’s thunderous silence.

Mañjuśrī, who came to visit him, to express their views as to how to enter into the Dharma of Non-

duality. Some replied, "Birth and Death are two, but the Dharma itself was never born and will never die. Those who understand this, are said to enter into the Dharma of Non-duality." Some said, "'I' and 'mine' are two. Because I think 'I am', there are things called 'mine.' By thus reflecting, we enter into the Dharma of Non-duality." Some replied, "Samsāra and Nirvāṇa are two. But when we understand the ultimate nature of Samsāra, Samsāra vanishes from our consciousness, and there is neither bondage nor release, neither birth nor death. By thus reflecting, we enter into the Dharma of Non-duality." Others said, "Ignorance and Enlightenment are two. No ignorance, no enlightenment, and there is no dualism. Why? Because those who have entered a meditation in which there is no sense impression, no cogitation, are free from ignorance as well as from enlightenment. This holds true with all the other dualistic categories. Those who enter into the thought of sameness, are said to enter into the Dharma of Non-duality." Still others answered, "To long for Nirvāṇa and to shun worldliness are of dualism. Long not for Nirvāṇa, shun not worldliness and we are free from dualism. Why? Because bondage and release are relative terms, and when there is no bondage from the beginning, who wishes to be released? No bondage, no release, and therefore no longing, no shunning: this is called the entering into the Dharma of Non-duality."

Many more answers of similar nature came forth from all the Bodhisattvas in the assembly except the leader Mañjuśrī. Vimalakīrti now requested him to give his own view, and to this Mañjuśrī responded, "What I think may be stated thus: That which is in all beings worldless, speechless, shows no signs, is not possible of cognisance, and is above all questionings and answerings,—to know this is said to enter into the Dharma of Non-duality."

Finally, the host Vimalakīrti himself was demanded by Mañjuśrī to express his idea of Non-duality, but he kept completely silent and uttered not a word. Thereupon, Mañjuśrī admiringly exclaimed, "Well done, well done! The Dharma of Non-duality is truly above letters and words!" (Suzuki's *Outlines of Mahāyana Buddhism*, pp. 106-107).

The two truths in each of the four folds indicate the middle path to have refuted every kind of extreme views. A famous Eight Noes lead us to the middle path. *kārika* of *Nāgārjuna*'s 'Eight Noes' is merely another form of his theory which leads us to the middle path and prevents us from adopting extreme views.

अनिरोधम् अनुत्पादम् अनुक्लेदम् अशाश्वतम् ।

अनेकार्यम् अनानार्थम् अनागमम् अनिर्गमम् ॥¹

Literally translated, these lines read : "No annihilation, no production, no destruction, no persistence, no unity, no plurality, no coming in, no going out."

According to the *Madhyamika* school, every kind of extreme view can be refuted by these 'eight noes.'

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NIRVĀṆA.

The middle path, pointed out by the negations, leads to Nirvāṇa, the ideal state of absolute unrestrictedness. But where can we find this ideal state? We may not find it in Heaven, nor in the pure western land (*Sukhāvati vyūha*), wanting in sorrow, abounding with joy, apart from the human world as conceived by most of the common disciples of the *Sukhāvati vyūha* school. We must look to this world for it; it should be realized in our own daily life. *Nāgārjuna* has said :

¹ The *Madhyamika śāstra*, Chap. I, *kārika* I.

न संसारस्य निर्वाणात्किञ्चिदस्ति विशेषणम् ।

न निर्वाणस्य संसारात्किञ्चिदस्ति विशेषणम् ॥¹

"Samsāra is in no way to be distinguished from Nirvāṇa, Nirvāṇa is in no way to be distinguished from Samsāra." Āryadeva comments as follows :—"Appearance and disappearance

Samsāra and Nirvāṇa are one.

of the five *Skandhas* in continuous succession is named *Samsāra*; but we have already stated that the essential nature of the five *skandhas* is absolute unrestrictedness, and that they are impereceptible. Thus there is no distinction between *Samsāra* and *Nirvāṇa*, as all things are neither produced nor annihilated." But, we may ask, how is it possible to find or realize the ideal state of absolute unrestrictedness in this world, where all is misery and pain? It is indeed very difficult to realise Nirvāṇa, but it is not impossible. For happiness and misery, pain and pleasure, sorrow and joy are merely our own subjective production. The world of Nirvāṇa, according to Mahāyānism, never exists objectively. Thus, if we find that the world is full of defilement, sorrow and misery, we have only to thank our own life or *karmas* for it.

It is our mind that is the source of all trouble and all happiness. We must not, therefore, neglect our social and individual duty, which can only be accomplished by the training of our mind, if we are desirous of enjoying a happy

Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva on the two principles.

life. Buddha taught both the conventional and the transcendental truths by which we may perform our duty and realise Nirvāṇa. Nāgārjuna says :—

हेसत्ये समुपायित्व बुद्धानां धर्मदेशना ।

लोकसंवृत्तिसत्यं च सत्यं च परमार्थतः ॥²

"The teachings of Buddha are based on the twofold truths, the conventional and the transcendental."

येऽनयोर्न विजानन्ति विभागं सत्ययोर्द्वयोः ।

ते तत्त्वं न विजानन्ति गम्भीरं बुद्धशासने ॥³

¹ The *Madhyamika Śāstra*, Chap. 25, Kārika, 19.

² The *Madhyamika Śāstra*, Chap. 24, Kārika, 8.

³ The *Madhyamika Śāstra*, Chap. 24, Kārika, 9.

"Those who do not understand the division between the two cannot know the real depth of Buddha's teaching".

We must not, however, think that there is no relation between the two truths: the conventional truth is essential for the attainment of Nirvāṇa. Nāgārjuna says:—

व्यवहारमनास्त्रित्वं परमार्थो न दिश्यते ।

परमार्थमनागम्यं निर्वाणं नाधिगम्यते ॥¹

"The transcendental truth cannot be taught without the assistance of the conventional, and Nirvāṇa cannot be attained without understanding the transcendental truth". Āryadeva comments on the above Kārika as follows:—"The transcendental truth is explained by speech, and speech is conventional. If we do not depend on the conventional, the transcendental cannot be explained; if we do not understand the transcendental, Nirvāṇa cannot be attained". Gyōnen says:—"It is owing to the conventional truth that we can accept the establishment of all things without moving out of the bounds of truth. Similarly, it is due to the transcendental truth that we can explain the true sphere of things without rejecting their provisional appellations".

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THE CONCEPTION OF BUDDHA-KĀYA IN THIS SCHOOL:

As will be apparent from what I have said above, the statements of the

Negative statements
and the middle course.

Madhyamika philosophers are formulated from negative and intuitive standpoints. The conception of Buddha-Kāya by Nāgārjuna and his followers is no exception to this rule. As an instance, I may cite some verses from the 16 stanzas in Chap. xxii of the 'Madhyamika śāstra' that deals with the real nature of Tathāgata.

¹ The Madhyamika śāstra, Chap. 24, Kārika, 10.

In the first place Nāgārjuna sought to refute all ideas as to the existence of Tathāgata, in order to purify the mind from extreme views. He says:—

स्कन्धो न नान्यः स्कन्धेभ्यो नास्मिन् स्कन्धा न तेषुसः ।
तथागतः स्कन्धवान्न कतमोऽत्र तथागतः ॥¹

"Tathāgata is neither identical with *Skandhas*, nor is he different from them; *skandhas* do not exist in him, nor does he exist in the *skandhas*."

बुद्धः स्कन्धानुपादाय यदि नास्ति स्वभावतः ।
स्वभावतश्च यो नास्ति कुतः स परभावतः ॥²

"If Buddha exists on account of *skandhas*, he can have no individuality (*svabhāva*) of his own. How can, then, the existence of Buddha be attributed to the other cause (*parabhāva*) when there is no self-cause recognised in him (*i.e.*, when he is found not to exist on account of himself)?"

But the other cause (*para-bhāva*) has no self-cause of its own, or any reason for existing by itself; and again self-cause (*svabhāva*) and the other cause (*parabhāva*) are relative and not absolute terms. Hence Nāgārjuna says:—

यदि नास्ति स्वभावश्च परभावः कथं भवेत् ।
स्वभावपरभावाभ्यामृते कः स तथागतः ॥³

"Again if Tathāgata has individuality, or self-cause, he cannot be said to owe his existence to the other cause. In absence, thus, of either of the two causes as a factor in his existence, the question resolves itself into "How is he called Tathāgata."

The above discussion may lead us to the erroneous supposition that Tathāgata is beyond the reach of conventional expression. Tathāgata is of the nature of śūnyata or aśūnyata. Such an idea, however, would be an extreme view, and

¹ The Mādhyamika śāstra, Chap. XXII, Kārika 1.

² The Mādhyamika śāstra, Chap. XXII, Kārika 2.

³ The Mādhyamika śāstra, Chap. XXII, Kārika 4.

Tathāgata is beyond the realm of relative expression. Hence Nāgārjuna says :—

शून्यमिति न वक्तव्यमशून्यमिति वा भवेत् ।
उभयं नोभयं चेति प्रज्ञस्यै तु कथ्यते ॥¹

“It should not be said that (Tathāgata) is śūnya or aśūnya, or both or neither, the name given to Him is simply conventional”.

शास्त्रताशास्त्रताद्यत्र कुतःशान्ते चतुष्टयम् ।
अन्तानन्तादिचाप्यत्र कुतः शान्ते चतुष्टयम् ॥²

“In the state of calmness (Nirvāṇa—Tathāgatahood) the four kinds of ideas, ‘permanent’, ‘impermanent’, ‘both’, or ‘neither’ cannot exist.”

स्वभावतश्च शून्येऽग्निंश्चिन्ता नैवोपपद्यते ।
परं निरोधाद्भवति बुद्धो न भवतीति वा ॥³

“When Tathāgata is by nature, unrestrictedness, the idea that Buddha exists or does not exist after his death cannot be entertained.”

After the above negative exposition of the question, Nāgārjuna proceeds to give his positive definition of the real nature of Tathāgata.

तथागती यत्स्वभावस्तत्स्वभावमिदं जगत् ।⁴

‘Whatever is characteristic of the Tathāgata is characteristic of the universe’.

God is all, and All is God. Such is the fundamental conception of Buddha-Kāya in this school. Gyōnen, a great Japanese priest and scholar, says :—

“All beings are Buddhas in their fundamental nature ; and all beings in the six gatis namely, hell, preta, beast, demon or Asura, man and heaven, without any exception, attain

Gyōnen's view of Buddha Kāya.

¹ The Madhyamika śāstra, Chap. XXII, Kārika 11.

² The Madhyamika śāstra, Chap. XXII, Kārika 12.

³ The Madhyamika śāstra, Chap. XXII, Kārika 14.

⁴ The Madhyamika śāstra, Chap. XXII, Kārika 16. (former half)

to Nirvāṇa. There is neither delusion nor enlightenment, when we come to look upon the universe from the standpoint of avoidance of extremes or of the Middle path. How and where is there room for discussion about becoming or not becoming Buddha? Delusion and enlightenment have no absolute existence but merely a relative existence. Therefore, we ought to know that discussion about delusion and enlightenment of about becoming or not becoming Buddha is possible, when we take our stand on the ground of conventional truth. As regards the question of becoming Buddha, viewed from the standpoint of conventional truth, there is a difference between respective intellectual powers of individuals; that is to say, the one who is endowed with superior intellectual powers, attains enlightenment more quickly than the one who is his inferior in this respect". Such is the doctrine of the identity of Tathāgata and the universe. To the enlightened mind, therefore, nature is Tathāgata's speech; every little flower peeping from

Wedding of Religion
and Poetry.

the ground is a silent emblem; *champak* and the *malika*, the cherry-blossoms and the chrysanthemums are all manifestations of Tathāgata. It is a beautiful conception that nature blooms from God or Buddha; and here are Religion and Poetry wedded together, where both are permeated by the presence of the True, the Divine. Where the poetical spirit is absent, nature appears but a dead mass, destitute of divinity, and deserted by God. Where the religious sentiment is absent or deficient, Buddha or God is lost in nature, and rude nature alone remains. Tathāgata and nature, religion and poetry, are so often coupled together, that it need not occasion us any surprise to occasionally find Pantheism in our poets. Lamartine says:—

"Salvation, principle and end of Thyself and of the world!
Thou, who, with a glance, renderest immensity fruitful,
Soul of the universe, God, Father, Creator,
Under all these different names I believe in Thee, Lord.
And without having need to hear Thy word,
I read in the face of the heavens my glorious symbol.
Extension reveals to my eye Thy greatness,
The earth, Thy goodness, the stars, Thy splendour.

Thou Thyself art produced in Thy shining work ?
 All the entire universe reflects Thy image,
 And my soul in its turn reflects the universe.
 My thought embracing Thy diverse attributes,
 Everywhere around Thee discovers Thee and adores Thee ;
 Contemplates itself, and discovers Thee there :
 Thus the day star shines in the heavens,
 Is reflected in the wave, and is painted on my eye.
 It is little to believe in Thee, goodness, supreme beauty ;
 I seek Thee everywhere, I aspire to Thee, I love Thee ?
 My soul is a ray of light and of love,
 Which is detached from the Divine centre for a day,
 Consumed with devouring desires far from Thee,
 Burns to re-ascend to its burning source.
 I breathe, I feel, I think, I live in Thee !
 That world which conceals Thee is transparent for me.
 It is Thou whom I discover at the foundation of nature,
 It is Thou whom I bless in every creature.
 To approach Thee, I have fled into the deserts ;
 There when the day-break, waving its veil in the air,
 Half opens the horizon which colours a rising day,
 And sows upon the mountains, the pearls of the dawn,
 For me it is Thy glance which, from the Divine dwelling,
 Opens upon the world and sheds over it the day."

Nāgārjuna says in his commentary of the Prajñā-pāramitasūtra :
 " Dharma-Kāya-Buddha (or Tathāgata) is always shining and is always
 preaching his doctrine. But living beings do not see the brightness and
 do not hear the preaching, on account of their sin, as the blind cannot
 see the sun-shine, and the deaf cannot hear the tremendous thunder ".

The same idea is to be found in a passage of the " Lotus of the good
 law " which runs as follows :—

अचिन्तिया कल्पसहस्रकोट्योयासां प्रमाणं न कदाचि विद्यते ।
 प्राप्ता मया एष तदाग्रबोधिर्धर्मं च देशेभ्यहु नित्यकालम् ॥

"An inconceivable number of thousands of Koṭis of Æons, never to be measured, is it since I reached superior (or first) enlightenment and never ceased to teach law."

समादपेमी बहुबोधिसत्त्वान्वोधस्मि ज्ञानस्मि स्थपेमि चैन ।

सत्त्वान कोटीनयुताननेकान्परिपाचयामी बहुकल्पकोट्यः ॥

"I roused many Bodhisattvas and established them in Buddha-knowledge. I brought myriads of Koṭis of beings, endless, to full ripeness in many Koṭis of Æons."

निर्वाणभूमिं चुपदर्शयामि विनयार्थं सत्त्वान व्रदाम्युपायम् ।

न चापि निर्वाण्यद्दु तस्मिन्काले इहैवचो धर्मुं प्रकाशयामि ॥

"I show the place of extinction, I reveal to (all) beings advice to educate them, albeit I do not become extinct at the time, and in this very place continue preaching the Dharma."

तत्रापि चात्मानमधिष्ठामि सर्वेभ्यः सत्त्वान तथैव चाहम् ।

विपरीतबुद्धी च नरा विमूढाः तत्रैव तिष्ठन्तु न पश्यिषूमां ॥

"There I rule myself as well as all beings, I. But men of perverted minds, in their delusion, do not see me standing there."

परिनिर्वृतं दृष्ट्वा समात्मभावं धातुपूजां विविधां करीन्ति ।

मां च अपश्यन्ति जनेन्ति दृष्ट्वा ततोर्जु कं चित्तं प्रभोति तेषाम् ॥

"In the opinion that my body is completely extinct, they pay worship, in many ways, to the relics, but me they see not. They feel (however) a certain aspiration by which their mind becomes right."

ऋजू यदाति ऋदु मारुवाच्च उक्लृष्टकामाश्च भवन्ति सत्त्वाः ।

ततो अहं यावकसंघहत्वा आत्मान दर्शय्यद्दु गृध्रकूटे ॥

"When such upright (or pious), mild, and gentle creatures leave off their bodies, then, I assemble the crowd of disciples and show myself here on the Gridhrakūta."

न चापि मे नाम शृणोन्ति जातु तथागतानां बहुकल्पकोटिभिः ।
धर्मस्य वा मङ्गलणस्य चापि पापस्य कर्मस्य फलेवरूपम् ॥

“Ay, many Kotis of years they may pass without ever having mentioned my name, the law, or my congregation. That is the fruit of sinful deeds.”

यदा तु सत्त्वा शृदुमार्दवाश्च उत्पन्न भोन्तीह मनुष्यलोके ।
उत्पन्नमात्राश्च शुभेन कर्मणा पश्यन्ति मां धर्मुं प्रकाशयन्तम् ॥

“But when mild and gentle beings are born in this world of men, they immediately see me revealing the law, owing to their good works.”¹

It is manifest that the one who is permanently shining and teaching must be unconditional, independent, and absolutely unrestricted. Hence it is said in the Mādhyamika Śāstra.

तथागतो निःस्वभावो निःस्वभावमिदं जगत् ॥²

“Tathāgata is absence of individuality (svabhāva), and the world is also absence of particularity (savabhāva).”

Svabhāva means, in this case, something concrete, individual. So that Tathāgata or God is free from the limitations of individuality and conditionality and is not subject to the law of causation. This is the real aspect of Tathāgata as well as that of the universe when we look at him from the standpoint of transcendental truth. So much for the doctrine of the Mādhyamika school. I shall now proceed to explain the Ālaya-phenomenology which is known as Vijñānavādin or Yogācāra school of Buddhist philosophy.

¹ The Sūdharmapāradīka, Chap. 15, (Chinese version, Chap. 16.)

² The Mādhyamika Śāstra, Chap. XXII., Kārika 16 (latter half).

CHAPTER VI.

ĀLAYA PHENOMENOLOGY.¹

*The Theory of the Vijñānavādin.*²

A cursory comparison of the realistic theory of the Sarvāstitvavādin school with the idealistic theory of the Vijñānavādin school or the Yogācāras, as they are sometimes called, would give an impression that they are diametrically opposed to each other. The former would appear dualistic, while the latter singularistic. The Sarvāstitvavādin insists on the eternal existence of the noumenal state of mental and material *dharmas*; while, the Yogācāras maintain that all objects in the universe are merely the manifestations of our Vijñānas or human consciousness. In other words, the Sarvāstitvavādin's is an objective system, and the Vijñānavādin's, a subjective one.

Now, the question being what is *samsāra* and what is *Nirvāṇa*, the Sarvāstitvavādin school seeks to solve it by establishing its theory of two different laws of causation.

The first part of it is that a group of *Samudayasatya* and *Duhkhasatya* represents the law of cause and effect in the world of *samsāra*. *Samudayasatya* is, according to them, the cause of *samsāra*, while *Duhkhasatya* is its effect. Likewise, the second part of the theory establishes that a group of *Nirodhasatya* and *Mārgasatya* represents the law of cause and effect in the realm of *Nirvāṇa*, *Mārgasatya* being the cause of *Nirvāṇa*, and *Nirodhasatya*, the effect thereof.

The Vijñānavādins, on the other hand, would solve the question by enunciating their theory of the *Ālaya-vijñāna*, which runs as follows :—

The *Ālaya-vijñāna* is a series of continuous consciousness. It is, to use the modern psychological term, a stream of consciousness. It is always running and changing. It is the sole substratum of the transmigration in *samsāra*. The *Ālaya-Vijñāna*

¹ Jap : *Raya* or *Araya-yengi-ron*.

² Chinese : *Wñ-shi-tsuñ*, Jap : *Yui-shiki-shū* or *Hossō-shū*.

of the Buddhist has its counterpart in the *Ātman* of the orthodox Hindu system of philosophy, with this difference that the *ātman* is immutable while the *Ālaya-Vijñāna* is continuously changing. The *Ālaya-vijñāna* involves all the various potential seeds of both delusion and enlightenment, pain and pleasure and so forth. Thus, the theory is singularistic as opposed to the dualistic basis of mental and material dharmas of the Sarvāstitvavādins. The one teaches how to practice morality and how to realise truth from the empirical and materialistic standpoints, while, the other deals with it from a purely idealistic or speculative point of view.

But let us look beneath the surface. The *Ālaya* phenomenology is really a development of, and supplementary to, the theory of the Sarvāstitvavādin school. The realistic theory of the Sarvāstitvavādins could go up to *Karma*, and no further, in search of the mystery of the phenomenon of this universe.

The Karma phenomenology was the explanation they offered. But what is the source of Karma? This, they could not solve or rather did not undertake to solve. Then, the Yogācāras stepped in and tried to fill up the vacuum by their theory of the eighth *Vijñāna*, *viz* : the *Ālaya vijñāna*.

The theory of the *Ālaya* phenomenology was developed and completed by Asaṅga and Vasubhandhu ; Nanda, Dignāga, Dharmapāla and Śīlabhadra were the great teachers of this school. In later days in Jambudvīpa, Śīlabhadra

was the reputed venerable professor at Nālanda, at whose feet Hiouen Tsang acquired his knowledge of Buddhist philosophy.

It has already been pointed out that the cornerstone of Buddhist phenomenology is represented by the 'Four Noble Truths' which occupied a very prominent place amongst the direct teachings of Buddha. In fact, Buddhism, either as a religion or as a philosophy, would lose its identity, if the doctrine of the 'Four Noble Truths' with the three *mudras* was excluded. Let us now see how the Vijñānavādins treated the doctrine of the 'Four Noble Truths.'

The *Lankāvatara-sūtra* is one of the canonical texts of the *Ālaya* and *Cittamātra* Vijñānavādin School. There, it is written, their synonymous usage.

दृश्यं न विद्यते चित्तं चित्तं दृश्यात् प्रमुच्यते ।

देहभोगप्रतिष्ठानम् आलयं ख्यायते नृणाम् ॥¹

"For the real import of the *śloka* one should refer to the interpretation found in the literal translation into Chinese by Śikshānanda.

"*Cittam* exists ; not the objects perceptible to the visual cognition. Through objects visually cognized *Cittam* manifests itself in body, in one's objects of (daily) enjoyment, in residence (etc.). It is called the *Ālaya* of men."

Here we see that *Ālaya* is used for *Cittam* and *Cittam* has been defined as the source of the objects we perceive. Such a *cittam*, the author of the Sutra calls, the *Ālaya*. The theory has still to be developed, and we find the development in the following verse of Asanga :—

चित्तं ह्यप्रभासं रागाद्याभासमिष्यते तदत् ।

अदाद्याभासं न तदन्यो धर्मः क्लिष्टकुशलोऽस्ति ॥²

Again following the Chinese translation, we would render the couplet as follows :—

"*Cittam* has twofold reflection. It is fond of greed and the like which are the one set of reflections ; likewise, it is fond of faith and the like which are the other set of reflections. The moral and immoral *dharma* does not exist apart from it (*i.e.* *Cittam*)."

The meaning is that whether good or bad, a *dharma* is the manifestation of *Cittam*, that is, of *Ālaya*. Pain or pleasure, our good conduct or bad behaviour, darkness or enlightenment is merely the outward development of *potential seeds* which are stored in the *Store-house-consciousness*, the *Ālaya-Vijñāna*.

These potential seeds are roughly classified into two divisions ; First, the seed which is full of defilement or *Sāśrava-bīja*,³ and Second, the seed which is free from defilement, or *Anāśrava-bīja*.⁴ The former comprises the first two principles of the 'Four

¹ The Lankāvatara-Sūtra, fasc. II.

² The Mahāyāna-sūtra-alankāra-śāstra, Chap. XI., stanza 34 (Sanskrit text, P. 63). Chinese translation, fasc. V, verse 1.

³ Jap : *U-ro shūji* ⁴ Jap : *Mo-ro shūji*.

Noble Truths,' which are, *Duhkhasatya* and *Samudaya-satya* ; while the latter represents the last two truths, namely, *Nirodha-satya* and *Mārga-satya*. Hence, it is said, in the *Vijñāna-mātra-śāstra*, the Sanskrit original of which has not yet been discovered :—

"All kinds of *dharma*s which are active in the illusory world (= *Pravṛtti-dharma*s = *Samudaya-satya*), are manifested by the existence of the *Ālaya-Vijñāna*, and it is due to the existence of the *Ālaya-Vijñāna* that all living beings move on in the *Samsāra* (*Duhkha-satya*)". "Every kind of *dharma*s which lead us to enlightenment (= *Nivṛtti-dharma*s = *Mārga-satya*) is kept on by the existence of the Eighth *Vijñāna* (the *Ālaya-Vijñāna*), and it is due to the existence of it that the practitioner (*Yogi*) realizes *Nirvāṇa* (*Nirodha-satya*).” Here *pravṛtti-dharma*s are the descendants of 'śāśrava-bīja' and the 'nivṛtti-dharma', 'those of the 'Anāśrava-bīja.'

Thus we see that, in the *Ālaya-Vijñāna*, there is stored a twofold seed from which springs up the *Samsāra* and the *Nirvāṇa*. The theory of the *Sarvāstivādin*s recognized the sixth *Vijñāna* as the agent of the effect of *Karma*. But they are, according to the *Vijñānavādin*s, merely phenomenal and not noumenal ; they, by themselves, would be unable to work out the law of *Karma*. Being rather destructible, they must be dependent upon some continuous power. There must be some active principle which, along with it, could make the six *Vijñāna*s move on according to the law of *Karma*. This active principle is introduced as the *Ālaya-Vijñāna* or Store-house-consciousness, which is ever active and continuous. Thus, the great important link in the law of causation is supplied by the school of *Yogācāra*s.

The term *Yogācāra*s tempts me to make a little digression. The term denotes that these practitioners of *Yoga* in India had arrived at the theory of the *Ālaya-Vijñāna* by experience, rather than by reasoning. This experience has been derived by the examination of the operations of their own mind ; a perfected form of what may be called self-mesmerism and *dhyāna*. Here, one is reminded of the psychological researches which are being pursued so eagerly today in Europe, Japan and America. Perhaps, the science has been reserved

A weak point of the *Sarvāstivādin*s improved upon by the *Vijñānavādin*s.

The flower of psychology first produced in Indian gardens.

for perfection one day or another in this very land which was the first garden where the tree of psychological science blossomed forth and bore the two noble fruits of the orthodox *ātman* and the Buddhist *Ālaya-Vijñāna*.

Modern researches have come to the conclusion that there are subconscious phenomena. The Buddhist also knows that there is, within man, a great tank of consciousness, of the contents of which, the average man is but feebly conscious. Only a small portion of the sum total of the conscious states within us forms personal consciousness. In the psychological world, the *Ālaya-Vijñāna* is the name for the sum total of the normal consciousness and subconsciousness.

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The relation between Ālaya-Vijñāna and the other Vijñānas.

By the preceding remarks you may have gathered that, according to this idealistic school of Buddhist philosophy, the Ālaya denotes the 'depository of all germs', of which the germ' implies the potential power which issues forth from the Ālaya-Vijñā in the form of various 'present actions'. Vasubandhu, in the Vijñāna-mātra-sāstra, says that the "present Samskāras" or experiences are capable of affecting and creating germs, and the germs which are already deposited in the Ālaya-vijñāna manifest themselves as present samskāra or experience of the first seven Vijñānas; the present experiences give impressions of some new germs on the Ālaya-vijñāna. And thus is created the objective world. They are termed the *prior* and the *posterior* germs.



The theory is that these potential germs are evolved as the effects or operations of the seven *Vijñānas*. We have already seen that there are six kinds of *Vijñānas*, as known to the Sarvāstivādin School, *viz.*:—*Cakṣu*, *Śrotra*, *Ghrāṇā*, *Jihvā*, *Kāya*, and *Manas*. To these, the Yogācāras added two others, the seventh *Mano-vijñāna* and the eighth *Ālaya-vijñāna*. It may be noticed that the sixth *Vijñāna* of the Realistic School is mind or *Mano-vijñāna*; and the first of the two, which forms the seventh *Vijñāna* introduced by the Yogācāras is also *Manovijñāna*. What, then, is the difference between these two? The one implies normal consciousness. It sometimes comes to a stop in its function, it does not act continuously. For instance, it ceases to act in the state which we call in popular language, sound sleep. The seventh *Mano-vijñāna* of the Yogācāras, on the other hand, is active and continuously active. It implies subconsciousness, which is never at rest; during sleep or during the possession of full normal consciousness, it acts unceasingly and continuously.

To explain the relationship of the seven *Vijñānas* to the *Ālaya-vijñāna*, I would here give you a simile, slightly changed, used frequently by the philosophers of India. The first six *Vijñānas*, which perform the sensory functions, may be compared to so many gatekeepers posted on the physical *cakṣu*, etc., that transmit their experiences to the secretary, the seventh *mano-vijñāna*, who, in his turn, conveys them to the lord, the *Ālaya-vijñāna*. The secretary receives orders, so to say, from the lord, to transmit them to the six *vijñānas*.

A simile for the relation of the seven *vijñānas* to the *Ālaya-vijñāna*.

THE CLASSIFICATION OF THINGS.

According to the *Vijñānavādin* school, all things in the Universe, similar to the classification adopted by the Sarvāstivādins, are divided into two groups, *viz.*: *Saṃskṛita*¹

Division and sub-division of things.

¹ Jap. *Uchi-hō*.

and *Asamskṛita*.¹ The former is similarly subdivided into four classes *Cittam*, *Caittam*, *Rūpam* and *Citta-viprayukta-sauṣkāra dharmas*. The order of enumeration, however, of these four *dharmas* is not the same in the two schools. In the Realistic school *rūpa-dharma* is placed before *cittam* while in the Idealistic school *cittam* and *caittam* are placed before *rūpa-dharma*. Further, the number of *dharmas* which are counted as 75 by the Sarvāstivādin, is reckoned as 100 in this school, as can be seen from the following list :—

The Five classes.	(I) Citta-dharma (8)	} 100 dharmas.
	(II) Caitta-dharma (51)	
	(III) Rūpa-dharma (11)	
	(IV) Viprayukta-sauṣkāra-dharma (24)	
	(V) Asamskṛita-dharma (6)	

The 51 *dharmas* of *Caittam*, the 11 of *Rūpa-dharma* and the 24 of *Viprayuktam*, are merely mental phenomena—the effects of the operations of the mind. The ultimate source of all things, therefore, is the *Cittam* or the mind; its real nature is indicated by the six kinds of *Asamskṛitam*, chiefly by the *Tathatā* (Suchness) *asamskṛita*.² Further, we must bear in

Two aspects of mind that *Cittam* has been regarded as possessed of two aspects, viz :—*lakṣhaṇa* or phenomenal, and *bhāva* or noumenal. The one deals with its changeableness, the other, with its immutability. Such is the Idealistic view of the world. We shall now proceed to examine, in detail, the conception of *Cittam*, the basis or repository of all things, mental and material.

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¹ Jap : *Mu-i-hō*.

² Jap : *Shōnyō-mu-i*.

CITTAM:

In the Buddhist psychology, the same word is variously termed as "Cittam," "Manas"; "Vijñāna". The three are the same in their origin, but are used differently to denote the three different aspects of Cittam. We read in the Lankāvatāra-sūtra:—

चित्तेन चीयते कश्च मनसा च विधीयते ।

विज्ञानेन विजानाति दृश्यं कल्पयति पञ्चभिः ॥¹

Cittam, according to the Vijñānavādins, has two meanings, "attending" and "collecting". By "attending", we mean the consideration of objects to which our attention has been attracted, while, by collecting, we mean the storing of germs or impressions about the objects, various phenomena having impressed themselves on our mind.

Manas has also two significations:—"the basis" or "what is depended upon" and "thinking" or "considering". By "depended upon", is meant the ground or the sphere on or within which mental operations take place, and due to which they are rendered possible; while, by 'thinknig', we mean the continuous consideration of the internal world, a kind of sub-consciousness which has, for the object of its contemplation, Egoism.

Vijñāna has also two meanings:—"discriminating" and "perceiving". By "discriminating", we mean the differentiation between the outward manifestations (lakshana) of the objects which form the subjects of contemplation, while by "perceiving", we mean the perception of the objects in the external world, which cause us to experience sensation (sense-objects).

According to the Yogācāra school, *Cittam*, in the sense of "collecting germs", is applicable only to the eighth *Vijñāna* or *Ālaya-Vijñāna*. *Manas*, in the sense of "thinking of", can be applied only to the seventh *Mano-vijñāna*. *Vijñāna*, in the sense of "perceiving", is particular to the first six *Vijñānas*; for, their sense of perceiving the general form of external objects is stronger than that possessed by the other two. We must, however, bear in mind that *Cittam*, in its general sense, is the common nomenclature for the eight kinds of *Vijñānas*.

¹ The Lankāvatāra-sūtra, fasc. II.

According to the *Vijñānamātra Śāstra*, the eighth *Vijñāna* i.e. *Ālaya* is called the "first Modification"; the seventh *Mano-vijñāna*, the "second Modification"; and the first six *vijñānas*, the "third Modification". But, sometimes, the first seven *Vijñānas* are called *pravṛtti vijñāna* (wandering consciousness), while, the eighth *Vijñāna* is called *Ālaya-Vijñāna* (Repository consciousness); for the former may mistake pain for pleasure, pure for impure, ego for non-ego, or permanent for impermanent.

So much for the explanation of *Cittam*. We shall now proceed to *Caittamdharmas* which means mental attributes or properties of *Cittam*. These two are very often compared, in Buddhist philosophy, to a king and his ministers. For, just as ministers follow the king whenever or wherever he goes, in the same way, whenever *Cittam* acts, *Caittam* necessarily succeeds. In my explanations, I omit the difference between the operations of these two, as I have already dealt with it in my lecture about the doctrine of the *Sarvāstivādin* School.

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CAITTAM.

The *Vijñānavādins* classify the *caitta dharmas* under six heads; viz: the universal 'dharmas,' the particular 'dharmas,' goodness, the fundamental 'kleśa,' the sectional 'kleśa,' and the indefinite 'dharmas.' These sects are again subdivided into fifty-one.

(I) The universal *caitta dharma* is of 5 kinds. These dharmas follow

Mental properties every kind of mental operation when the mind is in
which are common to action.
every act of conscious-
ness.

(a) The first of them is called *Manaskāra* which sets in motion all other mental properties, and causes them to act each in its own sphere.

(b) The second is *Sparśa* which operates when in contact with the objects of consciousness.

(c) *Veđañā* comes third and discriminates every object of consciousness whether it is pleasant, painful or neutral.

(d) The fourth is *Sanjñā*. Its function is to perceive the physical figure of object and the tone of voices; over and above this, it also makes other properties move simultaneously with it, perceive their respective objects, and realise their respective functions.

(e) Then comes *Cetañā*, the fifth in order. This may be rendered by the modern scientific term, 'motive'. This is capable of giving rise to every kind of conduct, good, bad or neutral. If the motive be good, the concomitant mental operation would lead to a good piece of conduct; the reverse will be the case if the motive is evil. It has been compared by the Indian-Buddhists to the relation existing between a driver and his horses. If the driver is well-inclined, the horses will be on the right track, if he is ill-disposed, the horses will go astray. The *cetana* is the driver and its concomitant operations are the horses it controls. The above five kinds of mental operations are termed *Sarvagā* or 'penetrating every where', that is, universal, for they are common to every act of the mind, thought, or consciousness.

The particular mental property, (II) The particular mental property which is not invariably present in consciousness, is also of five kinds.

(a) *Chanda* is the volition or rather desire to do an act, it forms the basis of the progress of morality.

(b) *Adhimokkha* is something like what is popularly called 'conscience.' It examines everything good or bad, right or wrong, and examines just for the sake of the examination itself. It is in no way affected by the results of such a procedure.

(c) *Smṛiti* means memory. It remembers a fact which it has once experienced. It becomes the basis of the operation '*samādhi*.'

(d) *Samādhi* is concentration of thought upon one object. This mental property concentrates our thought absolutely on one object, and thus leads to true knowledge.

(e) *Matī* judges whether the object is good or bad, right or wrong and so forth. It may be rendered by the term 'judgment' or 'understanding.'

(III) 'Goodness' may otherwise be termed morality. This mental property comes into activity only when the mind is in a state of purity. This is of eleven kinds.

The moral—mental property.

(a) *Śraddhā*, which means 'faith,' removes all impurities from all the attributes of the mind. It is the purifying factor in the mental domain. *Śraddhā* has, as a matter of fact, other meanings than that of faith proper. It is, firstly and pre-eminently, faith established on the basis of the cognition of universal truth. Secondly, it is the feeling of esteem and reverence, which we accord to a personality or to a set of doctrines. Thirdly, it implies earnest hope of executing and realising moral laws and of developing one's innate morality.

(b) *Vīrya* means vigour or effort. This is a mental property which furnishes us with courage, and from which springs diligence in striving after morality.

(c) *Hṛī* is bashfulness. This comes into play in the absence or rather negligence in the performance of our moral duties.

(d) *Apatrāpa* is akin to *hṛī*. It acts with regard to the external world, while *hṛī* is rather an internal operation. *Hṛī* affects our internal self, whether the negligence is apparent to the outer world or not. *Apatrāpa* makes you crest-fallen in the presence of and with regard to the outer world.

(e) *Alobha* implies freedom from covetousness. It is due to this mental property that we are enabled to free ourselves from every kind of sensual desire.

(f) *Adveśa* literally means absence of hatred. This is, in so far negative, that it prevents us from doing harm to the animate or inanimate world. It is also positive when it inspires us with sympathy for the animate and inanimate world.

(g) *Amoha* or freedom from stupidity leads to the observance of reason whereby the formation of wrong views in us is prevented.

(h) *Prasrabdhī* means peacefulness. The *Vijñānavādins* consider it very important, as it is regarded as the precondition of the state of *samādhi*. This mental property enables us to place our mind and consequently our

body under control so as to be able to overcome immoral sentiments and to observe morality.

(i) *Apramāda* means carefulness. This enables us to be watchful, and destroy every kind of evil passions and prepare the way to the noble path.

(j) *Upekṣā* or indifference, is the mental equilibrium which is not polluted by idleness or frivolity. *Upekṣā* and *Apramāda* are not independent mental properties; they are the results of the combined efforts of *vīrya*, *alobha* and *amoha*.

(k) *Ahimsā* meaning harmlessness is also not an independent mental property, but is only a part of *adveśa*.

(IV) The fundamental *kleśa* is that property of the mind which is
The immoral mental property. akin to immorality.

The Yogācāras divide *kleśas*, the immoral attributes of the mind, into the fundamental and derivative. The fundamental *kleśa* is of six kinds.

(a) *Lobha* means covetousness. It directs us to sensuality.

(b) *Dveṣa* means hatred which is the motive for hostile conduct, called 'the worst conduct'.

(c) *Moha* means stupidity which is one of the basis of all *kleśas*. It makes us dull in exercising reason (*mati*).

(d) *Māna* means pride. This causes us to feel false superiority over others, and gives rise to contempt.

(e) *Vicikitsā* is hesitation, such as, according to the Buddhist psychologists, the unwillingness in accepting the "adamantine" law of cause and effect.

(f) *Asamyagdr̥ṣṭi* or *Durdṛṣṭi* means an erroneous view. It has been subdivided under five heads: (1) *Kāyadr̥ṣṭi* is that erroneous physical view which makes one regard the combination of the five 'skandhas' as an eternal and indestructible *ātman*. (2) *Anugrahadr̥ṣṭi* is that view which is the origin of views like *Śāsvatavāda* and *Uchedavāda* about one's "soul". (3) *Mithyādr̥ṣṭi* is a view, such as that which denies the law of cause

and effect as an universal truth taught by the Buddha. (4) *Dṛiṣṭi-parāmarśa* leads one to adhere to the above three erroneous views as true and excellent. (5) *Śīlavrata-parāmarśa* causes one to attach oneself to asceticism as the means of attaining enlightenment—a useless procedure.

(V) The Sectional Kleśas. These are so many branches, says the Buddhist philosopher, of the fundamental 'kleśas' from which they are derived. They are of 20 kinds.

(a) *Krodha* is anger, which manifests itself as violent disposition.

(b) *Upādāha* which literally means "tying up" denotes resentment, from the difficulty with which it is shaken off after having once attached itself to a person.

(c) *Santāpa* means vexation. This causes us agony as a result of the anger experienced. The above three are, as a matter of fact, only different attitudes of 'dvesha' or hatred; they are not independent properties.

(d) *Mṛakṣa* means hypocrisy, a mental operation which causes us to cover our own wickedness from society.

(e) *Śāṭhya* is perfidy. In response to this mental operation, we act perfidiously towards others for the sake of our own gain.

(f) *Māya* means deceit. This is akin to *śāṭhya* with this distinction that *Māya* denotes an operation which causes deceit by speech, while the former produces the same result through action. The last three also are not independent mental properties but are only different aspects of *lobha* and *moha*.

(g) *Mada* means arrogance. Its effect is to make us feel our own importance and give us a proud exterior.

(h) *Vihinsa* means harmfulness. Its result is aggression on our part against our neighbours.

(i) *Iṣyā* or jealousy produces a feeling of mortification at the prosperity of others. The above two 'kleśas' are different moods of *dvesha*.

(j) *Kārpanya* means miserliness. Its operation is not confined to material wealth only, but may extend to moral wealth as well. One could, for instance, be miserly in respect of one's learning.

(k) *Āhṛīkya* is an operation of the mind quite opposite to that of *hṛī*—what is called brazen-facedness in popular parlance.

(l) *Anapatrāpya* is the opposite of *apatrāpa* operation. It corresponds to what is understood by the word shamelessness in society.

(m) *Kausidhya* which literally means “badly-executed,” is the contradictory of *vīrya*. The English word “laziness” is the nearest approach to the meaning of the term.

(n) *Āsraddhā* means ‘without faith’ or ‘unbelief’ which is diametrically opposed to *Śraddhā*.

(o) *Styāna* means sloth, which manifests itself as lassitude, both mental and physical, and leads to inaction.

(p) *Andhatya* is boldness in the bad sense. This produces rough and unfeeling thoughts and actions.

(q) *Mushitasmṛititā* literally means the “stealing away of memory”, an operation opposite to that of *smṛiti*. It is the effect of the combined action of *moha* and *smṛiti*.

(r) *Asamprajñā* means wrong judgment. This produces misunderstanding or misapprehension about the objects affected by our consciousness.

(s) *Vikṣhepa* means eccentricity. This property makes the mind operate in a changing, unsettled or fickle manner, like a monkey, as the Buddhist philosophers say.

(t) *Pramāda* means carelessness; it is a result of the combined action of *kausīdya*, *lobha*, *krodha* and *moha*.

(VI) The indefinite mental property which is common to good, bad and indifferent, is termed ‘*Aniṣṭa-caitta-dharma*’. This is of four kinds.

The indefinite *caitta*
dharma.

(a) *Kauṣṛitya*, though it literally means an evil deed, has a particular technical sense attached to it by convention. It signifies the mental property which causes regret to pass in our mind at some improper thing done by us.

(b) *Middha* is absent-mindedness, by means of which we sometimes do not perceive the objects affected by our consciousness. It comes into action

according to the Vijñānavādins, when the sixth Mano-vijñāna alone is working.

(c) *Vitarka* means conjecturing. The Vijñānavādins hold that when this operates we attempt to form some ideas about the object affected by the Mano-vijñāna.

(d) *Vicāra* means penetration. This school lays down that this mental operation causes us to consider minutely, and derive correct opinions about the object affected by the Mano-vijñāna.

So much for the mental properties. We shall now proceed to discuss

"RUPA-DHARMA."

'Rūpa-dharma' is the activity of the mind expressed through physical

The explanation of
Rūpa-dharma.

sense-organs and the objects affected by them. It is divided into eleven kinds, *vis*: five kinds of *indriyas*

or sense-organs and six kinds of *Āyatana*s or sense-objects. As the terms *indriya* and *āyatana* have already been explained in the lecture on the Sarvāstitvavādin school, they need not be discussed here. It should, however, be noted that while the Sarvāstitvavādins divide the Rūpa-dharma into (a) the five sense-organs, (b) the five sense-objects and (c) *Avijñapti*, the Yogācāra school holds that there are five sense-organs and six sense-objects. The *avijñapti* of the Sarvāstitvavādins is included in their sixth sense-object, which they call *dharmāyatana*, and which consists of five kinds of Rūpas: first, the material Paramāṇu, *e.g.* that of the earth, stone, tree, etc.; secondly, the abstract Paramāṇu, *e.g.*, that of light etc.; thirdly, *Avijñapti* (the same as in the theory of the Sarvāstitvavādins); fourthly, the sense-objects created by the *vijñāna*, *e.g.* colour, form, sound, smell, etc; and fifthly, illusion or mistaking as existent something non-existent, *e.g.*, to quote the conventional illustration, the flower which grows and blossoms in the sky.

VIPRAYUKTA-SANSKĀRA-DHARMA.

The term 'viprayukta-sanskāra-dharma' includes whatever is *non-caitta*

The meaning of
Viprayukta Sanskāra
dharma.

and *non-rūpa*—connected with neither the material nor the mental domain.

It is of the following twenty-four kinds :

(a) *Prāpti* literally means acquisition ; but, technically speaking, it implies the power of producing animate and inanimate objects. The Vijñānavādins maintain that from this energy, animate and inanimate objects are produced and differentiated. The Sarvāstivādin hold that it is an eternal noumenon ; but the Yogācāra theory is that it is merely a temporary manifestation of the energy which radiates from the germs deposited in the Ālaya-vijñāna.

(b) *Jīvitendriya* is the life organ. The Vijñāna-mātra-śāstra describes that its function is to enable us to exist in our physical state (live) for a period, and that the seeds of it are also stored in the Ālaya-vijñāna.

(c) *Nikāya-Sabhāga* means a heap of the same class. We find a certain similarity between the man A, and the man B, in physical structure or mental functions. To explain this phenomenon, both the Sarvāstivādin and Vijñānavādins maintained that it is owing to the existence of the Dharma called Nikāya-sabhāga, that similarity in material forms and mental operations is rendered possible. The difference between the views of the two schools consists in the Realistic school believing in the independent and eternal existence of the *nikāya-sabhāga*, while the Yogācāras insist that it is merely a temporary manifestation of the Ālaya-vijñāna.

(d) *Prithagjāti* denotes a particular stage in the development of man, when the intellectual *kleśa* has not been totally extirpated, nor the path leading to Arhatship yet arrived at.

By "intellectual Kleśa" are meant the germs of *kleśa* in the Ālaya-vijñāna.

(e) *Asañjñā-samāpatti* is a stage in which through meditation one tries to suspend all mental operations—the 'wanderings' of the mind. Some Tīrthakaras mistake this stage of suspension of thought for Nirvāṇa, but according to the Vijñānavādins, this also is a temporary stage, and is a mere manifestation of the germ of pessimism impressed on the Ālaya-vijñāna.

(f) *Nirodha-samāpatti* is a stage which may be realised by one who has already attained Anāgāminship. This also is a product of the germ of pessimism deposited in the Ālaya-vijñāna.

(g) *Asamjñikam* is a state which results from the practice of *Asamjñā-Samāpatti*. It is a stage higher than the latter, and its realisation brings about the capacity to hold down the sixth Maṇo-vijñāna.

(h) *Vyañjana-Kāya* denotes an articulate sound, which does not convey any sense, e. g., *Ā*, *ī* or *ū*. This also is evolved out of the germs of the Ālaya-vijñāna.

(i) *Nāma-Kāya* denotes an articulate sound which expresses the nature of things—words, e. g., mountain, river, etc.

(j) *Paśa-Kāya* denotes the sense conveyed by a sentence or phrase expressing a complete thought.

(k) *Jāti* denotes the state of origination of the mental and material things.

(l) *Jarā* is the existence of mental and material objects in the senile state.

(m) *Sthiti* indicates the state of the momentary existence of mental and material things in the present time.

(n) *Anityatā* means the state of the passing away of things mental and material.

(o) *Pravṛitti* denotes a state in which an uninterrupted series of things, mental and material occur in obedience to the law of cause and effect.

(p) *Evambhāgīya* means the distinct regularity of all things, mental and material based on the law of causation, as the occurrence of a good effect from a good cause.

(q) *Pratyubandha* is the inseparable connection between cause and effect.

(r) *Jānāyam* means the constant changeableness of things, mental and material.

(s) *Anukrama* means the order of effects, e. g., birth before death.

(t) *Deśa* means the ground, or to use the term of mesmerism, the medium necessary for the working out of the law of causation.

(u) *Kala* means the time necessary for the play of the law of causation.

(v) *Saṅkhyā* literally means number. It denotes an artificial system of measuring things, mental and material.

(w) *Sāmāgrī* is the state of harmony existing in the universe.

(x) *Bheda* literally means distinction. This denotes the state of the things existing in the universe taken separately.

According to the Vijñānavādin school the 24 *dharma*s enumerated above are cognisable only through the agency of the sixth *Maṇo-vijñāna*, as they are not eternally existent, but are only provisional effects, due to the combined action of the mental and material *dharma*s.

ASAMSKRITA DHARMA.

Asamskrīta Dharma denotes the state in which birth and death cannot exist; it is the *noumenon* of the universe, and has six aspects.

The explanation of Asamskrīta dharma.

(1) *Ākāśa-asamskrīta*: *Ākāśa* means limitless, incorporeal or non-obstructed. *Ākāśa-asamskrīta* indicates, therefore, an aspect of the noumenon of the universe which is unchangeable, limitless and incorporeal; it is of course, free from the Law of Birth and Death. In other words, it expresses a 'state of Suchness' (*tathatā*), and will be clearly expressed by the formula, "All is impermanent and non-ego".

(2) The second aspect is *Pratisamkhyā-nirodha-asamskrīta*. *Pratisamkhyā-nirodha* means the 'cessation of all kinds of *Kleśas*' acquired by the power of perfect knowledge. This is the purest state of Suchness, which is attained by the extirpation of the *Kleśas* through the agency of *Añāsrava-jñāna* or perfect knowledge.

(3) *Apratisamkhyā-nirodha-asamskrīta*. This literally means the cessation acquired without the aid of perfect knowledge. It indicates that

the essential nature of Suchness is pure by itself and does not stand in need of the assistance of any agency. It also implies that Suchness manifests itself when the conditions which obscure it are absent ; hence it is laid down in the *Vijñāna-mātra-śāstra* that Suchness is pure a priori, and that it manifests itself in the absence of conditions, *i. e.* the *Samskṛitas*, which pollute it.

(4) *Acala-asamskṛita*. *Acala* is rendered by *Upekṣa* which literally means 'disregard'; it is the disregard for pain and pleasure. According to the *Vijñāna-vādins*, one can realise the mental state of *Acala* where pain and pleasure cease to act, when one realises the mental state of Gods in the fourth *Dhyāna*. The Indian Buddhist philosopher, Dharmapāla says: "The stage wherein the feeling of pain and pleasure vanishes is termed *Acala*."

(5) *Sanjñā-vedana-nirodha-asamskṛita*. This is the state of equilibrium or Suchness in which *Vedana* and *Sanjñā* do not come into activity at all. This stage is realised when a *Yogi*, practitioner enters into the *Nirodha-samāpatti*, and overcomes the mental attributes of *Vedana* and *Sanjñā*.

The five *dharmas* enumerated above must not be considered as independent. They are merely conventional names given to the different aspects of the noumenon of the universe or Suchness, and also to the different stages in the development of the mind, the Suchness being considered from the psychological standpoint. To speak metaphysically, they indicate the different stages of manifestation of only one reality in the universe. Ācārya Dharmapāla says: "All these five conventional terms are given to several stages of manifestations and parts of Suchness."

(6) The sixth is the *Tathatā-asamskṛita*. *Tathatā*, literally, means Suchness; it is the 'eternal and unchangeable' noumenon. It is the eternal substance of all things in the universe. "This is the transcendental essence of everything," says Vasubandhu, "and it is termed 'Suchness' because its essential nature is real and eternal. But the real nature of Suchness is beyond the reach of human language; it is indefinable". So much so that the great Dharmapāla had to confess that even the very term, Suchness is merely a provisional name. He says that only to save us from falling into

the error of mistaking it for nothingness, its predicate *bhāva* (existence) is adopted; it may be called 'Śūnyata' or unrestrictedness. At the same time, since it is neither illusory nor visionary, it is termed 'reality'. It is therefore called 'Suchness'; it is absolutely free from illusion or error. Asanga says:—

न सन्न चासन्न तथा न चान्यथा न जायते येति न चावहीयते ।

न वर्धते नापि विशुध्यति पुनर्विशुध्यते तत्परमार्थलक्षणम् ॥

"It can neither be called existence nor non-existence; It is neither 'such' nor 'otherwise.' It is neither born nor destroyed; It neither increases nor decreases; It is neither purity nor filth. Such is the real *lakṣaṇa* of the Transcendental Truth (Suchness)."

This is another illustration of a situation to describe which the Indian Buddhists found language inadequate, something which they could experience but could not describe. They found words lacking in the scientific precision which definition must convey. Hence, like the ancient '*Neti*', '*Neti*' or 'not such,' 'not such,' they had once more to adopt a negative description instead of a positive definition, and then even they were not satisfied with the negative. The transcendental truth or Suchness was to them beyond the domain of demonstrative knowledge, beyond the grasp of intellect. It could only be felt and experienced by an earnest training of our mind.

The five aggregations or Panca Skandhas.

Aggregation of Dharmanas which belong to the same class is termed

The definition of the five aggregations.

'*skandha*'. Thus the first '*skandha*', called the *Rūpa-skandha*, consists of the eleven kinds of '*Rūpa-dharmanas*'; the second, the '*Vedanā-skandha*' comprises the different kinds of 'feeling'; the third, the '*Sanjñā-skandha*' is the collectivity of 'conceptions'; the fourth, the '*Samskāra-skandha*' includes forty-nine of the mental properties and twenty four of the viprayukta-dharmanas; and the fifth, the *Vijñāna-skandha*, the eight kinds of consciousness. The *Skandhas*, when technically spoken of, play a great part in Buddhist philosophy. For instance the *Vijñānavādin*s say that the vulgar mind is apt to adhere to the conception that the body and the mind has an eternal or real existence, while,

in fact, they are only temporary results of the combination, and a mere manifestation, of these five 'Skandhas'. The illusion, they say, is the cause which makes people transmigrate in the three worlds or through the six kinds of existences. Buddha preached, "the five *skandhas* have no real or eternal existence".

The twelve Āyatanas.

Āyatana ordinarily means a 'place', a 'resting place'; but in Buddhist philosophy it is used, in the technical sense, for 'the ground wherein the mental properties develop.' For example, we see a door; the *Cakshu-vijñāna* operates through the organic eye-ball and terminates at the door. The eye-ball and the door form the 'place' or the *Āyatana* of the *Cakshu-vijñāna*, in this particular instance. There are six sense-organs and six sense-objects; the combination of the two causes the mental properties to act. Twelve '*Āyatanas*' have been assigned as the field for operation. Out of them, the *Mano-āyatana* is the arena for the action of the eight kinds of consciousness. To the Dharma-*Āyatana* the *Vijñānavādins* assign the fifty-one properties of the mind, five *Rūpa-dharmas*, the twenty four kinds of *Viprayukta-samskara-dharmas* and the six kinds of *Asamskrita-dharmas*.

This is thus another psychological division—that of the universal phenomena into twelve *āyatanas*. It is to be noted that the '*asamskrita-dharmas*' are not included in the division of '*skandhas*', because they do not form any aggregation of 'dharmas'. But they are comprised in the twelve '*Āyatans*'; for they become objects of the mind, in as much as they become objects of mental speculation.

The Eighteen Dhātus.

Up to this time we have discussed the objects of the cognition of consciousness and the grounds and aspects of mental operation. We shall now proceed to discuss 'the bases of consciousness'.

There are eighteen agencies through which consciousness acts. These are termed '*dhātus*'; 'the root '*dha*' in Sanskrit meaning 'to hold' or 'to bear'; '*dhātu*', meaning 'holder' or 'bearer'. '*Dhātus*', therefore, are the bases and include the active agencies of the

The meaning of '*Āyatana*'.

The meaning of '*Dhātu*'.

different kinds of consciousness. They denote collectively both the passive and active agencies. The passive agencies are the six sense-organs and the six sense-objects. But as these instruments require some active agents, the want is supplied by the first six kinds of consciousness. Let us take an example: The sense-organ of the eye is an agency of consciousness; it perceives an object, for instance, a chair; the chair and the eye are two passive agencies of our consciousness; but the consciousness itself, the *Cakshu-vijñāna*, is the active agent of our mental operation in this particular instance. Therefore the Buddhist psychologist avers that the six *Vijñānas* are the '*dhātus*' or 'bearers' of their own characteristics. Thus, the six sense-organs, the six sense-objects and the six *Vijñānas* make up the eighteen *dhātus*.

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THE FOUR STAGES OF THE COGNITIVE OPERATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

The *Yogācāra* school assigns four stages to the cognitive operation of the eight consciousnesses.

The first is called *Lakṣhanatvam*,¹ which implies 'objectiveness', an operation which is brought into action when consciousness comes into contact with a particular object; hence this name for the first stage.

The second is *Dṛiṣṭrītyam*² which means 'perception'. 'Perception' is the process by which *Lakṣhanatvam* is connected with the stage of the subjective realisation of the object. While objectiveness is a passive operation; perception is believed to be active, and subjective.

¹Japanese: *Sō-bun*.

²Japanese: *Ken-bun*.

The Third stage is called *Sedśādkshītram*.¹ This is a legal term and means

The third stage of consciousness. 'proving by a witness'. In this stage consciousness starts analysing or proving to itself whether the result of perception is correct or not. This subjective process which begins to act in the second stage terminates in the fourth which is called *Sākskshivasādkshītram*.²

Sākskshivasādkshītram is another legal term which literally means

The fourth stage of consciousness. 'establishing or proving a case by bringing a witness to prove the correctness of whatever is proved by the first witness'; in this last stage consciousness is said to check the conclusions arrived at in the third stage. When it is said that in the third stage 'consciousness proves to its own satisfaction', it is meant that it does so by the agency of the operation in the fourth stage. It seems that these two stages are so much dependent upon each other, that they form something like one stage in the mental operation, because they are held to state and confirm the facts advanced by them among themselves. There is certainly the need of a higher stage in the operation than the second or the perceptive stage; because, as the great Dharmapala says, the result of perception might be fallacious. Let us take an example. We have a book, the characteristics or *Lakṣaṇas* of which are the first things noticed by the eye-consciousness (*Cakṣu-Vijñāna*). This, of course, is the result, according to the Idealistic school, of the germs contained in the *Ālāya-Vijñāna* which produces the psychological phenomenon of what we call a book. Then begins the process of perception: we see the length and breadth of the book, and come to the conclusion that it is made of paper. This conclusion,—whether the book is made of paper or not—is analysed in the third and fourth stages, and the fallacy, if any, detected; for instance, the result of perception in a certain case might have been that a piece of stone was floating on the surface of the water; the analysing stages would then detect the fallacy that stone by itself cannot swim. These stages are common to each consciousness.

¹ Japanese: *Ji-shō-bun*.

² Japanese: *Shō-jī-shō-bun*.

The three kinds of pramāṇas or conclusions arrived at by consciousness.

It is evident that only three stages out of the four viz: *Dṛiṣṭrītvam*, *Svasākṣhitvam* and *Sākṣhisvasākṣhitvam* come to their respective conclusions. *Lakṣhaṇatvam* being merely a passive operation terminating with the object of cognition can have no conclusion of its own. Now, the conclusions may be either perceived, inferred, or fallaciously conceived. These are the three divisions of the conclusions or Pramāṇas of the three operations. *Pratyakṣa*¹ meaning present, that is, present before the *Vijñāna*, is the term for the perceived conclusion. *Anumāna*² or inference is the term for drawn up conclusions. *Ābhāsa*³ or fallacy is the term for those conclusions that are fallacious.

Let us first take *Pratyakṣa-Pramāṇa* or the perceived conclusions—
 Pratyakṣa or per-ception, results of the second stage of the operation of consciousness called *Dṛiṣṭrītvam*. This is fairly clear. The operation called perception directly takes up objects, and forms its own conclusions on them. But the operation or *Dṛiṣṭrītvam* of the 7th *Maṇo-vijñāna* has no perceived conclusion or *Pratyakṣa-Pramāṇa* of its own; for, it always mistakes the perceived conclusions (*pratyakṣa-pramāṇa*) of *Ālaya-Vijñāna* as those of ego or *ātman*, as we have already seen in our former lectures. The two subjective stages of the operation of consciousness, viz: *Svasākṣhitvam* and *Sākṣhisvasākṣhitvam* have also their perceived conclusion (*pratyakṣa-pramāṇa*). This is said in the sense, I think, that the perceived conclusion of *Dṛiṣṭrītvam* is immediately handled by the loss in operations.

Anumāna-Pramāṇas or inferred conclusions are made only by the 6th *Maṇo-vijñāna* in its *Dṛiṣṭrītvam* stage of cognitive operation. The first five *Vijñānas*, being the consciousness confined to the agency of the five sense-organs, have got no means of exercising or executing any *Anumāna*. There are only three *Vijñānas* which are capable of producing inferential conclusions; but one of them, the *Ālaya-Vijñāna*, does not do it; for if it formed a conclusion, that must be a

¹ Jap: Gen-ryō.


² Jap: Hi-ryō.

³ Jap: Mi-ryō.

perfect truth ; hence there is no room for any Anumāna left. The other, *viz*: the seventh Mano-vijñāna, is blind, so to say ; it only takes the perception of Ālaya-Vijñāna as that of Ātman. This being its initial and universal defect, if it made any *anumāna*, that would be no Anumāna. Hence ' *Anumāna* ' is only attributed to the sixth Mano-vijñāna. As the last two subjective stages of the operation of consciousness can never be erroneous, while the inferential conclusions may be so, it is only to perceptual stage of the sixth Mano-vijñāna that inferential conclusions are to be attributed.

The third kind of conclusion is *Ābhāsa* or a fallacy. This could only *Ābhāsa* or fallacy. be drawn by a second stage of the operation ; as the last two stages cannot be fallacious. But then it is the second stage of the operation of the only two consciousnesses which come to this class of conclusion ; they are the sixth and the seventh Manovijñānas. The seventh is always blind, as we have seen, this to be always fallacious ; fallacy being its original *māya*. The sixth may be at times liable to fallacy. The eighth is never so, as we have already seen ; and so are the first five, on account of their being confined to the agency of sense-organs.

The following diagram will go to help you in understanding the Chapter more clearly :—



¹ Jap : Ken-bun.

² Jap : Ji-shō-bun.

³ Jap : Shō-jī-shō-bun.

FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE EIGHT VIJÑĀNAS.

(I) On the Ālaya-Vijñāna.

There are three senses in which 'Ālaya' is used—

- (a) that which deposits,
- (b) that which is deposited,
- (c) that which is regarded as 'Ego'.

(a) We have already considered 'Ālaya-Vijñāna' in its first sense, that is, as the 'vijñāna' depositing all the potential germs of the phenomenal world.

(b) 'That which is deposited' means the Ālaya-Vijñāna which is deposited with the germs of the phenomena by the 'Seven Vijñānas'. More properly speaking, the 'ālaya' is passive, while the first seven 'vijñānas' are active in the case of (b).

(c) The third is a special aspect of the 'Ālaya-Vijñāna' considered from the point of view of the relation existing between the seventh 'Mano-Vijñāna' and the 'Ālaya-Vijñāna'. The 'ālaya' is said to be the 'ālaya' of the seventh 'Mano-Vijñāna,' in the sense, that the former is regarded by the latter as its 'Treasure' or 'Repository'; the seventh acts as a constant attendant to the eighth—it is said to be 'attached' to the eighth. Or more accurately speaking, the seventh 'Mano-Vijñāna' fondly, but fallaciously, regards the 'eighth Vijñāna' as 'ego' or the "Eternal Individuality".

The Characteristics of the 'Ālaya-Vijñāna.'

We have noticed that 'Ālaya-Vijñāna' is something like the 'ātman' of the orthodox Hindu philosophy; but we shall now see how it differs from that, and what are its main characteristics. There are three characteristics given to it by Buddhist philosophy which explains its real nature. The first is that the 'Ālaya-Vijñāna' is the 'Karmic effect'; that is, the 'Ālaya-Vijñāna,' in each individual, must be neutral (*i. e.* neither bad nor good); it being a 'substratum' produced by the assistance of Karma, good or bad.

The three characteristics of Ālaya-Vijñāna.

It is the 'effect of Karma,' in this way, that the experience of our seven 'vijñānas' is deposited there ; and, according to those deposits, we create our phenomenal world. We may like or dislike a thing, each experience is deposited there. Thus the 'Ālaya-Vijñāna' is said to be 'the Karmic effect.' It is, thus, changeable and continuously changeable. It deposits *a priori* and *a posteriori* germs—the accumulative germs which are continuously changing the 'Karmic power'.

The second characteristic is that it is continuous. This is used in two senses ; one is that it is continuously changing on account of going out, and coming in, of the germs producing this phenomenal world including our birth and rebirth. And again it is continuous in the sense that the operation of the 'Ālaya-Vijñāna' never stops.

The third characteristic is that it is 'universal among the three worlds'. This means that it can go everywhere in the three worlds, to use the terms of the Buddhist philosophy. The 'Ālaya-Vijñāna' being the sum total of the normal and subconscious mental states, in the sense that it carries along with it all the other conscious states, has to move on according to the adamant laws of 'Karma' ; therefore it is able to wander about in every world, be it *Kāma-dhātu* or the realm of desire, *Rūpadhātu* or the realm of form, or *Arūpa-dhātu* or the realm of formlessness.

The Ālaya-Vijñāna, being the substance in individuals which transmigrate, may be compared to soul or *ātman* ; but the real difference would be apparent from the above three characteristics. It might be said to be mutable while the soul is immutable, but it may be said to resemble soul in its continuity. Other consciousnesses are dependent upon the Ālaya-Vijñāna. They may act or stop, but the *Ālaya-Vijñāna* is continuously a consciousness. It is universal only in the sense that it can go everywhere, while the '*ātman*' is said to be present everywhere. The '*ātman*' is said to attain its liberation and amalgamate with the ocean of the '*Great Ātman*', while the '*Ālaya-Vijñāna*' is the name given to consciousness in the stage of common people, and of one who has just attained the seventh *Bhūmi* or realm of *Bodhisattva*.

The theory of the *Ālaya-Vijñāna* occupies the most important place in the history of your Indian Buddhist philosophy, as this Vijñāna is the source

of our rebirth and 'Nirvāṇa.' But my time being limited, the discussion of the theory in detail must be left for another occasion; and I may hope, one of you should choose to perform it; for it was, after all, the production of the brains of your own forefathers.

The four stages of the cognitive operation of the 'Ālaya-Vijñāna'.

The 'Ālaya-Vijñāna,' like the other Vijñānas, has got four stages in its cognitive operation. Let us first take its 'Lakṣaṇatvam'.
The Lakṣaṇatvam of the Ālaya-Vijñāna. The 'Lakṣaṇatvam' of the first five Vijñānas constitutes the respective objects of their sense-organs, e. g. the 'Lakṣaṇatvam' of the 'Cakṣu-Vijñāna' is a name for the objects which can be perceived by the eye. But the 'Lakṣaṇatvam' of the 'Ālaya-Vijñāna' includes the principal five *indriyas* (i.e. sense-organs) and the five kinds of auxiliary *indriyas*. But that is not all. The 'Lakṣaṇatvam' of the Eighth Vijñāna also includes the materials of the 'Kāma and Rūpa dhātus'. And thirdly, it includes the potential germs which are deposited in the 'Ālaya-Vijñāna'. It is the germs, to speak psychologically, which produce the objective world through the interaction of the seven 'Vijñānas'; therefore the germs themselves are said to be the subject of *Lakṣaṇatvam* for the cognitive operation of the Eighth Vijñāna.

The *Dṛiṣṭritvam* of the 'Ālaya-Vijñāna', like that of others, are subjective.
The Dṛiṣṭritvam of the Ālaya-Vijñāna. There is nothing special about the operations of *Svasāksṣitvam* and *Sākṣi-svasāksṣitvam* of this Vijñāna. They were just like those of the other consciousnesses; that is, the result of *Dṛiṣṭritvam* is analysed by *Svasāksṣitvam*, *Svasāksṣitvam* by *Sākṣi-svasāksṣitvam*, and the last two, in turn, analysing each other's results.

Mental properties concomitant with the 'Eighth Vijñāna'.

When the Citta or mind is active, it is followed by some 'Caitta' or mental properties. They are called 'concomitant mental properties' in the Vijñānavādin school. And the term 'concomitant' is used by the Yogācāras in four senses as follows:—

- (1) The concomitant *caitta* is 'simultaneous' with the activity of the mind.

(2) It has the 'same basis' as the mind, that is, they both act through the same sense-organ.

(3) Both of them take the same *Lakṣaṇātva* or 'objectiveness'.

(4) Both of them have the same and only one substance at a time.

The above four conditions must exist as between the 'Cittam' and the 'Caittam'.

The *Ālāya-Vijñāna* has got its own concomitant *Caitta-dharmas*, and they are the five kinds of universal mental properties, viz: *Manaskāra*¹ (attention), *Sparśa*² (contact), *Vedana*³ (sensation), *Samjñā*⁴ (conception) and *Cetana*⁵ (motive). The above four conditions apply in the case of *Ālāya-Vijñāna* and its *Caittam* also.

The Mood of the Ālāya-Vijñāna.

Generally speaking, the mood of mind is said to be of three or four kinds.

General dispositions
of mind.

They are *Kusala* or 'good' or 'moral', *Akusala* which is the contrary of *Kusala*, and *Upekṣā* or 'neutral'; and again, *Upekṣa* is divided into two kinds, namely, *āvrīta* or 'covered *Upekṣa*'⁶ and *anāvrīta* or 'uncovered' or 'unfettered *Upekṣa*'⁷.

Kusala is the moral mood which is conducive to things moral and beneficial. *Akusala* is the cause of immoral conducts. 'Indifference' or *Upekṣa* means neither moral nor immoral. But when it is covered or not cleared, it is supposed to be an obstacle to the realisation of the highest bliss, that is, *Nirvāṇa*. The pure light is there 'covered'. But when it is not so or is cleared, it is called *anāvrīta* or 'uncovered'; it then leads to *Nirvāṇa*. The 'covered' or 'obscured indifference' is sometimes called 'defiled'.

The native mood of the *Ālāya-Vijñāna* is 'unobscured indifference' or *anāvrīta-pekṣa*. This is the basis or *asritam* of all 'dharmas'. If it were either moral, immoral or obscured, it could not be the basis for every kind of *dharma*. The concomitant 'caitta-dharmas' of the *Ālāya-Vijñāna* are, thus, necessarily *pekṣa-dharmas*.

¹ Jap: *Saku-i*.

² Jap: *Soku*.

³ Jap: *Jū*.

⁴ Jap: *Sō*.

⁵ Jap: *Shi*.

⁶ Jap: *U-fuku-muki*.

⁷ Jap: *Mu-fuku-muki*.

The stages in the development of the 'Ālaya-Vijñāna'.

The *Ālaya-Vijñāna* develops into 'Buddhahood' or 'Nirvāṇa'; but there are several intermediate stages. The realisation of the normal stage of the *Ālaya-Vijñāna* is hampered by the operation of the seventh '*Māno-Vijñāna*'; it is overpowered by its egoistic character, which is dominant not only among the common people, but even among those who have reached the stage of the seventh *Bhūmi* or realm of *Bodhisattva*. The stage is technically called the 'Domain of the Egoistic Character'. But the *Ālaya-Vijñāna* of *Bodhisattva* in the eighth *Bhūmi* is said to be free from this taint. And the very term, *Ālaya* is not, in the *Vijñānavādin* school, applied to the *Vijñāna* in this stage where the Egoistic trait becomes absolutely powerless; it is rather assigned another name, the *Vipāka-Vijñāna*, in the case of the stages from that of ordinary people up to the tenth *Bhūmi* of *Bodhisattva*. The last stage is that of 'Buddhahood' or 'perfect enlightenment'. The consciousness of this stage is called *Ādhana-Vijñāna*. This is the next development after the attainment of the '*Vipāka-Vijñāna*'. It is called *Ādhana-Vijñāna*, as it 'holds' all kinds of the germs of experience and consciousness in it.

(II) *The Seventh 'Mano-Vijñāna'.*

I have already casually touched upon this kind of consciousness, but I shall now proceed to discuss it more fully. 'Manas' or the operation of 'thinking' is the sixth consciousness in the case of the Sarvāstivādin, and is to be differentiated from the seventh *Mano-Vijñāna* of the Yogācāra school. The latter is one step higher than the former. It is not a very happy term adopted by the '*Yogācāras*,' in as much as it does not represent the operation of 'thinking' in various ways as the sixth or the proper 'manas' does. It acts only in one way, and that even is of an egoistic character corresponding to the *ahamkāra* of the Sankhya philosophy.

The Four stages of the Seventh Vijñāna.

It is so much a part of the 'Ālaya-Vijñāna', that it works with it incessantly like a piece of machinery attached to an engine, till our mind develops and attains the stage of the eighth Bhūmi of Bodhisattva, when it assumes another name, viz: "*Vipāka-vijñāna*". The *Lakṣaṇatvam* or 'objectiveness' of the seventh *Vijñāna* is the *Dṛṣṭrītvam* or perceptivity of the eighth *Vijñāna*. Or more exactly speaking, the seventh *Mano-vijñāna* perceives, in imagination, the *Dṛṣṭrītvam* of the *Ālaya-Vijñāna* as its object, and mistakes it for an immutable Ego. But in the Yogācāra philosophy, great care has been taken to preserve a clear line of demarcation between the *Lakṣaṇatvam* of the seventh *Vijñāna* and the *Dṛṣṭrītvam* of the *Ālaya-Vijñāna*; for the former is unsubstantial while the latter is not. Hence the object of cognition, *Lakṣaṇatvam* of the seventh *Vijñāna*, is called 'unsubstantial' or imaginary, and the *Dṛṣṭrītvam* of the eighth *Vijñāna* is termed 'substantial'. To fix the relation of the two in your mind, you may look to a picture in the following page.

The Drishṭvānam of the Seventh Vijñāna.



Unsubstantial

The Lakṣaṇatvam of the Seventh Vijñāna—

The direct object of cognition of the Seventh Vijñāna.

or Imaginary.



Substantial

The Drishṭvānam of the Eighth Vijñāna—

The indirect object of cognition of the Seventh Vijñāna.

or Real.

The other stages in the cognitive operation of this 'Vijñāna' are just like those of the *Ālaya-Vijñāna*.

The mental properties concomitant with the Seventh Mano-Vijñāna.

They are eighteen in number, and consist of the five universal mental properties, *prajñā* (knowledge) among the five particular 'caitta dharmas,' *lobha* (covetousness), *moḥa* (folly), *māna* (pride) and *asamyagdṛishti* (wrong view) of the fundamental Kleśas, and *styāna* (sloth), *anddhatya* (boldness), *kausīdhyā* (laziness), *mushitasampritiā* (forgetfulness), *asamprajñā* (wrong knowledge) and *vikshepa* (confusion) of the twenty derivative Kleśas.

The mood of the Seventh Vijñāna.

The mood of this Vijñāna is *āvrata-upekṣa* or 'obscured indifference'.

That is to say, the seventh *Vijñāna* becomes a hindrance to the attainment of *Nirvāṇa* hindrance to the realisation of the 'Holy Path' and the attainment of *Nirvāṇa*. It darkens the pure light in our mind, as it is a purely egoistic principle.

This ego or individuality, is an illusion. Forthwith you tell a man he is not an individual, he is so much afraid that his individuality will be lost. But the Buddhists aver that individuality cannot exist, as we are changing every moment of our life. A man has to pass through several stages from childhood to old age, and senility, each with his own way of thinking, his own aspirations, his own ideals. Every one changes at every instant; individuality is only a myth, an illusion, termed the '*Seventh Mano-Vijñāna*' in the Yogācāra school.

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(III.) *The sixth Mano-vijñāna and the other Vijñānas.*

The first six 'Vijñānas' are named after their respective bases or

Āsritas (i.e. '*Indriyas*') ; that is to say, the nomenclature *Cakṣu-Vijñāna* is adopted because it depends on the *Cakṣvīndriya* ; *Srotā-Vijñāna*, because its basis is the *Srotreṇḍriya*, and so forth. The sixth Vijñāna affects all *dharma*s and is connected with, or rather, dependent upon, the seventh *Mano-Vijñāna*. This dependence of the sixth Vijñāna upon the seventh is pointed out by the Indian Buddhists as the reason why the sixth has the same nomenclature as the seventh. They say that the sixth *Mano-Vijñāna* is used in the sense of the "*Tatpuruṣa* compound", meaning 'consciousness belonging to *manas*' (the seventh '*vijñāna*'), and they regard the seventh as a

The difference between the 6th and the 7th *Mano-vijñānas*.

"*Karmadhāraya* compound" which would mean the 'mind which is itself consciousness'.

There are two operations of the sixth Vijñāna : (1) The consciousness which arises along with the first five *vijñānas* at once and the same time, or the 'clear consciousness'; for it gives rise to a clearer faculty of discrimination than that developed by the perceptive operation of the first five 'vijñānas'. And (2) the consciousness which arises independently from the first five Vijñānas. This is either (a) 'consciousness in *dhyāna* or meditation' which means an intuitive operation of the mind and it arises in 'dhyāna' of the 'rūpa' and 'arūpa-dhātus'; or (b) the consciousness which arises solitarily,—a term given to the operation wherein the mind imagines, compares or recollects unaided by the first five Vijñānas; or (c) the consciousness in dreaming. This is the mental state when we dream in our visions.

So much as regards the further discussion of the eight kinds of consciousnesses. I shall now proceed to the division of human knowledge according to this school.

THE RELATION BETWEEN NOUMENON AND PHENOMENON.

We are now familiar with the classification of phenomena or *Samskṛita-dharmas*. One may ask : what is the relation between the *samskṛita-dharma* or phenomenon and the *asamskṛita-dharma* or noumenon ? This problem is explained in the *Ālaya phenomenology* by the Yogācāras from the epistemological standpoint. To follow their explanation, we must first understand their standpoints.

To take a very familiar illustration, we have all come across the Vijñānavādins and Vedantic phrase, 'mistaking the rope for a serpent'. (असंपदूते रज्जौ सर्पारोपवद्वद्वस्तुतोयोऽप्यरोपः *i.e.* "Illusory attribution is the attributing to the real of that which is unreal, as a snake is imagined in a rope which is not a snake"—Vedantasara). This error is an example

of Illusory Knowledge which would be called *Parikalpita*¹ or 'imagined' in our system. The knowledge which informs us that it was only a piece of rope is called *Paratantra*² or 'relative' knowledge. Now rope is made of straw; the straw is, therefore, the essence of which the rope is composed. This knowledge of the essence of reality is called *Pariniṣpanna*³ or the *absolute* knowledge.

Illusory Knowledge has got three component parts :—

- (a) The subjective elaboration in one's mind which designs an objective world;
- (b) the objective world thus designed;
- (c) the operation of Vijñāna which arises from the combination of the subjective illusion and the objective world.

There is a historical incident which very clearly illustrates, the three elements. In mediæval Japan, when Heishi was at war with Genzi, the leader of the Heishi's force woke up in his bed imagining that the enemy had come up. The illusion has been caused by the noise produced by the flying of a number of water-fowls. Here his fear of attack was a subjective elaboration; the noise which was mistaken for the foot-steps of the enemy was the objective world designed by his subjective notion. The combination of these two factors awakened the military chief from his sleep.

Were the water-fowls a real existence? According to the Vijñānavādin's philosophy, the answer would be in the negative, for all things in the phenomenal state are produced by cause and conditions. And therefore, they are 'paratantra' or 'dependent' (*paratantratākāṣṇam*). All things being thus relative or conditional, the reality or the essence underlying causes, conditions and phenomena must be something else, which is not 'paratantra' but absolute (*pariniṣpanna-lakṣaṇam*).

The following three stanzas quoted from Asanga's "Mahāyāna sūtrāṅkāra" will fully explain the three kinds of knowledge.

¹ Jap : Hen-ge-shū-shū-shū-shū.

² Jap : Yen-jō-jitsu-shū.

³ Jap : I-tō-ki-shū.

यथानामार्थमर्थस्य नाम्नः प्रस्थानता च या ।
असंकल्पनिमित्तं¹ हि परिकल्पितलक्षणम् ॥

i.e. "The name and meaning or the conception of the name or meaning (of a certain thing) which is caused by illusion, is known as *parikalpita-lakṣaṇam* or illusory attribution of knowledge."

त्रिविधत्रिविधाभासो ग्राह्यग्राहकलक्षणः ।
अभूतपरिकल्पो² हि परतन्त्रस्य लक्षणम् ॥

i.e. "It is called *paratantra-lakṣaṇam*, (on account of the fact that) the three characteristics of *grāhya* (i.e. that which is recognised) and *grāhaka* (i.e. that which recognises) are based on the law of relativity."

अभावभावता या च भावाभावसमानता ।
अशान्तशान्ताऽकल्पा च परिनिष्यन्न लक्षणम् ॥³

i.e. "It is called *pariniṣpanna-lakṣaṇam*, because it is beyond the range of research regarding existence or non-existence or both, and (beyond the range of) pain or pleasure."

That absolute is nothing else than Tathatā or Suchness with which we are already familiar. Thus Tathatā is the highest truth in the realm of philosophy as Tathāgata or one who has reached Suchness is the highest being in the religious world. In this system Tathatā is the noumenon of the universe. The relation between the Pariniṣpanna or Noumenon and Paratantra or Phenomenon is such that we cannot separate them one from the other. The phenomena are manifestations of the noumenon; they are, therefore, dependent or *Paratantra* upon *Pariniṣpanna* or the *Complete*. This is the real relation of the two.

¹ असंकल्प means absence of knowledge or notion, and निमित्त means cause. Hence the expression as a whole means that which is caused by absence of knowledge or notion or by illusion.

² (a) *Padābhāsa* (word); (b) *arthābhāsa* (meaning); and (c) *dehābhāsa* (body). These are the three kinds of characteristics of *grāhya* or *grāhaka*.

³ The Mahāyāna-Sūtra-Alaṅkāra, Chap. XI, Kārika, 39, 40 and 41. Chinese version, Chap. XII, Kārika, 36, 37 and 38.

THE BUDDHA-KĀYA-VIEW OF THIS SCHOOL.

I shall cite the nineteen *kārikas* of the great Asanga from the last chapter of his well known work, "Mahāyāna-Sūtra-Alankāra", in which we can learn the Buddha-Kāya-view of this school.

अनुकम्पक सत्त्वेषु संयोगविगमाशय ।

अवियोगाशय सौख्याहिताशय नमोऽस्तुते ॥

"I salute thee, O Buddha, who art compassionate towards living beings, whose mind is bent upon bestowing happiness on them and relieving them from misery, and who art always rejoicing and art free from *kleśas*."

सर्वावरणनिर्मुक्त सर्वलीकाभिभू सुने ।

ज्ञानेन ज्ञेयं व्याप्तं ते मुक्तचित्त नमोऽस्तुते ॥

"I salute thee, O Buddha, who art free from all delusions, who hast conquered the whole world, who art all pervading—this being known by means of knowledge,—and whose mind is, therefore, liberated."

अशेषं सर्वसत्त्वानं सर्वक्लेशविनाशक ।

क्लेशप्रहारक क्लिष्टसानुक्रोश नमोऽस्तुते ॥

"I salute thee, O Buddha, who art the annihilator of all the causes of misery, who hast destroyed every kind of *kleśas* and who art compassionate towards all afflicted fellow creatures without any exception."

अनाभोग निरासङ्ग अव्याघाता समाहित ।

सदैव सर्वप्रश्नानां विसर्जक नमोऽस्तुते ॥

"I salute thee, O Buddha, who art free from enjoyment, attachment and obstruction, whose mind is well balanced and free from all doubts."

आश्रयेऽश्रान्यिते देशे वाक्ये ज्ञाने च देशिके ।

अव्याहतमते नित्यं सुदेशिक नमोऽस्तुते ॥

"I salute thee, O Buddha, who art the good preacher and whose wisdom is always irrefutable in expounding of law (*dharma*) and its meaning, in speech, knowledge and teaching."

उपेत्य वचनैस्तेषां चरित्र आगतौ गतौ ।

निःसारं चैव सत्त्वानां स्वववाद नमोऽस्तुते ॥

"I salute thee, O Buddha, who art most efficient in teaching all living beings through the divine power of the will to assume different forms (*upetā*), the divine hearing (*vacanaistekṣṇam*), the divine knowledge of reading other's thought (*carijñā*), the divine knowledge of the past birth of others (*āgati*), the knowledge of their future (*gati*), and through the divine power by which those mayst enable men to find release from Samsāra (*nirvāṇa*)."

सत्पौरुषं प्रपद्यन्ते त्वां दृष्ट्वा सर्वदेहिनः ।

दृष्टमात्रात्प्रसादस्य विधायकं नमोऽस्तुते ॥

"All living beings attain greatness on seeing thee ; I salute thee who art the creator of faith (in the mind of all living beings) at the mere sight (of thee)."

आदानस्थानसंत्याग निर्माणपरिणामने ।

समाधिज्ञानवशितामनुप्राप्तं नमोऽस्तुते ॥

"I salute thee, O Buddha, who hast attained freedom in meditation and knowledge as well as in receiving (*ādāna*) hospitality, staying (*sthāna*), at and departing from Vihāras (*samtyāga*) and the transformation of objects of sense."

The four kinds of purity Buddha possesses are pointed out in this *kārika*. They are (i) *Āśraya-pariśuddhi* or 'purity of body', (ii) *Ālambana-pariśuddhi* or 'purity of observation as regards objects of sense,' (iii) *Citta-pariśuddhi* or 'purity of mind', and (iv) *Prajñā-pariśuddhi* or 'purity of knowledge'. In the above *Kārika* Buddha's *Āśraya-pariśuddhi* is signified by *ādāna*, *sthāna* and *samtyāga* ; his *Ālambana-pariśuddhi* by *nirmāna* ; his *Citta-pariśuddhi* by *samādhi*, and his *prajñā-pariśuddhi* by *jñāna*.

उपाये शरणे शुद्धौ सत्त्वानां विप्रवादन ।

महायाने च निर्याणे मारभञ्च नमोऽस्तुते ॥

"I salute thee, O Buddha, who, in leading living beings to the right path, destroyest Māra as regards expediency (*upāya*), refuge (*śaraṇa*), purity (*śuddhi*) and emancipation (*nirvāṇa*)."

ज्ञानप्रहाण निर्याण विघ्नकारक देशिक ।

स्वपरार्थेऽन्यतीर्थानां निराधृष्य नमोऽस्तुते ॥

"I salute thee, O Buddha, who, in the case of working out of thy own and others' well-being, art irrefutable by followers of other schools with regard to knowledge, destruction (of kleśas), emancipation and obstacles (to the teaching of the Noble Path)."

In this Kārika, the teacher's own well-being (*svārtha*) is indicated by *jñāna* or knowledge and *prahāṇa* or destruction; and the well-being of others is pointed out by *nirvāṇa* or emancipation and *vighnakāraka* or obstacles.

विगृह्यवक्ता पर्यक्तु द्वयसंक्षेपवर्जित ।

निरारक्ष असंमोष गणकर्ष नमोऽस्तुते ॥ //

"I salute thee, O Buddha, who art, though unsupported, an impressive speaker in assemblies, devoid of the two kinds of kleśas (intellectual and emotional), who hast a retentive memory, and who drawest the mass of living beings (towards thee)."

चरि विहारि सर्वत्र नास्त्यसर्वत्रचेष्टितम् ।

• सर्वदा तव सर्वत्र भूतार्थिक नमोऽस्तुते ॥

"I salute thee, O Buddha, who art always the missionary of Truth or the *Bhūtdārtha* and all-knowing in journeying or staying at Vihāras, at all time and in all places."

सर्वसत्त्वार्थकृत्येषु कालं त्वं नातिवर्तसे ।

अवस्यकृत्य सततमसंमोष नमोऽस्तुते ॥ 13

"I salute thee, O Buddha, who possessest a retentive memory and whose action, by being done at appropriate time in the interest of all fellow creatures, are never fruitless."

सर्वलोकमहोरात्रं षट्कृत्यः प्रत्यवेक्षसे ।

महाकरुणया युक्त हिताशय नमोऽस्तुते ॥ 14

"I salute thee, O Buddha, who art well-intentioned, and art possessed of great compassion; thou who seest the whole world six times during the day and night."

चारिणाधिगमिनापि ज्ञानिनापि च कर्मणा ।

सर्वश्रावक प्रत्येकबुद्धोत्तम नमोऽस्तुते ॥ १५

"I salute thee, O Buddha, who art the supreme of all *śrāvakas* and *pratyeka-buddhas* by virtue of thy conduct (*cāra*), acquisition (*adhigama*), knowledge (*jñāna*) and action (*karma*)."

This Kārika explains the eighteen unique characteristics of Buddha. The first six out of eighteen are, in the above Kārika, signified by *cāra*; the next six by *adhigama*; the next three by *jñāna*, and the last three by *karma*.

त्रिभिः कायैर्महाबोधिं सर्वाकारामुपागत ।

सर्वत्र सर्वसत्त्वानां काङ्क्षाच्छिद नमोऽस्तुते ॥ १६

"I salute thee, O Buddha, who art clearer of doubts of all living beings at every place, and who hast acquired the great enlightenment and every kind of knowledge through the three-fold body or *kāyas*."

The three-fold *kāyas* are :—

- (i) सभाविककाय (The body of self existent nature)¹,
- (ii) सौभोगिककाय (The body of enjoyment or compensation)², and
- (iii) नैमानिककाय (The body capable of transformation)³.

निरवग्रह निर्दोष निष्कालुष्यानवस्थित ।

आनिङ्ग्य सर्वधर्मेषु निष्प्रपञ्च नमोऽस्तुते ॥

"I salute thee, O Buddha, who, in all cases (*sarva-dharma*), art 'devoid of attachment' (*niravagraha*), 'free from faults' (*nirdoṣa*), 'free from stain' (*nishkādūṣhya*), 'devoid of sedentariness' (*anavasthita*), 'devoid of agitation' (*ānirīkṣhya*), and 'devoid of idle discourses' (*nishprapañca*).

निष्पन्नपरमार्थोऽसि सर्वभूमिविनिःसृतः ।

सर्वसत्त्वाग्रतां प्राप्तः सर्वसत्त्वविमोचकः ॥

¹ Jap: *Jishō-shin*.

² Jap: *Juyō-shin*.

³ Jap: *Ke-shin*.

अक्षयैरसमैर्युक्तो गणैर्लोकेषु दृश्यसे ।

मण्डलेष्वप्यदृश्यश्च सर्वथा देवमानुषैः ॥

19

"Thou hast accomplished the transcendental aim ; thou art beyond the region of all *bhūmi* or places (of Bodhisattvas). Thou art the highest in the universe ; and art the emancipator of all fellow creatures."

"Thou art possessed of indestructible and unequalled virtues ; thou art seen in the world and society ; thou art also totally unseen by human and divine beings."

CHAPTER VII.

BHUTATATHATĀ PHENOMENOLOGY.¹

In the *Yogācāra* and the *Madhyamika* schools of Buddhist Philosophy, the relation between Truth or *noumenon* and the thing around us or *phenomenon* is not sufficiently explained.

For this reason the Buddhist philosophers of China call them *partially developed Mahāyanists*.² In other words, although these two schools maintain that noumenon and phenomenon are inseparable, they do not proceed to develop it further as the *fully developed Mahāyanists*.³

The *Bhūtatathatā-phenomenology* was founded by the great *Aśvaghosha*⁴ who flourished in the reign of King *Kaṇishka*. *Bhūtatathatā* literally signifies "suchness of existence", which is synonymous with *paramārtha-satya* or 'transcendental truth' from the ontological point of view. In this school of Buddhist philosophy, noumenon and phenomenon are considered closely related and inseparable, bearing the same relation to each other as water and waves.

As I have already pointed out in one of my earlier lectures, the *Tien-Tai*, *Aratamsaka*, *Dhyāna* and *Sukhāvatīyūha* schools are included in the so-called *fully developed Mahāyanism*. The fundamental doctrine of these schools is the same as that of the great *Aśvaghosha*'s 'Suchness philosophy', which is explicitly explained in his well-known systematical work the "Awakening of Faith". The Sanskrit text of this book is irrecoverably lost; but we have two Chinese versions of it by *Paramārtha* and *Sikahānanda*. We have also two English translations of this important work, one by an eminent Japanese-Buddhist philosopher, Prof. T. Suzuki, and the other by

¹ Jap: *Shin-nyo-yengi-ran*.

² Jap: *Gon-dai-jō*.

³ Jap: *Jitsu-dai-jō*.

⁴ The date of *Aśvaghosha* is discussed in detail in Mr. T. Suzuki's English version of the "Awakening of Faith." See pp. 2—17.

Rev. Timothy Richard¹. The latter one is, as far as I can see, wilfully Christianized, contorted, and mistranslated. I have prepared an article criticising the version of Mr. Richard from a philosophical standpoint, which I do not intend to include in my present lectures.

Some Indian and European friends of mine have very often remarked to me that Mr. Suzuki's translation of the "Awakening of Faith" is not easy to understand. Sincere and ardent readers of philosophy, however, will, in my opinion, find no very great difficulty.

I shall now proceed to explain the most difficult and important portions of the book, that have a direct bearing upon our subjects.

We begin with

"THE MEANING OF BHÛTATATHATĀ."

Bhûtataṭhatā or Suchness is the ideal of Buddhism; it marks the consummation of all our mental efforts to grasp the highest principle which harmonises all possible contradictions, and spontaneously directs the course of all the events in the world.

This Suchness (existence as such), *Bhûtataṭhatā*, is called by as many different names as there are phases of its manifestation. It is *Nirvāṇa* when it brings absolute peace to a heart egoistic and afflicted with conflicting passions; it is *Bodhi* or perfect wisdom, when we regard it as the source of intelligence; it is *Dharmakāya*, when we call it the fountain-head of love and wisdom; it is *Kuśalamūlam*² or the *summum bonum* when its ethical phase is emphasised; it is *Bodhicittam* or the heart of intelligence, as it is the awakener of religious consciousness; it is *paramārtha-satyam* or the Highest Truth, when its epistemological feature is considered; it is *Madhyamārgam*³ or the Middle Path, when it is regarded as above the one-sidedness and limitation of indivi-

¹ His version is published by the 'Christian Literature Society' at Shanghai. (1907).

² Jap: *zen-gon*.

³ Jap: *Chū-dō*.

dual existence; it is the *Bhūta-Koṭi*¹ or the essence of Being, when its ontological aspect is taken into account; it is the *Tathāgata-garbha*² or the Womb of *Tathāgata* when the analogy from Mother Earth (where all the germs of life are stored, and all precious stones and metals are concealed under the cover of filth) is drawn; and it is *Mahāyāna* or the great Vehicle when it embraces the soul of all living beings. I shall treat this last aspect of Suchness more fully. Aśvaghoṣa says:—

“What is the *Mahāyāna* (the Great Vehicle)? It is the soul of all sentient beings (*sarvasattva*). The soul embraces everything in this world, phenomenal and superphenomenal, through which we can disclose the true meaning of *Mahāyāna*.”

The soul is not considered here, according to the doctrine of the Mahāyāna Buddhists, in its dualistic and relative sense, but in its monistic and absolute sense. It is regarded, rather, as the soul of the universe—the formative principle which gave and still gives shape to the world. The Mahāyānists however, consider the soul from two standpoints, *viz*: (a) The soul as the highest reality, and (b) the soul as the principle of birth and death or *samsāra*. The latter aspect of the soul is again considered from three standpoints, *viz*: (1) its quintessence, (2) its attributes, and (3) its activity.

Aśvaghoṣa says:—

“The soul in itself, involving, as it does, the quintessence of the Mahāyāna, is Suchness (*bhūtatathatā*), but it becomes (in its relative or transitory aspect, through the law of causation) birth and death (*samsāra*) in which are revealed the quintessence, the attributes, and activity of the Mahāyāna.”³

These are called the three magnitudes of the soul. And these are possessed by every thing that has its foundation in causes and effects. Taking for example, the case of a jar: its quintessence is the earth; its attribute, the form of a jar; and its

¹ Jap: *Shin-nyo-Jissai*.

² Jap: *Nyō-rai-zō*.

³ Suzuki's translation, p. 53.

activity (utility) is to keep water. A jar, a flower-pot and a tea-cup, are the same as regards their quintessence—the earth; but they differ in attribute and activity, for they have been manufactured under different conditions. Their attributes and activity are subject to the law of birth and death or *samsāra*, while their quintessence is indestructible. The tea-cup or flower-pot is perishable, but the earth of which it is made cannot be destroyed. The waves of the ocean are sometimes high and sometimes low, but the water itself of which they are composed neither increases nor decreases. For this reason, the universe is viewed from two standpoints in this school: (a) its unchangeable and indestructible state, and (b) its changeable and perishable state. Or using philosophical terms, (a) from the ontological standpoint and (b) from the phenomenological aspect. The “Awakening of Faith” of the great Aśvaghosha strives rather to solve the question—‘What is the source and manner of the origin of the phenomenal world’ than to explain the real nature of the substratum of the universe. It is for this reason that this school is called “Bhūtatahatā phenomenology”, rather than “Bhūtatahatā ontology”. I do not mean, however, to assert that Aśvaghosha did not touch upon the problem of ontology, *viz*: the noumenon of the universe; for his philosophy is not so narrow or limited; but he did not dilate on this problem to any very great extent. We shall now proceed to examine his doctrine about

“The Real Nature of Suchness.”

We can scarcely realise the real nature of Suchness, for our knowledge is based upon the relative and conditional state of things. It is something too vast for our finite comprehension—absolute, infinite, imperishable and immutable throughout all space and time; nay, even including time and space themselves within its sphere. Aśvaghosha says:—

“*Bhūtatahatā* implies oneness of the totality of things or *dharma-dhātu*—the great all-including whole, the quintessence of the doctrine. For the essential nature of the soul is uncreated and eternal”.¹

¹ Suzuki's English translation, pp. 55—56.

Where, then shall we find this soul? We must not search for it in heaven, nor in far-away places, for it is within us. For the essential nature of our mind is the soul as such (*bhūtatathatā*), though it appears to have a separate individuality on account of our confused mentality. It is, therefore, said in the *śāstra* of the 'Awakening of Faith':—

"All things appear to have individual existences simply on account of our confused mentality. If we could overcome our confused subjectivity, all signs of individuality would disappear, and there would be no trace of a world consisting of (individual and isolated) objects."¹

As soon as we remove the veil of ignorance that clouds the brightness of our mind, we shall be able to realise Suchness in all its universality. We should have done away with relativity and the conditional *this* or *that*, *I* or *he*, *enemy* or *friend* which are merely the natural effects of the confused state of our mind and the conception of individuality. We can only comprehend the true state of Suchness through earnest practice and intuition born of experience. Hence Aśvaghosha says:—

"All things in their fundamental nature cannot be named or explained. They cannot adequately be expressed in any form of language. They are beyond the range of perception, and have no distinctive features. They possess absolute sameness; and are subject neither to transformation nor to destruction. They are nothing else but one soul, for which Suchness is another designation (appellation)."

"As soon as you grasp that, when totality (universality) of existence is spoken of or thought of, there is neither that which speaks, nor that which is spoken of; neither that which thinks, nor that which is thought of; then you conform to Suchness; and when your subjectivity is thus completely obliterated, it is then that you may be said to have insight."²

Thus the very state of the absolute world or the realm of the soul is indescribable just as the sight of a terrible battlefield or a beautiful landscape. This is technically termed "Suchness beyond language."

But there would never come a time, nor will an opportunity ever present itself, for the people to enjoy this state of absolute Suchness, if,

¹ Suzuki's English translation, p. 56.

² Suzuki's English version, pp. 56—58.

owing to our incapacity for description and explanation, we were to pass over it in silence. It must, therefore, be explained with the help of some language; for there is no other way than language by which people can be made to understand what is, or what is not. Suchness, in this case, is technically termed "Suchness depending upon language".

The two aspects of
Suchness.

Such a Suchness is divided by Aśvaghoṣa into two classes :—

(1) Trueness as negation (Śūnyatā)¹ and

(2) Trueness as affirmation (Aśūnyatā).²

Hence the Śāstra says :—

"Again there is a twofold aspect of Suchness if viewed at from the point of its explicability (capacity of being explained in language). The first is its negative aspect, in the sense that it is completely set apart from the attributes of all things unreal, that it is the real reality. The second is its positive aspect, in the sense that it contains infinite merits, that it is self-existent."

Śūnyatā here signifies the true nature of Suchness absolutely free from relativity, individuality and conditionality &c., like a bright mirror free from spots, which is able to reflect everything as it is.

If a mirror has no spot, it must be bright; if it is not dirty, it must be pure. The bright or pure state of Suchness is technically termed "trueness as affirmation". It is expressed in the Śāstra³ that by this term we mean that (as soon as we come to understand) subjectivity is empty and unreal, we perceive the pure soul manifesting itself as eternal, permanent, immutable and completely comprising all things that are pure. On this account we call it affirmation.

The "trueness as negation" of Suchness is also taught adequately by the Madhyamika and Yogācāra philosophers⁴; but they have omitted to

¹ Japanese: *Nyo-jitsu-kū*.

² Japanese: *Nyo-jitsu-fu-kū*.

³ Suzuki's English translation, page 60; and see Richard's translation, page 5.

⁴ Asaṅga says in his famous work, the "Mahāyāna-sūtra-alakāra".

न सन्न चान्न तया न चान्वा न जायते व्यति न चावहीयते ।

न वर्धते नापि विवृण्वते पुनर्विशृण्वते तत्परमार्थलक्षणा ॥

(Sanskrit Text, Chap. VI. Kārika 1. Chinese translation, Chap. 7th. Kārika 1.)

give detailed explanation as regards "trueness as affirmation" of Suchness. We can, however, prove that they give a hint as to the latter point from the following Kārikas :—

यथातोयैः तद्वत्तिं ब्रजति न महासागर इव
न वृद्धिं वा याति प्रततविषदाम्बुप्रविशनेः ।
तथा बौद्धो धातुः सततसमितैः शुद्धिविशने-
न वृत्तिं वृद्धिं वा ब्रजति परमाश्चर्यमिह तत् ॥¹

Their explanation of this idea, however, is neither so clear nor sufficient as Aśvaghosha's. This is one of the reasons why they are regarded by the Chinese Buddhist scholars as "partially developed Mahāyānists".

So much for the meaning of Suchness. I shall now pass on to

"THE RELATION OF SUCHNESS TO ALL THINGS".

(The doctrine of *Alaya-Vijñāna*).

The relation of Suchness to all things, or that of noumenon to phenomenon is expressed by '*Alaya-vijñāna*'.² This word must be carefully differentiated from the word '*Ālaya-vijñāna*' which I used in relation to the *Vijñānavādin* school. Because Paramārtha and Śikṣānanda translated *Alaya-vijñāna* in Chinese by *Wu-mo-shih*, "never disappearing mind", "never lost mind"; while *Ālaya*, on the other hand as translated by Hiouen Tsang, means 'Store house' or 'Repository'. *Alaya-vijñāna* has a twofold significance, viz: (1) enlightenment³ and (2) non-enlightenment⁴. One side of it is pure, bright or true, while the other side is dirty, dark or false. But we, on this subject, must take care that *Alaya-vijñāna* of Aśvaghosha's school includes the two kinds of knowledge, viz: relative

¹ "Mahāyāna-sūtra-alankāra", Sanskrit Text, Chap. 9th. Kārika 55. And Chinese Translation, Chap. 10th. Kārika 49.

² Mr. Richard translated the word '*Alaya-vijñāna*' by the 'natural state of man'. This shows apparently that he and even his Chinese assistant were quite ignorant of Buddhist philosophy.

³ Sanskrit: *Buddhi*, Japanese: *Koku*.

⁴ Sanskrit: *Nirbuddhi*, Japanese: *Fu-Koku*.

(*paratantra*) and absolute (*pariniṣpanna*) ; while Ālaya-vijñāna of the Yogācāra school simply indicates relative knowledge (*paratantra*).

Thus that which leads us to the realm of enlightenment or *Nirvāṇa* is *Ālaya-vijñāna*, and that which makes us wander about and lose ourselves in the illusory world or *Saṃsāra* is also *Ālaya-vijñāna*.

Enlightenment is divided into two parts '*a priori*'¹ and '*a posteriori*'². The '*a posteriori*' enlightenment is further sub-divided into two, 'not perfect' and 'perfect', of which the 'not-perfect' enlightenment has three branches, *viz*: the 'enlightenment of the ordinary (average) man', 'approximate enlightenment' and 'apparent enlightenment'. The '*a priori*' enlightenment is sub-divided into two, *viz*: 'enlightenment *a priori* implicated in the domain of defilement or relativity' and 'pure enlightenment *a priori*'. Of these the former has two branches, *viz*: 'pure wisdom' and 'incomprehensible activity'; and the latter four, *viz*: bright mirrors (1) of trueness as negation, (2) perfumed by the causes, (3) free from hindrance and (4) perfumed by conditions.³

By '*a posteriori*' enlightenment is meant our empirical knowledge. That is to say, we can recognise a light in the dark and illusory world through experience and practice, and can increase the light gradually till the dark world is full of brightness. For instance, when we are walking on a lonely road, in a dark night, with an undefined fear pervading us, we may take a stake for a spectre. We imagine that the stake is possessed of eyes and a nose, and that it is moving. However, when we regard it carefully we find that it is not moving. This state of our mind may be compared to the enlightenment of the ordinary man. Next we find that it has neither eyes or nose; then we reach a stage which corresponds to 'approximate enlightenment'. Lastly we come to find that it is not a spectre, but only a stake,—a state of mind parallel to 'enlightenment in appearance'. The mental state consequent on the removal of all feelings of fear which is the 'root of illusion' is called "perfect enlightenment". And when the

¹ Jap: *Hon-kaku*.

² Jap: *Shi-kaku*.

³ Jap: (1) *Nyo-jiten-kū-kid*; (2) *In-kun-jū-kid*; (3) *Hō-shuten-rō-kid*; (4) *Yen-kun-jū-kid*.

darkness of our mind is dispersed by the light of knowledge, the mind will be full of brightness. '*A posteriori*' enlightenment merges into '*a priori*'—the former becomes the latter—and we reach a state called 'oneness of *a posteriori* and of *a priori*.'

By 'enlightenment *a priori*' implicated in the domain of defilement or relativity we represent the illusory side of *a priori*; while by pure enlightenment we indicate a mental state free from ignorance, when Kleśa, darkness or illusion has been rooted out by the internal power of Suchness and the external powers of the doctrine.

When there is wind, there are waves; and when the wind ceases to blow the waves gradually subside. Our mind is agitated by the wind of ignorance and loses its balance; it becomes peaceful and calm when ignorance is rooted out. This peaceful state of our mind is technically termed "pure wisdom". The next stage is, when the peaceful mind acts and perceives everything rightly, "incomprehensible activity". So much for our explanation of the 'enlightenment side' of *Alaya-vijñāna*. We shall now pass on to the 'non-enlightenment aspect' of *Alaya-vijñāna*.

As I have already pointed out, *Alaya-vijñāna* has two different aspects, 'enlightenment,' and 'non-enlightenment.' Truth is only one and universal, as the water of the great ocean has but one taste. But if we lack the knowledge of the oneness of the totality of things, we are afflicted with 'non-enlightenment' or ignorance. Thus Āśvaghoṣa says: "When the oneness of the totality of things (the universality of the universe) is not recognised, then ignorance and particularities ensue, and thus all phases of the defiled mind are developed."

Non-enlightenment has two aspects, 'Root'¹ and 'Branch.'² The former implies ignorance about enlightenment itself. One who strays on does not know which is east or which is west. And with this defective knowledge, or rather ignorance of the true direction, he continues to regard as the east what, in reality, is not the 'east,' and pursues his way with this misconception; he shall be involving himself in what is termed 'Branch non-enlighten-

¹ Jap: *Konpon-fukaku*.

² Jap: *Shimatsu-fukaku*.

ment.' The *root* is the ignorance itself, and the *branch* is the determination to persist in that ignorance; the root is sometimes called the ignorance of the true nature of Suchness; the branch, the ignorance which makes us cling to the illusory existence. Such is the doctrine of non-enlightenment in this school. We shall now proceed to explain

‘What is ignorance’.

The fundamental idea and object of Buddhism as well as of the other systems of Hindu philosophy is ‘to disperse the clouds of ignorance (*avidyā*)’ in order to make the moon of enlightenment shine out in her full glory.

Ignorance, according to Hindu scholars, does not mean the absence of knowledge, but erroneous apprehension or misconception. Thus we find in Amarakośa and Haima-kośa that—

“अज्ञानमविद्याऽहम्भतिः ।” or “अविद्याऽहम्भत्यज्ञानं ।”

“The synonym of *ajñāna* and *avidyā* is *aham-matī*”

Vācaspati Misra says in “Tattva-kaumudī”—

“विपर्ययोऽज्ञानमविद्या सा बुद्धिधर्मः ।”

“Wrong notion is ignorance, nescience, which is a property of the intellect.” In like manner, says Vijñāna Bikṣhu in his *Saṅkhyā-pravacana-bhāṣya*:—

“अत एव चाऽविद्या नाऽभावोऽपि तु विद्याविरोधिज्ञानान्तरमिति योगभाष्ये व्यासदेवैः प्रयत्ने नाऽवष्टुतम् ।”

“And, for this very reason, nescience is not a negation, but a distinct sort of consciousness, opposed to true science. Thus it has been laboriously established, in the *yoga-bhāṣya*, by the divine Vyāsa.” The author of the Nyāya-sūtra-vṛtti also says:—

“विपर्ययो मिथ्याज्ञानापरपर्यायोऽयद्वार्थनिश्चयः ।”

"Wrong notion, equivalent to which is false apprehension, is incorrect conviction." The Vedantins hold *ignorance* to have a verity for its object; but this is not a characteristic of *mistake*: for mistake is cognition whose object is a falsity; as, for instance, the cognition of nacreine silver. But ignorance, they teach, has verity *i.e.* pure Brahma, for its object. The Samshepa-Śārīraka says:—

“आश्रयत्वविययत्वभागीनो निर्विभागचित्तिरेव केवला ” ।

"The impartite intellect alone is subject and object of ignorance." They declare that ignorance of which the object is Brahma, is the cause of this world, a false thing; and so, that ignorance whose object is nacre, is the cause of false silver. It appears, then, that ignorance, since verity is its object, is the absence of apprehension of the veritable. This absence of apprehension is the power of concealment which the Vedantins ascribe to ignorance, that is to say, its faculty of hiding verity. The *Vedānta-sūtra* says:—

“अस्याज्ञानस्यावरणविक्षेपनामकमस्ति शक्तिद्वयम् । आवरणशक्तिस्तावद-
ल्योऽपि मेघोऽनेकयोचनायतमादित्यमण्डलमवलोकयितुमनपथपिधायकतया
यथाच्छादयतीव तथाज्ञानंपरिच्छिन्नमप्यात्मानमपरिच्छिन्नमसंसारिणमवलोक-
यितुमुद्विपिधायकतयाच्छादयतीव तादृशं सामर्थ्यम् । तदुक्तम् ”

"This Ignorance has two powers, namely, that of (a) concealment (*āvarana*), and of (b) projection (*vikshepa*). As even a small cloud, by obstructing the path of the eye of the spectator, hides the sun's disc which extends over many leagues, such also is the concealing power of Ignorance which, though finite, by obstructing the mind of the observer, hides as it were the soul which is infinite and not subject to worldly vicissitude. Thus it is said:—"

“घनच्छन्नदृष्टिर्घनच्छन्नमकं यथा मन्यते निष्प्रभं चातिमूढः ।

तथा बद्धवद्भाति यो मूढदृष्टेः स नित्योपलब्धिस्वरूपोऽहमात्मेति । ”

"As the very stupid man, whose eye is covered by cloud, thinks that the sun is covered by a cloud and void of radiance, so that (soul) which, in

the sight of the stupid, is, as it were bound, that, in the shape of the eternal understanding, am I myself."

“विचेपशक्तिस्तु यथा रज्ज्वन्नानं स्वावतरज्जौ स्वशक्त्या सर्पादिकमुद्भावयति एवमन्नानमपि स्वावतात्मनि विचेपशक्ति आकाशादि प्रपञ्चमुद्भावयति तादृशं सामर्थ्यम् । तदुक्तम्”

“The power of projection is such that just as ignorance regarding a rope produces, by its own power on the rope enveloped by it, (the appearance of) a snake or the like, so (this projective) ignorance, by its own power, raises up on the soul enveloped by it (the appearance of) a world, ether, etc., (and thus the thinker mistakes himself for a mere mortal, as he mistook the rope for a snake. Thus it is said :—”

“विचेपशक्तिर्लिङ्गादि ब्रह्माण्डान्तं जगत्सृजेदिति ।”

“The projective power can create the world, beginning with the subtle body, and ending with the whole external universe.”

By ignorance, Buddhism understands the assertion of self, which is the root of all evils and miseries. Self or self-will is tantamount to ignorance, because it is blind to the truth that the world has only a relative existence, that self separated from other similar selves is non-existent non-reality, and that individuals acquire their reality in proportion as they penetrate into the foundation of existence. A man who is self-assertive pushes himself forward, without any consideration for the welfare of his brother creatures; he congratulates himself when he reaches the pinnacle of self aggrandisement, but unfortunately fails to perceive that his success is the sure road to final destruction. For self-assertion really means self-annihilation according, not only to Buddhistic doctrine, but also to European ethics and the modern medical science. The study of insanity in lunatic asylums has shown that most forms of madness involve, and in fact proceed from, an exaggerated idea of self—megalomania—the patient brooding over the idea that he is some great personage,—“Napoleon” or “Jesus Christ” or “God Almighty” (in the worst cases of religious mania).

When the ignorance of self-assertion is eradicated, the enlightenment of universal love and kindness takes its place; arrogance, pigheadedness or obstinacy, and relentlessness which characterise egoistic tendencies are all transformed into desirable virtues and are made subservient to the general welfare of humanity. We must not, therefore, conclude that ignorance departs when enlightenment is ushered in; for, as we have shown above, ignorance itself is turned into enlightenment. In other words, self-will is not annihilated to make room for divine will, but self-will itself assumes divinity, just as old paper or rags and waste product themselves are changed into pure and white paper. This ignorance and enlightenment are not fundamentally different or diametrically opposed, though they are regarded as two entirely different things according to popular conception. They are one in their essence. We shall be better able to understand this doctrine if we refer to the following extract from the "Sûtra on the doctrine of neither increasing nor decreasing" translated into Chinese by Bodhiruci who was one of the most learned monks among the Indian Buddhists of the 7th century A. D.

"The realm of Buddha (the divine world, Nirvâṇa-world full of enlightenment) never increases, and the world of all living beings (ignorance, Samsâra) never decreases, though all the living beings may attain to Buddhahood at the same time." ¹ Yōka-Daishi, the most famous Buddhist poet in China says, in his beautiful work entitled "The song of realising the Holy Path or Buddhahood"² :—

"The essential nature of ignorance is identical with that of Buddha. The transitory and changeable body (of ours) is not separated from (the eternal and unchangeable) *Dharma-Kāya*."

A fire has the capacity for both good and evil: it may destroy buildings, or it may cook our food. A knife in the hands of a villain can destroy life, but in the hands of a physician it serves as a saviour. Ignorance becomes enlightenment, and self-will divine will, when one attains Nirvâṇa,

¹ Nanjio's cat. No. 524.

² Japanese: "Shō-dō-ka."

the consummation of Buddhism. When we locate the final abode of the seeming ego-soul, we discover the fount of divine will. Āśvaghoṣa says:—

“On account of the human mind not being able to comprehend the oneness of the totality of things (*dharmadhātu*), the mind is not in accordance with (is aloof from) the Truth or Reality; and then delusion (or subjectivity) ensues; this is called ignorance or *avidyā*.”¹ We shall now proceed to examine the

“THEORY OF IMPRESSION OR PERFUMING”.

There are two aspects of the phenomenology of Buddhist philosophy.

Pravṛitti and Nir-
rīti.

One is called, in the Buddhist-Sanskrit phraseology, ‘*pravṛitti*’ or ‘wandering about’ or circling towards,² and the other ‘*Nirvṛitti*’ or ‘returning to’ or circling away.³ The first indicates the reasons due to which we wander about in *Saṃsāra*, while the second points out the path by which we can attain *Nirvāṇa*, and return to our essential nature or eternal home. Using the technical terms employed in Āśvaghoṣa’s philosophy, one is called ‘impression’ or ‘perfuming’ of defilement, and the other that of purity. Āśvaghoṣa explains ‘perfuming’ or ‘impression’ thus:—

“When we say ‘perfuming’ we mean that while our worldly clothes (*viz*: those that we wear) have no odour of their own, neither offensive nor agreeable, they acquire one or the other which depends on the nature of the substance with which they are perfumed”.

Explanation of ‘Im-
pression.’

“Now Suchness is a pure *Dharma* free from defilement. It acquires, however, the quality of defilement owing to the perfuming power of ignorance. Ignorance, on the other hand, has nothing to do with purity. We, nevertheless, speak of its being able to do the work of purity, because it, in its turn, is perfumed and partly purified by Suchness”.⁴


¹ I have rendered from Paramārtha’s Chinese version.

² Japanese: Ru-ten (mon).

³ Japanese: Gen-metsu (mon).

⁴ Suzuki’s English version of “Awakeing of Faith”, pp. 84—85.

We shall now learn how defiled things (not of one nature but adulterated) are constantly being produced (how things are constantly getting defiled with different attributes) by perfuming. At first ignorance perfumes Suchness and gives rise to subjectivity. I mean by this that ignorance impresses Suchness, sets its stamp on it, adulterates it, and causes its defilement; ignorance imparts some of its nature to Suchness; that is, it imparts some attributes due to its own nature to Suchness, and it affects with its own characteristics the purity of it. Subjectivity, in its turn, perfumes ignorance, and produces an external world of subjectivity. By reflex action, this external world created by subjectivity perfumes subjectivity itself, and gives rise to attachment. The following diagram may help us to make this clear.



The impressing or perfuming powers of ignorance, subjectivity, and the external world of subjectivity are divided into two, viz: (1) Root and (2) Branch. Of the first the root is technically termed the "fundamental impression" or "perfuming",⁴ and the branch is called the "impression of intellect and affection".⁵ Of the second, the one is the 'power which strengthens the

¹ Jap: *Mumyō-kunjiā.*

² Jap: *Mōchin-kunjiā.*

³ Jap: *Mōkyōzai-kunjiā.*

⁴ Jap: *Konpon-kunjiā.*


⁵ Jap: *Ken-ai-kunjiā.*

fundamental consciousness of activity',¹ and the other, the "power which strengthens the consciousness which particularises."² Of the third, one "strengthens particularisation"³ and the other, "attachment".⁴ In this manner we are constantly producing (evolving) the illusory world and are fated to wander about in the Samsāra. So much for the "gate of wandering about" (*pravyitti*) in birth and death. I shall now pass on to the "gate of returning to" our 'flowery' and primary abode.

We have already mentioned that ignorance perfumes Suchness and that Suchness, in its turn, impresses ignorance. It is due to this attribute of Suchness that we have the power to attain enlightenment, and disperse the clouds of ignorance.

Again while Suchness impresses some of its purity on subjectivity, *this impressed subjectivity* gives its impression to Suchness. By belief in and practice of this doctrine, we may attain Nirvāṇa. This is the most profound and mystical part of Aśvaghosha's philosophy.

The process by which subjectivity impresses Suchness is termed 'internal perfuming', or Suchness-perfuming, and the reverse operation (the impression of this purified subjectivity on Suchness) is termed 'external' or 'subjectivity-perfuming'. The following diagram will help to make it clear:—



"External perfuming" is divided into the "perfuming of (1) particularising-consciousness⁵ and (2) ego or Manas-consciousness".⁶ It is due to the first that we are unable to comprehend the idealistic doctrine, and that we comprehend the external world as a real existence. It perfumes Suchness

¹ Jap: *Gasshiki-konpon-kunjid*.

² Jap: *Zōchō-nen-kunjid*.

³ Jap: *Funbetsujishiki-kunjid*.

⁴ Jap: *Zōchō-funbetsujishiki-kunjid*.

⁵ Jap: *Zōchō-shu-kunjid*.

⁶ Jap: *I-kunjid*.

and gradually develops itself, and finally attains Nirvâṇa. Manas-consciousness similarly advances towards Nirvâṇa, but does not give any impression to Suchness.

"Internal perfuming" is also divided into (1) "essence-perfuming"¹ and (2) "activity-perfuming."² Now every one in this world shares a part of the essential nature of Suchness with Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. The impression of this essential nature on subjectivity induces a desire for Nirvâṇa and an aversion for Samsâra. If, therefore, we consider essence-perfuming only, we are led to the conclusion that all living beings can attain enlightenment at the same time. Every body, wise or ignorant, would enter Nirvâṇa simultaneously, and would have equal powers of internal perfuming and Suchness-impression. But such is not the case in this empirical world of ours. For the degree of each one's delusion varies with the person, in spite of the power, possessed by each one in essence, of internal perfuming, just as the defects of each mirror are of different degrees, although all of them possess the power of reflection.

We have, therefore, in order to attain Nirvâṇa, to borrow assistance from our spiritual teacher, the Buddha or Bodhisattva. The power of internal perfuming is the cause, but the practice of the doctrines of Buddha and Bodhisattva is the condition of attaining Nirvâṇa. This condition is termed "activity-perfuming" in 'The Awakening of Faith', and is considered from two aspects, universal³ and individual.⁴ The latter one is further subdivided into proximate and ulterior.

By the 'proximate condition'⁵ is meant the cause which takes effect immediately, and by the 'ulterior condition'⁶ the cause whose effect is gradual. Each of these, again, is subdivided into the condition which increases the root of our merits, and the condition which induces us to enter into the holy path.

I shall now explain these technical terms. *Essence-perfuming* is an operation of Suchness itself which is included in our essence and acts spontaneously.

¹ Jap: *Jitaisō-kunjid.*

² Jap: *Hyōdō-yen.*

³ Jap: *Kin-yen.*

⁴ Jap: *Yō-kunjid.*

⁵ Jap: *Shaketen-yen.*

⁶ Jap: *Yen-yen.*

Activity-perfuming is that quality in the attributes of Suchness which assists us in the attainment of Nirvāṇa. It manifests itself in the shape of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, and is divided into universal and individual conditions.

Individual condition implies an active form of the deep compassion (mahākarma) of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. All things from the first aspiration to the time when they attain Buddhahood, are sheltered under the guardianship of all Buddhas and Bodhisattvas who take the form of their parents, servants, friends or enemies, and assist in attaining Nirvāṇa. Buddhas and Bodhisattvas teach all living beings and assist them in attaining Nirvāṇa, sometimes with the four methods of entertainment,¹ sometimes with the six *pāramitās*² or in any other method, and make the stock of the merits of all living beings increase.

Proximate condition is the condition due to which some people are led to (attain) Buddhahood without any delay, because of their intellectual power being fully developed, and other conditions satisfied.

Ulterior condition is the condition due to which some people can attain the highest place only after subjection to long training, because of their intellectual powers not being fully developed and other conditions satisfied.

Universal condition signifies the universal compassion and wisdom of Buddhas or Bodhisattvas, through which they desire to effect the emancipation of all living beings universally. It pervades and affects all beings, just as the moon shines equally on a splendid palace or on a poor cottage.

Such is, in outline, the philosophical side of the Bhūtatahatā phenomenology.

¹ The four methods of entertainment are as follows:—

- (a) Dāna or Charity (Jap: Fuse.)
- (b) Priyamāna or Loving speech. (Jap: Ai-go.)
- (c) Arthakriya or Benefiting deeds. (Jap: Ri-gyō.)
- (d) Samānārtahata or Sharing with others. (Jap: Dō-ji.)

² The six kinds of perfection:—

- (a) Dāna.
- (b) Śīla or Morality. (Jap: Ji-kai.)
- (c) Kṣānti or Patience. (Jap: Niniku.)
- (d) Vīrya or Diligence. (Jap: Shōjin.)
- (e) Dhyaṇa or Contemplation. (Jap: Zenjō.)
- (f) Prajñā or Wisdom. (Jap: Chiye.)

CHAPTER VIII.

THE TIEN-TÀI SCHOOL¹.

The fundamental thoughts of the Mahāyāna School consist of the idea of identity between the real and unreal. To speak in more philosophical terms, it professes to maintain that the phenomenal and noumenal are the same and identical. Aśvaghosha, in his "Awakening of Faith", illustrates the idea with an example of the water and waves : the water is real and the waves unreal. But as the water does not exist separately from the waves, and the waves do not exist apart from the water, so the noumenon does not exist separately from the phenomena and the phenomena do not exist apart from the noumenon. This doctrine is explained more clearly by Chi-che-tā-shih², the founder of the Tien-tài school.

The fundamental idea of the Buddhist Ontology.

The Tien-tài school has, for its basis, the canons of the "Saddharma Puṇḍarīka" or the "Lotus of the Good law"³. Chi-che-tā-shih studied carefully the Madhyamika-Śāstra of Nāgārjuna whence, as is clear from the following Kārika, he got some hints to found his own doctrine.

"Things which are produced by causes and conditions, we say to be all *Emptiness* ; they may also be given the name of *Conventionality*. Further they may be said to contain the import of the *middle path*."

But it should be carefully observed in what light Chi-che-tā-shih took the three principles involved in the passage. He found these three principles—*emptiness* (*Śūnyatā*⁴), *conventionality* (*Prajñapti*⁵) and *middle path* (*Madhyamā*⁶) as the real means for the observation of Truth. These principles, according to this school, have an inseparable connection with each other and are not isolated. This is the reason why Chi-che-tā-shih called his own principle the "Con-

The three principles of this school.

¹ Japanese : Tendai.

² Jap : Hokke-kyō. Or more fully "Myō-hō-ron-gō-kyō."

³ Chinese : Kūi. Jap : Ke or Ge.

⁴ Japanese : Chisho Daishū.

⁵ Chinese : Kung. Jap : Kū.

⁶ Chinese : Chung. Jap : Chū.

cordant tri-satyas¹², while he rejected that of the Yogicāra school as the "Discordant tri-satyas"¹³.

But, before we treat of these three principles, we have to learn what

The classification of the Buddha's teachings. is known as the classification of the Buddha's teachings in this school Chi-che-tā-shih dealt with the question from three points of view, viz :

- (1) The Periodical ;
- (2) The Theoretical;¹⁴ and
- (3) The Practical.¹⁵

By the periodical classification, we are to mean the series of preachings of the Blessed One in order of the periods of their delivery. Chi-che-tā-shih divided them into five, viz :—

- (i) The Avatamsaka¹⁶ (Sūtra).
- (ii) The Āgama¹⁷ (Sūtra).
- (iii) The Vaipulya¹⁸ (Sūtra).
- (iv) The Prajñāpāramitā¹⁹ (Sūtra) and
- (v) The Sadharmapuṇḍarīka and Nirvāṇa²⁰ (Sūtra).

In the first period of his life, the Buddha preached the Avatamsaka Sūtra which contains the most profound doctrine of Mahāyānism. According to a tradition, this Sūtra was preached by the Lord Buddha for three weeks soon after he had attained enlightenment. In the second period, as Chi-che-tā-shih says, the Buddha preached the Āgama Sūtra for twelve years, at Saranāt near Benares City. In the third period, the Tathāgata preached both the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna Sūtras for eight years. According to the orthodox opinion of the Tendai school, some canons of Mahāyānism, namely, the Vimālakīrti Sūtra,²¹ the Svarnaprabhāsa Sūtra²² and the Laṅkāvatara Sūtra, etc., were preached by the Blessed One in this period. In the fourth period, according to Chi-che-tā-shih, the Tathāgata preached

¹² Jap : Yen-yū-no-san-tai.

¹³ Jap : Ke-gi.

¹⁴ Jap : Hōdō.

¹⁵ Jap : Fui-mō-kyō.

¹⁶ Jap : Kureki-no-san-tai.

¹⁷ Jap : Keron.

¹⁸ Jap : Hannya.

¹⁹ Jpn : Kōn-kō-myō-kyō.

²⁰ Jap : Ke-hō.

²¹ Jap : Agon.

²² Jap : Hokke Nichan.

for twenty-two years the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras which belong to the so-called "partially developed Mahāyanism". Lastly, the Lord Buddha preached the Saddharma-Puṇḍarīka Sūtra and the Mahā-Nirvāṇa Sūtra for eight years. According to the Tendai School, the highest and the most developed doctrines were preached by the Tathāgata in this period of his life.

The Theoretical classification indicates an order from shallowness to deepness or from imperfection to perfection. Here Chi-che-tā-shih made four divisions of the Tathāgata's Teachings, *viz*:

- (1) *Collection*¹ (or the Tripitakas of Hīnayanism),
- (2) *Common*² (or ordinary doctrines found both in the Hīnayana and a part of the Mahāyana),
- (3) *Distinction*³ (or extraordinary doctrines for the Bodhisattvas only), and
- (4) *Perfection*⁴ (or the doctrines of identity between Buddha and all living beings) which contains the main doctrine of the Tendai school.

The Practical classification has reference to the teachings of Buddha according to the methods which he employed for teaching different classes of people with different intellectual powers. Chi-che-tā-shih made them four-fold:

- (1) The Sudden,⁵
- (2) The Gradual,⁶
- (3) The Secret⁷, and
- (4) The Indeterminate.⁸

By the "Sudden" is to be meant an instructive method by which the Blessed One led people to the world of enlightenment suddenly, that is, without imparting any preparatory instruction. The Avatamsaka Sūtra is said to fall under this category.

¹ Jap: Zō-kyō.

² Jap: Tō-gyō.

³ Jap: Bekkyō.

⁴ Jap: Yen-gyō.

⁵ Jap: Ton-kyō.

⁶ Jap: Zen-kyō.

⁷ Jap: Himitsu-kyō.

⁸ Jap: Fu-jit-kyō.

By the 'Gradual' is to be meant a method which is employed to make the people open their mind's eye gradually, that is, with aids of various kinds of preparatory instruction, and at last, develops their insight thoroughly. According to the Tendai school, the doctrine of the Âgama Sûtra, the Vaipulya Sûtra and the Prajñâpâramitâ Sûtra are of this category. *

By the 'Secret' is to be meant the method by which the Buddha taught a special class of people who were notable to hear and understand his teaching in public.

And lastly, the 'Indeterminate' shows that some of the Buddha's teachings are very wide and lofty in their import, so that his disciples understood them in different senses as the different degrees of their intellectual power permitted.

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THE THREE PRINCIPLES¹.

(1) *The Principle of Emptiness*²: All things are emptiness when we

Explanation of the
principle of Empti-
ness.

observe them from the standpoint of transcendental truth; for they are products of causes and conditions.

Emptiness or *Śūnyata* never means 'nothingness'; but it means "the unreality of the phenomenal world". Or more properly speaking, it simply means "Not" like the *it is not so* of the Brihadâraṇyaka Upanishada. In other words, the different imaginations and observations of men who cannot see through the true nature of things, are far away from the Truth; for the realm of Truth is beyond our conventional or relative knowledge. We cannot even say that "It is"; because everything that exists pre-supposes that which does not exist; existence and non-existence are relative terms as much

¹ Japanese: *Son-Tai*.

² Japanese: *Kô-tai*.

as the subject and the object, 'I' and "He", mind and matter, this and that, one and many, and the like. "It is not so", therefore, is the only way in which our imperfect human tongue can express the Truth. Hence the "principle of emptiness" is established in order to dispel the imaginations of vulgar minds and to rectify our defective views about the universe and human life. In short, this principle is a negative method that enables men to get rid of their delusions.

(2) *The Principle of Conventionality*¹: The mountains soar high up in the air, the water flows in the river, stars adorn the sky, the flowers beautify the earth: all these have distinctive existences. These existences, however, are not real, but are only conventional. In other words, they are all subject to the law of causation; they could not have their respective existences without causes and conditions. This law of causation is technically called "the principle of conventionality" in the Tendai school. And the 'law of causation', according to this school, is nothing but an active principle of the Truth or Reality; hence individual existences in the universe are not independent manifestations apart from the Reality.

(3) *The Principle of Middle Path*²: This is established in order to explain the relation between the above two principles. Truth seems like a white paper when we look upon it from the stand point of the first principle, 'emptiness', while it seems like a coloured paper when we look upon it from the stand point of the second, 'conventionality'. Under these circumstances, Truth is threatened to be divisible. As it has already been pointed out, all things have existence on account of cause and condition, and their existence is impossible without the law of causation. Therefore they may be called "either existence or *śūnyatā*," and "neither existence nor *śūnyatā*." This is the middle path which forms the fundamental world-view of the Tendai school. When we look upon phenomena from the stand-point of the principle of the middle path, all of them are manifestation of the Truth. In other words, we must discover the truth even in the insignificant blade of grass or the minute dust, as their existence

¹ Japanese: *Ke-tai*.

² Jap: *Chū-tai*.

is not meaningless. We must not, therefore, forget that in every phenomenon or individual we may recognize the light of Truth. Or more Buddhistically speaking, we should comprehend that the mountains which soar high up in the air, the water which flows in the stream, the stars that adorn the sky or the flowers which decorate the earth, are all manifestations of the supreme reality; therefore, we may enjoy the enchanting views of the realm of Truth through their manifestation. Nay, the phenomena themselves are revealing to us the teachings of Tathāgata, as the great German poet, Goethe, said:—
 "The highest would be to understand that all facts are themselves theory. The azure colour of the sky recalls to us the fundamental law of chromatics. We must not seek anything behind phenomena; for they themselves are our lessons."¹

Truth is thus considered in this school from three points of view: nega-

In what sense the three principles are concordant?

tive (*śūnyatā*), positive (*conventional*) and the intermediate, (*Middle Path*). These three principles are not, however, isolated from one another but are inseparable; or more properly speaking, they are perfectly concordant; because when we think of the negative principle, the positive, as also the middle, are considered therewith, and *vice versa*. It is not allowable, therefore, to make any distinct demarcation with regard to these three principles.

So much for the outline of the doctrine of Three Principles in the Tendai School. We must now proceed to the theory—

"THAT THREE THOUSAND DHĀTUS ARE INCLUDED IN OR IDENTICAL WITH ONE THOUGHT."

But, before entering into the import of the theory, I must stop for a

Explanation of the three thousand worlds.

while to explain what are the ten 'Dhātus' and the ten characteristics of things. The ten Dhātus are the six kinds of existence namely, Hell, Pretas, Beasts, Demons, Man, and Heaven, and the four kinds of sages namely, the Śrāvaka, Pāatyaka-Buddha,

¹ Dr. Paul Curo, "Buddhism and its Christian Critics," P. 99.

Bodhisattva and Buddha. Each of these ten Dhâtus, according to this school, possesses ten characteristics which are:—(1) *Yat-lakṣaṇa*¹ (form); (2) *Yat-svabhāva*² (essential nature); (3) *Yat-bhūvatā*³ (substance); (4) *Yat-bala*⁴ (power or force); (5) *Yat-kriyā*⁵ (action); (6) *Yat-kāraṇa*⁶ (cause); (7) *Yat-pratyaya*⁷ (condition); (8) *Yat-kārya*⁸ (effect); (9) *Yat-phala*⁹ (retribution); and (10) *Yat-uttarasamutā*¹⁰ (the final identity).

Each of the ten Dhâtus again possesses the nature of all the ten Dhâtus. This is the reason why a man is capable of becoming a Buddha, as also the beings of hell or of the animal world are capable of becoming Buddhas. Hence it is expressed in the Mahāvāna-Chikwan that “the essential nature of all living beings is pure; all are manifestations but of one single thought which is identical with all living beings, Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. We wander in the *samsāra* owing to the activity of that thought and attain Nirvāṇa through operation of the same thought.” Again, it is said in the same book—“There is no single thought that does not possess the ten Dhâtus, each ‘dhātu’ possesses the nature of the ten ‘dhâtus’. Hence ultimately there become one hundred ‘dhâtus,’ each of these 100 ‘dhâtus’ possesses, as shown above, ten kinds of characteristics; so that finally there are one thousand characteristics. These again are possessed by each of the three worlds, *viz.* Bhājana-loka or Mother Earth, Pañca-Skandha-loka and Sattva-loka or the world of animate things. Thus there are ultimately three thousand worlds. One thought=10 dhâtus; 10 dhâtus × 10 dhâtus=100 dhâtus; 100 dhâtus × 10 characteristics=1000 dhâtus; 1000 dhâtus × 3 kinds of worlds=3000 dhâtus.

Now to return to the main theory, the three thousand dhâtus are included in one thought. By the three kinds of worlds are to be meant (1) the five skandhas, (2) the living beings and (3) mother earth. The first is individual, the second social and the

¹ Jap: *Nyo-Ze-so.* ² Jap: *Nyozo-ahô.* ³ Jap: *Nyo-ze-tai.* ⁴ Jap: *Nyo-ze-riki.*

⁵ Jap: *Nyo-ze-ai.* ⁶ Jap: *Nyo-ze-in.* ⁷ Jap: *Nyo-ze-gen.* ⁸ Jap: *Nyo-Ze-kon.*

⁹ Jap: *Nyo-ze-hô.* ¹⁰ Jap: *Nyo-ze-hon-mutsu-kyu-kyô.*

third cosmic. That is to say, wherever there are living beings, there is the world of five skandhas; and society in which they act; and wherever there is society, there is country or land where living beings live. As each of these three kinds of worlds possesses 1000 characteristics, there come to be 3000 worlds or 'dhātus'. And these 3000 worlds or dhātus are included in the thought of all living beings. Hence it is said in Mahāyāna-Chikwan:

"These 3000 'dhātus' are included in every thought or every thought possesses 3000 'dhātus'. We should not say that thought comes before and 'dhātus' come after, or that 'dhātus' come before and thought comes after." So much of the theory that one thought possesses three thousand 'dhātus'. Now, we shall proceed to the doctrine of the 'Three kleśas' according to the Tendai School.

THE THEORY OF KLEŚA.

The kleśas are of three kinds, namely (1) Ignorance; (2) Numberless hindrances, (lit. *dust-and-sand-like-kleśas*); and (3) Intellectual and emotional errors. According to the Tendai school, these three kleśas are not different from one another in their essence, but are so only in their operations. Let us explain them separately.

(1) Ignorance: This is the fundamental kleśa, being a hindrance for the right understanding of the real nature of things. This is, to speak in modern phraseology, the universal kleśa.

(2) The *Numberless* kleśa: Sex, capacity and conditions etc., of human beings in society are different, though, in essence, they possess the same human nature; some are found wise, while others are foolish, some become ministers, others coolies, and so on. Social order is to be kept by their restriction to the respective business which corresponds to their own capacity, sex, conditions etc. As the variety of human beings is infinite in the world, there are numberless kleśas of this kind, like the sands in the Ganges, which hinder them from observing social order. This is called "the social kleśa" in modern phraseology.

(3) Intellectual and emotional *kleśa*: Two kinds of *kleśas* are treated under this name as one in this school; they are treated as two in the Sarvāstivādin and other schools. But, as the explanation is the same in all the schools, I hope you will see them in details in an earlier lecture "Karma-phenomenology". This may be called "Individual *kleśa*".

The question that naturally next demands solution is, how to dispel

The three contemplations are the way how to dispel the three *kleśas*.

these three kinds of *kleśas*? And the solution is met with in the conception of the three-fold contemplations—The contemplation of "Emptiness", the contemplation of "Conventionality", and the contemplation of the "Middle Path".

(1) The contemplation of 'emptiness' removes the intellectual and emotional delusions which make us blind about the universal truth, and confine us to the unreal world. The most successful method is to view all things as produced by causes and conditions so as to result in 'śūnyatā'. By this contemplation, we may realise the knowledge of the equality of all things ('samatā-jñāna') and attain the virtue of 'prajñā' or wisdom. (2) The contemplation of 'conventionality' solves the question that, if all is one (*sarvam ekam*) and if there is no difference between the *vulgar* and the Buddhas in their real nature, why is it that we suffer from pains while the Buddhas are absolutely in peace? and why is our daily life so defiled that we cannot enjoy happiness, while the lives of the Buddhas are so happy that they never experience any pains or sufferings? By this contemplation we may realise 'Mārgajñāna' or the knowledge of the holy path, and attain the virtue of 'Moksha', deliverance. (3) The contemplation of Middle Path dispels the extreme views, namely, those of existence or non-existence, sameness ('samata') or difference ('nanata') and the like. That is to say, when they hear the doctrine which teaches the sameness of the Buddhas and the vulgar in their essence, they cling to the idea that there is not any distinction between the enlightened and common people, the elderly and the young, the rulers and the ruled, and so on. While otherwise, they would fall into the error that there is a wide gap between the Buddhas and the vulgar, the rulers and the ruled—and others, and thus give up their progressive spirit and aspiration after Buddhahood. The contemplation estab-

lishes the adamant law of Buddhism that "sameness without difference is sameness wrongly conceived, and difference without sameness is difference wrongly conceived". Thus we are neither entirely identical with, nor absolutely different from, the Buddhas, and the universal truth lies always in the middle path and not in the extreme. We must recognise that there is a road to lead us to Buddhahood and should not give up our progressive spirit or aspiration. The baneful effect of extreme methods, to take a living example, is vividly manifest in the obstacle to a healthy progress of the Indian people by their extreme views of the caste system. The middle way, be it theoretical or practical, is to be realised by the contemplation of the middle path; by this contemplation we may turn the fundamental *kleśa*, ignorance, into universal knowledge (*sarvākarañjana*); and through their knowledge is to be realised the virtue of *Dharmakāya*.

But how is it that ignorance may be turned into knowledge?

It is a remarkable feature of Mahāyāna Buddhism to maintain the view that *Ignorance and intelligence are one.* that *यः क्लेशः सो बुद्धिः* or "what is sin or delusion, that is intelligence". In fact, three kinds of *kleśas* which I have mentioned above are merely the darkness produced by our own confused subjectivity; the three kinds of knowledge, on the other hand, are merely the brightness produced by the training of our own intellectual power. As a physician saves the life of a sick man with application of morphia, while a robber kills others with it, so also the wise aspirant for Buddhahood enjoys a peaceful life through the cultivation of his mind or will, while the fool falls into hell and suffers a painful life through the dissoluteness of his mind or will. It is on this that Asanga says :—

धर्मधातुविनिर्मुक्तो यस्मादसौ न विद्यते ।
तस्मात्संज्ञेन निर्देशे स संविद्धीमतामृतः ॥

i. e. "As there is no phenomenon separated from reality, so when describing *samkleśa* or ignorance, wise people are of opinion that it is intellect itself." (*avidyā ca bodhiś ca ekam.*)

From this stand point, the Mahāyāna Buddhists go to the conclusion

that *Nirvāṇa and Saṃsāra are one.* "Yas Saṃsāras tat Nirvāṇam" or what is birth and death that is

Nirvāṇam. This conclusion may seem to be rather a bold and revolutionary proposition in the dogmatic history of Buddhism. But it is nothing more than a natural development of the spirit that was breathed in the original views of its founder. We must not, therefore, be surprised when we find the following passages in the "Viśeṣha-cinta-brahma-paripricha Sātra":—

"The essence of things lies in their freedom from attachment, attribute and desires, that is in truth. In essence they are pure, and, as they are pure, we know that what is the essence of birth and death, that is the essence of Nirvāṇa; that what is the essence of Nirvāṇa that is the essence of birth and death. In other words Nirvāṇa is not to be sought outside of this world, which, though transient, is, in reality, nothing more than Nirvāṇa itself. Because it is contrary to reason to imagine that there is Nirvāṇa and that there is *samsāra*, and that the one lies outside the pale of the other; and therefore, that we can attain Nirvāṇa only after we have annihilated or escaped the world of birth and death. If we are not hampered by our confused subjectivity, this our wordly life, is an activity of Nirvāṇa itself."¹ Vasubandhu expresses the same views in his work entitled "The Discourse on Buddha-essence".²

All sins transformed into the constituents of enlightenment!

The vicissitudes of Samsāra transformed into the beauty of Nirvāṇa!

All these came from the exercise of the great religious discipline;

Beyond our understanding, indeed, is the mystery of all Buddhas".

Goethe has made the Earth-Spirit sing:—

"In the floods of life, in the storm of deeds,

I move up and down,

I go to and fro,

Birth and the grave,

An eternal sea

A changing strife,

A glowing life.

Thus I create the roaring loom of time

And weave the living garment of the Deity."

¹ Nanjio's Cat. No. 189 (Bodhiruci), No. 190 (Kumārajīva), and No. 197 (Dharmarakṣa).

² Nanjio's Cat. No. 1220.

Do you not see here a most explicit expression of the Mahāyanistic sentiment?

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THE CONCEPTION OF BUDDHA-KĀYA IN THIS SCHOOL.

According to the Tendai School, the doctrine of the Madhyamika and Vijñānavādin Schools is called the "Bodhisattva-yāna" or the "vehicle for aspiring to Buddhahood", while its own doctrine is termed the "Buddha-yāna" or the "vehicle of the Enlightened one". And the Buddha-kāya-view of this school entirely depends upon the "Sūtra of the Lotus of the Good law", from the beginning to the end. I do not, therefore, hesitate to say that there is, in fact, no Tendai School without the "Lotus of the Good law" (*Saddharma-puṇḍarīka*).

Most of the Hinayanists think that Śākyamuni became all wise at Gaya about twenty five centuries ago; but Mahāyanists, at least the followers of the Tendai School, believe that he has been the All-wise from eternity. It is called by himself to be a delusion to think that he had attained enlightenment under the Bodhi-tree near Gaya, because he has not only existed from eternity but he is the All-wise, the Buddha from the beginning. Thus it is preached in the "Lotus of the Good law"¹ as follows:—

"The Blessed One, considering that the Bodhisattvas repeated their prayer three times, addressed them thus: Listen then, young men of good family. The force of a strong resolve which I assumed is such, young men of good family, that this world, including gods, men, and demons, acknowledges: Now has the Tathāgata Śākyamuni, after going out from the home of the Śākyas, arrived at supreme and perfect enlightenment, on the summit of the terrace of enlightenment at the town of Gaya. But, young men of good family, the truth is that many hundred thousand myriads of

¹ Sacred Book of the East, Vol. XXI, p. 298.

koṭis of *Æons* ago, I have arrived at supreme and perfect enlightenment. By way of example, young men of good family, let there be the atoms of earth of fifty hundred thousand myriads of *koṭis* of world ; let there exist some man who takes one of those atoms of dust and then goes in an eastern direction fifty hundred thousand myriads of *koṭis* of worlds further on, there to deposit that atom of dust ; in this manner let the man carry away from all those worlds the whole mass of earth, and in the same manner, and, by the same act as supposed, deposit all those atoms in an eastern direction. Now would you think, young men of good family, that any one should be able to imagine, weigh, count, or determine (the number of) those worlds ? The Tathāgata having thus spoken, the Bodhisattva Mahāsattva Maitreya and the entire host of Bodhisattvas replied : " They are incalculable, O Tathāgata, those worlds, countless beyond the range of thought. Not even all the Śravakas and Pratyekabuddhas, O Tathāgata, with their noble knowledge, will be able to imagine, weigh, count, or determine them. For us also, O Tathāgata, who are Bodhisattvas standing on the place whence there is no turning back, this point lies beyond the sphere of comprehension ; so innumerable, O Tathāgata, are those worlds."

"This said, the Blessed one spoke to those Bodhisattva Mahāsattvas as follows : I announce to you, young men of good family, I declare to you : However numerous those worlds where that man deposits those atoms of dust and where he does not, there are not, young men of good family, in all those hundred thousands of myriads of *koṭis* of worlds, so many dust atoms as there are hundred thousands of myriad *koṭis* of *Æons* since I have arrived at supreme and perfect enlightenment."

The real qualities of Tathāgata are so innumerable and so incalculable that the end of it would be difficult to reach, though we continue to enumerate them for immeasurable *Æons*. He is the master of the law, the king of truth and the lord of all beings. Thus we read in the "Sūtra of the Lotus of the Good laws" the following *gāthās* :—

यद्यपि काश्यपा¹ मेघो लोकधातु यदुन्नतः ।

सर्वमोनहती चापि च्छादयन्तो वसुंधराम् ॥

¹ Correct grammatical form must be काश्यप, but I think the author has used the form, काश्यपा, for the sake of the metre.

"It is, O Kāśyapa, as if a cloud rising above the horizon shrouds all spaces and covers the earth."

सो च वारिस्थ संपूर्णो विद्युन्माली महाम्बुदः ।

निर्नादयन्त शब्देन हर्षयेत्सर्वदेहिनः ॥

"That great cloud, full with water, is wreathed with flashes of lightning and delights, by its thundering noise, all creatures."

सूर्यरश्मी निवारित्वा शीतलं द्रवमण्डलम् ।

हस्तप्राप्तोऽवतिष्ठन्तो वारि मुञ्चेत्समन्ततः ॥

"By obstructing the sunbeams, it makes the region cool ; and gradually lowering so as to come in reach of the hands, it sprinkles water all around."

स चैव सम मुञ्चेत् आपस्कन्धमनल्पकम् ।

प्राखुरन्तः समन्तेन तर्पयेन्नेदिनीमिमाम् ॥

"And so, flashing on every side, it pours out an abundant mass of water equally, and refreshes this earth."

इह या काचि मेदिन्यां जाता श्रोषधयो भवेत् ।

दृणगुल्मवनस्पत्यो द्रुमा वाय महाद्रुमाः ॥

सस्यानि विविधान्येव यद्वापि हरितं भवेत् ।

पर्वते कन्दरे चैव निकुञ्जेषु च यद्भवेत् ॥

सर्वान्संतर्पयेन्मेघ स्तृणगुल्मवनस्पतीन् ।

दृषितां धरणीं तर्पेत्परिषिञ्चति चौषधीः ॥

"And all herbs which have sprung up on the face of the earth ; all grasses, shrubs, forest trees, other trees small and great ; the various crops, and whatever is green in hills ; caves and thickets ; all those grasses, shrubs, and trees are refreshed by the cloud which refreshes the thirsty earth and waters the medicinal plants."

तच्च एकरसंवारि मेघमुक्तमिह स्थितम् ।

यथाबलं यथाविषयं दृणगुल्मापिबन्ति तत् ॥

"Grasses and shrubs drink the water of one essence which issues from the cloud according to their faculty and reach."

द्रुमाश्च ये केचि महाद्रुमाश्च खुद्राक मध्याश्च यथावशाश्च ।
यथाबलं सर्वे पिबन्ति वारि पिबन्ति वर्धन्ति यथेच्छकामाः ॥

"And all the trees great, small and mean, drink that water according to their growth and faculty, and grow lustily."

काण्डेन नाडेन त्वचा यथैव शाखाप्रशाखाय तथैव पत्रैः ।
वर्धन्ति पुष्पेहि फलेहिचैव मेघाभिवृष्टेन महौषधीयः ॥

"The great plants whose trunk, stalk, bark, twigs, pith, and leaves are moistened by the water from the cloud develop their blossoms and fruits."

यथाबलं ता विषयश्च यादृशो यासां च यद्यादृशकं च बीजम् ।
स्वकस्वकं ताः प्रसवं ददन्ति वारिं च तं एकरसं प्रसुक्तम् ॥

They yield their products, each according to its own faculty, and reach the particular nature of the germ ; still the water emitted is of but one essence."

एवमेव बुद्धोऽपि ह लोकि काश्यप उत्पद्यते वारिधरो व लोके ।
उत्पद्य च भाषति लोकनाथो भूतांचरिं दर्शयते च प्राणिनाम् ॥

"In the same way, Kāśyapa, the Buddha comes into the world like a rain-cloud, and, once born, he the world's Lord, speaks and shows the real course of life."

एवं च संश्रावयते महर्षिः पुरस्कृतो लोकि सदेवकस्मिन् ।
तथागतोऽहं द्विपदोत्तमो जिनो उत्पन्न लोकास्मिं यथैव मेघः ॥

"And the great Seer, honoured in the world, including the gods, speaks thus : I am the Tathāgata, the highest of men, the Jina ; I have appeared in this world like a cloud."

संतर्पयिष्याम्यहु सर्वसत्त्वान्संशुष्कगात्रां स्त्रिभवे विलग्नान् ।
दुःखेन शुश्रून्त सुखे स्वपेयं कामांश्च दास्याम्यहु निर्वृतिं च ॥

"I shall refresh all beings whose bodies are withered, who are clogged to the triple world ; I shall bring to felicity those that are pining away with toils, give them pleasures and final rest."

शृणोय मे देवमनुष्यसंघा उपसंक्रमध्वं मम दर्शनाय ।
तथागतोऽहं भगवाननाभिभूः संतारणार्थं इह लोकि जातः ॥

"Hearken to me, ye hosts of gods and men ; approach to behold me : I am the Tathâgata, the Lord, who has no superior, who appears in this world to save."

भाषामि च प्राणिसहस्रकोटिनां धर्मं विशुद्धं अभिदर्शनीयम् ।
एका च तस्य समता तद्यत्वं यदिदं विमुक्तिश्च निर्वृत्ती च ॥

"To thousands of *koṭis* of living beings I preach a pure and most bright law that has but one scope, to wit, deliverance and rest."

स्वरेण चैकेन वदामि धर्मं बोधिं निदानं करियान नित्यम् ।
समं हि एतद्विषयमत्र नास्ति न कश्चि विद्वेषु न रागु विद्यते ॥

"I preach with ever the same voice, constantly taking enlightenment as my text. For this is equal for all ; no partiality is in it, neither hatred nor affection."

अनुनीयता मद्वा न काचिदस्ति प्रेमा च दोषश्च न मे कश्चिचित् ।
समं च धर्मं प्रवदामि देहिनां यथैकसत्त्वस्य तथा परस्य ॥

"I am inexorable and bear no love nor hatred towards any one ; and I proclaim the law to all creatures without distinction, to the one as well as the other."

अन्यन्यकर्मा प्रवदामि धर्मं गच्छन्तु तिष्ठन्तु निषीदमानः ।
निषण्णशय्यासनमारुहित्वा किलासिता मद्वा न जातु विद्यते ॥

"Whether walking, standing, or sitting, I am exclusively occupied with this task of proclaiming the law. I never get tired of sitting on the chair I have ascended."

संतपर्यामो इमु सर्वलोकं मेघो व वारि सम मुच्चमानः ।
 आयेषु नीचेषु च तुल्यबुद्धिर्दुःशीलभूतेश्वर्य शीलवत्सु ॥
 विनष्टचारित्र तथैव ये नराश्चारित्र—आचारसमन्विताश्च ।
 दृष्टिष्टिता ये च विनष्टदृष्टौ सम्यग्दृशो ये च विशुद्धदृष्टयः ॥

"I recreate the whole world like a cloud shedding its water without distinction ; I have the same feeling for respectable people as for the low ; for moral persons as for the immoral ; for the depraved as for those who observe the rule of good conduct ; for those who hold sectarian views are sound and correct."

हीनेषु चोद्योतमतीषु चापि ऋद्धिन्द्रियेषु प्रवदामि धर्मम् ।
 क्लृप्तासितां सर्वं विवर्जयित्वा सम्यक्प्रमुच्चास्यद् धर्मवर्धम् ॥

"I preach the law to the inferior as well as to persons of superior understanding and extraordinary faculties ; inaccessible to weariness, I spread in season the rain of the law."

यद्याबलं च शुणियान मह्यं विविधासु भूमीषु प्रतिष्ठहन्ति ।
 देवेषु मर्त्येषु मनोरमेषु शक्रेषु ब्रह्मेश्वर्य चक्रवर्तिषु ॥

"After hearing me, each according to his faculty, the several beings find their determined place in various situations, amongst gods, men, beautiful beings, amongst Indras, Brahmas, the monarchs or rulers of the universe."

चन्द्रसूर्यप्रभा यद्विपतन्ति समं नृषु ।
 गुणवत्स्वथ पापेषु प्रभाया नोनपूर्णता ॥
 तथागतस्य प्रज्ञा च भासदादित्यचन्द्रवत् ।
 सर्वसत्त्वान्विनयते न चोना नैव चाधिका ॥

"As the rays of the sun and the moon descend alike on all men, good or bad, without deficiency in one case or surplus in the other ; so the wisdom of the Tathāgata shines like the sun and the moon, leading all beings without partiality."

Such is the view of Buddha-kāya in this school ; I shall now proceed to examine the theory of the Avatamsaka school.

CHAPTER IX.

THE AVATAMSAKA SCHOOL.¹

*The Dharmatoka-Phenomenology.*²

The Madhyamika, Yogācāra and other Mahāyāna schools do not go beyond the explanation of the relation between phenomena and the noumenon, and consequently do not undertake to discuss the *relation between one phenomenon and another*. The Avatamsaka school deals with this latter subject. This school marks the final development of the Buddhist philosophy. The Tien Tai and the Avatamsaka schools are regarded as the two most beautiful flowers in the garden of the Buddhistic thought. One is called the orchid in the spring and the other the chrysanthemum in the autumn ; that is to say, they are the last and also the best products of Buddhist thought. It is the doctrines of these two systems, that the Chinese schools, viz : the *Mantra*, the *Dhyāna*, and the *Sukhādevīvyūha*, as well as the Japanese *Nichiren* school sought to realize by experiment and practice.

Both the Tien Tai and the Avatamsaka schools arose and developed in China where Buddhism found the most congenial soil next to that in the land of its origin, as China was already of a rationalistic temperament. The Tien Tai school, as I have already said, developed from the doctrine of *Madhyamikavāda*, the development taking place in Southern China. The Avatamsaka sprang up in the North of China as a descendant of the Yogācāra school ; it claims to have been founded by the great Aśvaghosha himself ; and they call him its first patriarch and Nāgārjuna the second ; the third patriarch, according to it, is Tu-Pā-shun ;³ as a matter of fact, he is the real founder of this school. He was born in the reign of the Chao dynasty which ruled over China between 557 and 589 A. D., and was a contemporary of Chih-che-ta-shih who founded the

¹ Chinese : Hwa-yen-tsueh. Japanese : Ke-yon-shū.

² Japanese : Hokke-yengi-ron.

³ Japanese : Hō-jūn.

Tendai school. He wrote two famous treatises embodying his theory, namely the "*Go-kiô-shi-kwan*" or "The Theoretical and Practical sides of the Five Doctrines," and, "The Theory of the Dharma-loka" (Hokkai-kwan-mon).¹ The theory of this school was perfected by Fâ-tsan² who was given the posthumous title of Hhien-shen-tâ-shih.³

This school derives its name from the "*Buddhâratamsaka-mahâvaipulyâ-*

The origin of this *sûtra*,"⁴ which is the canon of this school. This school.

sûtra is ascribed to the Buddha himself; tradition says that it was preached by the Tathâgata as soon as he obtained Buddhahood at Gaya, and that the Buddha expressed thereby the highest truth realized by him. The Tathâgata is said to have declared: "Alas! Alas! All living beings do not know or see, on account of their ignorance, the fact that they possess the same wisdom and virtues as the Tathâgatas. I will show them the 'Holy Path' which shall enable them to become entirely free from false notions and attachment, and shall make them realise that they possess in themselves the boundless wisdom which is, by no means, different from that of the Buddhas."

It is also said that most of the audience found it too difficult to follow

The position of this *sûtra* among the Buddhist canons.

him at the time; and, therefore, they behaved like the deaf and dumb. This period is called the 'Dawn' in Buddhism.

The Avatamsaka school, calls this *sûtra* as the '*Mûlâdharma-cakra*' or the "Root Doctrine of Buddhism," and the other *sûtras*, with the exception of the *Suddharmopundarîka*, as the "Branch Doctrines" (*Śâkhâ-dharma-cakra*). *Suddharmopundarîka*, according to this school, is one "from the branches to the root". The three are called the *Tri-dharmacakra*.

Fâ-tsan divided the Buddhist canons into five classes, viz: (1) the

The classification of the canons.

Hindâyâna, (2) the *primary* doctrine of the *Mahâyâna*, (3) the *later* doctrine of the *Mahâyâna*, (4) the doctrine of the *Dhyâna* or Contemplative School and (5) the *perfected Mahâyâna*, that is the doctrine of his own school.

¹ Nanjô's Cat. No. 1596.

² Japanese: *Kenjû-Daishi*.

³ Japanese: *Hô-shô*.

⁴ Nanjô's Cat. No. 87.

With the first we are already familiar. 'The Primary doctrine of the Mahāyāna' indicates the Madhyamika-vāda and the Vijñānavāda. It is also called 'partially developed Mahāyanism'. The 'Later doctrine of the Mahāyāna' is the name given to Aśvagosha's philosophy of Suchness and the Tien Tai doctrine of Identity. 'Dhyāna doctrine' is the theory of the Contemplative school which holds that contemplation is indispensable for the attainment of enlightenment. 'The Perfected Mahāyāna' is the epithet claimed for its own doctrine by the Avatamsaka school. The most notable feature of this theory is that it explains the *relation between one phenomenon and another*. The distinction is made, as has already been pointed out, with a view to give the highest place to their own Avatamsaka school. We may not accept the distinction, but it is nevertheless true that the Tien Tai and this school represent "fully developed Mahāyanism". In his treatise, Fātsan discusses these 'five kinds of the Buddhist Doctrines.'

He subdivides the Five Doctrines into 'Ten Schools', six of which are Hīnayanistic. Before proceeding to discuss the main theory of the Dharma-loka-Phenomenology, it is necessary to notice briefly these Ten Schools, as they form an introduction to the Theory of the Avatamsakas. (1) First of these is that of the *Vātsīputriyas* who maintain a permanent existence of *ātman* of persons and things, *pudgalātman* and *dharmātman*.¹ (2) The second propounds the existence of the mental and material things in the noumenal state, and denies the existence of the *ātman* of persons. The Sarvāstivādins represent this view.² (3) The third theory denies the permanent existence of the ego-soul and maintains the Śūnyatā of the noumenal state of dharmas both in the past and future.³ The Mahāsaṅghikas uphold this theory. According to them, things, as they appear to our senses, exist only in the present, that is, as long as they are present before our senses, and that they are void in the past and future, because the dharmas do not manifest their respective operations except in the present. (4) The next one rejects the existence of conventional dharmas even in the present. It explains that there

¹ Japanese: The *ga-ho-ku-u shū*.

² Japanese: The *hō-u-ga-mu-shū*.

³ Japanese: The *hō-ma-kyō-rai-shū*.

are two kinds of dharmas, conventional and transcendental, out of which the real dharmas alone exist in the present and in the present only. The advocates of this theory are the Prajñaptivādins.¹ (5) The fifth theory insists upon the real existence of dharmas in the transcendental state only, while, it denies all existence of things in the conventional state. The Lokottaravādins support this theory.² (6) The sixth denies all real existence of dharmas both in the conventional and transcendental states. According to it, things are only words and names. The Susukhavādivyavahārika school believes in this speculation.³ The above six theories belong to the Hīnayāna, the next four to the Mahāyāna. (7) The theory of the Madhyamikāvādins or the Śūnyavāda which I have already explained is the first of them.⁴ (8) The next one accepts reality or Suchness but denies the permanent existence of phenomenal things. This is the doctrine of the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra and the Awakening of Faith.⁵ (9) The Ninth theory is one which declares that Suchness is beyond description and perception. This is the doctrine of the Vimālakīrti-sūtra.⁶ (10) The last is the theory of the Avatamsaka School itself which we shall now discuss in detail.⁷

THE THEORY OF THE DHARMA-LOKA PHENOMENOLOGY.

According to this school, the universe is the manifestation of the One Great Spirit, the corresponding sanskrit expression being "*ekacittāntar-gata-dharma-loka*," which literally means the "One Mind in which is included the whole of the universe". This One Mind is not finite or relative, it is, on the contrary, infinite and absolute. The relation between the One Mind and the universe is described as the reflection of the moon and stars in the ocean; we see the objective

The universe is included in one mind.

¹ Japanese: The *gen-tai-ke-jitsu-shū*.

² Japanese: The *zoku-mō-shin-jiten-shū*.

³ Japanese: The *sho-ho-tan-myō-shū*.

⁴ Japanese: The *shū-hō-kai-kā-shū*.

⁵ Japanese: The *shin-toku-fu-shin-shū*.

⁶ Japanese: The *shō-shō-gu-zetsu-shū*.

⁷ Japanese: The *gen-myō-gu-toku-shū*.

universe as a reflection of that infinite and absolute Mind. The One Mind is also called the Dharma-kāya, which, philosophically speaking, implies Reality. Viewed in the religious aspect of Buddhism, it is the object of belief ; but here, we are only concerned with its philosophical aspect.

The activity of this great Mind has four aspects (Catur-dharma-lokas).

(1) *The Dharma-loka considered from the phenomenal stand point:—*¹

Explanation of the dharma-loka from the stand point of phenomena.

The phenomenal *Dharma-loka* means the objective world. The theory of this school on this subject promulgates that all things that exist are separate and distinct, they are subject to the law of individuation and, therefore, to that of limitation. They exist in time and space and move according to the law of causation, both physically and morally. Thus there is a distinction between the mineral kingdom and the vegetable kingdom, between man and any other animal ; and every distinct individual, in his distinct capacity, has to perform his moral as well as his physical duty. Thus, there are marked distinctions between the ruler and the ruled, the parent and the child, man and woman, old and young etc., etc., and each one must perform his own respective duties. By a recognition of this distinction, we shall be able to observe the true social order.

(2) *The Dharma-loka considered from the noumenal stand point:—*² This

Explanation of the dharma-loka from the standpoint of noumenon.

is the *analytical* view of the activity of the Dharma-loka which regards all things in the objective world as one. The Nyagrodha tree and the Bodhi tree are one as belonging to the vegetable kingdom ; again the tree, the dog and the man are one as belonging to the kingdom of living beings. In this way, we ultimately arrive at the one and same thing which comprises all things, apparently diverse. This ultimate being, by the way, is considered all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-loving ; as a matter of fact, it is the life-spirit, the noumenon. This idea is expressed by the Buddhist maxim : "Heaven and earth have the same source and all is one".

¹ Jap: Ji-hok-kai.

² Jap: Ri-hok-kai.

(3) *The Dharma-loka considered from the stand point of identity between noumenon and phenomenon*¹:—There is again another aspect of Dharma-loka according to which noumenon and phenomenon are found to be in absolute harmony with each other. A thorough knowledge of the principle of the 'oneness of all things' naturally leads us to the idea or the law of "one is many and many is one". In other words, things (phenomena) of the universe do not exist apart from their reality (noumenon) and *vice-versa*. For instance, the idea of waves in the ocean cannot be produced without the idea of water in it, nor can the idea of water be formed without an idea of the waves. The harmony between noumenon and phenomenon is so strong that it is impossible to separate the one from the other. Or technically speaking, noumenon is the substratum of phenomenon, while the latter is the attribute of the former.

Here, Buddhism recognises the existence and identity of the two principles, sameness (*samata*) and difference (*nânâtva*). Things are many and yet one; they are one and yet many. I am not 'thou' and thou art not 'I'; and yet we are all one in essence. While, therefore, we have to acknowledge a world of particulars in which individuality predominates, we must not forget that, looking through the gates of sameness, all distinctions and contradictions vanish in a higher principle of unity.

A Japanese poet sings:—

Rain and hail and ice and snow,
Neither like the other lo!
When they melt, however, lo!
See one stream of water flow!

(4) *The Dharma-loka considered from the stand point of identity of one phenomenon and another*²:—We come now to the fourth aspect of the world or *Dharma-loka* where the concord or harmony between all phenomena is found. The discussion of this subject belongs entirely to the Avatamsaka School. For, the Tien Tai and other schools could not go beyond the doctrine of the concord between noumenon (reality) and phenomenon. When the law,

The question of relationship between one phenomenon and another solved.

¹ Japanese: *Ji-ri-muge-hokkai*.

² Japanese: *Ji-ji-muge-hokkai*.

"one is many and the many is one" is recognised, the question "what is the relation of many to many, or things to things" should naturally suggest itself. The Avatamsaka School maintains that all phenomena, being only the manifestations of the Original Reason, Reality, Noumenon or Spirit of Life, are inseparably connected among themselves, and are in harmony with one another like the different waves of the ocean which are only manifestations of the same water. The axiom that "if A is equal to C and B is also equal to C, then A is equal to B", may be applied in the present case. For A (one wave)=C (water); B (another wave)=C (water); therefore A (one wave)=B (another wave.)

From the religious point of view, as Dogenzenzi says, every thing in the universe, be it the earth itself, or a form of vegetation, or a fence-post, or a piece of brick, performs the work of Buddha. Inspired by the spiritual influence of the Buddhas, even inanimate things lead us to the state of enlightenment. This doctrine of the equality amongst things, animate and inanimate, is the view of the 'fully developed Mahāyānism'.

I would like to tell you something of the famous maxims of this school as related to the theory of the *Dharmaloka phenomenology*.

'All is correlative'. As all things in the universe are manifestations of the Great Truth, Suchness or Tathatā, we must recognise even in an insignificant blade of grass the light of that Truth. But all phenomena, which are endowed with that light, do not exist independent of one another. *They are correlative*. We have a book on the table, which again rests on the floor. The contact between the three is due to the law of gravitation. We can easily separate the table or the book from one another. Such an action would affect gravitation that connects the whole universe. The harmony in the phenomenal world is expressed by the maxim, "all is correlative".

'All is one'. Herbs, birds, wheat, and men appear different to our senses, but in their essential nature they are the same. The law of the "oneness of all," medicine,² meat and bread nourish man's body, because, in their nature, they have something common. This sameness can be distinguished throughout the objective world; the reason, of course

for this, being that they are manifestations of the same Truth.

This *Oneness* in nature is expressed by Yōka-daishi
Saying of Yōkudaishi.
in these lines :—

"The nature of the One is common to that of all things,

"In one *dharma* are included all the *dharman* without exception.

"The one moon is reflected universally on all waters,

"All the water-moons are included in the one moon.

"The *Dharma-kāya* of *Tathāgatas* is enveloped in our nature,

"Our nature is identical with that of *Tathāgata*."

These "laws of correlativity and oneness" are said to be true of the world
The six characteristics. of *Sattvas* which includes not only the living beings
but also the inanimate things. The *Sattvas* have six kinds of characteristics.
They are :—

- (1) General characteristic or the characteristic of unity.
- (2) Special characteristic.
- (3) Similar characteristic or the characteristic of harmony.
- (4) Different characteristic.
- (5) Formative characteristic.
- and (6) Self-preserving characteristic.

(1) *Characteristic of Unity* means that many are in one. For instance, the house is made up of the union of the constituent materials, e. g. walls, pillars etc.

(2) *Special characteristic* means that many things have not the same qualities. In the case of a house, for instance, the quality of the wall is different from that of the pillar or of the beam.

(3) *The characteristic of harmony* gives symmetry to the functions of the different members of unity, e. g. the pillars, walls etc., perform their functions harmoniously in a building.

(4) Yet they have their different functions, which are called *differential characteristics*, e. g. erection, covering etc.

(5) *The formative characteristic* means a power which is able to combine many conditions. As for instance, the formation of a house which depends

on many conditions e. g. wall, pillar and beam etc., is due to the power of formative characteristics of them.

(6) *Self preserving characteristic* means that the things do not trespass into one another's function, but keep to their own respective duties. Walls, pillars and beam, etc., each performs its own special task, though they form a house in common.

Among these six characteristics, the first and the second, the third and the fourth, the fifth and the sixth are counterparts of each other. The first one of each group belongs to the gate of Sameness or *Samatā*, and the last ones to the gate of difference or *Nādvā*. These two gates occupy a paramount place in Mahāyana Buddhism. Therefore, the Buddhists declare that no philosophy or religion is satisfactory which does not recognise these two gates.

The six-fold Characteristics of Being.	{	First Counterparts ...	(1) Characteristic of Unity.
			(2) Characteristic of diversity.
	{	Second Counterparts...	(3) Harmonious Characteristic.
			(4) Differential Characteristic.
	{	Third Counterparts ...	(5) Formative Characteristic.
			(6) Self-preserving Characteristic.

We must not forget, as I have already pointed out, that these two gates are inseparably connected, and not isolated. We find, therefore, very frequently a favourite saying in Buddhist works which declares that sameness without difference is sameness wrongly conceived, while difference without sameness is an equally erroneous conception. The view of Buddhakāya and Nirvāṇa and of human life, in this school, is established on the basis of the above dogma.

From the religious point of view, the gate of sameness may be considered to correspond to Dharma-kāya or God, and the gate of difference to the world of individual existence. In accordance with Christian terminology, it becomes, 'God not in the world is a false God and the world not in God is unreality'. All things return to One, and the One operates in all things;

many in One and One in many; this is the "Fully Developed Mahāyanistic" conception of Buddha-kāya or God and the world or Loka.

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THE CONCEPTION OF BUDDHA-KAYA IN THIS SCHOOL.

According to the Avatamsaka school, "Buddha is truth and truth is Buddha"; there is no truth, therefore, separated from Truth is Buddha and Buddha is truth. Buddha and also no Buddha apart from truth. "Truth is uncreated," says St. Augustine, "it is immutable, eternal, above all things, it is true by itself. It makes creatures more perfect; and all spirits naturally endeavour to know it. Nothing but to have God can have the perfection of truth; therefore, truth is God."

This truth, according to Mahāyāna Buddhism, is the Spirit of Infinite Nature is preaching the great gospel of Tathāgata. Life which animates all; it vivifies all; it manifests itself in and through all. Every flower that blooms by the wayside, springs up, grows, fades according to the unchangeable law of Truth. Every star that twinkles above our heads, shines, falls, decays, according to the immutable law of Truth. The universe, therefore, is the purple temple of Buddha, and nature is his great gospel. Thus we read in a *sūtra* of the Mahāyāna text —

"In all beings there abideth the Dharma-kāya;
With all virtues dissolved in it, it liveth in eternal calmness.
It knoweth not birth nor death, coming nor going;
Not one, not two, not being, not becoming;
Yet present everywhere in worlds of beings;
This is what is perceived by all Tathāgatas.
All virtues, material and immaterial,
Dependent on the Dharma-kāya, are eternally pure in it.

Dharma-kāya is, then, the life of all. When we realise this belief, nature becomes a continuous action of the Divinity in the world, and in the sons of men. When our faith in this is full and perfect, we find the eternal in the mortal, the infinite in the finite; and we read the great teaching in nature. Thus we are taught by Buddha in the canon of the Sukhavāti-vyūha school as follows :—

पुनरपरं शारिपुत्र तत्र बुद्धचेत्रे संति हंसाः क्रौञ्चा मयूराश्च । ते त्रिष्कृत्वो
रात्रौ त्रिष्कृत्वो दिवसस्य संनिपत्य संगीतिं कुर्वन्ति स्म स्वकस्वकानि च कृतानि
प्रव्याहरन्ति । तेषां प्रव्याहरतामिन्द्रियबलबोध्दंगशब्दो निश्चरति । तत्र तेषां
मनुष्याणां तं शब्दं श्रुत्वा बुद्धमनसिकार उत्पद्यते धर्ममनसिकार उत्पद्यते
संघमनसिकार उत्पद्यते ॥

“And again, O Śāriputra, there are in that Buddha country swans, curlews, and peacocks. Three times every night, and three times every day, they come together and perform a concert, each uttering his own note. And from them thus uttering proceeds a sound proclaiming the five virtues, the five powers, and the seven steps leading towards the highest knowledge. When men there hear that sound, remembrance of Buddha, remembrance of the Law, remembrance of the Church, rises in their mind.”

पुनरपरं शारिपुत्र तत्र बुद्धचेत्रे तासां च तालपंक्तीनां तेषां च किंकिणीजालानां
वातेरितानां वल्गुर्मनोज्ञः शब्दो निश्चरति । तद्यथापि नाम शारिपुत्र कोटिशत-
सहस्रांगिकस्य दिव्यस्य तूर्यस्यचार्यैः संप्रवादितस्य वल्गुर्मनोज्ञः शब्दो निश्चरति
एवमेव शारिपुत्र तासां च तालपंक्तीनां तेषां च किंकिणीजालानां वातेरितानां
वल्गुर्मनोज्ञः शब्दो निश्चरति । तत्र तेषां मनुष्याणां तं शब्दं श्रुत्वा बुद्धानुस्मृतिः काये
संतिष्ठति धर्मानुस्मृतिः काये संतिष्ठति संघानुस्मृतिः काये संतिष्ठति एवं
रूपैः शारिपुत्र बुद्धचेत्रगुणव्यूहैः समलंकृतं तद्बुद्धचेत्रम् ॥

“And again, O Śāriputra, when these rows of palmtrees and strings of bells in that Buddha Country are moved by the wind, a sweet and enrap-
turing sound proceeds from them. Yes, O Śāriputra, as from a heavenly

musical instruments consisting of a hundred thousand *koṭis* of sounds, when played by Āryas, a sweet and enrapturing sound proceeds, in the same manner, a sweet and enrapturing sound proceeds from those rows of palmtrees and strings of bells moved by the wind. And when the men hear that sound, reflection on Buddha arises in them, reflection on the law, reflection on the Church. With such arrays of excellences etc."

But, we may ask, where is the Buddha Country situated? Does it mean the heaven or the pure western land. According to this school, it means not only the heaven or the pure western land, but there is hardly any place in the universe which is not known as the Buddha Country; in other words all places in the East, West, South and North, go by the name of the Buddha-kshetra, because Buddha is to be found everywhere.

This view is fully explained in the "Mahā-Vaipulya-Buddha-Avatamsaka-Sūtra" which is the authoritative canon of this school.

It is, however, not easy for the student to go through this voluminous work consisting, as it is, of sixty (old translation) or eighty (new translation) fasciuli. It has, therefore, been the practice to explain the Sūtra itself *viz*, Mahāvaiipulya-Buddhāvatamsaka-Sūtra so that its purport may be understood by all. I shall also adopt this method of explanation of the view of Buddha-kāya in this school.

Mahā means "great"; philosophically speaking, it means, infinite, boundless, all-pervading, spreading its force everywhere.

Vaipulya means etymologically "spaciousness." Spaciousness means "limitless extension"; it signifies again that everything is included in *It*. That is to say, man lives and moves and has his being in it, Sun and Moon shine, stars glitter, birds sing, flowers blossom, and waters run in *It*.

Buddha means "the enlightened one," and *mahā* and *vaipulya* are epithets used to describe his qualities and virtues. In other words, He (Buddha) is infinite, all-pervading, omnipresent and omnipotent. He is the Spirit of Infinite Life, He fills all the universe with himself alone, so that all is from Him and in Him, and there is nothing that is outside of Him. We have received, we are receiving, and we will receive our life from Him.

We partake of the life of Buddha ; and in essence the life of Buddha and that of ours are identically the same and so are one, though we differ from Him in that we are individualized spirits, while He is the Infinite Spirit including as well as all else beside.

'*Avatamsaka*' means "ornament." This is used to bring out the innumerable qualities and virtues which adore Buddha as ornaments.

The following few verses contain a beautiful description of the Characteristics of Buddha which have been stated above :

In all the worlds over the ten quarters,
O ye, sentient creatures living there,
Behold the most venerable of men and gods.
Whose spiritual Dharmabody is immaculate and pure.

As through the power of one mind.
A host of thought is evolved :
So from one Dharmabody of Tathāgata,
Are produced all the Buddhabodies.

In Bodhi nothing dual there existed,
• Nor is any thought of self present :
The Dharmabody, undefiled and nondual,
In its full splendor manifesteth itself everywhere.

Its ultimate reality is like unto the vastness of space ;
Its manifested forms are like unto magic shows ;
Its virtues excellent are inexhaustible,
This, indeed, the spiritual state of Buddhas only.

All the Buddhas of the present, past and future,
Each one of them is an issue of the Dharmabody immaculate
and pure ;

Responding to the needs of sentient creatures,
They manifest themselves everywhere, assuming corporeality
which is beautiful.

They never made the premeditation,
That they would manifest in such and such forms.

Separated are they from all desire and anxiety,
And free and self-acting are their responses.

They do not negate the phenomenality of *dharma*s,
Nor do they affirm the world of individuals ;
But manifesting themselves in all forms,
They teach and convert all sentient creatures.

The Dharmabody is not changeable,
Neither is it unchangeable ;
All Dharma's (in essence) are without change,
But manifestations are changeable.

The Sambodhi knoweth no bounds,
Extending as far as the limits of the Dharma-loka itself ;
Its depths are bottomless, and its extent limitless ;
Words and speeches are powerless to describe it.

Of all the ways that lead to enlightenment
The Tathāgata knoweth the true significance ;
Wandering freely all over the worlds,
Obstacles he encountereth nowhere.¹

¹ The Avatamsaka-sūtra, fasc. XIV. (Mr. Suzuki's "Outlines of Mahāyana Buddhism," pp. 376—377).

CHAPTER X.

CONCLUSION.

I have already explained, in outline, the philosophical or theoretical side of Buddhism in my previous lectures ; but Buddhism in itself is not a philosophical system, although it is the most rational and intellectual religion in the world. It seeks to establish on a firm foundation the deepest instincts of our spiritual life and to formulate a doctrine which may lead its followers to Nirvâṇa, the highest aim of human existence. According to it, the possession of a calm and resigned spirit in our every day struggle for existence is an important factor, and this spirit may only be attained by the realisation of a religious life.

We must not, however, suppose that the religious life or the attainment of Deva, Allah or God can be consummated by forsaking God in us and we in God. ing the world, where we are doomed to struggle for existence. We must be able to find paradise here, because God, according to the proclamation of the Buddha, is immanent in the universe, and not transcendent. Or more properly speaking, "God in us and we in God" must be the fundamental doctrine upon which should rest the entire fabric of every religion, be it Hinduism or Islamism, Christianity or Buddhism.

Philosophy, or Science is necessary for the satisfaction of our intellectual appetite ; art and music are welcome for the gratification of our emotional desires ; and ethics or morality is indispensable for the necessities of our devotional existence. But there must be something all pervading like ether, to harmonise the activity of all the departments of our mind, consciously and unconsciously. This is religion ; at least, Buddhism is able to supply the requirements of the practical life of human beings. What, then, is the entrance to Buddhism ?

"Faith is the entrance to the ocean of the laws of the Buddha," says the great Nāgārjuna in his famous commentary on the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra, "and knowledge is the ship on which one can sail in it."

By faith is generally meant trust—trust is something external to our self.

The Buddhist idea of faith.

When religion is defined as a faith, it is considered to imply trust or belief in the existence of a Being or

Power which has created this world and presides over it, directs its course and shapes its destiny. For this reason, religion has come to be identified with a belief in some external or extramundane object, particularly by some occidental scholars. But the Buddhist faith does not identify itself with this conception of religion, for it rejects the existence of a personal God, as He is ordinarily understood by other religionists. What, then, is the idea of faith entertained by Buddhism ?

Asanga says in one of his illustrious works :—

यथास्त्वं सर्वगतं सदा मतं तथैव तत्सर्वगतं सदा मतम् ।

यथास्त्वं रूपगणेषु सर्वगं तथैव तत्सर्वगणेषु सर्वगम् ॥

यथोदभाजने भिन्ने चन्द्रबिम्बं न दृश्यते ।

तथा दुष्टेषु सत्त्वेषु बुद्धबिम्बं न दृश्यते ॥¹

i.e. "As ether is all-pervading, so also is Buddha all-pervading ; as ether is all-pervading in the material world, so also is Buddha all-pervading in the world of living beings."

i.e. "The reflection (or image) of the moon cannot be seen in a broken water-vessel ; so also the reflection (or image) of Buddha cannot be seen in spoiled mind."

But the following Chinese gāthā may serve better to illustrate the Buddhist conception of faith than the above kārīkas :—

"The Buddha-Body fills the world,
Being immanent universally in all things ;
It will make itself manifest wherever and
whenever conditions are matured,
Though it never leaves this Seat of Bodhi."

The Buddha-Body or in Sanskrit *Buddha-kāya* is the reason, life, and norm of all particular existences. It is also very often termed *Dharma-kāya*

¹ "Mahāyāna sūtrāṅkārā", Chap. ix. verse 15 and 16 (Sylvain Levi's Sanskrit Text.) Chinese version, Chap. x. Kārīka 13 and 14.

in Buddhist philosophy, the development of whose most concrete conception culminates in the *Buddha, Tathāgata Vairocana*, or *Amitābha*. *Buddha* means "enlightened," and this may be understood to correspond to "God is Wisdom". *Vairocana* is "coming from the sun", and *Amitābha*, "infinite light" which reminds us of the Christian conception, "God is Light".

In the first line of the above Chinese gāthā, the principle of "All is one" or "Unity in variety", is declared; the second line expresses the principle of "diversity" or "variety in unity"; the third and fourth teach the doctrine "All things move and work". These three principles constitute the fundamental faith of Buddhism. The same sentiments are manifested in the "*Mahāyāna-mūlajāta-hṛdaya-bhūmi-dhyāna sūtra*"¹.

"In all beings there abideth the *Dharma-kāya*;
With all virtues dissolved in it, it liveth in eternal calmness.
It knoweth not birth, nor death, coming nor going;
Not one, not two; not being, not becoming;
Yet present everywhere in worlds of beings;
This is what is perceived by all *Tathāgatas*.
All virtues, material and immaterial,
Dependent on the *Dharma-kāya* are eternally pure in it."

But how can we, it may be asked, perceive the *Buddha-body* or *Dharma-kāya* in its manifold activities and recognise it in the diversity of desires, feelings, passions, instincts, motives and sentiments? Mere intellect cannot give us the necessary power; we must have recourse to the practice of *Dhyāna* and morality; for *Śīla* or moral precepts, *Dhyāna* or contemplation and *Prajñā* or wisdom are regarded as the indispensable tripod for the realisation of the Buddhist life; be they *Hīnayānists*, the followers of the Lesser Vehicle, or *Mahāyānists*, the followers of the Greater.

Briefly speaking, to be a good Buddhist, a man must be ethical, and must regulate his life by moral precepts. Next, he must be his own master. He ought to be able to examine the inner state of his own life and direct his thoughts and desires in order to fulfil a rational existence. *Dhyāna* or

The indispensable tripod for the realisation of the Buddhist life.

¹ Nanjio's Cat. No. 955.

contemplation is the only way by which one may attain this mastery over oneself, an insight capable of discerning the indwelling reason of things. This insight is technically called *Prajñā* or 'wisdom'. We shall now proceed to explain the moral precepts of Buddhism.

"Hak-Rak-Ten,"¹ a famous Chinese poet, author and statesman, who lived in the thirteenth century of the Christian era, once went to see an eminent Buddhist priest whose saintly life was known far and wide, and asked him if he would instruct him in the essentials of the Buddhist doctrine. The saint assented and recited the following gāthā:—

A story of Hak-Rak-Ten.

"Commit no wrong, but good deeds do,
And let thy heart be pure,
All Buddhas teach this truth,
Which will for aye endure."²

The poet-statesman was not at all satisfied with this simple moral teaching, for he expected to have something abstruse, recondite, and highly philosophical from the mouth of such an eminent and virtuous personality. So said the poet "Every child of three summers is familiar with this Buddhist injunction. What I wish to learn from you is the highest and most fundamental teaching of your faith." But the monk retorted, "Every child of three summers may know of this gāthā, but even a silvery haired man of eighty years old fails to put it into practice." Thereupon, it is said, the poet bowed reverentially and went home meditatively.³

No doubt, the gāthā recited by the saint is the most important factor in Buddhist ethics, for Buddhism is, from beginning to end, a religion,

¹ Chinese: *Pai Lu-Tien*.

² The Pāli verse runs as follows:—

Sabbapāpassa akaranam,
Kusalassa upasampadā |
Sacittipariyodapanam : etam
Buddhāna āsannam ||

³ "Sermons of a Buddhist Abbot", (Soyen Shaku) pp. 69-70.

and is most practical in its announcement of what constitutes goodness.

The negative side of
the Buddhist Ethics.

It dogmatically and concretely points out what is good and what is evil. First come the ten moral precepts, the fundamental abstentions from evil. They are :—

- (1) Not to kill any living being ;
- (2) Not to take anything that does not belong to oneself ;
- (3) Not to look at the other sex with an unclean heart ;
- (4) Not to speak falsehood ;
- (5) Not to calumniate ;
- (6) Not to use vile language ;
- (7) Not to make sensational utterances ;
- (8) Not to be greedy ;
- (9) Not to be out of temper ;
- (10) Not to be confused by false doctrines.

These represent the negative side of Buddhist ethics, while the six

The positive side of
the Buddhist Ethics.

pāramitās or virtues of perfection and the Eight-fold Noble Paths represent the positive side of it.

The six *Pāramitās* or virtues of perfection are :

- (1) *Dāna* or Charity ;
- (2) *Śīla* or morality (*i.e.* the observation of the moral precepts as formulated by Buddha) ;
- (3) *Kṣhānti* or humility ;
- (4) *Vīrya* or strenuousness ;
- (5) *Dhyāna* or contemplation ;
- (6) *Prajñā* or spiritual enlightenment.

The Eight-fold Noble Paths need not be repeated here, as I have already explained them in my earlier lecture on the Sarvāstivādin School.

These several precepts are summed up under the following three general headings :—

- (1) To cease from wrong doing ;
- (2) To promote goodness (in oneself) ; and
- (3) To enlighten the ignorant.

The first two, comparatively speaking, show the way of serving oneself, while the last is exclusively intended to serve others. Altruistic side of the Buddhist Ethics. We shall now learn how we shall be able to serve others. Dogen-zenji says:—

“There are four ways of serving others: (1) Charity; (2) Loving words; (3) Beneficial deeds; (4) Sharing with others.”

“(1) By *Charity* is meant “not coveting.” Cast not a glance at the smallness of your gift—a verse, even a phrase extracted from the Buddha’s teachings, may be the planting of a seed of goodness not only in this life but in the next. Only let there be no thought of reward in helping others. Not only is the building of a bridge or the provision of a ferry boat a work of charity, but all methods of benefiting life or mankind are classed as such.

“(2) By *Loving words* we mean kind speech to all sentient beings, who should universally be regarded with loving kindness, praise for those who are virtuous and pity for those who are deficient in virtue. Loving words gain the hearts of enemies and keep the virtuous peacefully together. Let us learn that ‘loving words’ have the power to make the heavens[”] revolve.

“(3) By *Beneficial deeds* we mean actions contrived to benefit others, be the recipients noble or humble—a helpless tortoise, a sick sparrow—without any thought of reward for such actions. The ignorant may say, ‘Others may be benefited by a man’s action, but what benefit does he himself derive from it.’ They are wrong. Beneficial deeds benefit equally and impartially the giver and the recipient.

“(4) *Sharing with others* implies non-contradiction. The human Tathāgata appeared among human beings, and shared his fate with men. There is this spiritual law, that “when otherness is identified with selfness, selfness in turn becomes identified with otherness”.

Refrain from doing wrong, which is against the reason of things; do whatever is good, which advances the course of reason in this life: and help those who are backward and weary in realising enlightenment: Here is Buddhism in a nutshell; it has nothing to do with prayer and

worship and singing or anything of the kind. Our simple everyday life of love and sympathy is all that is needed to be a good Buddhist. There is nothing mysterious, nothing superstitious, nothing supernatural.

अस्माकमनुकम्पार्थं परिभुक्ता विनायक ।

वयं च सर्वसत्त्वाय अग्रां बोधिं स्पृशेमहि ॥

THE END.

MEMORANDUM

TO : THE PRESIDENT
FROM : THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
SUBJECT: [Illegible]

[Illegible text block]


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APPENDIX.

THE SIX KINDS OF CAUSES AND THE FIVE KINDS OF EFFECTS.

The law of causation in the Sarvâsthitvavâda aims at explaining the relation between all 'dharma's,' mental or material. This law has to show the causal relation of the 'dharma's,' not only in (temporal) succession, but also in their (spacial) concomitance; so its scope is very vast. The cause, in the Buddhist sense, does not mean a motive power efficient to produce something absolutely new, but it is always co-relative to the effect. One cannot be explained without the other and *vice versa*—they being the different states of each other; so that if we take up some cause (a mental or material *dharma*) into our consideration, the notion of the effect also must be implied therewith. There are, according to this view, *six kinds of causes and five kinds of effects*. Their relation is represented as follows :—



Of the above relations, those between *Sahabhûhetu* and *Purushakâra-phalam* and *Samprayuktahetu* and *Purushakâra-phalam*, are the laws of

causation which indicate the spacial relations of all 'dharma's' mental and material; the relations between *Sabdhāgahetu* and *Nishyanda-phalam* and *Sarvatragahetu* and *Nishyanda-phalam* indicate a temporal connection; the pair of *Vipdka-hetu* and *Vipdka-phalam* represents a relation of succession by intervals; while the remaining one of *Kāranahetu* and *Adhipati-phalam* comprises this as well as that of immediate succession.

I. *Kāranahetu* and *Adhipati-phalam*.

The *Kāranahetu* is an auxiliary condition which does not directly make any disturbance in the causal nexus; [it is something like the 'colligation' dealt with in J. S. Mill's System of Logic;] the effect considered in its relation is called '*Adhipati-phalam*'. The scope of this cause is very vast, since all 'Sanskṛita' and 'Asanskṛita' *dharma's* may become '*Kāranahetus*'. This cause is of two classes: "positive" or "forceful" and "negative" or "forceless;" by the former is meant a condition that lends a positive, though indirect, influence for the becoming of the *dharma*, while the latter is a circumstance which, by the absence of a *dharma*, does not affect the becoming of the effect. To take an illustration, the mount Himalaya seems to be of no interest to us for the general occurrences of the world; but its existence or non-existence brings about a great change in the climatic condition of the world, and thereby exerts some indirect influence on our life. Mount Himalaya is here a positive *Kāranahetu* for us, and the change in our life is an *Adhipati-phalam* in relation to that. Again, in the case of a running ship, the absence of a sunken rock in her course is a 'negative' *Kāranahetu*; for, by its very absence, it does not create any disturbance for the safe voyage which is the '*Adhipati-phalam*.'

II. *Sahabhūhetu* and *Purushakāra-phalam*:

When two *dharma's* exist simultaneously as the cause and the effect in their spacial relation, that which plays the part of the cause is called '*Sahabhūhetu*', while the other is named the *Purusha-kāra-phalam*. The

term *Purushakāra* means 'working of a man'; here the term "*Purushakāra-phalam*" is taken in analogy to the working of a man that brings about the effect simultaneously with it.

III. *Sabhāgahetu and Nishyanda-phalam.*

This refers to the law of causation which is to be applied for explaining the temporal relation of all '*dharma*s' which are of the same kind or order. The two terms '*Sabhāga*' and '*Nishyanda*' go to imply that the cause and the effect are of the same class or order. To take an illustration, the human body, in spite of its change from day to day, and even from moment to moment, which it must undergo owing to the changes in the physical condition of the world, seems to remain the same; we do not perceive that there is a difference between our body of the morning and that of the evening. This is so because our body changes keeping its physical states all along in the same class or order. The changes are very minute and are of kinsfolk relation with one another; so that we, by ordinary understanding, are not conscious of them. Thus the relation of all things that are never at rest, but are in a state of continuous change, is to be explained by this law of causation, namely *Sabhāgahetu* and *Nishyanda-phalam*. To speak in Buddhist technical terms, mind, mental properties and matter at a certain moment, are '*Sabhāgahetus*', while those at the subsequent moment are the *Nishyanda phalam*s.

IV. *Samprayuktahetu and Purushakāra-phalam.*

This is the law of causation that explains the relation between mental operations only at a given moment. The term '*Samprayukta*' bears the sense of harmony; here it means a harmonious state of the mental properties tending to operate for a common object; there are five conditions for this state of harmony:—

- (a) The mental operations should depend on the same *Indriya*.
- (b) They should perceive the same object.
- (c) They should arise simultaneously.
- (d) They should adopt the same process.

- (e) Their respective substance (*dharma*) must be one and not more than one.

The harmonious operation of the mind and mental properties that satisfy these conditions perfectly well, is called the *Samprayuktahetu*, and the perception that is presented as the result of this harmonious action is the *Purushakāra-phalam*. A troop is formed with different kinds of forces, viz: infantry, artillery, engineers, transport soldiers, etc; all these are under the control of the same order: they associate with one another in their advance or retreat; they work with the same object in view; they eat the same food; and there is a certain limit in their respective number. With this order, they can attack and fight their enemy. The harmonious action of the different kinds of soldiers may be compared to the '*Samprayuktahetu*', and their victory to '*Purushakāra-phalam*'.

F. Sarvatragahetu and Nishyanda-phalam.

This is the law of causation that explains the relation between different kinds of '*kleśas*'. The '*kleśas*', as herebefore shown, are many in number; the fundamental ones are the following ten:—

- | | | | |
|--------------------------|-----|-----|--|
| (1) Lobha | ... | ... | Greed. |
| (2) Dvesha | ... | ... | Hatred. |
| (3) Mōha | ... | ... | Ignorance or folly. |
| (4) Māna | ... | ... | Self-conceit. |
| (5) Vicikitsā | ... | ... | Doubt. |
| (6) Kāyadrishṭi | ... | ... | Belief that the physical body is Ego. |
| (7) Anugrahadrishṭi | ... | ... | Learning about Eternalism or Nihilism of soul. |
| (8) Mithyādrishī | ... | ... | Erroneous view of the law of causation. |
| (9) Drishṭiparāmarsha | ... | ... | Adhering to one's own erroneous view. |
| (10) Śīlavrataparāmarsha | ... | ... | Attachment to extreme mortification or superstitious rites as means to the realisation of Nirvāṇa. |

These ten '*kleśas*' are the hindrances for the real observation of the '*Dokkhaṣatya*'; and seven of these—with the exception of '*Kāyadrishṭi*,

Anugrahadrishṭi and *Śīlavarataparāmarśha*—are obstacles for the real observation of *Samudayasatya*. Eleven out of the above-mentioned seventeen *kleśas* are very powerful. They are the five kinds of intellectual *kleśas* which are obstacles to *Duḥkhasatya*, two kinds of the same that stand against *Samudayasatya*, two kinds of *Môhas* or ignorance that are also hindrances for *Duḥkha* and *Samudayasatya* and the two '*Vicikitsā*' or doubts which also are obstacles for the same two *Satyas*. They are not only the hindrances for the real observation of the first two truths, but they may also be the causes of the other *kleśas*, namely, the intellectual and emotional '*kleśas*.' For this reason they are called '*Sarvatragahetu*', and the result which they produce is '*Nishyandaphalam*'.

VI. *Vipākahetu and Vipāka-phalam.*

This law of causation explains the relation between our *Karmas*, good or evil, and their fruits. It is the '*Karma*' from which we suffer pain or enjoy pleasure. The term '*Vipāka*' is here used to imply only that the mode of the effect is always different from that of its cause; that is to say, our conduct or *Karmas* are by nature good or evil, while their effects are pleasant or painful, and so are, in this sense, different. Our immoral conduct introduces us into the domains of pain, namely, the hell, the world of the devils and that of the animals; and the moral conduct leads to the pleasant worlds of the human beings and of the gods. Such a moral or immoral conduct is called *Vipākahetu*, and the pleasant or painful condition, as the effect, is the '*Vipāka-phalam*'. By this law of causation is exclusively explained a relation of succession of the cause and effect. By this the '*Karma*' in this life will receive its retribution in the next life, or in one more remote. The theory of transmigration and that of the twelve '*āśāḍhas*' in the Buddhist philosophy, has reference chiefly to this law.

VII. *Vinayogya-phalam.*

This effect does not come out directly from any of the six causes mentioned above. It is, on the other hand, the same as the eternal state of '*Nirvāṇa*' attainable by pure and undefiled knowledge. The eternal state of '*Nirvāṇa*' lies, for a time, bound up, as it were, by the rope of passions and covered with the clouds of delusion. This bondage is to be got rid of by


purest knowledge. The term '*Vimuktaya*' signifies freedom from bondage. Here, it must be borne in mind that '*Nirvāṇa*', or in the Sarvāstitvavādin's technology, '*Pratisamkhyā-nirvāṇa*,' is an eternal and independent existence, and is not produced by any cause. It is like Brahmahood, in Śāṅkara Vedāntin's conception, that is only a recovery and no acquisition—an attainment of a state that is already there in its pure and eternal existence, though under the bondage of illusion.

So much with regard to the law of causation in accordance with the doctrine of the Sarvāstitvavādins. Let us now take a different sort of classification of Causes in the Buddhistic philosophy. These are what are known as the four conditions or '*Chatuspratrayas*', viz :

- | | | | |
|-------------------------|-----|-----|------------------------------------|
| (1) Adhipatipratyaya | ... | ... | Additional cause. |
| (2) Ālambanapratyaya | ... | ... | Objective cause of mental process. |
| (3) Samanantarapratyaya | ... | ... | Immediate cause. |
| (4) Hetupratyaya | ... | ... | Direct cause. |

Of these four conditions, *Hetupratyaya* corresponds to five of the above-mentioned six causes, namely, *Sahabhāhetu*, *Samprayuktahetu*, *Sabhāgahetu*, *Sarvatragahetu* and *Vipākaketu*; while the other three are the same as the *Kāraṇahetu*, both positive and negative, as explained above. *Adhipatipratyaya* or additional cause is a cause which is invariably antecedent to the effect (and is not otherwise constituted). *Ālambanapratyaya* is an object of perception but for which no operation of the mind is possible. This object is an invariable condition of the mental process, though it is not the direct cause of it; hence it is taken up as a cause in the Buddhist epistemology. *Samanantarapratyaya* or immediate cause explains the relation between the state of mind and mental functions at a certain moment and that at a subsequent one. Psychologically speaking, our consciousness is a continuous stream flowing like the water of a river; when we consider a certain flow of consciousness as the cause of one of those in the subsequent moment, we call the former the *Samanantarapratyaya* or immediate cause. The *Samanantarapratyaya* and the *Ālambana* correspond exclusively to the positive '*Kāraṇahetu*'; while '*Adhipatipratyaya*' corresponds to both the '*Kāraṇahetus*', positive and negative. Let us draw a diagram to indicate, a little

more clearly, the relation of the six causes, four conditions and the five effects hitherto dealt with :—





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